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ARTICLES

THE SCIENCE WE ARE SEEKING*

RALPH MCINERNY

WHEN IN BOOK 3 of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* we come upon the phrase that supplies my title, *epizētoumenēn epistēmēn* (995a24), it does not yet have a haunting tone. Clearly Aristotle is engaged in an exceptionally long windup, but those who imagine that the methodology of the *Posterior Analytics* can be exemplified only in Euclidean discourse, and who thus have trouble with all the treatises, will already have thrown up their hands. Indeed, after the prolonged aporetic discussions of book 3 comes the firm statement at the opening of book 4: There is a science of being as being and of that which pertains to it *per se*.

This amounts to the declaration that the discourse in which we are engaged exemplifies the methodology of the *Analytics*, meaning it has a subject of which properties will be demonstrated by means of principles. Almost immediately qualifications of a massive sort have to be made, lest the enterprise fall afoul of Pierre Aubenque's *ur-aporia*:

Every science studies some genus.

Being is not a genus

There is no science of being as being.¹

* Presidential address to the Metaphysical Society of America, University of Notre Dame, March 12, 1993

¹ Cf. Pierre Aubenque's three propositions

- 1) Il y a une science de l'être en tant qu'être
- 2) Toute science porte sur un genre déterminé
- 3) L'être n'est pas un genre

Pierre Aubenque, *Le problème de l'être chez Aristote*, 2d ed (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1977), 222. Aubenque's actual claim, it will be seen, is that one cannot hold all three of these to be true simultaneously. The argument I have formulated is the relevant upshot of this impossibility.

But it is not simply that the way this science is a science keeps presenting difficulties. There are recurrent problems having to do with what functions as its subject. The phrase "the science we are seeking" begins to suggest that we are engaged in a quest whose aim is unclear. Like Aubenque, we may even come to think that the science we seek can never be found.

In what follows I wish to say a few things about how Thomas Aquinas saw the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle. Understanding Aristotle aright was a critical issue of his time, of course. The Latin West had become the sudden beneficiary not only of texts of Aristotle hitherto unavailable in Latin, but also of the Muslim and Neoplatonist commentators on Aristotle. It was Thomas's task to detach the real Aristotle from the accretions of these traditions, particularly from the Muslim commentators and most particularly from Averroes, whose status alters from the *commentator* par excellence to the *depravator* of Aristotle.²

Although Thomas exhibits a remarkable acquaintance with Aristotle from the very beginning of his career, his commentaries on or *expositiones* of Aristotle fall to his final years, the effort fueled by the controversies in Paris generated by what has been called Latin Averroism or heterodox Aristotelianism. By the time Thomas wrote his commentary on the *Metaphysics* he had several versions of the work available to him.³

A feature of a Thomistic commentary is its preface or *proemium*. Sometimes Thomas embeds his prefatory remarks within the commentary itself,⁴ sometimes it is a separate essay, sometimes it is both.⁵ The *proemium* to the commentary on the *Metaphysics* is a separate essay in

² See Ralph McInerny, *Thomas Aquinas Against the Averroists: On There Being Only One Intellect* (Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1993), 79.

³ Thomas used only Latin translations of Aristotle, Avicenna, Averroes, and the Neoplatonist commentators, but he was the beneficiary of the translating efforts of William of Moerbeke, his fellow Dominican who eventually became bishop of Corinth.

⁴ The commentary on the *De anima* is precipitated by what Thomas identifies as Aristotle's own preface or *proemium*, thus numbering the author among his commentators: "In tractatu autem de anima quem habemus pre manibus, primo ponit prohemium, in quo facit tria que necessaria sunt in quolibet prohemio", *Sententia super De anima*, in *Opera Omnia*, Leonine ed., vol. 45 I, p. 424-26. Dante, in the famous dedicatory letter to Can Grande della Scala, wrote a *proemium* to the *Divina Commedia*.

⁵ See *Commentarium in sensu et sensato*, ed. Angel M. Pirotta (Turin: Marietti, 1928), lect. 1, nn. 1-6. Here there is an embedded, extended introduction before the text begins to be commented on. For a *proemium* the editors set aside as a separate essay, see the *Proemium S. Thomae* to his *Commentarium in de caelo et mundo*, ed. R. Spiazzi (Turin: Marietti, 1952). In both of

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which Thomas puts before us an account of the *Metaphysics* as a unitary effort. This requires him to suggest solutions to some of the more vexed questions that arise in the pursuit of the science we are seeking.⁶

I

The *proemium* functions as an overture, striking the major themes of the *Metaphysics*, and first of all *its* overture, the magnificent panorama of chapters 1 and 2 of book 1 in which Aristotle, ringing the changes on "all men by nature desire to know," moves from the outer to the inner senses, to reason itself; and, among rational activities, from art to science and onward and upward to wisdom itself, seen as divine knowledge. So too the *proemium* places the science we are seeking among the other sciences as their sapiential regulator and term.

The argument of Thomas's *proemium* moves through six stages, which I shall summarize.⁷

1 *That there must be a ruling science* When many things are ordered to one, one of them must be directive and rule and the rest directed and ruled.⁸

these, Thomas provides remarkable overviews of the natural writings of Aristotle and their interrelations.

⁶ The *proemium* to the commentary on the *Metaphysics* has attracted the interest of many. See, for example, James Doig, *Aquinas on Metaphysics* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972), 55–94; Alberto Gajano, "Il Problema della metafisica come scienza nel Commento di S. Tommaso d'Aquino alla *Metafisica* di Aristotele," in *Studi Medievali* 5 (1964), 793–819; Suzanne Mansion, "L'intelligibilité métaphysique d'après le *proemium* du commentaire de Saint Thomas à la *Métaphysique* d'Aristote," in *Rivista de filosofia neo-scolastica* 70 (1978): 49–62 (reprinted in her *Etudes aristotéliciennes*, [Louvain-la-Neuve: Editions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1984], 509–22), and Jean-François Courtine, *Suarez et le système de la métaphysique* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1990), 31–74. Hermann Weidemann's essay, "Zum Problem der Begründung der Metaphysik bei Thomas von Aquin," concentrates on the exposition of Boethius's *De trinitate*, which, of course, any complete rethinking of the *proemium* before us would have to take into account. See Hermann Weidemann, "Zum Problem der Begründung der Metaphysik bei Thomas von Aquin," in *Ontologie und Theologie*, ed. Matthias Lutz-Bachmann (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1988), 37–63.

⁷ See *In XII Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio*, ed. M. R. Cathala and R. Spiazzi (Turin: Marietti, 1950). The *proemium* is set off from the commentary proper, on pp. 1–2. I follow it closely in what follows.

⁸ For example, the soul naturally commands and the body obeys, both being ordered to the good of the living substance, also, for instance, among the powers of the soul, the passions are, in the natural order, ruled by reason.

But all sciences and arts are ordered to one end, namely, to man's perfection, that is, happiness.⁹

Therefore, one thing must be regulative of the others, and it will be called wisdom because *sapientis est ordinare*

2 *Identifying the ruling science* The analogy from the political order those with greater intelligence are naturally apt to command those of lesser intelligence

If intelligence is the prerequisite for command, and the intelligible is the correlative of intelligence, the science that will be naturally regulative of the others will be that which bears on the most intelligible things

3 *Three ways of identifying the most intelligible Things*

(i) *ex ordine intelligendi* That from which mind derives its certitude will be most intelligible

Mind derives the certitude of knowledge from causes, knowledge of causes seeming to be characteristic of intellect

Therefore, the science which considers the first causes will be most intelligible and that which regulates the others.

The argument thus takes the following form

A that from which mind derives its certitude

B that which is most intelligible.

C knowledge of causes

A is B

C is A

C is B

Certain intellectual knowledge derives from causes

The higher the causes are, the higher the certainty derived from the causes

Most certain intellectual knowledge derives from first causes

The conclusion Thomas wants to reach is that, because any science is had through knowledge of causes which are productive of certitude, the science of first causes is regulative of the other sciences

(ii) *ex comparatio intellectus ad sensum* Intellect differs from sensation as universal differs from particular

⁹ These are activities undertaken for the sake of some end, and this must be the good of the agent. Needless to say, the end of theoretical uses of the mind differs from that of its practical uses, and art differs from prudence, but this does not affect the validity of the generalization

Since the grasp of the universal characterizes intellect, the more universal object will characterize the more intellectual science and the most universal object the most intellectual science.

The most intellectual science deals with the highest universals

The highest universals are being, one, many, and potency and act

These universals are not treated by any particular science, yet they ought not be left untreated

They will be treated in a common (that is, not particular) science, which will be the most intellectual science, and thus regulative of the other sciences.

(iii) *ex cognitione intellectus* Possession of the intellectual power depends upon being free of matter the intelligible is separated from matter.

To be more or most separated from matter is to be more or most intelligible

Concern with that which is most separated from matter (and therefore most intelligible) is most intellectual

Intellect and the intelligible are correlatives since understanding and the actually understood are one

In what does more or less separation from matter consist? It consists not only in separation from signate matter (for example, the consideration of natural forms apart from matter or of the species apart from the accidents of the individual) as in natural science, but from all sensible matter, and not only *secundum rationem* as in mathematics, but *secundum esse, sicut Deus et intelligientiae*

The science that treats of such things (that is, of things separated *secundum rationem et secundum esse*) would seem to be most intellectual and thus the chief and ruling science

4 *Threefold consideration but one science.* "The most intelligible" things, arrived at by three different criteria, turn out to be (i) the first causes, (ii) the most universal things, and (iii) the things most separate from matter

Either we have three wisdoms—which defeats the exercise, since on the assumption that all sciences are ordered to one, we are looking for *the* regulative science—or the consideration of "the most intelligible" in these three senses falls to one and the same science.

Substances separate from matter are first causes of being.

It falls to the same science to consider a genus and the causes of that genus.

Being taken universally is the genus of which those separated substances are the first and *universal* causes

Therefore, this science considers these three things, but only *ens commune* or being in all its generality or universality, is its subject

The subject of a science is that thing whose causes and properties we seek

Any science seeks the causes of its genus, that is, of the kind of thing it studies

5 *How may we Characterize this Science?* Although the subject of this science is *ens commune*, the whole is said to be concerned with what is separate from matter *secundum rationem et secundum esse*, since this is applicable *both* to what never can exist in matter (God and intellectual substances), but also to things which can be without matter, such as *ens commune* *Hoc tamen non contingeret, si a materia secundum esse dependeret.*

Here we may raise Suzanne Mansion's query If *ens commune* does not depend upon matter because it *can* be found without matter, and if this possibility is realized or actualized in God and angels, either they *are* part of *ens commune*, the subject of metaphysics, *or* we have an unrealizable potentiality, which is no potentiality at all ¹⁰

6 *Names of this science* Given its three considerations, this science is called three things

divine science or theology, insofar as it considers separate substance,

metaphysics insofar as it studies being and what pertains to it as such, this being after physics in the way of resolution as the more common after the less common,

first philosophy insofar as it studies the first causes.

Sic igitur patet quod sit subiectum huius scientiae, et qualiter se habeat ad alias scientias, et quo nomine nominetur.

II

The modern reader will be struck by how neatly the problem Jaeger saw as crucial is handled here, although Thomas no more than Avicenna would have accepted the problem in the terms Jaeger posed it ¹¹ Neither God nor first causes are possible candidates for *subject*

¹⁰ See Mansion, "L'intelligibilité métaphysique," 53, (reprint, p 513)

¹¹ See Werner Jaeger, *Aristotle*, trans Richard Robinson, 2d ed (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1948), 216-19

of the science we are seeking.¹² Nonetheless, as *Metaphysics* 1 makes clear, the science we are seeking is such knowledge of the divine as is possible for us. How can a science of being as being, an ontology, become a theology? What we have in Aristotle, to put it in Heideggerian terms, is an onto-theo-logy. I now propose to examine more closely several of the crucial moves in the *proemium*.

1 *Putting a Premium on Universality* Because it provides a sense of “the most intelligible” that takes off from the distinction between sense and intellect, the grasp of the universal is seen as the mark of intellect. If universality is the mark of the intelligible, the science that deals with the most universal is said to take precedence over the others. That is, an identification is made between the most universal and the most intelligible. What things are most universal and most intelligible? Being, one, many, potency and act.

We must be astounded by this, especially as it is put forward in the name of Aristotle. Aristotle seems to insist on just the opposite of the identification Thomas proposes. For Aristotle, the most universal is the least intelligible. The methodological remarks at the outset of the *Physics* liken progress in knowledge to seeing something from afar and then approaching it gradually: the initial grasp is progressively refined until we see that the object is indeed the cast-iron lawn deer we never thought to loathe again. The analogue of this for intellection is the initial generic grasp which, with reflection and study, becomes ever more specific until definitive knowledge of the kind of thing it is is had. The first universal knowledge is confused and imperfect, and demands to be completed in the direction of the less universal and more specific.¹³ The species is more intelligible than the genus, it is thus the less, not the more or most, universal that is most intelligible.

¹² “Dico igitur impossibile esse ut ipse deus sit subjectum huius scientiae, quoniam subjectum omnis scientiae est res quae conceditur esse, et ipsa scientia non inquit nisi dispositiones illius subjecti”, M. M. Anawati, *La Métaphysique du Shifa'*, (Paris: J. Vrin, 1978–1985), 1.4, 1.60–3. See also Courtine, *Suarez et le système métaphysique*, 14–24. For Thomas, see *In VII Metaph.*, lect. 17. The argument is roughly this: Only the complex can be the subject of a science, God is simple, *ergo*, God is not the subject of a science.

¹³ Thomas not only knows this hallmark of Aristotelian procedure and makes use of it with great elaboration in the *proemia* to the commentaries on the *De coelo* and the *De sensu et sensato* mentioned above, but also insists on it in his discussion of human knowledge in *Summa theologiae* I, q. 85, a. 3.

Has Thomas left himself open to the most frequently expressed musgiving about metaphysics, namely, that it puts a premium on vagueness and generality, and seems to wish us to believe that to know a snail-darter as a being is somehow more profound than knowing it as a snail-darter? After he has listed being, one, and act and potency as instances of the most universal, Thomas adds that these ought not to be left undiscussed, as they would be if there were only particular sciences, since none of the particular sciences has their discussion as its proper task.¹⁴ Here the science we are seeking seems to be compared explicitly with the particular sciences as the generic to the specific

A moment's reflection tells us that this will not do. If the subject matters of natural philosophy and mathematics compared to that of the science we are seeking as species to their genus, then there would be but one science, not three: the particular sciences would simply be departments of ontology which carry the discussion away from the universal toward the specific. But that is not at all how Aristotle, or Thomas, compares them.

There is an equivocation on "genus" operative in talk of the development of an inquiry along the lines suggested at the outset of the *Physics*. The genus can be a predicable universal—that which is said of many specifically different things, in Porphyry's definition—or the genus may be the *genus subiectum* of a science, that of which properties are proved.¹⁵ We must turn to Thomas's third account of "most intelligible" for a reminder of the way subject matters of sciences, *genera subiecta*, differ from one another.

The mark of intellection, Thomas notes, is immunity from matter, thus the objects most proportioned to such an activity will be those most distant from matter. You have permission to feel surprise. Has Thomas revealed himself to be a transcendental Thomist? Is he arguing that certain objects are demanded by the very nature of intellection? I suggest that we have here the kind of shorthand Thomas

¹⁴ It should be noted that a consideration of such notions, which transcend the limits of the particular sciences, would not go unconsidered even if the science we are seeking proved to be impossible. Following Aristotle, Thomas accepts the need to distinguish the metaphysical consideration of such *communia* from a dialectical or a sophistical consideration of them. Cf. *Metaphysics* 4.2 1004b17–27 and St. Thomas, *In IV Metaph*, lect. 4, nn. 572–577.

¹⁵ What I called Aubenque's *ur-aporia* can be seen to trade on this ambiguity.

employs when he is reminding us of a position rather than establishing it. After all, he simply asserts that intellection is immaterial and then says things about its object by making use of the correlation between the intelligible and intellect.¹⁶ None of this is being *established* here, Thomas is reminding his auditor of what he has already learned from his study of the *De anima*.¹⁷

2 *Abstraction and Separation* Students of the *proemium* regularly and rightly compare it to that remarkable work of Thomas's youth, the *Expositio* of Boethius's *On the Trinity*. There, Thomas characterizes the object of any theoretical science (the *speculabile*) by traits from intellection on the one hand, and traits from the habit of science on the other: intellection requires immateriality, the habit of science requires necessity, that is, immunity from change, that is, distance from matter. The two traits coalesce into one and it is abstraction or separation from matter that is proper to the *speculabile*. Accordingly, it is just insofar as there are formally different ways in which the concerns of different sciences relate to matter—or are immaterial—that different sciences *are* different sciences. That difference will show up in the mode of defining, because the definition of the subject supplies the middle term in the apodictic syllogism constitutive of a science. This is what Thomas is recalling in the *proemium*.

Those things are most separate from matter which not only abstract from signate matter, like the natural forms taken universally with which natural science deals, but in every way from sensible matter. And not

¹⁶ "Intelligibile enim et intellectum oportet proportionata esse, et unius generis, cum intellectus et intelligibile in actu sint unum", *In Metaph*, *proemium*. All translations are my own.

¹⁷ It is clear that all *proemia* are sapiential or metaphysical, in that they locate a particular inquiry within philosophy. Obviously, the beginner who is being told the place of logic within philosophy, or the relation between the *Physics* and other natural works when he is just embarking on the study of natural philosophy, is in no position to assess what he is being told, nor is it the proper business at hand. From the beginner's point of view it must often seem a matter of *obscurum per obscurius*. The vantage point from which the various sciences are compared is not the vantage point of any special science. Hence it is metaphysical. The *proemium* to the *Metaphysics*, addressed as it is to advanced students of philosophy, will invoke the knowledge they have and arrange it in such a way that the result is at once familiar and strange. Even here *oportet addiscentem credere*.

simply insofar as they are thought about, e.g. mathematical, but also insofar as they exist, such as God and the intelligences¹⁸

This passage neatly summarizes what Thomas has laid out in far more detail in the commentary on Boethius's tractate, but it points ahead, of course, to the discussion in *Metaphysics* 6 and thus paves the way, in the overture, for an indication of the later teaching on how the science we are seeking can be at once ontology and theology

For the last half century, Thomists have discussed these matters, not in terms of three modes of abstraction from matter, but rather in terms of a distinction between abstraction and separation, the latter characterizing metaphysical intellectual activity¹⁹ By and large *abstractio* and *separatio* are interchangeable in Thomas's usage, but in this article he assigns a narrower sense to each thanks to which they are distinguished To consider apart what does not exist apart is what abstraction in its narrower sense means, whereas to consider apart what exists apart is separation in the narrow sense of the term So understanding abstraction, the subjects of natural philosophy and of mathematics are said to be products of abstraction The nature defined with sensible matter that is considered apart from the accidents of individuals having that nature does not, of course, exist apart from them Its apartness or abstraction is *secundum rationem* but not *secundum esse* The same is true of mathematical, which abstract not only from singular sensible matter—this flesh, these bones—but also from common sensible matter, flesh and bone Mathematical, however, no more than the natures of physical things, do not exist apart from sensible particulars

¹⁸ "Ea vero sunt maxime a materia separata, quae non tantum a signata materia abstrahunt, 'sicut formae naturales in universali acceptae, de quibus tractat scientia naturalis,' sed omnino a materia sensibili Et non solum secundum rationem, sicut mathematica, sed etiam secundum esse, sicut Deus et intelligentiae", *In Metaph.*, proemium

¹⁹ The "Gogol's overcoat" out of which so many other discussions have come is L. B. Geiger, "Abstraction et séparation d'après S. Thomas in de trinitate, q. 5, a. 3," *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques* 31 (1947) 206–23 Geiger studied the holographs in which Thomas made several attempts before he hit upon the strategy that takes him through this remarkable article 3 There have not been wanting Thomists who see in the role assigned *separatio* a basis for distinguishing the metaphysics of Thomas from that of Aristotle For reasons to doubt such conclusions, see Ralph McInerny, *Boethius and Aquinas* (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1990), 148–58 The holographs have been transcribed in *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Expositio super librum Boethii De Trinitate*, ed. Bruno Decker (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1959), 230–4

Metaphysics is constituted by a negative judgment that something exists apart from matter and motion. It is on the basis of such a judgment that to be and to be material are no longer identified and that the account of being that makes no mention of sensible matter can be taken to be, not merely a vaguer way of thinking of sensible objects, but a notion which gives "being" a predicable range beyond sensible substance. Where and on what basis is such a judgment made?

Avicenna denies that God can be the subject of metaphysics because his existence is established by the metaphysician and no science demonstrates that it has a subject to deal with. Would Thomas agree with Avicenna that a proof of the existence of God is not a presupposition of metaphysics? I don't think he would, at least not without qualification. For Thomas, it is in the course of doing natural philosophy that Aristotle came to know, that is, proved, that to be and to be a physical object are not identical. The first instance of this occurs at the end of the *Physics* when the need is seen for a Prime Mover, which is unlike physical movers that in moving are moved. The second occurs in book 3 of *De anima*, when the nature of intellection, *pace* Averroes, is taken to entail that a soul capable of such an immaterial activity can subsist without matter.

Thomas sees these as puzzling, even disturbing, achievements. They indicate a horizon beyond that of natural science and they will be the basis for the pursuit recorded by the *Metaphysics*. If to be and to be material are not identical, can there be a science of being as being? What would it be like? This is the science we are seeking and we can see the difficulties which attend the description of its subject matter.

If the *genus subiectum* were merely a more common predicable genus, the subjects of natural philosophy and of mathematics would be species of this genus and, since the subject genus is the principle of unity of a science, these three would not be three distinct sciences. But if a *genus subiectum* is distinct from another because of its different way of defining—that is, because of the different way in which matter and motion are excluded from its definitions—the subject of metaphysics will be formally different from those of natural philosophy and mathematics and they will not be species of it.²⁰ In short, "being" is predicable of immaterial as well as material being.

²⁰ Thomas goes into this, see *In Boethium de trinitate*, q. 5, a. 1, ad 6. "Quamvis subiecta aliarum scientiarum sint partes entis, quod est subiectum metaphysicae, non tamen oportet quod aliae scientiae sint partes ipsius. Accipit enim unaquaeque scientiarum unam partem entis secundum specialem modum

This seems to suggest that, if being is the subject of metaphysics, and being is both immaterial and material—a truth established along with the proof that there is a prime mover—then God must be part of the subject of metaphysics. But Thomas explicitly denies this. What then is the point of the science we are seeking? It cannot be to prove the existence of immaterial being, or of God, because that is presupposed. Accordingly, the subject of natural philosophy must suffice to arrive at such knowledge. The science we are seeking seems not so much unfindable as unnecessary, otiose.²¹

Thomas addresses this by distinguishing two senses of the claim that there are things which not only can be understood without matter but which can so exist. The first and obvious application of the description would be to things which never exist in matter, for example, God and the angels. The second application is to what *can* exist apart from matter, namely, *ens commune*. This is of course the subject of the science we are seeking, but the warrant for saying that “being” has applicability beyond material substance is its applicability to God, and God is not part of the subject of metaphysics.

A way out of this difficulty could be found by distinguishing separate substances other than God from God and saying that *they* but not *He* are part of the subject of metaphysics, since they are among the beings of which God is the cause. Let us put this possibility aside,

considerandi alium a modo, quo consideratur ens in metaphysica, non enim est pars entis secundum illam rationem, qua ens est subiectum metaphysicae, sed hac ratione considerata ipsa est specialis scientia aliis condvisa.”

²¹ That Thomas does indeed see proofs of the existence of immaterial things by the natural philosopher as a presupposition of metaphysics is clear from the commentary itself. “Quia in rebus non solum sunt corpores, sed etiam quaedam incorporea, ut patet ex libro *de Anima*”, *In I Metaph*, lect 12, n 181. “Non enim omne ens est huiusmodi, cum probatum sit in octavo *Physicorum*, esse aliquod ens immobile. Hoc autem ens immobile superius est et nobilius ente mobili, de quo considerat naturalis. Et quia ad illa scientiam pertinet consideratio entis communis, ad quam pertinet consideratio entis primi, ideo ad aliam scientiam quam ad naturalem pertinet consideratio entis communis, et eius etiam erit considerare huiusmodi principia communia. Physica enim est quaedam pars philosophiae sed non prima, quae considerat ens commune, et ea quae sunt entis in quantum huiusmodi”, *In IV Metaph*, lect 5, n 593. “Scilicet quod sit quaedam ‘natura immobilis’, scilicet natura primi motoris, ut probatum est in octavo *Physicorum*”, *Ibid*, lect 13, n 690. Hence the reiterated phrase that, if there were no immaterial substance, natural philosophy would be first philosophy, see, for instance, *In Metaph*, nn 398, 1170, 2267.

for two reasons. First, because it may seem to depend upon clarifications we find in Thomas and which are arguably not found in Aristotle, and second, because keeping the problem simple, or at least simpler, enables me to state what I take to characterize the trajectory of the science we are seeking.

Here is my suggestion. If it is the case that the recognition of beings beyond the realm of natural being is one of the unlooked-for achievements of natural philosophy, this recognition or knowledge is expressed by way of contrast with, or negation of, features of the subjects of natural philosophy. There is a mover which, unlike natural movers, is not moved in moving. This mover, consequently, exists separately from matter, if matter is the principle of being moved. Just as awareness of such a mover arises from reflection on the realm of moved movers, so descriptions of it, and talk about it, borrow on descriptions of physical or natural objects. Not only is such talk oblique and negative, it takes place on the margin of the central object of concern: natural things, that is, things that have come to be as the result of a change.

This creates a sense not only of a further task, of unfinished business, but also of a task different from the one we would face if it were simply a question, say, of talking about how the theory of proportionals is applicable to both arithmetic and geometry, or the way in which first principles of demonstration are variously found in different particular sciences. Such a discussion is called dialectical by Aristotle—it could even be sophistical—but it does not give rise to or depend upon any claim that there are substances which exist separately from matter.²²

The discussion of common notes takes on a new valence when one is convinced that there are separate substances, things which exist apart from matter. The science we are seeking is driven by the desire to know such things. That is why it is a theology. But divine things are introduced in *Metaphysics* 1.2 as first *causes*. Causes, as causes, are not the subject of a science. But these things have already come to be known as causes. How then may we characterize the science we are seeking?

Here is my suggestion. The science of being as being is undertaken with an eye to arriving at a knowledge of God better than the

²² On dialectical, sophistical and metaphysical considerations, see *In IV Metaph*, lect. 4, nn. 572–577.

oblique and negative knowledge already had. The model I am suggesting derives from the distinction St. Thomas makes among the divine names. Such names, he notes, are negative, relative, and positive.²³ To say of God that he is immaterial or timeless is of course to deny of Him traits of creatures. To say of God that he is Lord or cause, is to speak of Him in relation to His effects. But there are other divine attributes, or names, which give us an intimation of what God is in Himself. For example, God is intelligent and loving, God is. Of course, for Thomas, *all* our knowledge of God is derivative from and dependent upon our knowledge of creatures, but in this case of what he calls affirmative or positive attributes the meaning of the terms does not include a reference to creatures.

Well, difficult as all that is, it will seem to have a straightforwardness that takes us far beyond the *Metaphysics*. It does. But it also provides a way of construing what it is Aristotle is doing. The reason the phrase "the science we are seeking" becomes poignant is that, even after the extended and tentative treatment of book 3 and the ringing assertion with which book 4 begins—there is a science of being as being and of that which belongs to it *per se*—the very subject of the inquiry remains elusive. It is not simply that "being" is said in many ways and we must establish the primacy of *ousia* and argue that it provides sufficient focus for us to talk of a science of being as being. Even taken as the science of substance, the task remains obscure.

Who has not been puzzled by *Metaphysics* 7 and 8? I do not mean simply their elusive contents, but their *point*. There is of course the anti-Platonic polemic and the dismissal of universals as instances of separate substance. But this seems to leave us with natural substance. What we would expect is an account of *ousia* that does not include matter. What we find is rather a reflection on natural substance. Why is this?

It is because the study of natural substance is taken to be a way toward such knowledge of immaterial substance as we can attain. It is as if, knowing as a result of proofs in natural philosophy that there is something more to talk about, Aristotle is devising a language which will enable him to speak of separate substance. This requires a look at sensible substance *with an eye toward devising such a language*.

²³ *Summa theologiae* I, q. 13, a. 2. For the textual basis for this distinction, see Ralph McInerny, *Being and Predication* (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1986), 272.

Consider, from this point of view, the apparent identification of essence and form in the analysis of sensible substance. Since essence is what is expressed in the definition, this clearly goes contrary to Aristotle's view that the natures, essences, and thus definitions of sensible things include sensible matter. Why then does he move toward the equation of form and essence? The process begins, does it not, when Aristotle asks what in sensible substances is most substance? This turns out to be a question as to whether matter or form or composite most deserves the appellation substance. The answer is form.

The argument is that form is more deserving of the appellation substance than matter, the two being related as act to potency²⁴. Thomas sees two arguments for the priority of form over the composite. The first follows on the proof for the primacy of form. If the composite includes matter, and form is prior to matter, then form is prior to the composite which includes matter. The second argument is this: Principles are prior to that of which they are the principles, but matter and form are the principles of the composite, *ergo*, matter and form are prior to the composite. Again, form is prior to matter²⁵. What follows from this is not the claim that the sensible substance *is* form or that the composite *is* one of its components, but rather that in composite substances that which is most substance, which is the chief ground of their being and being called substance is form. What follows is this: If there is a substance which is not composite, calling it a substance is in effect to call it a form. There is thus an extrapolation from the sensible to the separate substance, not this time in terms of a proof that the latter exists, but rather in terms of a refinement of our understanding and talk about separate substance.

So understood, the *Metaphysics* is a quest, a seeking for a science that will provide less imperfect knowledge of God than we already have in beginning the science. The subject matter is in the process of being fashioned; this, I think, is at least partial justification of Aubenque's notion that Aristotle is in pursuit of something tragically unfindable.

²⁴ "Forma prior est materia. Materia enim est ens in potentia, et species est actus eius. Actus autem naturaliter prior est potentia. Et simpliciter loquendo prior tempore, quia non movetur potentia ad actum nisi per ens actu. Unde patet quod forma est prior quam materia, et etiam magis ens quam ipsa, quia propter quod unumquodque et illud magis", *In VII Metaph.*, lect 2, n 1278

²⁵ *Ibid.*, n 1279

When in the *proemium* Thomas confronts the problem that we want to say both that the subject of metaphysics is that which can be defined without matter and motion and that God is not part of the subject of the science, he distinguishes between that which *does not necessarily* exist in matter (being, one, act, potency, and so forth) and that which *never* exists in matter (God, the angels). We will of course object that the only way we can pay off on being, act, potency, and so forth existing apart from matter, will be by appealing to the things which never exist in matter, and we are back to the difficulty raised by Suzanne Mansion.

I hope that now that difficulty can be seen differently. In fashioning the subject of the science we are seeking, Aristotle is in effect looking at natural substance to see if he can fashion a notion of substance which, while it will be inadequate with respect to natural substance—substance as form—provides a sense of the term which makes it affirmatively applicable to separate substances. In short, he is engaged in establishing that *ousia* is analogously common to material and separate substance.

This interpretation, prompted by St. Thomas, can be seen to accommodate our sense of how imperfectly “the science we are seeking” exemplifies the characteristics of *epistēmē*. Then we see the tentativeness of the *Metaphysics*, not as a sign of its having been cobbled together, but as an inescapable feature of any human effort to move beyond sensible objects to others known only on the basis of our knowledge of sensible objects.

If knowledge of sensible objects is so dependent, then necessarily our talk of them is likewise dependent, at least by way of origin. Is it possible to pass beyond the negative and the relative to some intimation of what God is in himself? The answer is to be found in *Metaphysics* 12, the culmination of all that has gone before. God is thought thinking itself.

And then comes, stated in relative terms, the poetic assertion of monotheism: One ruler is best, one ruler let there be.

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THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF MATHEMATICAL ENTITIES THE NECESSITY FOR MODERN PHYSICS OF AN EVALUATION OF MATHEMATICAL SYSTEMS

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FAR FROM BEING A PURELY ESOTERIC CONCERN of theoretical mathematicians, the examination of the ontological status of mathematical entities, I submit, has far-reaching implications for a very practical area of knowledge, namely, the method of science in general, and of physics in particular. Although physics and mathematics have since Newton's second derivative been inextricably wedded, modern physics has a particularly mathematical dependence. Physics has moved and continues to move further away from the possibility of direct empirical verification, primarily because of the increasingly complex logistical problems of experimentation within the parameters of the very large and of the very small. As certain areas become more and more theoretical, with developments of this century in astrophysics, cosmology, and quantum mechanics, and more specifically, with the postulation of new hypothetical elementary particles based almost exclusively upon mathematical data, physics is forced to depend increasingly upon mathematics as a method for verifying physical possibility. Typically, a mathematical formulation descriptive of an empirically established phenomenon x is manipulated and made subject to derivation on the assumption that the new formulation will continue to correspond with physical reality, and may even yield new information about the phenomenon's behavior. Why, however, should a coherence between the empirically-defined world and mathematical processes be assumed? This coherence is, above all, dependent upon a hidden metaphysically strong presupposition about the ontological status of mathematical entities and their systems.

That there is a metaphysically strong presupposition of the sort to which I refer is not immediately obvious, and I would like here to address three common refutations of this position initially given. Perhaps the most immediate is the insistence that mathematics serves a

purely descriptive function in the sciences, that it acts only as a kind of language. Although this characterization is certainly applicable in some cases, it cannot possibly justify the present use of mathematics to make hypotheses and predictions in physics. It cannot explain the prescriptive use of mathematics to verify and suggest physical possibility.

Assuming the prescriptive use of mathematics, another argument can be made that mathematics is simply logic, in its most absolute, noncontroversial tautological sense. Thus, the use of mathematics in physics simply ensures the same consistency, although in a much more easily manipulatable form, that would occur by our following out the implications of theories using what amounts to common sense reason, for it is obvious that our knowledge of physical reality (physics) must be limited by, or at least not be inconsistent with, our own mental principles of logic. Unfortunately, this tautological view of mathematics too is untenable, for besides its rather narrow view of the role of mathematics, it makes the mistaken assumption that mathematics as used in physics is in fact logical, never mind tautological. One need only think of the prominent use in physics of complex numbers and common surds such as the exponential function and π to realize how many mathematical inconsistencies have been wholeheartedly embraced without question and with success. The intuitionist school of mathematics, very much concerned with consistency and solid grounding, deems the use of infinity as unacceptably anti-intuitive, yet where would its absence leave calculus, a veritable cornerstone of the foundations of physics? A merely tautological system would severely limit the present scope of the physical and even social sciences.

The final and most common argument against inherent assumptions of mathematical Platonism in physics is simply that of cold pragmatism, which claims that we use the mathematical systems that we use not because we endow them with any real ontological status, but because they are effective. They make possible certain coherent explanations of the world around us, if they did not, we would not hesitate to adopt the next expedient mathematical system that did. This view is problematic on many different levels. First, the adoption of more than one mathematical system within one body of knowledge threatens to make any kind of coherence impossible. The movement in modern physics is currently toward simplification, the search for the grand unification theory that will tie all of the area-specific theories together, yielding consistency within the large mass of knowledge

known as physics. While quantum mechanics uses four-dimensional Riemann-space, the theory of relativity operates in infinitely dimensional Hilbert space. Most of classical mechanics functions with Euclidean geometry. For the grand unification theory to be successful, it will be necessary to reconcile the three geometries so they fit within one large coherent and structurally sound system. The basis for the physicist's optimism in this project lies in his or her usually unexamined assumption of a Platonistic ideal of mathematics, that is, that there is only one true system, and that it corresponds to reality as he or she knows it. Differing competing mathematical processes that describe one area of physics or set of physical phenomena, even more so than differing processes describing areas on opposite ends of the size spectrum (as in the case of quantum mechanics and relativity theory), would wreak havoc on any attempt to synthesize the whole of this vast field of knowledge.

Second, "effective" does not mean "true." This in itself would not be such a large problem (we can, after all, be more modest in our expectations) except for the presence of still a third problem, namely, that there exists the possibility that one is simply limiting one's array of physical hypotheses by the kind of mathematical questions one chooses to pose, for these questions are a product of the particular mathematical system being used. If one poses a physical question in strictly mathematical terms, one should see the assumptions inherent within that particular mathematical description reflected in the final physical outcome (an outcome, in fact, which is supposed to validate its mathematical vehicle). Since there is the potential for one's mathematically defined hypothesis to determine the result as much as the scientific reality does, one finds that the term "effective" is not particularly reassuring in this context. The issue is being approached backward. As the mathematician Morris Kline has stated

The disagreements concerning what correct mathematics is and the variety of differing foundations affect seriously not only mathematics proper but most vitally physical science. As we shall see, the most well-developed physical theories are entirely mathematical. Hence scientists, who do not personally work on foundational problems, must nevertheless be concerned about what mathematics can be confidently employed if they are not to waste years on unsound mathematics.¹

¹ Morris Kline, *Mathematics The Loss of Certainty* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 7.

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Physicists must first judge which kinds of mathematical questions are acceptable and which are not before they can even begin to evaluate the answers to these questions

My argument is that the mathematical assumptions upon which much of modern theoretical physics is grounded are characteristically Platonic, in the sense that the language of mathematics is thought to correspond to the actual physical order of the universe. By positing an actual connection between the external world of physics and the seemingly internal mental world of mathematics, we can deduce certain truths about that external world by the internal method. Thus, both physical and mathematical truths are implicitly understood as "discovered," and are meant to reflect more than merely the discoverer's own private creative process.

The problem is that while physics implicitly makes certain assumptions regarding the objectivity of its mathematical vehicle, allowing for only one true description, mathematicians are not at all unanimous in their support of the Platonic school. In fact, there are currently four general schools of thought, of which the Platonic school is but one. The scenario of equally valid yet conflicting mathematical systems (leading to conflicting results or predictions) has the potential to create a conflict which physics is at this time ill-equipped to face.² The Nobel prize-winning physicist Eugene Wigner worried that eventually,

The argument could be of such abstract nature that it might not be possible to resolve the conflict, in favor of one or of the other [mathematically derived] theory, by an experiment. Such a situation would put a heavy strain on our faith in our theories and on our belief in the reality of the concepts which we form. It would give us a deep sense of frustration in our search for what I called the "ultimate truth." The reason that such a situation is conceivable is that, fundamentally, we do not know why our theories work so well.³

Physicists must subject their choice of mathematics to foundational scrutiny in order to be secure in their own foundations of method

² For an example of a physical question to which there are two answers that are equally valid mathematically, one of which is physically invalid, see the "coconut puzzle" in John D. Barrow, *The World Within the World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 254.

³ Eugene P. Wigner, "The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences," *Communications in Pure and Applied Mathematics* 13, no. 1 (February 1960): 13–14.

This kind of scrutiny requires an evaluation of the different mathematical schools of thought, and the implications of each for the method of physics. The most fundamental ideological division between them is whether they understand their project as the creation of mathematical systems or their discovery. Is the order that we see, the symmetry, a product solely of our minds, or is it rather a real reflection of the fabric of the universe? For purposes of clarity, I propose first that we define three basic standards for judging the validity of mathematical, and by extension, physical systems. The first is internal coherence. This litmus test for validity merely prohibits self-contradiction: one part of the theory may not contradict another part, nor may different theories within one physical system be mutually exclusive. Initially, we may use as examples created mathematical systems, such as Hilbert's nonstandard analysis (which as of yet has no physical applications), or any other formalistic system, its only requirement is that it be internally consistent. The second candidate is external coherence (or "correspondence"), by which I mean that the theory must be consistent with observed (empirical) data, as well as be able to ground predictions with regard to that physical data. Absolute internal consistency assumes a secondary role, and is not as rigorous. Thus, a particular mathematical system, such as non-Euclidean geometry, must have practical applications to be valid by external coherence. The third candidate for criterion of mathematical validity, which I am describing loosely as "Platonic," requires both internal and external coherence, bridging the gap between human intuition and experience.

In addition, there are two different senses of which we may speak of the "closure" of mathematical systems. The first is the more open of the two (as well as the more useful), and states: Given x finite assumptions, every intelligible question has an intelligible answer with respect to x . The second, more restrictive closure entails that given x finite assumptions, there can be drawn y finite intelligible questions, as well as the corresponding intelligible answers with respect to x . The only difference between the two is the restriction on the number of questions; the second closure requires not only a finite number of assumptions, but also that there will be a limited number of questions arising from these assumptions. The second type of closure, being axiomatic, seems to be restricted by Godel's proof; the first type does not. Likewise, the first two general candidates of internal and external coherence allow for the possibility of competing systems, while

the third requires that the existence of only one particular system be necessary, thereby excluding all others. Obviously, one can see that a method which yields necessary results as opposed to merely possible ones would be deemed more useful by anyone seeking knowledge, if for no other reason than that it provides more clues. We must, however, question to what extent our security of necessary results may actually be a false security. By virtue of what, other than pure pragmatism at best, or arbitrariness at worst, do we decide that one method is superior to another?

We may very well ask whether a Platonistic understanding of mathematics, even if merely a myth, is a necessary myth for physics. Put another way: even if a Platonistic understanding is not correct, can the method of physics function without at least postulating the Platonistic understanding hypothetically, and then correcting for the hypothetical element by later empirical verification of the results? What are the limitations imposed by the scientific method on physics and physical knowledge? For mathematical derivations to be of use in predicting empirical phenomena, we must make certain assumptions not only about the validity of mathematical coherence, but about the coherence, or order, of the physical world. The latter assumption is evident in the physicists' project itself, if physical properties changed constantly and randomly, then there would be no laws of nature to discover.⁴ A pragmatic definition of "order" requires a reference to an ability to predict. If mathematics (intuitively rational) represents order, and the physical world is in fact ordered, then mathematical order should be able to be used to predict occurrences and properties in the physical world. The essence of Platonism (with a metaphorical rather than the literal interpretation of his theory of Forms) is the necessary joining of the intuitive and the empirical.

The Platonic understanding of mathematics can be characterized as having mathematical entities linked to perfect templates of their imperfect representations, it is therefore desirable first to discuss what is meant by Plato's perfect templates, the Forms. They first appear as well-defined entities in the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*, although even

⁴ The discovery of chaos theory and quantum physics does not in any way invalidate this project. The indeterminacy or "uncertainty" has not spread like a plague, engulfing old secure areas of physics and rendering them useless. Our uncertainty, as a matter of fact, is rather well-behaved, found consistently and constrained between very tightly mathematically defined limits.

in his earlier dialogues, where the theory of Forms is not yet full-blown, Plato refers to nonsensible "things," such as the better (*Gorgias* 489d) and holiness (*Euthyphro* 6d). Plato makes the strong claim that we do not simply require the Forms in a kind of metaphorical sense in order to understand particulars, but that these particulars actually do participate in the Forms. White explains that "objects in the world somehow fall out into "natural kinds," and that certain ways of collecting things together yield genuine groups and others do not, quite independently of the way in which we ourselves happen to classify things."⁵

The Platonic dialectic, by which we are able to get closer to understanding the Forms, requires that we seek definitions. This process involves moving from the particular to the more general. Admittedly, there is a circular aspect to this attempt: the way to understand the Forms is to come closer to their true definitions. This requires one to engage in a continual process of clarification, yet the only way that one knows if a particular definition is correct is through a comparison of it with the Forms. We can resolve the issue at least partially by moving from an intuitive (remembering) knowledge to intellectual (creative) knowledge. Even after we have moved past the problem of finding a correct definition, however, the role of the definition remains ambiguous, for it is unclear whether, once a definition is found, one can logically deduce truths about the Forms. Or, once one comes close enough to the Forms through definitions, can one then intuit information independently of that definition?⁶

Perhaps the characteristic of the Forms most crucial to mathematical Platonism is the theory of recollection presented in the *Meno*. Socrates tries to explain to Meno that knowledge, particularly knowledge about virtue, cannot be taught, but rather is remembered. In *Meno* 80–86 Socrates uses a slave boy as an example of how a person without instruction "knows" certain mathematical truths, in this case, the fact that the "square on the diagonal of the original square is double its area." This assumption is also that made by modern Platonic mathematicians, who believe that the purpose of mathematics is to discover an originally existing mathematical structure rather than to create it, and that any person possessing reason, regardless of time, place, or

⁵ Nicholas P. White, *Plato on Knowledge and Reality* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1976), 7.

⁶ Cf. White, *Plato on Knowledge and Reality*, 38.

culture, may find it. Recollection provides an answer to the paradox of Meno's question,

But how will you look for something when you don't in the least know what it is? How on earth are you going to set up something if you don't know what is the object of your search? To put it another way, even if you come right up against it, how will you know that what you have found is the thing you didn't know?⁷

Plato presents his theory of mathematics within the context of the Forms. One of the most explicit presentations of the Forms is given in Plato's discussion of the divided line (*Republic* 509d-511c). Ideas are described as eternal and one, while things are characterized as temporal and multiple. Mathematical entities are somewhere in the middle, being both eternal and multiple.

According to Plato, mathematicians seek to understand at the abstract level of the Forms, not the individual imperfect manifestations of a man-made square here or a diagonal appearing in nature there, but rather the "square and the diagonal itself."⁸ The relationship of mathematics to the Forms stands in contrast with that of the dialectic, which also attempts to take one to a final Form or Idea. In comparison to the dialectic, the mathematical method is somehow less pure, for although both begin with hypotheses, the dialectic aims at establishing irrefutable premises, while mathematical premises always remain at the level of hypotheses (*Republic* 510c). The second major difference between dialectic and the mathematical method is that, unlike dialectic, the mathematical method is dependent on sensibles, although mathematics itself is not about sensibles but rather about the Forms. In other words, although "square itself" is not actually a square, we begin to conceive the former through visual contact with the latter's imperfect exhibition of the Forms. This connection between geometry and vision is later expanded on by Kant in the *Critique of Pure Reason*,⁹ on which I will elaborate later. In both cases, the fact that we are able to abstract and idealize geometric forms

⁷ *Meno* 80d, trans. W. K. C. Guthrie in *Plato: The Collected Dialogues*, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).

⁸ *Republic* 510d7, trans. Paul Shorey in *Collected Dialogues*.

⁹ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), A27.

(which should not be confused with generalization from observed objects), shows us that we must already have some underlying understanding of extension, limit, and symmetry so as to be able to categorize and synthesize our sensory perceptions. It is this "underlying understanding" that is remembered by the slave boy in the *Meno*. Robinson makes the claim that this process is "analogous to grasping a visible object by direct vision [as compared to] grasping it through its shadow or reflection."¹⁰ Within the line's division of the intelligible and the visible, mathematics therefore straddles the boundary between the two divisions. It is dependent on both the intelligible (since it deals with Ideas) and the visible (since it requires vision at least to initiate the inquiry). Unlike geometry, however, other areas of mathematics, such as number theory and set theory, do not seem to be dependent on vision or any other sense. It could be argued that number theory is grounded in the same division of one and two that the dialectic depends upon for its binary disjunctions, while the dialectic's dependence on categorization is also the basis of set theory. To my knowledge, however, Plato does not discuss the problem except in the context of geometry.

In the metaphor of the Cave, mathematics floats in an intermediate stage. Robinson states

In the figure of the cave everything from the first moment of the prisoners' release to the last moment of looking at shadows and reflections outside the cave is mathematics, and everything from the first look at the real things outside the cave to seeing the sun is dialectic. It follows that the state of the unreleased prisoners is everything below mathematics.¹¹

Because of the two criticisms given of geometry—of its uncertified hypotheses and its dependence on sensation—Plato makes the implicit claim at the end of his discussion of the line that mathematics is preferable to science (because science depends even more on the empirical, which provides not only its method, but also its subject matter), and also that mathematics itself would have a higher status as knowledge if it were to give a logos to its hypotheses (*Republic* 511c). How it is to do so is unclear, but perhaps Plato would for this reason put the less visually intuitive arithmetic and set theory on a higher rank than geometry.

¹⁰ Richard Robinson, *Plato's Earlier Dialectic* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1941), 207.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 196.

It is important to note that Plato's understanding of mathematics was highly influenced by Pythagoras¹² Unlike Aristotle, both Plato and Pythagoras believed that mathematics and its laws can act as a basis for other kinds of knowledge, such as morality or aesthetics In his dialogues, Plato examines the question of what constitutes mathematics, he also uses it as a tool, providing illustrations, analogies, and even direct correlations with his treatment of other subjects In the *Republic*, he compares temperance to harmony (books 2–4), uses the divided line's mathematical proportions to explain different kinds of knowledge (book 6), and enumerates the desirability of lives of each type in the tyrant's number (books 8–9) As in the *Meno*, Plato uses geometrical diagrams frequently This conflation of mathematics with other kinds of knowledge is crucial because it is a precursor to the interrelatedness of mathematical perfection and science that would later be taken almost for granted, from the Ptolemaic system's pure circular orbits to the elegant simplicity of Maxwell's equations for the electromagnetic field The thinkers of the Enlightenment also had a peculiar fascination with mathematics that went beyond the realm of science, and used mathematical models to explain both philosophy and society

Today, Platonism in a modified form occupies a place among the major competing theories about the nature of mathematics, although absolute Platonism has proved to be untenable under the Russell-Zermelo paradox¹³ Unlike the formalists, such as Whitehead and Russell, who found the need to dismantle all of Platonism, some realized that they could keep most Platonic underpinnings simply by

¹² Robert S Brumbaugh, *Plato's Mathematical Imagination* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1954), 5–6

¹³ I am referring here to an inconsistency in set theory as related to self-referential sets, first proposed by Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead While it has been held that "the set of objects is not that object itself," in the case of self-referential sets the sets of some objects (such as "not-objects" or "concepts") are often also their objects Hence the "paradox" For example the set of not-objects is a not-object, the set of concepts is a concept, both cases breaking the rule See Bertrand Russell, *Principia Mathematica* (George Allen and Unwin, 1903), 101 In 1908 Ernst Zermelo expanded upon Russell's paradox to include paradoxes in all of classical analysis, Ernst Zermelo, "Untersuchungen über die Grundlagen der Mengenlehre I," *Mathematische Annalen* 65 (1908) 261–81 See also Paul Bernays, "Sur le platonisme dans les mathématiques," trans C D Parsons as "On Platonism in Mathematics," in *Philosophy of Mathematics Selected Readings*, ed Paul Benacerraf and Hilary Putnam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 261

imposing a few restrictions. The chief restriction was to reject the so-called principle of totality, the assumption that there exists a totality of mathematical entities (the second type of closure earlier defined). Subsequent modifications along these lines include those of Kronecker and Brouwer, who proposed the further elimination of the assumption of a presupposed totality of integers. The rejection of the principle of totality would seem to have widespread physical implications, for it in fact rejects the notion on which infinite series problems are based, as well as the foundations of calculus. Without it, one cannot look at the "end" of an infinite process, but only continue with a potentially infinite number of finite repetitions (of the $n + 1$ variety). Bernays explains,

A general theorem about numbers is to be regarded as a sort of prediction that a property will present itself for each construction of a number, and the affirmation of the existence of a number with a certain property is interpreted as an incomplete communication of a more precise proposition indicating a [particular] number having the property in question or a method for obtaining such a number, Hilbert calls it a "partial judgement."¹⁴

In Bernays' statement we can see two different interpretations of infinity: as a closed system (Platonic) and as an open, repetitive system (formalistic). Hilbert also describes them respectively as "actual infinity" versus the "potential infinite."¹⁵ Put in the context of Plato's theory of recollection of the Forms, we can say that while Euclid's system of axioms is described by Euclid himself as constructed (that is, we can *construct* a line from point *A* to point *B*), Hilbert's axiom system is set in the language of discovery (that is, between any two points there will be *found* one straight line).

So far we can see that there are evidently at least three distinct strains in contemporary mathematics, each assuming a greater degree of necessity, and each claiming a stronger independent ontological position. The first is that of the formalist, who believes that we can produce many mathematical systems, none more correct than the other, as long as they all remain logically consistent. The second postulates that, given our existence, mind structure, and so forth, we can conceive of mathematical entities in only one way. This Kantian¹⁶

¹⁴ Bernays, "On platonism in mathematics," 262

¹⁵ David Hilbert, "On the Infinite," trans. E. Putnam and G. J. Massey in *Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings*, ed. Paul Benacerraf and Hilary Putnam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 188

¹⁶ See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A26/B42

approach I will classify as “intuitionist,” although it contains elements from both the conceptualist and intuitionist schools. The third approach is Platonic, holding that mathematical entities exist in only one way, before and independently of our existence, perhaps within the very pattern of the universe. This, as mentioned before, can be said to be the most important assumption made by theoretical physicists in using mathematical representations to discover nonempirically tested physical phenomena. Plato would undoubtedly be pleased to see the increasing dependence on mathematics in contemporary theoretical physics.

Having discussed mathematics from the ideological vantage point of discovery (Platonism), we now turn our attention to mathematical creation. The formalist and intuitionist mathematical schools of thought, to a respectively stronger and weaker degree, consider mathematics to be an expression of creativity. Since I hold, with John Barrow,¹⁷ that creative enterprise necessarily entails personal uniqueness—that is, that two creators will most likely not accidentally create the same work (what is the probability, after all, of two authors spontaneously and independently writing *Crime and Punishment*?)—I believe the implications of an understanding of physics’ underlying mathematical structure as created are fairly substantial. The principal problem is one of foundations: that the validity of the inference (earlier described as mathematical manipulation) conform to the expectation that the final mathematical result will correspond to a meaningful notion of physical reality. If the assumption of a relationship between physical reality and its mathematical language is untenable, then this kind of mathematical hypothesizing so useful to physics is untenable as well. The study of physics is not the study of logic; mere coherence leads to no answers without empirical pinning points. In the same way that physicists would be uncomfortable with the claim that they merely create physical laws out of their imaginations instead of discovering independent truths about the universe, the use of a created (individually subjective) mathematical system to ascertain these truths calls into question the entire validity of the physicists’ project.

¹⁷ See John D. Barrow, “What is Mathematics?” in John D. Barrow, *The World Within The World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 553.

Perhaps one of the most influential leaders of the formalist school of mathematics was David Hilbert, who realized after numerous paradoxes had been found that it was necessary to establish the consistency of arithmetic by certain indisputable logical principles. In a speech given in 1925 before a congress of the Westphalian Mathematical Society, Hilbert lamented,

In the joy of discovering new and important results, mathematicians paid too little attention to the validity of their deductive methods. The present state of affairs where we run up against the paradoxes is intolerable. Just think, the definitions and deductive methods which everyone learns, teaches, and uses in mathematics, the paragon of truth and certitude, lead to absurdities!¹⁸

Earlier, Whitehead and Russell had attempted this project of clarification as well in the *Principia Mathematica*. Both projects ultimately fell prey to Gödel's incompleteness theorem. As Paul Weiss has noted, the formalists ultimately were not creative, but functioned as a kind of cleanup crew for other mathematicians, inserting consistency and logical rationalizations for steps which were originally made with sometimes large intuitive gaps.¹⁹ Although some axiomatic attempts, such as Hilbert's, aimed at starting from the very beginning, deriving all principles independently from metamathematical starting-points, most formalist enterprises concentrated exclusively upon establishing adequate proofs using only acceptable criteria for validity. Thus, they argued, mathematics would be grounded in absolute certainty.

There is, however, a very obvious problem with this formalist presupposition, which is that the "undisputed" metamathematical principles can hardly be assumed to be quite so clear-cut. The formalists are caught in a philosophical quagmire of question begging when asked to defend their criteria for an acceptable first principle. Even given a first principle, what then determines logical criteria for deriving one axiom from the next? The actual rules which the formalist uses to obtain rigorous consistency must themselves be justified by rigorously consistent analysis, whose rules must in turn be justified with rigorous consistency, resulting in either an infinite regress or a

¹⁸ Hilbert, "On the Infinite," 190-1.

¹⁹ Paul Weiss, *Creative Ventures* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992), 105.

nonrigorously justified grounding point. The formalist Hilbert vehemently rejected Brouwer and Weyl's rather vague justification by virtue of "intuition", yet ultimately one must ask what his metamathematical logical principles are based on if not intuition. It becomes apparent that both camps are arguing only about the boundaries of justification, while both make the same intuitionist assumptions.

It is actually more accurate to classify intuitionism as a mathematical method of discovery and not of creation, yet the discovery involved is internal psychological discovery rather than external physical discovery. Our intuitive knowledge is, in Kantian terms, correspondent to reality, but cannot be assumed to be a clear reflection of it. It is in many ways just as indicative of the structure of our minds as it is of the object that our minds seek to capture. As we have shown in our discussion of the formalist enterprise, when conducting a "rational reconstruction of knowledge"²⁰ starting from a single foundational principle, one will find that an infinite regress is inevitable, for one is always required to justify belief in the reasons which justify the final belief. Otherwise, the fundamental truths become arbitrary. To avoid the infinite regress, it has been most commonly stipulated that the foundational beliefs be intuitive ones, requiring no rational justification. This too has complications. Even under a fairly broad interpretation of "requiring no reasons" and in spite of our use of intuitive metamathematical starting points, we must start with what is truly intuitive. Otherwise, we would base our entire construction of mathematics on a mere individual assertion which could be later disputed at whim. Unfortunately, there is no way of checking intuitive belief. Even Quanton's "authoritative, laborious, and inferential way of justifying the beliefs in question"²¹ is meaningless without the assumption that the premises are correct in some sense. This caveat, of course, renders the process vicious.

A related problem with designating first beliefs as intuitive is that according to the psychological definition of "intuitive," all that is required for a belief to be so designated is the (again, intuitive) knowledge that one has neither a rational justification for the belief nor any way of providing such a justification. There always remains the

²⁰ The phrase is that of Anthony Quanton in his "The Foundations of Knowledge," in *British Analytic Philosophy*, ed. Bernard Williams and Alan Montefiore (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971), 56.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 59.

possibility, however, that the intutor is wrong, for he or she could be ignorant, or lacking in the appropriate insight. Perhaps another person might be able to justify those same beliefs rationally, in any case, it must always remain intelligible to imagine that there might exist some rational justification for the intuition of x , although no one may have thought of it yet. Lawrence Bonjour goes further along these lines and suggests that many beliefs, which are easily taken for granted as self-evident are in fact "depend[ent] for their justification on inferences which have not been explicitly formulated and indeed which could not be explicitly formulated without considerable reflective effort."²² This belief would be supported by those formalists who have tried to go back and justify already existing mathematical proofs that are deemed useful and intuitively correct but were not rigorously derived. Bonjour's view is perfectly in line with our stated purpose, the "rational reconstruction of knowledge," and, like both our definitions of system closure, it also assumes the existence of an intelligible answer to every intelligible question.

Many epistemologists see the continuation of the debate surrounding foundationalism as being kept alive by the problem of epistemic regression. Foundationalism requires that there be some non-arbitrary grounding somewhere in the epistemic chain of justification in order that any belief have meaning. Bonjour distinguishes between two popular versions of foundationalism: "strong foundationalism," which assumes the existence of epistemically valid termination (grounding) points; and "weak foundationalism," which holds that beliefs may have a partial grounding, but may be additionally justified by inference. The larger the number of these hybrid beliefs, the greater the degree of knowledge. Thus, supposedly, the infinite regress is somehow magically avoided. As Bonjour himself points out, however, only a pseudoproblem has been solved, for one still has to explain how beliefs are ultimately grounded. If inference and coherence are supposed to lend validity to terminally grounded parts, why could they not be used as criteria alone? He sees the main concept of the "basic belief" as confused and fraught with contradictions, for the notion of intuition is itself illogical. He says, "Knowledge requires epistemic justification, and the distinguishing characteristic of this particular

²² Lawrence Bonjour, "Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?" *American Philosophical Quarterly* 15 (1978) 2

species of justification is, I submit, its essential or internal relationship to the cognitive goal of truth."²³ To accept such a belief without reason he calls "epistemically irresponsible."²⁴ Justification by its very definition implies the notion of reasonableness, to which personal intuition cannot answer.

Weak foundationalism also balks at the requirement of necessity and incorrigibility, characteristics which the mathematical intuitionist seems to assume. Though the refusal to require necessity and incorrigibility appears in some ways to be a reassuring compromise, ultimately it leads to a further problem with intuition: the consistency among the intuitions of different people that is required for intelligibility. If there is truly a first premise which is intuitive and correct, then everyone must agree on the choice of that particular premise, for it remains necessarily true, although not necessarily certain (that is, objectively and rationally true although it might not be known). Mathematical intuitionists must posit the existence of only one true mathematical system, or else admit to allowing the criteria for mathematical validity to be different for each person. This second option seems unacceptable. Assuming that everyone does agree on the designation of a particular foundational belief—a rather large assumption—how would one determine that the agreement is bona fide and not simply conventional? The theory of ostensive statements "argues that to avoid an infinite regress of explanation there must be a class of statements whose meaning is explained some other way, not by correlation with other statements but by correlation with the world outside language,"²⁵ as in the empiricist theory of mathematics. Here, then, foundationalism seems reduced to an empiricist correspondence theory of mathematical knowledge (external coherence). While the purely empiricist view of mathematics, which states that all mathematical structures are gleaned from experience with physical objects, has been suggested as an alternative by thinkers such as Jean Piaget,²⁶ it is a theory that is highly unpopular and serves to explain only a very small portion of mathematics. Yet if neither an empirical nor a strictly

²³ Bonjour, "Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?" 5

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 5

²⁵ Quinton, "The Foundations of Knowledge," 60

²⁶ See Jean Piaget, *The Child's Conception of Number*, trans. C. Gattegnot and F. M. Hodgson (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), and Jean Piaget, Barbel Inhelder, and Alina Szenuska, *The Child's Conception of Geometry*, trans. E. A. Lunzer (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960)

formalistic approach is possible, we are left with a still rather vague notion of what intuitionist discovery actually is.

By claiming necessity, intuitionism hints at the strong metaphysical assumptions about mathematical entities that characterize Platonism, but ultimately can go only far enough to claim a psychological rather than an ontological necessity. The underlying metamathematical rules which end the infinite regress that plagues intuitionism can only consistently be attributed to the structure of our thinking patterns. Thus, the discovery process of intuitionism is inward and analogous to the outward discovery process of Platonism. Both claim necessity and objectivity, but does intuitionism, like Platonism, require the possibility of just one right answer? As we have stated before, the answer to this question has crucial physical implications, for physics, in assuming a Platonistic application of mathematics, has no tools with which to discriminate between two equally useful systems that may, at least theoretically, yield radically different results. Only formalism openly allows for a plurality of valid yet mutually incompatible mathematical systems. Yet Morris Kline admits,

In defense of the formalist philosophy, one must point out that it is only for the purposes of proving consistency, completeness, and other properties that mathematics is reduced to meaningless formulas. As for mathematics as a whole, even the formalists reject the idea that it is simply a game, they regard it as an objective science.²⁷

Thus assumed objectivity provides a significant bridge between the seemingly opposed ideologies of mathematical discovery (Platonism, intuitionism) and creation (formalism). In the case of formalism, however, I do not believe that objectivity necessarily entails the presence of just one system if the "objectivity" is confined to the metamathematical rules of derivation only. Again, what will differentiate between different formalist systems will be simply the intuitions one accepts as starting points.

In response to the problem of competing mathematical systems, much has been made of the impact of non-Euclidean geometry upon the Kantian ideal of geometry, which can be described as containing elements of both Platonism and intuitionism. If Plato believed the realm of the mind and the realm of objective ontological reality to be

²⁷ Morris Kline, *Mathematical Thought From Ancient to Modern Times* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), 1208.

one and the same, Kant adapted this strong metaphysics to include at least a nod to epistemological concerns. He lays out the foundations of his theory in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant believes that it is absurd for us to be able to assume that we can understand reality in the pure ontological sense, what we do understand, however, is in some fundamental way connected (that is, integrally linked) with reality. This view has particular implications for his theories of space and time, and Kant's theory of space has great importance for the development of geometry in the nineteenth century. Gauss, in fact, reportedly refused to publish his paper on non-Euclidean geometry immediately because the philosophical air at the time was saturated by Kantians.²⁸ I shall attempt to demonstrate, however, that non-Euclidean geometry and Kant's philosophy are actually quite compatible. The connection between an objective reality and our own intuitionist principles is firmly entrenched in Kant's philosophy, and this is what links him closely to Plato, if only to Plato's more imperfect way of knowing described by the cave metaphor.

In spite of Gauss's nervousness, it is not so much the presence of an alternate theory (or mathematical system) that Kant would have found so disturbing, but rather the presence of two equally logically valid (internally coherent) and equally true physically interpretive theories. Kant's theory of geometry, Platonistic in the sense of holding that our mind's intuition corresponds to the outside world of reality, has no room for competing mathematical systems. Can physics allow for this kind of flexibility without striking a death blow to the overall coherence of the grand unification that is sought? This problem, thought initially to arise from the geometry of Gauss, Bolyai, and Lobachevsky, has not made such unification impossible because their geometry is not truly competing with the standard Euclidean geometry. To date, the issue of competing mathematical systems has not yet been dealt with in physics, and thus has not yet been resolved.

In the "Transcendental Aesthetic" of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, (specifically, in section 1 on "Space") Kant uses the subject of pure mathematics as the most perfect example of his synthetic a priori, consisting not of a strict formalism but rather of absolute logical consistency coupled with what he calls "rational intuition," a leap of understanding, or "insight" (in contrast to an "empirical intuition"). Although Kant claims that this knowledge is "necessary," it is different

²⁸ Kline, *Mathematical Thought from Ancient to Modern Times*, 871

from the necessity of the tautologies produced by the analytic a priori. What the nature of its difference actually is, we will examine later. It is, in any case, a heading which denies any kind of empirical contribution. Kant makes it clear that

we shall understand by a priori knowledge, not knowledge independent of this or that experience, but knowledge absolutely independent of all experience.²⁹

While it might be supposed that this method applies to arithmetic, its claim is more tenuous for geometry, which seems to have a strong dependence on our empirically based conception of space. Kant would agree with the claim that there is an implicit connection between geometry and our understanding of space, yet he strongly denies our conception of space any epistemic grounding in the sensory world. This idea, though radically counterintuitive at first glance, proves crucial for his conviction that geometry and arithmetic fulfill the two requirements of the synthetic a priori, namely, necessity and universality.

When Kant wrote the *Critique* in the late eighteenth century the two characteristics of necessity and universality in mathematics seemed firmly entrenched and permanent in the Leibnizian literature. With the advent of a non-Euclidean geometry (and later, other alternate systems, such as Hilbert's), however, their foundations were shaken. If geometry and arithmetic are truly a priori, then there is the implication that there can be only one absolute form for their construction. To determine which form is mathematically correct (which may not necessarily mean physically accurate), a firm understanding of the basis for judgment must be established.

Given the reality of competing mathematical systems, each claiming to be free of any internal contradictions, we must again note that there can arise a multiplicity of systems based on the a priori as long as each is grounded on different premises, that is, on different primary axioms. This explanation is insufficient, however, given Kant's dependence on intuition as the sole starting point for our understanding of space and time, which, he claims, are the bases for any mathematical genesis. For intuition to have any kind of epistemological validity, it must lead only to true insight; therefore, a single insight into space and time must bring forth a single definitive insight into a single (non-arbitrary) mathematical structure. Thus, it is clear that to save the

²⁹ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A2.

validity of the a priori as a meaningful process, one must be able to prove that a certain system of arithmetic and geometry (either A_1G_2 or A_2G_2 , for instance) is the correct form or, alternatively, that our understandings of space and time are indeed grounded empirically—that is, that Kant was wrong and that A_nG_n are not derived a priori at all, leaving no problem with a possible multiplicity. To save Kant we must agree that the true test for the validity of a mathematical structure is internal consistency and elegance rather than physical applicability. We must be able to decide which of the two, A_1G_2 or A_2G_2 , is wrong and why, while maintaining that the ultimate basis of our knowledge of space and time is not empirical but rather intuitive. Perhaps the only way to save both the a priori and Kant is to be able to prove that one AG is more internally consistent than the other. Unfortunately, this is no small task, and may ultimately be inconclusive if the problem lies not with the a priori but rather with the synthesis.

Another approach is to suggest that the two geometries, while remaining synthetic a priori truths, are not mutually exclusive. We know that relativistic physics is not entirely incompatible with the laws of Newtonian physics because for most velocities, which are extremely small compared to the speed of light ($c = 3 \times 10^8$ m/s), in the Lorentz transformation ($L' = L/(1 - v^2/c^2)^{1/2}$) the denominator goes to one, and $L' = L$.³⁰ The derivation of this equation, which indirectly created the necessity for non-Euclidean geometry, is, in fact, based on visible (Euclidean) geometry, a thought experiment constructed in ordinary three-dimensional space. It thus seems logical that the two geometries be related in some way, since for some circumstances at least (for instance, the everyday macroscopic world at slow velocities), Euclidean geometry remains accurate and useful. It seems absurd simply to dismiss Euclid's geometry so easily in light of the fact that it remains intuitive. Kant would see intuitivity as the final test of a mathematical system's veracity, but again we come to the question of how strong is the necessity of intuition?

When Kant says that "all mathematical inferences proceed in accordance with the principle of contradiction,"³¹ he seems to be establishing its necessity through its a priori nature. But does the fact that

³⁰ Lorentz Transformation L = length of object at zero velocity (the length normally observed), L' = observed length at high velocity, v = velocity, c = speed of light, the highest velocity possible—at which point matter becomes energy in accordance with the equation $E = mc^2$

³¹ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A10/B14

it is noncontradictory mean that it is necessarily true? Of course not. I could say, for example, "My third child will be a daughter." This statement is not logically contradictory, but it is obviously not a statement of necessity, in contrast to an alternative statement, "My third child will be a four-sided triangle," which is necessarily impossible. Thus, it would perhaps be more accurate to say that the a priori process derives or creates all possible mathematical systems. What would be further needed to establish its necessity is the second step, namely, the synthetic or "intuition."

While the analytic a priori has the necessity of a tautology, the Kantian intuition appeals to a different kind of necessity. It seems contradictory to speak of more than one kind of necessity in this context, the only way that one could modify this modal category would be to assume that one type of necessity was stronger or weaker than the other, in which case they could not both be necessary in the true definition of the word. Part of the problem is that Kant at times seems to be flirting simultaneously with the two claims that spatial intuition is subjective, in the sense that it "underlies all outer appearances" (intuitions), and that it not only can but must correspond to the supposed objective domain.³² In other words, although empirical evidence could never bring about our understanding of space (Kant would say that it is our intuition of space that makes empirical data intelligible), neither should they contradict one another. Why is this?

The answer lies in the fact that Kant's intuition of geometry is inextricably tied to visualization, which, of course, is at least in part dependent on our ability to see. The fact that we are able to abstract and idealize geometric forms, however, shows us that we must have some underlying understanding of such fundamental properties as extension, limit, and symmetry with which to categorize and synthesize our random sensory perceptions.³³ These fundamental properties are

³² Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B39

³³ So far we have been using three-dimensional perceived space and Euclidean geometry almost interchangeably. It would be an error to presume that everything included in Euclidean geometry can be sensed empirically, however. As defined by Euclid in his primary definitions, a point (position without extension) and a line (extension without breadth) would be impossible to "see," since vision requires extension in all three dimensions. An idealization is a visualization modified by intellectual understanding of given postulates that describe it, while a generalization is a mere averaging of seen objects, for instance, imagining the "perfect" circle after having seen a thousand "imperfect" ones. The reason that the view that our knowledge of

some of the rules by which our understanding is bound simply by being human, Kant alludes to these limitations when he begins his Introduction to the *Critique* with the sentence, "There can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience."³⁴ Therefore, even when we are able through greater and greater abstraction and mathematical representation to derive scientific views of reality which are in conflict with our normal modes of perception, such as the Minkowski space-time in four dimensions, they are always conceptually explained in three-dimensional Euclidean space, with lines, warps, twists, and so forth. Thus it must be questioned whether the scientific reality that has been derived mathematically presumes to describe actual space independently of how we perceive it, at last free from our sensory limitations, or whether what it concludes is a mathematical analogy of our same three-dimensional understanding, but presented in a different way for mathematical simplicity in describing observed empirical phenomena. For while the theories, manipulations, and explanations may be possible in any dimension mathematically, experiments are actually always constructed and their results physically measured or interpreted by human beings with these conceptual limitations. Therefore physics, by virtue of being physics (requiring empirical verification subject finally to our senses, no matter how augmented they may be) and not solely mathematics (requiring no empirical verification), must always have one foot firmly grounded in our intuition of space, understood as Euclidean.³⁵ Since Kant recognizes correspondence with human intuition of space as the final test of a true geometry, the emergence of a non-Euclidean geometry should not affect his position. Furthermore, the emergence of this particular

geometric forms is obtained by generalization is incorrect is that we would never be able even to identify the imperfect circle as imperfect, much less see the connection between different imperfect circles, unless we already had the mental idealization of that circle.

³⁴ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B1. This is a response, then, to our earlier question about the respective necessities of the analytic and the synthetic. The former contains an objective necessity: a tautology is necessary by virtue of its being known. The latter is a subjective necessity which arises from the relation of the knower to the proposition and makes no claims about the object's status independent of our knowledge of it.

³⁵ Even "objective" experimentation ultimately takes into account our perspective and relates the object back to us. Einstein's relativity theory demonstrated this idea graphically for the scientific world when it proved the absence of absolute space, that is, of a perspectiveless point of reference for all observers.

non-Euclidean geometry does not affect our position either, for since the two geometries are not actually competing to explain the same phenomena (not only because they are restricted to different parameters of magnitude, as with quantum versus classical mechanics, but also and more crucially because the structure of relativity theory allows for a connection with Euclidean geometry at some common level), we as of yet have no model with which to test the hypothesis of physically useful yet contradictory mathematical systems

In summation, we review the possibilities for physics. The formalist seeks to give a clear account of mathematical structure, and to define which moves are acceptable and which are not. This would seem to be beneficial for physics, yet by allowing for a multiplicity of equally valid systems and by concentrating upon tautological consistency, the formalist introduces elements of incoherence into the larger structure of physics and limits enormously the scope of mathematics which is already used. The mathematical intuitionist shares the Platonistic assumption of a single true mathematics by requiring only moves that are intuitively obvious (being logically unambiguously specified by the previous step) and by postulating single true principles as starting points. Kronecker, for instance, referred to whole numbers as the "works of God," although the origins of the mathematical entities derived from these whole numbers were less well articulated.³⁶ There is a question as to whether the mathematical intuitionist is involved in an epistemological or psychological endeavor, or whether the objectivity for which he or she strives goes beyond his or her own existence. We also must further inquire as to the possibility of more than one valid mathematical system derived on intuitionist principles by mathematicians with different intuitions. This would, again, introduce physical incoherence. The mathematical formalist evaluates seemingly without foundations—an approach that initially bypasses the problem of infinite regress—yet we find that the formalist's evaluative structures of derivation have what are ultimately intuitionist foundations. Even the empiricist must demonstrate by what virtue different manifestations fall under one abstraction coherently. To use the language with which we began, the physicists' project requires a mathematics which possesses both internal and external coherence; that is, it must be internally consistent, and its propositions must not

³⁶ See Kline, *Mathematical Thought from Ancient to Modern Times*, 1197

be reduced to “meaningless formulae.” Rather, they should be able to describe the physical world

It is my argument that the primary physical assumption made about mathematics is one that is essentially Platonistic in form, and that the absence of this assumption would have a profound influence upon the structure of physics. Physics would then have to discriminate between two equally useful or elegant systems, while the adoption of either system could alter the course of physical examination because each system possesses differing processes of derivation. This is a discrimination for which physics is as of yet ill-equipped, and which it has not yet had to make. Even accepting the Platonic view, physicists will still need to determine their own boundaries for the Principle of Totality, and thus to decide which mathematical entities and processes they will understand as valid. Although the old, more empirically based physics also left us problems concerning the fittingness of its mathematical language, it is the fundamental change in method, with a renewed emphasis (harkening back to the Greeks) on the aesthetic and the theoretical, that makes the investigation of hitherto unquestioned physical assumptions about the mathematics it utilizes mandatory.³⁷

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³⁷ I wish to express my thanks to Dr. Paul Weiss, Dr. Timothy Eastman, and Mr. Baruch Kfia for their helpful comments and criticisms.

THOMISTS AND THOMAS AQUINAS ON THE FOUNDATION OF MATHEMATICS

ARMAND MAURER

I

SOME MODERN THOMISTS, claiming to follow the lead of Thomas Aquinas, hold that the objects of the types of mathematics known in the thirteenth century, such as the arithmetic of whole numbers and Euclidean geometry, are real entities. In scholastic terms they are not beings of reason (*entia rationis*) but real beings (*entia realia*). In his once-popular scholastic manual, *Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae*, Joseph Gredt maintains that, according to Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, the object of mathematics is real quantity, either discrete quantity in arithmetic or continuous quantity in geometry. The mathematician considers the essence of quantity in abstraction from its relation to real existence in bodily substance. "When quantity is considered in this way," he writes, "it is not a being of reason (*ens rationis*) but a real being (*ens reale*). Nevertheless it is so abstractly considered that it leaves out of account both real and conceptual existence." Recent mathematicians, Gredt continues, extend their speculation to fictitious quantity, which has conceptual but not real being, for example, the fourth dimension, which by its essence positively excludes a relation to real existence. According to Gredt this is a special, transcendental mathematics essentially distinct from "real mathematics," and belonging to it only by reduction.¹

¹ "Obiectum Matheseos est quantitas realis ita tamen secundum quidditatem suam abstracte et inadaequate considerata, ut non dicat ordinem ad esse reale in substantia corporea seu in ente mobili. Quantitas ita considerata non est quidem ens rationis, sed ens reale, tamen ita abstracte consideratur, ut abstrahat etiam ab esse reali et esse rationis. Recentes mathematici speculationem mathematicam usque ad quantitatem fictam extendunt, quae non est ens reale, sed rationis tantum, ut est quarta dimensio, quae secundum essentiam suam positive excludit ordinem ad esse reale. Ita constituitur Mathesis quaedam specialis, quae vocatur Mathesis transcendentalis et quae a Mathesi reali essentialiter distinguitur neque ad eam pertinet nisi reductively", Joseph Gredt, *Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae*, 5th ed (Freiburg Herder, 1929) 1194

Jacques Maritain read the works of Gredt, including his *Elementa*, and in his magistral *Degrees of Knowledge* he agrees with Gredt that at least the objects of Euclidean geometry and the arithmetic of whole numbers are *entia realia* in distinction to the objects of modern types of mathematics, which he calls *entia rationis*. The objects of the former types of mathematics, Maritain says, are real in the philosophical sense that they can exist outside the mind in the physical world, whereas the objects of the newer types of mathematics cannot so exist. A point, a line, and a whole number are real beings, but not irrational numbers or the constructions of non-Euclidean geometries.²

Delving more deeply than Gredt into the nature of mathematics, Maritain stresses that when the mathematician conceives his objects they acquire an ideal purity in his mind which they lack in their real existence. By abstracting these entities from the sensible world the intellect idealizes them in such a way that not only their mode of being but their very definition is affected. There are no points, lines, or whole numbers in the real world with the conditions proper to mathematical abstraction.³ Maritain also describes the purification or idealization of quantity in mathematics as a construction or reconstruction. He writes in his *Preface to Metaphysics*, "Quantity [in mathematics] is not now studied as a real accident of corporeal substance, but as the common material of entities reconstructed or constructed by the reason. Nevertheless even when thus idealized it remains something corporeal, continues to bear in itself witness of the matter whence it is derived."⁴ He makes the same point in the *Degrees of Knowledge*: "In . . . mathematical knowledge, the mind grasps entities it has drawn from sensible data or which it has built on them. It grasps them through their constitutive elements, and constructs or reconstructs them on the same level. These things in the real [world] (when they are *entia realia*) are accidents or properties of bodies, but the mind treats them as

² Jacques Maritain, *Distinguish to Unite, or, The Degrees of Knowledge*, trans. under the supervision of Gerald B. Phelan (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1959), 145–6. Maritain refers to Gredt's *Elementa* on p. 460.

³ *Ibid.*, 166.

⁴ Jacques Maritain, *A Preface to Metaphysics* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1943), 82.

though they were subsistent beings and *as though* the notion it makes of them were free of any experimental origin.”⁵

In *The Philosophy of Mathematics* Edward Maziarz sees the essence of the scientific habit of mathematical abstraction as the mind’s becoming “conformable and identifiable to the nature of substance solely as quantified”⁶ He hastens to assure us that the objects of mathematics are not completely discovered in nature, as the scientist discovers the properties of the elements, but neither are they pure products of the mind The mind, he says, discovers quantified substance in nature and “inducts” mathematical entities with the help of the imagination It is only in the imagination and not in extramental reality that the objects of mathematics as such exist Thus the universe of the mathematician is one of imaginative construction and invention with the materials of experience⁷

Does this mean that these objects are purely fictitious? Not at all according to Maziarz. Mathematics is not an innate or sheerly self-creative affair, as the idealist would have it. Experience furnishes at least the point of departure for mathematics For this reason Maziarz does not regard a mathematical object as a logical entity or *ens rationis* but as an *ens naturae* Referring to Maritain’s *The Degrees of Knowledge*, he calls these entities *entia realia* He goes beyond Maritain, however, in claiming that the objects of modern mathematics are also real entities⁸

Taking up a suggestion of John of St Thomas, Yves Simon, a distinguished pupil of Maritain, places the objects of mathematics somewhere between real beings and beings of reason. On the one hand, he asserts that mathematics is not an ontology of real quantity On the other hand, he is equally insistent that mathematical entities are not beings of reason, for this would imply that none can have physical counterparts On the contrary the square root of sixteen

⁵ Maritain, *The Degrees of Knowledge*, 32 In *The Range of Reason*, Maritain writes of science using as its instruments “explanatory symbols which are ideal entities (*entia rationis*) founded on reality, above all mathematical entities built on the observations and measurements collected by the senses”, Jacques Maritain, *The Range of Reason*, (London Geoffrey Bles, 1953), 32 See also p 36

⁶ Edward Maziarz, *The Philosophy of Mathematics* (New York Philosophical Library, 1950), 194 On pp 208–209, however, the mathematical nature is said to be “treated as if it were a substantial thing”

⁷ *Ibid*, 240

⁸ *Ibid*, 208 See also p 227 n 125

does have such a counterpart, though the square root of minus one does not. All mathematical objects, however, have an element of unreality, which Simon calls a "condition of reason", for they abstract from sensible qualities and primary matter, which makes it impossible for them, as mathematical, to exist outside the mind. They are said enigmatically to exist "beside the world of reality."⁹

Simon quotes John of St. Thomas's statement that mathematical quantity admits of real and true being, indeed, it does not exclude the reality of quantity itself. In this respect it differs from purely imaginary quantity, which is a being of reason. "Mathematical quantity," says John of St. Thomas, "is not determinately a being of reason, neither is it determinately a real being, but it is indifferent to either condition and admits of either of them."¹⁰

Some Thomists interpret Aquinas as teaching that the objects of mathematics not only have counterparts in the real world but are in fact the real quantities of bodies abstracted from them. Thomas Anderson writes that the mathematician studies real quantities, though not precisely as real. Like the philosopher of nature he treats of physical quantities, but unlike the philosopher of nature he does so in abstraction from the sensible qualities and motions of natural things. Furthermore, since quantity is an accident of substance and is only intelligible as such, quantity must enter into the object of mathematics.¹¹ Though Anderson states that mathematics treats of real quantities, he grants with John of St. Thomas that "mathematical entities, as Thomas describes them, are sort of intermediate beings, i.e. they are neither purely beings of reason nor real beings, but share features of both."¹²

That mathematics—more exactly geometry—is a science of the real world is the theme of Vincent Smith's Aquinas Lecture, *St. Thomas*

⁹ Yves Simon, "Nature and the Process of Mathematical Abstraction," *The Thomist* 29 (1965) 135 n. 23. Commenting on Maritain's philosophy of mathematics, Simon describes Maritain's conception of a mathematical object as "a *pre-ter-real* entity always affected by some *conditio rationis* and which often turns out to be a mere *ens rationis* with a foundation in the real", Yves Simon, "Maritain's Philosophy of the Sciences," in *The Philosophy of Physics*, ed. Vincent E. Smith (Jamaica: St. John's University Press, 1961), 36.

¹⁰ Simon, "Nature and the Process," 135–6 n. 23. See also John of St. Thomas, *Cursus theologicus*, disp. 6, a. 2 (Paris: Desclée, 1931) 1534 n. 20.

¹¹ Thomas C. Anderson, "Intelligible Matter and the Objects of Mathematics in Aquinas," *The New Scholasticism* 43 (1969) 555–76.

¹² *Ibid.*, 559 n. 13.

on the Object of Geometry How can it be called a science, he asks, if it is not a study of the real world?¹³ In fact, geometry studies substance along with its dimensions of quantity, and this is something real. Its objects, he writes, "exist in the sensible world although they are not thought of mathematically as bearing this existence."¹⁴ He concludes his lecture with the statement, "Euclidean geometry is the science of what is real but not physical, imaginable but not sensible, truly essential but not natural and mobile."¹⁵ In his *Science and Philosophy* he presents a similar realistic view of mathematics. Contrary to Bertrand Russell's conception of mathematics as an affair of logic and David Hilbert's view of mathematics as a linguistic or symbolic system, he insists that the subject of mathematics is quantified being—something that exists in matter though it is not thought of as so existing.¹⁶

From this brief survey of some of the leading Thomistic interpretations of Aquinas's conception of mathematics it is readily apparent that there are significant differences among them. The Thomists generally agree that in Aquinas's view the objects of mathematics are not purely mental beings or constructs but forms of quantity, either continuous or discrete, such as circles, triangles, and numbers. The mind abstracts these forms from sensible matter. There is general consensus that these objects are real, for they exist in the external world. Most qualify this by adding that there is also an element of unreality in the object of mathematics: they are reconstructed in the mind, or they do not exist in reality as mathematical objects, or they are subject to a "condition of reason." It is not clear, however, how the reality and unreality of these objects can be reconciled.

Some Thomists contend that, since the object of mathematics is real quantity, it cannot be abstracted from substance, on which it depends for its being and intelligibility. Others see no place for substance, in the categorical sense, in the object, for this would imply that

¹³ Vincent E. Smith, *St. Thomas on the Object of Geometry* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1954), 65.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 66.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 84.

¹⁶ Vincent E. Smith, *Science and Philosophy* (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1965), 219. See also Vincent E. Smith, *Philosophical Physics* (New York: Harper and Row, 1950), 11–12.

the object is a subsistent entity.¹⁷ It will be recalled that Maritain holds that the mathematician treats of quantity *as though* it were a subsistent being¹⁸

II

Both the Thomists who insist on the reality of the object of mathematics and those who regard that object as containing an element of unreality, such as a reconstruction by the mind or a "condition of reason," find support for their interpretations in the works of Aquinas. In his commentary on the *De Trinitate* of Boethius (1258-59; his earliest and most extended treatment of the subject), he describes pure mathematics as the science of abstract quantity and its properties, such as the circle and triangle.¹⁹ Geometry considers magnitude and arithmetic number.²⁰ Mathematical objects, such as lines and numbers, are said to depend on sensible matter for their existence but not for our knowledge of them, for they do not include this sort of matter in their definitions.²¹ Following Boethius, Aquinas distinguishes between the theoretical sciences of physics, mathematics, and divine science (namely, metaphysics) by the kind of form which they study. Mathematics is said to concern the form of quantity, and its mode of abstraction is called the abstraction of form (*abstractio formae*).²² Quantity is understood as the first accidental form inhering in substance. Since quantity depends on substance for its existence and intelligibility, the mathematician cannot abstract it from substance but only from the sensible qualities and movements of bodies.²³

¹⁷ For Aquinas's notion of substance see *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum* 2, d 3, q 1, a 6, ed P Mandonnet (Paris Lethielleux, 1929), 2 103. See also Etienne Gilson, "Quasi Definitio Substantiae," in *St Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974 Commemorative Studies*, ed Armand Maurer (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974), 1 111-29.

¹⁸ See note 5 above.

¹⁹ *Expositio super librum Boethii De Trinitate* (hereafter *EBT*), q 5, a 3, ed Bruno Decker (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1955), 184 20-22, *The Division and Methods of the Sciences*, trans Armand Maurer, 4th ed (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1986), 38-9.

²⁰ *EBT*, q 5, a 3, ad 6, 188 25, *Division and Methods*, 44.

²¹ *EBT*, q 5, a 1, 165 21-24, *Division and Methods*, 14.

²² *EBT*, q 5, a 3, 186 16-18, *Division and Methods*, 41.

²³ *EBT*, q 5, a 3, 184 2-186 12, *Division and Methods*, 37-40.

The presence of substance in the object of mathematics is also required as the intelligible matter of quantity. As Aristotle maintains, there must be some matter wherever there is form instantiated in several individuals.²⁴ Since there are many mathematical circles, triangles, and numbers, there must be a material principle of individuation in mathematics, not perceptible to the senses but known by the intellect. This principle, according to Aquinas, is substance.²⁵ The notion of substance as the intelligible matter of quantity also appears in Aquinas's *Summa theologiae* and his commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*.²⁶ It should be noticed, however, that in his commentaries on the *Metaphysics* and *De anima* it is not substance but the continuum, surface, or body that is said to be the intelligible matter of mathematical forms.²⁷ This conforms to Aristotle's use of the term, for example, he calls the generic notion of plane figure the intelligible matter of the circle.²⁸

This description of the object of mathematics in terms of the form of quantity and its underlying substance easily lends itself to a realist interpretation of mathematics. As the physicist treats of material substance with its sensible qualities and actions, so it would seem the mathematician takes for his domain substance with quantity, abstracting from the sensible qualities and active and passive properties of bodies. The object of mathematics would appear to be a real substantial entity characterized only by the form of quantity.

Aquinas's commentaries on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and *Physics* also lend themselves to a realist point of view in mathematics. In the former commentary the forms of figures, such as circles or triangles, are said to exist in the continuum or body as the form of human nature

²⁴ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 7.10 1036a9–12, 7.11 1037a4–5. For Aristotle's notion of intelligible matter see Hippocrates G. Apostle, *Aristotle's Philosophy of Mathematics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), 50–2, 106, and Joseph Owens, *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics*, 3d ed. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1978), 342–3.

²⁵ *EBT*, q. 5, a. 3, 184.16–20, q. 5, a. 3, ad 2, 187.2–13, *Division and Methods*, 38, 42.

²⁶ *Summa Theologiae* (hereafter *ST*) I, q. 85, a. 1, ad 2, *Sententia super Physicam* 2, lect. 3, n. 332, ed. Angelus M. Pirota (Naples: M. d'Auria Pontificus, 1953).

²⁷ *Sententia super Metaphysicam* 7, lect. 11, n. 1508, ed. M.-R. Cathala and R. M. Spiazzi (Turin: Marietti, 1950). See also lect. 10, n. 1496, and *Sententia super De anima* 3, lect. 8, n. 714, ed. Pirota (Turin: Marietti, 1938).

²⁸ *Metaphysics* 8.6 1045a33–35.

exists in the organic body²⁹ In the latter commentary physics and mathematics are said to have the same objects of inquiry—for example, points, lines, and surfaces—but they consider them in different ways Physics, he says, studies them as the termini of natural bodies, whereas mathematics studies them in abstraction from these bodies and their motions³⁰ Statements such as these would lead to the conclusion that for Aquinas the objects of mathematics, like those of physics, are found in the real world, in short, that they are *extra realia*

Along with these statements we find others in the same works of Aquinas implying that the objects of mathematics are abstracted in such a way that, as Maritain says, they are affected not only in their mode of existing but in their very definition³¹ The fact that a mathematical line has only one dimension—length without breadth—gives it properties different from those of a real or natural line Aquinas recognizes that, although lines and circles exist in the real world, they are not of the same sort as those studied by mathematics.³² He points out that Aristotle was aware of this, for he realized that in geometry a straight line and a circle have properties that do not belong to real circles and lines For example, in Euclid's geometry a straight line touches a circle at only one point, but this is not true of a real circle and straight line³³

Aquinas clearly differentiates between properties of the real world and those of mathematical objects when he explains how Christ could have entered his disciples' room while the doors were shut This seems to be contrary to the principles of geometry, for two mathematical straight lines cannot coincide but must differ in place, each having its own starting point and end point When Christ passed through the closed door, at that moment two bodies occupied the same

²⁹ *In VII Metaph*, lect 10, n 1496

³⁰ *In II Phys*, lect 3, n 329

³¹ See note 3 above Anderson lists texts of Aquinas and works on Aquinas that "say in effect that mathematics exist with their specific characteristics only in the mind of the mathematician", Anderson "Intelligible Matter and the Objects of Mathematics in Aquinas," 558 n 10

³² *In III Metaph*, lect 7, n 416, 11, lect 1, n 2161 The statement is in an objection, but Aquinas does not deny it He only denies Plato's position that there are separately existing objects of mathematics

³³ *EBT*, q 6, a 2, 216 20–26, *Division and Methods*, 78 See Aristotle, *De anima* 1 1 403a12–16, *Metaphysics* 3 2 997b35–998a4 The tangency of a straight line to a circle at only one point is demonstrated by Euclid, *Elements* 3, prop 15, 16, as Aquinas points out, *In III Metaph*, lect 7, n 416

place, and two lines of these bodies terminated at only two points, and each line at the same two points. Since this contradicts the notion of a mathematical straight line, God would have done what is mathematically impossible.

In replying, Aquinas distinguishes between mathematical and natural lines. The former must be distinct in place, so that two lines of this sort cannot be thought of as coinciding. Two natural lines, on the contrary, are distinct in the bodies in which they exist. Now, if we assume that two bodies exist in the same place, as in the miracle of Christ's entering the room with the doors shut, it follows that two lines, two points, and two surfaces, coincide. This could only happen by a miracle, but the miracle did not violate the principles of mathematics.³⁴ This shows that Aquinas clearly conceives the objects of mathematics as having properties quite different from those of nature or reality.

This is true not only in geometry but also in arithmetic. Aquinas distinguishes between a multitude that is numbered or numerable and the number by which we number it. In a sense things numbered or numerable can be called a number, as we speak of ten men or horses. Number itself, however, is that by which they are numbered. Thus numeration or counting is an act of the human mind. The existence of the multitude is due to the divine mind, its numeration is owing to ours.³⁵

Numbers themselves originate through an act of our mind. For Aquinas, neither zero nor one is a number, one is the starting point of what today are called natural numbers.³⁶ Each natural number is an aggregate of ones, produced by adding one to its immediate predecessor, for example, four is produced by adding one to three. In other words, each number is caused by taking one several times.³⁷ Number is also said to be caused by the division of the continuum, but this seems to be number in the sense of a numbered or numerable multitude.³⁸ Number itself, while presupposing this multitude, depends on

³⁴ *De potentia*, q 1, a 3, *sed contra* 8 and reply, ed Paul M. Pession (Turin: Marietti, 1953). See also *In IV Sent.*, q 2, a 2, sol 3, ad 2 (Paris: Vivès, 1874), 11 325.

³⁵ *In IV Phys.*, lect 23, n 1209, lect 17, n 1113, and *In VII Metaph.*, lect 3, n 1722.

³⁶ *ST I*, q 11, a 1, ad 1.

³⁷ *In V Metaph.*, lect 17, n 1020.

³⁸ *De potentia*, q 1, a 16, ad 3.

an act of the mind. Incidentally, Aquinas would not agree with Kronecker's saying that God made the whole numbers but all the others are the work of humans. In fact we make all of them.

From this it seems clear that, in Aquinas's opinion, the objects of mathematics are not simply abstracted from the real world but owe their existence to a constructive or reconstructive activity of the mind.

It is not immediately clear, however, how this view of mathematics can be reconciled with the statements of Aquinas cited above, which seem to imply a realist interpretation of mathematics. If the objects of mathematics have properties different from those of nature or reality, and if they differ from it even in their definitions, how can they be said in any sense to exist in the real world or be abstracted from it?

In a neglected *quaestio disputata* Aquinas approaches the object of mathematics in a new and original way which offers a possible solution to these problems. Composed at Rome between 1265 and 1267, Aquinas regarded the *quaestio* as so important that he inserted it into his commentary on the *Sentences*, which he had written a decade earlier (1252-1256).³⁹ Thus the *quaestio* dates from his mature years, when he was a master in theology, unlike the rest of the commentary, which he wrote as a bachelor of the *Sentences*.⁴⁰ It cannot be dismissed, therefore, as an early expression of Aquinas's teaching on mathematics.

In the *quaestio* Aquinas inquires into the distinction between divine attributes, like goodness and wisdom, and their possible foundation in God. We are not concerned here with his reconciliation of the plurality of these attributes with the absolute oneness of God.

³⁹ It is so important, Aquinas says, that practically nothing in book 1 of the *Sentences* can be understood without it. See *In I Sent*, d. 2, q. 1, a. 3, sol., ed. Mandonnet, 166.

⁴⁰ *Ibid*, d. 2, q. 1, a. 3, ed. Mandonnet 163-72. On the origin and authenticity of this *quaestio* see Antoine Dondaine, "Saint Thomas et la dispute des attributs divins (I *Sent* d. 2, a. 3) authenticité et origine," *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 8 (1938) 253-62. For an analysis of the notion of mathematics in this *quaestio* see my article, "A Neglected Thomistic Text on the Foundation of Mathematics," *Mediaeval Studies* 21 (1959) 185-92, reprinted in Armand Maurer, *Being and Knowing Studies in Thomas Aquinas and Later Medieval Philosophers* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1990), 33-41. The *quaestio disputata* has been a part of Aquinas's commentary on the *Sentences* since his own day, but for the sake of convenience I shall refer to it simply as the *quaestio*.

What is of importance for our subject is his threefold distinction between the ways concepts are related to extramental reality. (1) A concept may be a likeness of a reality outside the mind, for example "man." A concept of this sort has an immediate foundation in extramental reality: the reality causes the truth of the concept through the conformity of mind and reality, and the term signifying the concept is properly predicated of the reality. (2) A concept may not be a likeness of an extramental reality, but the mind may devise (*adinvenit*) it as a consequence of our way of knowing extramental reality. A concept of this sort has only a remote foundation in reality, its immediate basis is an activity of the mind itself. An example is the concept of genus. There is nothing outside the mind corresponding to this concept, but from the fact that we know there are many species of animals we attribute to animal the notion of genus. The proximate foundation of a concept of this sort is a constructive act of the mind; but the concept has a remote basis in the extramental world, so the mind is not mistaken in forming it. Another example of this type of concept suggested by Aquinas is the abstraction of the mathematicians, or the abstraction of mathematics (*abstractio mathematicorum*). He is not referring to the mathematician's act of abstracting but to the mathematical concept or *intentio* he forms by means of this act. But more about this later. (3) A concept may have neither a proximate nor a remote foundation in reality, like the concept of a chimera. This is not a likeness of anything in the world, nor do we form it as a consequence of our way of knowing the world. Hence Aquinas calls it a false concept.⁴¹

⁴¹ "Unde sciendum, quod ipsa conceptio intellectus tripliciter se habet ad rem quae est extra animam. Aliquando enim hoc quod intellectus concipit, est similitudo rei existentis extra animam, sicut hoc quod concipitur de hoc nomine 'homo', et talis conceptio intellectus habet fundamentum in re immediate, in quantum res ipsa, ex sua conformitate ad intellectum, facit quod intellectus sit verus, et quod nomen significans illum intellectum proprie de re dicatur. Aliquando autem hoc quod significat nomen non est similitudo rei existentis extra animam, sed est aliquid quod consequitur ex modo intelligendi rem quae est extra animam, et huiusmodi sunt intentiones quas intellectus noster adinvenit, sicut significatum huius nominis 'genus' non est similitudo alicujus rei extra animam existentis, sed ex hoc quod intellectus intelligit animal ut in pluribus speciebus, attribuit ei intentionem generis[,] et huiusmodi intentionis licet proximum fundamentum non sit in re, sed in intellectu, tamen remotum fundamentum est res ipsa. Unde intellectus non est falsus, qui has intentiones adinvenit. Et simile est de omnibus aliis qui consequuntur ex modo intelligendi, sicut est abstractio mathematicorum et

When Aquinas first commented on the *Sentences* a decade before he wrote the *quaestio* we have been following, he made a similar distinction between three orders of "things signified by names" (1) those having a complete being in extramental reality, like man and stone, (2) those having no being at all in reality outside the mind, like dreams and the image of a chimera, (3) those having a foundation in extramental reality but whose notions are completed by an act of the mind. Aquinas gives as an example of the latter type of concept a universal, such as a species. Humanity, for instance, is something real, but outside the mind it does not have the nature of a universal, for there is no common humanity in the external world. When the mind forms the notion of humanity, however, it acts upon it and adds to it the meaning (*intentio*) of a species. The same is true of time, continues Aquinas. It has a basis in the before and after of motion, but its formal character as time, namely the numbering of the before and after, is completed by an act of the mind. Truth also has a foundation in reality, primarily the being (*esse*) of things, but its notion (*ratio*) is completed by an act of the mind, when it knows things such as they are.⁴²

Aquinas here distinguishes between the same three orders of concepts that he described in the *quaestio* on the divine attributes.

hujusmodi. Aliquando vero id quod significatur per nomen, non habet fundamentum in re, neque proximum, neque remotum, sicut conceptio chimerae quia neque est similitudo alicujus rei extra animam, neque consequitur ex modo intelligendi rem aliquam vere et ideo ista conceptio est falsa", *In I Sent.*, d. 2, q. 1, a. 3, ed. Mandonnet 167. For an analysis of this text from the viewpoint of logic see Robert W. Schmidt, *The Domain of Logic according to Saint Thomas Aquinas* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), 85–9.

⁴² "Respondeo dicendum, quod eorum quae significantur nominibus, invenitur triplex diversitas. Quaedam enim sunt quae secundum esse totum completum sunt extra animam, et hujusmodi sunt entia completa, sicut homo et lapis. Quaedam autem sunt quae nihil habent extra animam, sicut somnia et imaginatio chimerae. Quaedam autem sunt quae habent fundamentum in re extra animam, sed complementum rationis eorum quantum ad id quod est formale, est per operationem animae, ut patet in universali. Humanitas enim est aliquid in re, non tamen ibi habet rationem universalis, cum non sit extra animam aliqua humanitas multis communis, sed secundum quod accipitur in intellectu, adjungitur ei per operationem intellectus intentio, secundum quam dicitur species et similiter est de tempore, quod habet fundamentum in motu, scilicet prius et posterius ipsius motus, sed quantum ad id quod est formale in tempore, scilicet numeratio, completur per operationem intellectus numerantis. Similiter dico de veritate, quod habet fundamentum in re, sed ratio ejus completur per actionem intellectus, quando scilicet apprehenditur eo modo quo est", *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ed. Mandonnet, 1486. See also *De potentia Dei* q. 7, a. 6, Schmidt, *The Domain of Logic*, 82–5.

Unlike the *quaestio*, this passage does not mention mathematical concepts as an example of notions with a foundation in reality but completed by an act of the mind. They readily fit into this category, however, as does the logical notion of species or genus.

The language of the two passages is somewhat different. The notions in this category are here said to be "completed" by an act of the mind in order to achieve their formal character. In the *quaestio* an act of the mind "devises" (*adīnvenit*) them on a real foundation. It would seem, however, to be the same mental act that does the devising and completing. This act results in an *ens rationis*, not an *ens reale*. Aquinas regularly describes an *ens rationis* as a being that the mind does not discover in reality but devises (*adīnvenit*) as a consequence of knowing reality.⁴³ He uses this term of logical notions and others, for example, the craftsman's idea of what he intends to make.⁴⁴ Among them he places the objects of mathematics, as mental elaborations remotely based on real quantity but proximately on the mind's constructive activity.

If this be true, for Aquinas the mode of abstraction in mathematics is only analogous to the modes employed in the other sciences. Like abstraction in general, it is a way of knowing in which the mind considers one aspect of a thing, leaving out of consideration other aspects of the same thing.⁴⁵ Specifically, it considers the quantity of bodies, abstracting from their sensible qualities and motions. But the abstraction is constructive or complete as well as selective. The mind must add to the real foundation of the mathematical notion and complete its formal character, as it does with the notions of species, universal, time, and truth. None of these, Aquinas has told us, enjoys a complete being in extramental reality. They have a foundation there, but their formal character comes from the mind. The same would seem to be true of mathematical notions.

In this new notion of mathematical objects real substance does not play an intrinsic role as the intelligible matter of quantity. Intelligible

⁴³ "Ens autem rationis dicitur proprie de illis intentionibus, quas ratio adīnvenit in rebus consideratis, sicut intentio generis, speciei et similium, quae quidem non inveniuntur in rerum natura, sed considerationem rationis consequuntur", *In IV Metaph*, lect. 4, n. 574. It should be noted that here Aquinas asserts that beings of reason are properly the subject of logic. For the meaning of *ens rationis* see Schmidt, *The Domain of Logic*, 75–93.

⁴⁴ *Quodlibet*, q. 8, a. 1, ed. R. Spiazzi (Turin: Marietti, 1949), 162.

⁴⁵ *EBT*, q. 5, a. 3, 183.26–184.3, *Division and Methods*, 37.

matter is within the order of quantity itself, where it is placed by Aristotle and sometimes by Aquinas himself when commenting on his works.⁴⁶ The mathematical object is still essentially related to substance, however, for sensible substance is the remote reality from which it is abstracted

There are important consequences of Aquinas's placing the notions of mathematics in the second order of his *quaestio disputata* instead of the first. Unlike concepts on the first level, those on the second do not properly speaking exist outside the mind. Their proper subject of existence is the mind itself. They are not signs of anything in the external world. Hence mathematical terms cannot properly be predicated of anything real: there is no referent in the external world for a mathematical line, circle, or number. Finally, mathematical notions are not false; but neither are they said to be true, in that they conform to anything outside the mind. Aquinas does not suggest that they might be true in some other sense

The originality of this notion of mathematics should not go unnoticed. It seems to have had few, if any, precedents in the Middle Ages, and to the best of my knowledge none that placed logic and mathematics in the same order in relation to the real world.⁴⁷ It has the important advantage of enabling the Thomist to reconcile the real and unreal features of the mathematical object: it is real in its remote foundation in the sensible world, but it is unreal in the construction or completion the mind adds to it through its act of abstraction

III

Not long after the death of Aquinas his views on mathematics in the *quaestio disputata* were challenged by Giles of Rome (1247–1316),

⁴⁶ See notes 27 and 28 above

⁴⁷ Andrew Molland shows that Albert the Great, Aquinas's teacher, places mathematics in the real order, but that he strongly inclines towards a conceptualist view of mathematics, Andrew G. Molland, "Mathematics in the Thought of Albertus Magnus," *Albertus Magnus and the Sciences* Commemorative Essays 1980, ed. James A. Weisheipl (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1980) 466–7. Molland quotes Albert, on pp. 469–70 "Many of the geometers' figures are in no way found in natural bodies", Albert, *Physica* 3, tr. 2, c. 17, ed. A. Borget, *Opera omnia* (Paris: Vivès, 1890). Augustine, in a Platonic vein, differentiates between thin lines, which are like a spider's web, and the lines of pure mathematics, which the eye does not see and which are known within ourselves, also between the numbers by which we count and mathematical numbers (See Augustine, *Confessions* 10.12.19). I owe the reference to Augustine to Edward Synan.

a member of the Hermits of St. Augustine. Giles studied under Aquinas in Paris in 1269–1272, shortly after the latter had left Rome, where he had disputed the *quaestio* on the divine attributes. Giles is best known for teaching that in creatures essence and existence are not, as Aquinas taught, two principles of a being, but two things (*res*).⁴⁸

In his own commentary on the *Sentences* Giles takes notice of Aquinas's *quaestio* and heartily disagrees with it. He quotes almost verbatim the passage in which Aquinas distinguished between three orders of concepts: those with an immediate foundation in reality, those with only a remote foundation, and those with no foundation at all. He notes that Aquinas placed the conceptions of natural things and the divine attributes in the first order, logical and mathematical conceptions in the second. But according to Giles this misconstrues both the divine attributes and the objects of mathematics. Perfections truly exist in God and in a higher way than in creatures, he says, but when we affirm them of God our affirmations fall short of their object. When I understand the divine wisdom, the divine essence furnishes an immediate foundation for my knowledge as regards the reality I understand (*quantum ad rem intellectam*), but not for my way of knowing it (*quantum ad intelligendi modum*), for wisdom does not exist in God as we understand it. Our conceptions of God are not like those of natural things but rather like conceptions of mathematics. A mathematical line, Giles continues, has an immediate foundation in a natural line as regards the *thing* that is understood, for a mathematical line exists in the natural world. But *my way of understanding* it does not have an immediate foundation in reality, for I know it without the sensible and qualitative matter with which it exists in that world. My way of knowing it has only a remote foundation in reality, like all "second intentions." The remote foundation for my knowing mathematics is the fact that quantity lends itself to be abstracted from quality and the imaginable from the sensible.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de esse et essentia*, ed. E. Hocedez (Louvain: Museum Lessianum, 1930). See Etienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, trans. L. K. Shook (New York: Random House, 1956), 369.

⁴⁹ "Cum intelligo lineam mathematicam, isti conceptioni intellectus quantum ad rem respondet linea naturalis etiam ut fundamentum immediatum, quia linea mathematica esse habet in re naturali. Sed quantum ad modum intelligendi non respondet ei aliquid immediatum fundamentum in re, quia licet linea mathematica sit in re naturali et illam intelligam, tamen non habet esse sine materia quali vel sensibili, quam tamen sine materia quali et sensibili

Consequently, to the three classes of concepts distinguished by Aquinas Giles adds a fourth, in between concepts with an immediate foundation in reality and those with a remote foundation. Concepts in Giles's fourth class, which include divine attributes and mathematical notions, have, as noted above, both an immediate and a remote foundation in reality. They have an immediate foundation in the external world as regards the reality they designate, but they have a remote basis as regards our way of understanding that reality. In the latter respect they are like "second intentions"⁵⁰

With the introduction of Giles's fourth class of concepts he proposes a radically different notion of mathematics from that of Aquinas's *quaestio*. Unlike Giles, Aquinas does not grant that mathematical concepts have a proximate basis in reality, their proximate foundation is a constructive act of the mind. There are natural lines and circles but these are not the lines and circles of mathematics. There are also numbered or numerable multitudes in reality but they are not the numbers of mathematics. The objects of mathematics, though remotely based on the sensible world and abstracted from it, are products of a mental activity which alters their definitions and

intelligo. Et licet isti modo intelligendi res immediate non respondeat, respondet immediate quia in ipsa re est quod sic intelligi possit, cum quantum possit separari a quali et imaginabile a sensibili", Giles of Rome, *In libros Sententiarum* 1, d. 2, q. 3, ql. 2 (Venice, 1521), f. 18rb. Giles does not refer to Aquinas by name but, as was the custom of the time, as *quidam*. Antoine Dondaine has shown conclusively that the reference is to Aquinas. See his article, "Saint Thomas et la dispute des attributs divines," 256. For Giles' doctrine of mathematical abstraction see Robert J. McLaughlin, *Abstraction as Constitutive of Science according to Aristotle and Saint Thomas Aquinas* (Ph.D. diss., University of Toronto, 1965), 33–9.

⁵⁰ "Cum intelligo sapientiam divinam quantum ad rem intellectam ut immediatum fundamentum respondet ipsa divina essentia in qua verissime talis perfectio existit. Sed quantum ad intelligendi modum non respondet divina essentia ut immediatum fundamentum, quia non est eo modo sapientia in Deo ut nos intelligimus. Unde non assimilatur conceptioni rerum naturalium, sed magis conceptioni mathematicorum, quae conceptio nec penitus immediatum fundamentum habet in re, nec penitus mediatum. Sed quantum ad rem habet immediatum et convenit cum naturalibus, quantum ad modum [intelligendi] habet mediatum, et convenit cum secundis intentionibus", Giles of Rome, *In I Sent.*, f. 18rb-va.

A "first intention" is immediately the concept of an external thing. A "second intention" is a concept of something consequent upon that first knowledge. It is formed by reflection on the primary act of knowledge and its concept. See St. Thomas, *De potentia*, q. 1, a. 1, ad 10, q. 7, a. 9. For the meaning of these intentions see Schmidt, *The Domain of Logic*, 117–29.

natures. Nothing like them exists in the external world. Aquinas was clearly aware of this from his knowledge of contemporary mathematics. Had he known modern types of mathematics, he would have seen the almost unlimited range of the mind's mathematical inventiveness.

As a witness and defender in Thomas's behalf we have Robert of Orford's polemic against Giles of Rome, written about 1288–1292. A Dominican and Thomist, Orford supported his confrere's threefold division of concepts in his *quaestio disputata* against Giles's fourfold division. Like Aquinas, he places the divine attributes in the first class and logical concepts in the second, but unfortunately he does not mention mathematics.⁵¹

IV

Aquinas did not bring together in one place his views on mathematics. They are scattered throughout his many writings, chiefly in commentaries on Boethius and Aristotle and often expressed while treating of other topics. Only in the highly original questions of his treatise on the *De Trinitate* of Boethius do we find an approach to a philosophy of mathematics. In his literal commentaries on Aristotle he stays close to the Greek philosopher's thought, echoing his doctrine of mathematical abstraction as a mental act that concentrates exclusively on the extensive and numerical quantities of physical bodies, to the disregard of their sensible qualities and motions.

In these commentaries Aquinas presents arithmetic and geometry (which he knew from Boethius's *Arithmetic* and Euclid's *Elements of Geometry*)⁵² as frankly realistic liberal arts and sciences. Their objects are not separately existing forms, as Plato taught, but neither are they free constructions of the imagination and intellect. They exist in sensible bodies, though considered apart from them. Logic alone—

⁵¹ Robert of Orford, *Reprobationes dictorum a fratre Egidio in primum Sententiarum*, q 1, d 2, q 9, ed A P Vella (Paris: J Vrin, 1968), 57–9.

⁵² Boethius, *De Institutione arithmetica*, ed G Friedlein (Leipzig: Minerva, 1867). Euclid, *Elementa Geometriae*, ed I L Heiberg, *Opera omnia*, vols 1–5 (Leipzig: Teubner, 1883–1888).

which Aquinas regarded not so much as a science as an instrument of science—treats of mental constructs (*entia rationis*).

The realistic view of mathematics seems to have been commonly accepted in the thirteenth century. It was held by Albert the Great,⁵³ Robert Kilwardby,⁵⁴ and in general the masters of arts at Paris.⁵⁵ We have seen indications in the writings of Aquinas, however, that he qualified this generally held view of mathematics as a science of reality, suggesting a constructive role for the imagination and intellect in the elaboration of mathematical objects. It has been claimed that Albert the Great preceded him in this regard. "Albert's general strategy," writes Andrew Molland, "was to make more tenuous than had Aristotle the link between the geometer's mind and the outside world."⁵⁶ While commenting on Euclid's *Geometry*, Albert could hardly have failed to be struck by the mind's constructive function in that science.⁵⁷

Aquinas explicitly attributes a quasi-factive role to the mind in mathematics in the *quaestio disputata* we have been considering. There he places the concepts of mathematics in the same order as those of logic, as devised by the mind on the proximate basis of its own activity and only remotely on reality. He uses the same word *advenit* (which has the double meaning of discovering and inventing) to denote the genesis of both kinds of concepts. Consequently it seems inevitable to conclude that both are *entia rationis* and "second intentions," though not of the same kind. Logical notions are relations consequent on acts of the mind. Mathematical notions include relations but primarily such items as lines, circles, and numbers. These exist in reality as natural and visual quantitative features of bodies. The mathematician visualizes them in the imagination and

⁵³ Albert, *Physica* 1, tr. 1, c. 1, ed. A. Borgnet, *Opera omnia*, 3 2a. See also Molland, "Mathematics in the Thought of Albertus Magnus," 466, and note 47 above.

⁵⁴ Robert Kilwardby, *De Ortu Scientiarum*, ed. Albert G. Judy (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1976), 13–14, 29–31, 36–41, 53–81. This work is dated c. 1250.

⁵⁵ See *Quatre introductions à la philosophie au XIIIe siècle*, ed. Claude Lafleur (Paris: J. Vrin, 1988). This is a compilation of four treatises by masters of arts at Paris before 1250.

⁵⁶ Molland, "Mathematics in the Thought of Albertus Magnus," 470.

⁵⁷ See Paul M. J. E. Tümmers, "The Commentary of Albert on Euclid's *Elements of Geometry*," in *Albert the Great and the Sciences*, 479–99.

mentally abstracts them from their natural setting, while reconstructing them in an ideal way. The objects of geometry are proximately founded on such a reconstructive act and numbers are directly based on the acts of adding and counting.

Giles of Rome criticized his former teacher for deviating from the commonly held Aristotelian doctrine of mathematics and even from his usual teaching on the subject. Giles granted that mathematical notions are second intentions, in the sense that our way of knowing mathematical entities in abstraction from sensible and qualitative matter depends on the mind and not on reality. But he rejected Aquinas's contention that in mathematics *what* is known (the *res intellecta*) is devised by the mind, with only a remote foundation in the sensible world, and that as such it is an *ens rationis*.

If this be indeed the case, the ambiguities in Thomistic literature on the subject can be removed. Are all—or at least some—of the objects of mathematics real beings, or are they *entia rationis*, or do they lie somewhere between real beings and *entia rationis*? The present study leads to the conclusion that they are all constructs of the mind, but they have a real remote foundation in the sensible world. Is substance needed as the intelligible matter of mathematics, or is substance only thought of as fulfilling this function? If real quantity is only the remote foundation of mathematical objects, substance itself does not enter into a mathematical notion. A mathematical object is not a substantial entity; as an *ens rationis* it does not fall within the ten categories of Aristotle. The intelligible matter of the mathematics is within the conceptual order, like an *ens rationis* itself; for example, the generic concept of line as divisible into straight and curved, and the generic concept of number as divisible into whole and fraction. These difficulties and ambiguities in Thomistic accounts of mathematics can be resolved in the light of Thomas's neglected text on the subject.⁵⁸

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⁵⁸ See note 40 above.

WHAT ARE KANT'S ANALOGIES ABOUT?

WAYNE WAXMAN

A CLAIM THAT TWO HUNDRED YEARS of interpretation have missed the point of one of the most important and frequently revisited texts in the philosophical canon is bound to be greeted with suspicion. Unless I am mistaken, however, such is the case with Kant's Analogies of Experience. The problem it addresses has, in my view, invariably been misunderstood, with the result that Kant's solution to it has always been adjudged in relation to one or another problem it was never intended to solve. The reason it has hitherto eluded interpreters, I shall argue, is that transcendental idealism, a doctrine as essential to the Analogies as to virtually everything else in Kant's philosophy,¹ has been almost universally misconstrued. With this done, I shall attempt to show that the theory of objective experience that then emerges not only better accords with the text but also is more powerful, perspicuous, and persuasive than the alternative. The latter tends to detach the Analogies from the portions of the *Critique of Pure Reason* that precede them, and derives principles of experience that can legitimately be claimed to have only *epistemic indispensability*, not the

¹ Transcendental idealism is the basis on which Kant rests his entire philosophy. "The system of the critique of pure reason turns on two cardinal points: as system of nature and of freedom, one leading with necessity to the other — The ideality of space and time and the reality of the concept of freedom, the first leading inexorably and analytically to the second. According to the one, synthetic-theoretical cognition a priori, according to the other, synthetic-practical, likewise completely a priori", *Kants Gesammelte Schriften* (henceforth, "KGS"), vol. 18, §6351 (1796–8) (Berlin and Leipzig: Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1938). All quotations from Kant's writings are my own translations taken from this edition. Citations will be made to this edition, in the case of published works, I will refer to them by title also. The sole exception is the *Critique of Pure Reason* (henceforth, "CPR") for which I shall be translating from the Raymond Schmidt edition (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1956) and citing the page numbers of the original (A and B) editions (1781 and 1787).

fully fledged *objective reality* that was Kant's goal. The theory outlined here, by contrast, weaves together the Transcendental Aesthetic, the Analytic of Concepts, and the entire System of All Principles of Pure Understanding to yield a genuine refutation of the Humean skeptical thesis that principles like "every beginning of existence must have a cause" can at most be known to be necessary conditions for thought of objects, while we must remain ignorant of whether they are likewise necessary conditions for the objects themselves.

I

Undoubtedly, the principal reason the Analogies have attracted so much attention is that they are the culmination of Kant's endeavor to surmount the challenge posed by Hume's skepticism regarding causality.² Hume's analysis of causality, and in particular of the general principle that every existence must have a cause, represented for Kant a watershed in the history of philosophy. It seemed to him that Hume thereby exposed all previous metaphysics, including Kant's own treatise on the *mundus intelligibilis*, as an empress without any clothes. The time when it was possible to make a simple dogmatic assumption of the objective validity of a notion like cause and effect, without any thought as to the nature or limits of its employment, had been brought to an end. Yet, far from following Hume in his wish to consign all metaphysical works to the flames, Kant envisaged the possibility of a new, reformed metaphysics—one capable at once of assimilating Hume's teachings and of surmounting his skeptical challenge. The work which finally emerged was, of course, the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and the portion of it consecrated to the Humean challenge was the Analogies of Experience.

Because the Analogies are Kant's response to Hume's challenge, philosophers have naturally tended to assume that the problem Kant is addressing in them was Hume's own. They thus regard it as (mercifully) rather less deeply rooted in the specifics of the Kantian system

² Although Hume is not mentioned by name in the Analogies themselves, that he was Kant's intended target is made clear in the corresponding portions of the *Prolegomena*. See Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, §§27–31 and Preface, *KGS*, vol. 4, see also *CPR*, B5, B19–20 and A760/B788ff, and Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, pt. 1, bk. 1, div. 1, sect. 2, *KGS*, vol. 5.

than other portions of the *Critique*, and even perhaps sufficiently independent to be amenable to treatment in isolation. This assumption seems to me mistaken, however. By the time Hume sounded the knell which roused Kant from his dogmatic slumber, Kant had already recast his philosophical position in the mold of the doctrine he was eventually to entitle *transcendental idealism*.³ Transcendental idealism is a theory of the nature of space and time which, in Kant's own eyes, sets his philosophy apart from every other, be it empiricist or rationalist, materialist or subjective idealist, intellectualist, sensualist, or what have you—all, to him, mere varieties of *transcendental realism*. We can thus be reasonably certain that, when a recollection of Hume struck the spark that ignited Kant's philosophical muse, it was transcendental idealism that supplied the flammable material.

What is transcendental idealism? It is the doctrine that space and time are mere subjective forms of our sensibility, so that spatial and temporal characteristics are restricted to the sensible representations immediately present to consciousness, and things distinct from our representation are maintained to be aspatial and atemporal (Kant's usual designations for that within representation which is spatial and temporal is "appearance" or "object of intuition," while that outside representation which is neither spatial nor temporal he denominates "thing in itself," "transcendental object," or "noumenon")⁴

³ See Kant's *Inaugural Dissertation* of 1770, *KGS*, vol. 20. Kant's awakening is generally thought to have occurred sometime in 1771 or 1772 (the "dogmatic slumber" remark is from the *Prolegomena's* Preface). Kant's first acquaintance with Hume's analysis of cause and effect probably dates back to the late 1750s or early 1760s, shortly after the appearance of a translation of Hume's *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, this however seems to have made no great impression on him at the time. That Hume's critique of the metaphysical employment of the concepts of cause and substance first struck Kant as the great philosophical challenge of the age not when he initially encountered it but only after his reflections on space and time had led him to transcendental idealism suggests that the transcendently ideal nature of space and time and the objective validity of a priori concepts became inextricably linked in his mind quite early. See also my discussion of Kant's notion of epigenesis in Wayne Waxman, *Kant's Model of the Mind: A New Interpretation of Transcendental Idealism* (hereafter, *KMM*) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), chap. 7. For a detailed examination of Hume's views on causality, with an emphasis on their proximity to Kant's own, see my forthcoming book, *Hume's Theory of Consciousness* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming), pt. 2.

⁴ The motives behind Kant's choice of varying modes of designation for nonrepresentational reality are difficult to fathom. My own view is that his terminology is generally determined by the correlative faculty of representa-

Kant's attempt to surmount the challenge of Humean skepticism and found a reformed, critical metaphysics in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is, in my view, premised on this thesis and impossible to understand if regarded from any other point of view. This is true in particular of the problem addressed in the Analogies of Experience. It can be posed only within a transcendental idealist perspective and otherwise vanishes from view.

That transcendental idealism is presupposed by the Analogies has of course been noted before, since no careful reader can overlook Kant's iterated, if implicit, references to it. His reliance on the thesis that sensible appearances are merely representations and not things in themselves is one example,⁵ another, plainer still, is the iterated thesis—stated as a premise in each of the Analogies⁶—that time is imperceptible. (The real, for Kant, is the perceptible, time, as the pure form of sensibility which first makes temporal perception possible, is necessarily itself imperceptible and, therefore, ideal.)⁷ All too often, however, Kant's references to transcendental idealism are taken lightly or discounted altogether, apparently on the ground that, when all is said and done, idealism is idealism, and the Kantian variety cannot be

tion, "transcendental object" being best suited to the Analytic of Concepts (understanding), "thing in itself" to the Transcendental Aesthetic (sensibility), "noumenon" to the Analytic of Judgment (judgment), and the "object of the idea" to the Transcendental Dialectic (reason). For a different view, see Gerd Buchdahl, *Kant and the Dynamics of Reason* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992), chap. 1.

⁵ See esp. *CPR*, A189–90/B324–5 (cf. A45–6/B62–3, A104–9).

⁶ See *CPR*, B219, B225, A183/B226, B233, A200/B245, and B257. There are quite explicit indications in Kant's other writings that the same holds for pure space as well (time, it must be remembered, is the exclusive focus of the Analytic of Principles because it alone is a form of *all* appearances). Elsewhere, Kant states quite plainly that transcendental idealism has been presupposed throughout the Analytic of Principles: "The understanding can make no use of the categories [except] in relation to the unity of intuitions in space and time, and even this unity they can determine a priori through universal concepts of combination only because of the ideality of space and time", *CPR*, B308.

⁷ The formal character of space and time implies ideality, the material character of sensation reality. "I speak of ideality in reference to the *form of representations*, but [Eberhard and Garve] interpret this to mean ideality with respect to the *matter*, that is, the ideality of the *object* and its very existence", Letter to Beck, 4 Dec. 1792, *KGS*, vol. 12. See also section II-B below.

all that different, at bottom, from the Berkeleian or other varieties of idealism then current.⁸ Anyone who disputes this is, of course, under the obligation to spell out precisely how Kant's form of idealism is unique, and to do so in such a way as to demonstrate that this uniqueness demands that transcendental idealism never be overlooked in the analysis of Kantian doctrine. The inability to do this satisfactorily is one of the signal failings of recent Kant interpretation, and stems, in my view, from a simple failure to comprehend what transcendental idealism means.

My divergence from the prevailing interpretation of transcendental idealism centers on how one should understand the "sensibility" of which space and time are the pure forms. The sense of "sensibility" is generally supposed to be restricted to the receptive part of the mind, and so excludes any role for the active faculties, including imagination. So construed, a form of sensibility is the peculiar manner in which the mind is constituted to receive sensory affections, so that if one's forms happen to be space and time, sensations originally present themselves in the mind in relations of juxtaposition and succession, pure space and time are thus, in effect, species of grid (relational nexuses) in which sensations arise and take up positions in the mind. Accordingly, Kant's denial of supersensible reality to space and time—his transcendental idealism—signifies only a denial of spatiality and temporality to things in themselves, it does not, however, deny them to sensations (quite the contrary). By contrast, on the interpretation I propose, "sensibility" should be construed only to exclude discursive understanding (concepts, judgments), but not preconceptual, "blind" imagination and its synthesis.⁹ Here, "forms of sensibility" signify the

⁸ For instance, "Kant, as transcendental idealist, is closer to Berkeley than he acknowledges", Peter Strawson, *Bounds of Sense* (London: Methuen, 1966), 21.

⁹ In what is surely an intentional echo of the "intuitions without concepts are blind" thesis of A51/B75, the imagination is likewise said to be blind because of its dependence on understanding in order to bring its synthesis to concepts at A78/B103. Kant usually defined sensibility as inclusive of imagination, especially on those occasions when his intention was to contrast it with understanding (as the faculty of concepts), see *CPR*, A124, Immanuel Kant, *Anthropology*, §15, *KGS*, vol. 7, see also *KGS*, vol. 25, §223, §225 (c. 1783), and §229 "Sensibility, as belonging to the cognitive faculty, is sense and imagination, (the understanding concepts) *Intuition*." See also *KGS*, vol. 28, pt. 1, p. 473 "To empirical intuition belongs *sense*, to pure intuition *imagination*. The latter is the capacity for intuition even in the absence of objects. Both together, sense and imagination, constitute the sensibility." Imagination belongs properly to sensibility because it is not a source of con-

peculiar manner in which the imagination synthesizes sensations, space and time are, therefore, forms not of sensations themselves but merely of their synthesis of apprehension in intuition, that is, forms of our consciousness of sensation (perception).¹⁰ Hence, as I construe it, transcendental idealism involves the denial not merely of supersensory reality to space and time but superimaginative reality as well, correspondingly, not only things in themselves but sensations too have no intrinsic spatiality or temporality (as prior to and independent of imagination, sensations count as transcendently real)¹¹

Now whatever its merits philosophically (and it is not my purpose here either to defend or to attack it), at least this much may be said of the doctrine of transcendental idealism as I suggest it be interpreted: transcendental idealism alone is capable of sustaining Kant's claim to stand apart from all other philosophers on the question of space and time. Dating back at least to Descartes, it was agreed that the actual data, or input, of the senses is a kaleidoscopic flux of representations: new sensations enter the mind to displace those of the preceding instant, only to be supplanted in their turn by those of next, thereby

cepts (these being, in Kant's view, a very special sort of representation, requiring a quite distinct faculty of the mind to account for them, namely, discursive understanding)

¹⁰ See A30/B46 (*perception* of sensations as simultaneous and successive presupposes time) and A23/B38 (*experience* of sensations as outside and alongside presupposes space). Kant's clearest statement that space and times are the forms not of sensations themselves but our consciousness of them can be found in Immanuel Kant, *Progress in Metaphysics*, KGS, vol. 20, Ak 266: "An intuition which is supposed to be possible a priori can only concern the form under which the object is intuited, for to represent something a priori means to make a representation of it prior to and independently of *perception*, i.e. *empirical consciousness*" (my emphasis). Throughout this paper, "synthesis of apprehension" should be understood to include synthesis of reproduction, see *KMM*, chap. 5-E.

¹¹ Since that *in representation* which is imagination-independent counts as transcendently real on this interpretation, the representation of acts of the mind as *spontaneity* (in generating time, space, and the representation "I think") must also be accorded transcendental reality, see *CPR*, B422 and note, B157–58n, and *KMM*, chaps. 6-A, 8. A good example of the standard view, according to which transcendental idealism is simply mind-dependence and it simply is not asked whether this might mean, more specifically, imagination-dependence, is furnished by Henry Allison: "'Ideality', in the most general sense in which Kant uses the term, signifies mind dependence or being in the mind (*in uns*), while 'reality' (*Realität*), in the sense in which it is opposed to 'ideality', signifies independence of mind or being external to the mind (*ausser uns*)", Henry Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 6.

forming a single continuous succession (while from confused perceptions of agglomerations of colored and/or tactile points we first become conscious of the idea of space) In considering how to interpret transcendental idealism we must therefore ask, How can this depiction of the receptivity of our minds be said to differ in any fundamental respect from the way Kant's own position is customarily portrayed? I can detect no substantive difference between the pre-Kantian consensus that the sensory given is a flux and the standard interpretation of transcendental idealism, according to which our minds are so constituted that the manifold data offered by the senses originally present themselves in relations of succession By contrast, a truly fundamental divide separating Kant from his predecessors results when we interpret his doctrine as I propose Succession is then nothing more than the manner in which the *imagination* apprehends the nonsuccessive, nonjuxtaposed manifold data of the senses, and has nothing whatever to do with the way in which that manifold is present preimaginatively in receptivity

I have evaluated the two conflicting interpretations of transcendental idealism in considerable detail elsewhere, adducing extensive textual evidence to demonstrate both the correctness and novelty of my reading.¹² Here my purpose is a narrower one: to show this interpretation to be crucial to a correct appreciation of the problem Kant addresses in the Analogies of Experience The consequence of removing sensations from space and time (juxtaposition and succession) is the confinement of the latter to pure imagination That is, space and time can never be apprehended in perception, and everything that can (that is, the *a posteriori*) is devoid of existence in space and time (that is, it neither occupies nor contains space or time) Since, for Kant, the only reality ever present to us is that given in sensation, this means that space and time are deprived of all objectivity (empirical reality), and so risk being reduced to mere fictions Hence, on the interpretation I propose, the transcendental idealist is confronted with a demand to demonstrate the objective reality of space and time vis-à-vis precisely those immediately apprehended data of perception of which, on the standard interpretation, they are presupposed to hold! Further, it was Kant's genius to recognize that this problem and the Humean challenge are but two sides of the same coin He saw that the *a priori* application to appearances of the concepts of cause (with

¹² See *KMM*, Introduction and Part 1

its implication that the existence of the cause necessarily precedes that of the effect) and substance (with its implication of permanent existence)—that is, the application of the very concepts whose a priori objective employment Hume questioned—would serve to place all objects of perception within a single, all-embracing network of relations of space and time, thereby effectively objectifying space and time¹³ Two strands of Kantian thought that previously could not be fit together—the ideality of space and time and the objective validity of metaphysical concepts—were thus fused into a single problem with a single solution In particular, Kant could concede Hume's point (instead of dogmatically rejecting it as transcendental realists were obliged to do) that concepts such as "cause" and "substance" have no inherent application to objects, and nevertheless affirm their a priori objective validity on grounds Hume himself would never have questioned that is, as conditions of the possibility that perceptions actually exist in relations of juxtaposition and succession

My proposal will be examined in detail below. Here, however, we need only recognize that since, on the standard interpretation of transcendental idealism, the problem of objectifying space and time does not even exist (since objects of perception are presumed already to exist in relations of succession and juxtaposition), its espousal precludes any such approach to the Humean challenge That the standard interpretation leaves Kant without the problem of objectifying space and time, and so no way of surmounting the Humean challenge, is evident also from the following consideration The Analogies form part of a transcendental system of principles which, according to Kant, amount to nothing less than the creation of nature and its laws by the faculty of understanding

The order and regularity in appearances which we call *nature* we ourselves introduce, and could never be found there had we, or the nature of our mind, not originally put it there The understanding is thus not merely a capacity to produce rules through a comparison of appearances it is itself the law-giver for nature, i.e. without understanding there would be no nature at all So, however exaggerated and absurd it may sound, to say that understanding is itself the source of the laws of nature, and thence of the formal unity of nature, is correct¹⁴

¹³ A priori validity, as Kant understands it, betokens the necessary and universal application of these concepts to appearances

¹⁴ *CPR*, A125–7, see also A114 This view is reaffirmed in the B edition Deduction "That the *laws* of appearances in nature must agree with the understanding and its a priori form is no stranger than that the appearances themselves must agree with the form of a priori sensible intuition For

Texts like this put two things quite beyond doubt. First, principles of pure understanding like the Analogies are supposed not simply to be valid of nature but actually to create it, that is, they not only hold of our experience of objects (as with Hume) but are constitutive of the objects themselves which make such experience possible. Second, this creative, constitutive role premises transcendental idealism in the notion that nature (that is, the entire spatiotemporal cosmos) is nothing but our own representation, subject a priori to the faculties of sensibility and understanding. The pure concepts involved in the Analogies find their place in this scheme as the source of the time in which appearances *exist* (that is, of objective time, as distinct from the subjective time which is merely the form of their apprehension in intuition)¹⁵ They are thus constitutive specifically of that which Kant calls *experience* the ordered whole of appearances in which each appearance has determinate time-relations of duration, succession, and simultaneity (one Analogy per mode of time)¹⁶ with respect to every other. (Experience, in this sense, involves inference and should be contrasted with immediate intuition and perception)¹⁷ Yet, any such creative, constitutive role for understanding is precluded by the standard interpretation of transcendental idealism, according to which appearances already exist in relations of time, simply by virtue of the forms of sensibility in accordance with which sensations originally present themselves in the mind, and so prior to and independently of their apprehension by imagination in intuition. What need is there then for constitutive principles of pure understanding to *endow* appearances with existence in time? Any would-be objective time the understanding and imagination might fashion for epistemic purposes would then

laws no more exist in the appearances but only relatively to the subject insofar as it has understanding, than appearances exist in themselves but only relatively to this same being insofar as it has senses", *CPR*, B163–4

¹⁵ "By means of these rules the existence of every appearance can be determined in respect of the unity of time", *CPR*, A176/B219

¹⁶ There are three Analogies not only because there are three categories of relation but also so that objective time may be constituted in each of its three modes: duration, succession, simultaneity

¹⁷ The Analogies hold only "under the condition of empirical thought in one experience, and thence only mediately and indirectly", *CPR*, A160/B200. Following Hume, Kant situates necessary connection not in perception but in empirical thought: "no necessity determining their connection is or can be revealed in the perceptions themselves", *CPR*, B219. Intuition and perception have their own constitutive principles of pure understanding: the Axioms of Intuition and the Anticipations of Perception (see section II-B below)

be reduced to an idle fiction, its pretensions to objectivity mocked by the subjective flux of sense in which appearances really exist. Kant's Analogies could have at most the validity of thought determinations, that is, of Humean style fictions of how appearances must be *regarded* (irrespective of how they really are) if we are to think them as objects existing in nature; in that case, however, no pretense could be made that there are synthetic a priori propositions genuinely *determinative* of experience and its objects. In short, on the standard interpretation of transcendental idealism, the whole Kantian enterprise, displaying understanding in a creative, constitutive role, promptly collapses.

No such difficulty arises if transcendental idealism is understood as the thesis that space and time (including succession) have no reality outside or independently of imagination. With time no more than the ideal form of the apprehension of the manifold of sensation in imagination, this manifold itself lacks existence in time, that is, it is altogether devoid of temporal relation. This means that, given immediate consciousness alone (that is, intuition and perception), there can be no objective time of appearances (even existence as a mere flux) distinct from the purely formal successiveness of the mode of their apprehension. Since appearances which are atemporal (and aspatial) in respect of existence are not suitable objects for possible experience, however, transcendental idealism, properly construed, leads directly to the demand for principles capable of determining their existence in relations of time a priori: principles not of intuition or perception but of inference founded on repeated experience (association). This is the demand satisfied by the Analogies of Experience, to create a time comprehending the existence of appearances *where otherwise there is none*¹⁸—for instance, the irreversible order of existence that follows when one event is determined as cause and another as its effect. They achieve this by means of concepts of necessary connection capable of uniting all appearances in relations of existential dependence. From such connections, relations of time are inferable which, because they are founded on determinations of the *existence* of appearances, count as genuinely real and objective.¹⁹ Thus, the problematic of the Analogies will be obscured from us so long as we remain wedded to a

¹⁸ In respect solely of what is given *immediately* in intuition and perception.

¹⁹ "Since they [namely, concepts of relation that connect perceptions according to their existence] carry necessity with them, it follows that experience is only possible through a representation of the necessary connec-

conception of transcendental idealism according to which appearances already have existence in time, and so stand in no need of concepts of pure understanding to receive such existence.

II

A. To comprehend Kant's problem in the Analogies with sufficient precision, we first need to gain a better understanding of two things the pure intuition of time of the Transcendental Aesthetic, and the two principles of pure understanding that precede the Analogies—the Axioms of Intuition and the Anticipations of Perception. The crucial point concerning pure time—or rather pure space and time together—is that they are nothing more or less than the particular form assumed by the original synthetic unity of the manifold (that is, original, transcendental apperception, “The Supreme Principle of all Employment of the Understanding”)²⁰ in beings whose sensibility is constituted like ours. Where is this stated? As Hegel remarked,

tion of perceptions”, *CPR*, B219. In this, as in so much else, Kant is following a path first marked out by Hume: “the mind stops not there. For finding, that with this system of perceptions [of the senses and memory], there is another connected by custom, or if you will, by the relation of cause or effect, it forms them into a new system, which it likewise dignifies with the title of realities.” ‘Tis this later principle, which peoples the world and brings us acquainted with such existences, as by their removal in time and place, lie beyond the reach of the senses and memory. By means of it I paint the universe in my imagination, and fix my attention on any part of it I please. All this, and every thing else, which I believe, are nothing but ideas, tho’ by their force and settled order, arising from custom and the relation of cause and effect, they distinguish themselves from the other ideas which are merely the offspring of the imagination”, David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, rev. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 73–4, 108. See Waxman, *Hume's Theory of Consciousness*, chap. 4.

²⁰ *CPR*, B136 (from title of §17). Time and space are to be identified with transcendental apperception not in its most general signification (that is, the synthetic unity of the manifold *in general*) but only in respect of the specific form in which it is realized given a sensibility constituted like ours. See also *CPR*, B150, B159–60, A177/B220. In Kant's notes, one finds remarks like these. “Consciousness of oneself (*apperceptio*) is an act whereby in general the subject makes itself into an object. It is yet no *perception* (*apprehensio simplex*), i.e., no sense representation (for which it is required that the subject be affected by means of some object, and the intuition becomes empirical), but pure intuition, which under the names of space and time contain merely the form of composition (*coordinatio, et subordinatio*) of the

It is not where it ought to be, in the transcendental exposition of these forms [in the Transcendental Aesthetic], but only in the sequel, when, in the deduction of the categories, the original synthetic unity of apperception finally comes to the fore and is recognized as the principle of figurative synthesis, or the forms of intuition. There, space and time are conceived as synthetic unities, and the productive imagination, i.e. spontaneity and absolute synthetic activity, as the principle of sensibility which previously had been characterized only as a receptivity²¹

While there are at least two passages in the A edition of the Transcendental Deduction (1781) where the careful reader can discern Kant's view that space and time are original a priori synthetic unities founded on pure understanding,²² it is only in the B edition (1787) that one finds it spelled out explicitly and unequivocally. The first such occasion is the following

Space and time, and all their parts, are intuitions, and are thus, with their manifold, singular representations (see the Transcendental Aesthetic). They are thus not mere concepts, through which the very same consciousness is contained in many representations, but, on the contrary, contain many representations in one, and in the consciousness of that representation. The *unity* of that consciousness is therefore *synthetic* and yet also *original*.²³

This remark, with its explicit reference to the Transcendental Aesthetic, was appended as a footnote to the assertion that "all the manifold of intuition should be subject to conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception", hence, there can be no doubt that the outcome of subjecting the manifold to these conditions, given a sensibility constituted as ours is, is the pure space and time of the Aesthetic. This thesis is reformulated shortly afterward, when Kant states that "the pure form of intuition in time, merely as an intuition in general which contains a given manifold, is subject to original unity of consciousness simply through the necessary relation of the manifold of intuition to a single (*zum Einen*) 'I think', hence, through the pure

manifold of intuition, with them [results] an a priori principle of synthetic cognition of the manifold which for just this reason makes the object in appearance representable", KGS, vol. 22, p. 413, see also pp. 16, 74, 90, 105, 364, 435.

²¹ G. W. F. Hegel, *Glauben und Wissen*, in *Werke in Zwanzig Banden* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1969), 2:297 (my translation).

²² See CPR, A99–100, A107.

²³ B136n, corresponds closely to A107.

synthesis of the understanding which underlies the empirical synthesis." Finally, in section 26, the culminating section of the Transcendental Deduction of the categories, space and time serve as the essential link between perceived appearances, on the one hand, and the categories, on the other, and Kant states quite categorically that they are able to discharge this mediating role only because they themselves are an original, preconceptual synthetic unity of the apprehended manifold

Space contains a *combination* of the manifold given according to the form of sensibility in an *intuitive* representation, so that the *formal intuition* gives unity of representation. In the Aesthetic, this unity was credited solely to sensibility merely in order to indicate that it precedes all concepts, though to be sure it does presuppose a synthesis not belonging to the senses which yet first makes possible all concepts of space and time. For since through it (in that understanding determines sensibility) space and time are first *given* as intuitions, the unity of this a priori intuition belongs to space and time, not to the concept of the understanding (cf. §24).²⁴

Kant could not have been plainer: the pure space and time of the Transcendental Aesthetic could not even be given as intuitions did the understanding not impart synthetic unity to the manifold offered by sense by means of the transcendental synthesis of imagination.

The identification of space and time (but particularly time since only to it are *all* appearances subject, outer no less than inner) with the synthetic unity of apperception in the Transcendental Deduction is the single most crucial, yet in recent times most widely overlooked, element in Kant's system of experience. In my view, we can follow his reasoning through each stage in the unfolding of that system only when we have conditioned ourselves to read "time" whenever he states that, in the absence of *synthetic unity of apperception*, experience would be impossible. A particularly illuminating example with

²⁴ CPR, B160n, corresponds closely to A99–100. Kant's reference to §24 at the end indicates that the synthesis in question is the transcendental synthesis of imagination (for a detailed analysis of this text, see *KMM*, ch. 2). Also "One can and must concede that space and time are mere thought entities and creatures of the imagination", Immanuel Kant, *On A Discovery*, KGS, vol. 8, Ak 203, "Space is itself a synthesis a priori", KGS, vol. 18, §5876 (1783–4), "Space and time are of course not objects of intuition, but merely its *subjective forms*. They do not exist apart from representations and are given only in the subject, i.e. their representation is an *act* of the subject itself and a *product of the imagination* for the sense of the subject", KGS, vol. 22, p. 76.

special relevance to the Analogies, is the following passage from the A edition of the Transcendental Deduction

If this unity of association were not also to have an objective ground which makes it impossible that appearances should be apprehended by imagination otherwise than under the condition of a possible synthetic unity of this apprehension, it would then be entirely contingent that appearances should fit into a coherent whole of human cognition. For even though we should have the power of associating perceptions, it would remain entirely undetermined and contingent whether they would also themselves be associable, and should they not be associable, there might be a multitude of perceptions, and indeed even an entire sensibility, in which much empirical consciousness would be found in my mind, but separately, and without belonging to a consciousness of myself which, however, is impossible. For it is only because I ascribe all perceptions to one consciousness (original apperception) that I can say regarding all perceptions that I am conscious of them. There must therefore be an objective ground. This can be found nowhere save in the principle of the unity of apperception. According to this, all appearances must be so apprehended that they conform with unity of apperception, which would be impossible without synthetic unity in their connection, which therefore is itself objectively necessary.²⁵

This text bears directly on the Analogies because its focus is association and its conditions (thus recalling Hume's account of cause and effect in terms of customary association).²⁶ The claim that association demands an objective ground which makes it possible for all perceptions to belong to one consciousness should, in my view, be read

²⁵ CPR, A121–2. This should be read in conjunction with section §26 of the B Deduction, in which apprehension is brought into conformity with original apperception by virtue of being subject to the formal intuition of space and time.

²⁶ This is confirmed by the specification of the synthesis as connection (*Verknüpfung*) the species of combination (*Verbindung*) which is the exclusive province of the Analogies. (I exclude the Postulates of Empirical Thought since they are merely subjective principles, not principles constitutive of objects—see CPR, A219/B266.) See CPR, B201n and the B edition formulation of the general principle of the Analogies at B219. It should be remarked, however, that it was never Kant's intention to assert that powers of association of the kind to be found in animals depend on apperception, and thence on intuition of the space and time of the Transcendental Aesthetic. For insofar as such association (unlike the Humean variety) does not presuppose the union of the manifold of different apprehensions in synthetic unitary time, it is independent of the conditions of cognition and experience (Kantian psychology, especially the account given in the A edition Transcendental Deduction, is geared toward, and contingent upon, apprehension's and reproduction's lending themselves to the cognition of objects existing in objective space and time, but this does not mean they do so essentially, see especially my discussions of Kant on animal consciousness in *KMM*, 200–1.)

simply as a call for all appearances to stand together in a single (synthetic-unitary) time. If appearances did not successively exist in one and the same time, how could they belong together in one consciousness and so be amenable to association? Kant's thesis that time is our form of sensibility, properly understood, is simply another way of saying that all appearances must stand together (exist) in time if they are all to be mine. Conversely, for perceptions to arise in a sensibility detached from a consciousness of myself would be simply for there to be, instead of one time intuition which precedes and makes possible all particular times (the original synthetic unity of the manifold), a plurality of separated, ununifiable times. It is difficult to see how else to make sense of this text only if we recall that, for Kant, time is the form of our sensibility (that is, that in the intuition of which all possible appearances are contained),²⁷ can we understand how, without original apperception (that is, time, in humans) "there might be a multitude of perceptions, and indeed even an entire sensibility, in which much empirical consciousness would be found in my mind, but separately, and without belonging to a consciousness of myself." For all intents and purposes, a sensibility separated from myself is, by Kantian lights, a distinct person "the manifold representations which are given in a certain intuition would not all be *my* representations if they did not all belong to one self-consciousness."²⁸ Indeed, since the perceptions belonging to such a sensibility could not be supposed to fall within the same temporal nexus (that is, the same synthetically unified manifold) as that in relation to which my self-consciousness (analytic unity of apperception) is defined, more than merely demarcating a different person, that sensibility would quite literally inhabit a different universe, detached from and utterly unknown to the sensibility definitive of me and my universe.²⁹ The avoidance of such a

²⁷ See *CPR*, A34/B50, B136n

²⁸ *CPR*, B132

²⁹ It should be noted that the "me" (that is, the "I think") in question is not to be equated with my self or person—which normally happens when, thanks to the usual reading of transcendental idealism, the "I," or subject of experience, is set into time, see *KMM*, 265 n. 17. Representations do not exist in time, pre-imaginatively, Kant's "I" is therefore not a Cartesian-type perduring substratum, a catch-basin in which a succession of momentarily existing representations are retained, but something real that is neither appearance nor thing in itself (see *CPR*, B422n). More importantly, not only does the empirical self exist in time, it is merely one object (phenomenon) in the universe of space and time among all the rest and has exactly the same

scenario is both the principal consequence of and the rationale for adopting the transcendental idealist thesis that time is nothing other than a form of our sensibility

In addition to having demonstrated the sensible and intuitive character of time, Kant prefaced the *Transcendental Analytic* with the *Transcendental Aesthetic* in order to establish time's *uniqueness* and its *unicity*, that is, to establish that all times are contained within a single, all-embracing time and that this one time, far from being an aggregate composed of particular times, precedes them and makes them possible. The two features together yield the original synthetic unity of the *Analytic*—a sensibility encompassing all possible representations, a truly universal self-consciousness³⁰. For, in the absence of unicity, there might be a succession of times (that is, of distinct apprehensions of manifolds in inner intuition) but nothing to unite them as representations belonging to one and the same sensibility. Time, so construed, would not then give form to our sensibility by unifying distinct apprehensions, and since it is only as such a form that Kant's ideal time is able to manifest itself to consciousness in the first place, the result would be, in effect, fleetingly existing, detached sensibilities, incapable of being brought together in a single self-consciousness. In the absence of uniqueness, there would be a multitude of times unconjoined and uncontained by any other. Though each might still be characterized by unicity (that is, it might constitute

relation to the "I think" as any other: an ordinary objective representation produced when the "I," as subject of judgment, unites some synthesis of a manifold in a concept (see Kant's definition of an object at B137). As that in which all objects are contained, psychological no less than material, the "I think" is most appropriately denominated *universal* self-consciousness (one of Kant's several designations for apperception at B132). Thus, insofar as subjective unitary sensibility is to be equated with the objective infinity of space and time, the sensibility in question is that corresponding to universal, not individual, self-consciousness (otherwise, the universe of objective space and time would be present in something which is present in them).

³⁰ See the previous note. Besides being the keystone of Kant's theory of objectivity, universal self-consciousness has a logical dimension of equal interest and importance. Any representation, in being thought, is thereby (namely, through its relation to the "I think") related to *every other possible* representation, and thus acquires a genuinely *universal* scope (that is, a *potentially* universal application). This theory of universals without words therefore avoids, on one side, Lockean abstractionism (since concepts are not universal in content, only in [potential] application) and, on the other, the ersatz universals of Humean association. See the discussion of Kant's position in Waxman, *Hume's Theory of Consciousness*, ch. 3-B.

a sensibility embracing a plurality of manifolds apprehended according to a certain form), since no single one necessarily encompasses all the others, the universal self-consciousness on which Kant bases the possibility of experience (objectively grounded association) would be nullified

What this means can perhaps best be grasped, for our purposes, by considering its implications vis-à-vis Humean association. First, Hume simply takes for granted that the immediately apprehended objects of consciousness ("perceptions" in his terminology) *exist* as a flux (that is, as a time series). Next, he supposes that, when enough resemblances between sequences of perceptions have been observed at various points in the time series, the imagination associates them in relations of constant conjunction (as when sensations of heat and bright flickering light are regularly observed to precede sensations of billowing grey, certain noxious fumes, a choking feeling, and so forth). Finally, the constantly conjoined perceptions become united in imagination by custom, such that the existence of present phenomena is deemed dependent on predecessors (for instance a hot, bright flickering light becomes for us the cause and the billowing grey the effect)³¹ From Kant's point of view, Hume's failure was to have simply presupposed the unity of time in the succession of perceptions (that is, their all belonging to the same sensibility), without inquiring into the conditions whereby alone such unity is possible. Had he done so, he might have recognized that a priori principles of necessary connection (namely, the Analogies) are the only way otherwise atemporal perceptions can come to exist in determinate time relation to one another (that is, as a time series), and because synthetic unitary time is essential to inference-based experience (that is, the world of judgment founded on customary association),³² this would have obliged him to admit that his psychological account of such experience presupposes a transcendental grounding. Without conformity a priori to concepts of necessary connection, perceptions could not be represented as

³¹ See Hume, *Treatise*, 252ff. Hume's commitment to the transcendental reality of succession is clear also on pp. 635–6. (For Kant's own affirmation of the "flux" see, for instance, *CPR*, A381–2—but see also notes 33 and 73 below.) Indeed, in my view, it is the source of the dilemma described in the appendix on personal identity (633ff), see Wayne Waxman, "Hume's Quandary Concerning Personal Identity," *Hume Studies* 18, no. 2 (November 1992): 233–53. For a fuller account of Hume's views on custom and necessary connection, see Waxman, *Hume's Theory of Consciousness*, chap. 5.

³² See Hume, *Treatise*, 108.

themselves forming a time series, and the possibility of taking cognizance of resembling sequences of perceptions scattered through that series and associating them in relations of cause and effect would be precluded³³

B In order fully to understand what is at stake in the Analogies, it is necessary to consider their relation to the two principles of pure understanding which precede them, the Axioms of Intuition and the Anticipations of Perception. When Kant designated these two principles *constitutive* and the Analogies only *regulative*,³⁴ he did so with a quite precise meaning. For him there are only two constituents of appearances: the spatial or temporal *form* of their intuition and the sensation *matter* of their perception. The Axioms are a constitutive principle of objects of intuition, and the Anticipations a constitutive principle of objects of perception. Because there are but two constituents of appearances, no other principles of pure understanding constitutive in respect of *appearances* are possible. But it should not be overlooked that, while only regulative with regards to intuition and perception, the Analogies are nevertheless "constitutive in respect of *experience*,"³⁵ that is, in respect of *synthesis* of perceptions.³⁶

To understand how there can be a place for principles constitutive of the objects of experience which yet are merely regulative in respect of the appearances from which they are synthesized, one must first appreciate the constraints transcendental idealism, properly understood, imposes on the Axioms and Anticipations. According to Kant,

³³ "The general principle of all three Analogies rests on the necessary *unity* of apperception in respect of all possible empirical consciousness (i.e. all perception) at *each time*, and consequently on the synthetic unity of all appearances as regards their relation in time", *CPR*, A176/B220. This of course does not complete the story of how Kant raised questions bearing on the possibility of the representation of the subjective flux and thereby refuted subjective idealism from the inside. The *coup de grace* is delivered in the section entitled "Refutation of Idealism," in which Kant maintains that the existence of appearances in space (where alone it is possible to represent the permanent substratum necessary for time-determination described in the First Analogy) is a precondition for their having an existence in time (see B275-9, also B291-4).

³⁴ See *CPR*, A179/B222.

³⁵ *CPR*, A664/B692 (my emphasis).

³⁶ Experience is defined as the synthesis of perceptions described in the Analogies themselves (see *CPR*, B218) and elsewhere as well (see B161, B164-5, A764/B792).

"reality, in the pure concept of the understanding, is that which corresponds to a sensation in general"³⁷ This claim makes perfect sense provided one recognizes that, for him, "ideal" means "imagination-dependent" Thus, as forms of synthesis which exist only in and for imagination, space and time are ideal, whereas sensations, as prior to and independent of imagination (and so too prior to and independent of space and time) are real. "Since time is only the form of intuition, and so of objects as appearances, that in the objects which corresponds to sensation is the transcendental matter of all objects as things in themselves (thinghood, reality)"³⁸ Yet if, as the standard interpretation of transcendental idealism would have it, sensations originally presented themselves in the mind in relations of succession, then like succession (time) itself they too would be transcendently ideal. By contrast, if understood as atemporal, they must be regarded as transcendently real constituents of our representation, which, if they have any ground at all, must be referred to things in themselves—just as Kant claimed to be the case³⁹ Since, however, things in themselves can never be given in intuition, and so cannot be determined in conformity with space and time or the categories, they are useless for purposes of cognitive experience Thus, in order for concepts of reality to acquire a priori objective validity on the one hand and, on the other hand, to make possible a *phenomenal* objective reality, the reality defined by sensations must somehow be transferred to appearance; and this is precisely what the principle of the Anticipations of Perception enunciates "in all appearances, the sensation, and the *real* corresponding to it in the object (*realitas phaenomenon*), has an *intensive magnitude*, i.e. a degree"⁴⁰

Perception, for Kant, is consciousness in which there is sensation it thus not only betokens empirical consciousness, but also consciousness of the real.⁴¹ The implication here of Kant's transcendental ide-

³⁷ CPR, A143/B182

³⁸ CPR, A143/B182 Wille, and Kemp Smith after him, add a "not", thus reversing the sense of this text to bring it into accord with their conception of transcendental idealism See also Kant, *Prolegomena*, pt 1, remark 3; Immanuel Kant, *First Principles of Natural Science*, KGS, vol 4, Ak 481; Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, Intro VII (2d ed.) and §1, and note 7 above

³⁹ See CPR, A30/B45 The only other transcendently real constituent of our representation is spontaneity (see CPR, B422–3n, *KMM*, chap 7)

⁴⁰ CPR, A166

⁴¹ See CPR, B147, A225/B272–3, and A373ff

alism, understood as I propose, is that, like sensations themselves, the cognizable, phenomenal reality which corresponds to them neither contains nor occupies space and time (which is why it has no extensive magnitude "since neither the intuition of space nor that of time is to be met with in it, its magnitude is not extensive but intensive")⁴² Accordingly, time and space, in and of themselves, lack all perceptible objective reality (hence their purity and ideality), while, on the other hand, real objects of perception lack determinate existence in time and space That is, precisely insofar as appearances constitute realities in their own right, distinct from their apprehension in accordance with pure time, they are entirely devoid of temporal or spatial relation. With this, we come face to face with the reason, *given transcendental idealism*, that constitutive principles of experience, over and above those of appearance, are indispensable Unless and until realities apprehended in perception are set in determinate relations of time (that is, unless and until such reality is determined as temporal existence), unity of consciousness (that is, all perceptions belonging to one and the same sensibility), and so objective experience, will be impossible

Because a time in which the realities of perception actually exist is not "already there" waiting for imagination to represent it, transcendental idealism makes the possibility of experience hinge on our ability to produce such a time via principles of pure understanding Since neither intuition nor perception (that is, immediate representation) are fit for the task, there is no option left for Kant but to posit the philosophically unprecedented idea of determinative discursivity to fill the breach constitutive principles of objects which yet hold only "under the condition of empirical thought in one experience, and thence only mediately and indirectly"⁴³ Securing the possibility of

⁴² CPR, B208 See also Kant, *Prolegomena*, §24, §26, KGS, vol 4

⁴³ CPR, A160/B200, see also note 17 above It should be noted that the Axioms and Anticipations are principles not of the form and matter of appearances *per se* (as pure space and time are, vis-à-vis their form) but only of their judgment in discursive understanding The Axioms concern the conceptualization of intuition, for instance, its construction in accordance with a previously obtained *concept* of space or time, it thus yields cognizable objects of intuition, where "object" is understood as an object of a concept (in the sense of B137 that in the *concept* of which the manifold is united) Likewise, the Anticipations concern the conceptualization of perception, and

experience by bringing time out of pure imagination into perceptible reality thus proves to be possible only by means of pure concepts of necessary connection whose a priori objective validity rest solely on their ability to function as surrogates for pure time in the field appearance. In this capacity, Kant characterized these concepts—the relational categories of substance and accident, cause and effect, and community—as *exponents*, the express purpose of the Analogies being none other than to explicate their time-surrogacy.

Our analogies exhibit the unity of nature in the interconnection [*Zusammenhange*] of all appearances under certain exponents, which express nothing other than the relationship of time (insofar as all existence is encompassed within it) to the unity of apperception, which can only take place in synthesis according to rules.⁴⁴

C. Kant's problem in the Analogies of Experience has commonly been interpreted as the question how, given the subjectivity of perception, objective cognition can arise, for if nothing is ever before us but mere representations, how can an object distinct from them be given or cognized through them? But in addition to what was said earlier regarding the inadequacy of this conception, it teeters on the brink of (and often falls into) a related misconception: that at least subjectivity—the solipsistic world of an enduring self—is given immediately. As is well known, however, Kant made quite plain in his Refutation of

thereby its construction as an intensive quantity. Both principles make possible empirical laws governing judgments which bear on objects of immediate consciousness and not repeated experience (association, constant conjunction).

⁴⁴ *CPR*, A216/B263 (rules = concepts), also A159/B198, A331/B387, A416/B443. "To exponentiate a representation of the imagination means to bring it to concepts", Kant, *Critique of Judgment* §57, remark 1, *KGS*, vol. 5. "We must exponentiate [*exponieren*] concepts if we are unable to construct them. We cannot construct appearances, although we can intuitions. But we must have rules of their exposition. These rules are actually conditions of apprehension in their transition from one to the next. The principle: everything that is thought stands under a rule, for only by means of a rule is it an object of thought", *KGS*, vol. 17, §4678 (1773–5). We cannot construct appearances precisely because the reality they contain corresponds to sensation, and so can only be given a posteriori. The reference to rules that are conditions governing the transition from one appearance to the next in apprehension seems to be an allusion to the Analogies (for instance, the concept of cause and effect renders the order of apprehension irreversible—see *CPR*, B234, A192–7/B237–42).

Idealism that the empirical subject is not representable unless a permanent is likewise representable,⁴⁵ and since the possibility of a permanent in our representation is founded on the First Analogy, the empirical subject too is possible only “under the condition of empirical thought in one experience, and thence only mediately and indirectly”⁴⁶ Hence, where there is as yet only immediate intuition and perception, an enduring self (that is, personal identity over time) is just as unrepresentable as empirical objectivity generally (things distinct from and independent of our apprehension) Indeed, the same seems to be true of the self transcendently as well According to Kant, the transcendental representation “I think” (analytic unity of apperception)—and so too the thought of its correlate, the transcendental object⁴⁷—presuppose the synthetic unity of the manifold in one, universal self-consciousness (the synthetic unity of apperception)⁴⁸ As emerged earlier, however, universal self-consciousness is possible only if all representations *exist* together in one, synthetic unitary time; this possibility Kant likewise predicates on the Analogies (“Our analogies express nothing other than the relationship of time, insofar as all existence is encompassed within it, to the unity of apperception”)⁴⁹ Hence, the subjective succession of apprehension prominent in all three Analogies must not be construed as the perspective either of an empirical or a transcendental “I”, it is instead a blind, unself-conscious, immediate apprehension in imagination of the flux simply as such.⁵⁰

⁴⁵ See *CPR*, B275–9

⁴⁶ That the Analogies presuppose empirical thought is stated at *CPR*, A160/B200, and that “this ‘I’ (a mere thought) may be just as much in flux as the remaining thoughts which are linked to one another by its means” at A364

⁴⁷ The transcendental object, as described at *CPR*, A109–10 and A250–1, is the correlate of synthetic unity of apperception, and so has to be thought through given sensible data (in contrast to the negative noumenon, in the concept of which we abstract from the sensible mode of our intuition) See note 4 above

⁴⁸ This dependence is clearest at *CPR*, A364 (the end of which is quoted in note 46 above) The presupposition of synthetic unity of apperception by the analytic unity of apperception is stated at B133 Regarding “universal self-consciousness” see notes 29–30 above

⁴⁹ *CPR*, A216/B263

⁵⁰ It is probably no accident that this awareness corresponds so closely to the scene Hume painted in his theater analogy of the mind (“I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement”, Hume, *Treatise*,

D There is one final potential source of confusion we need to clear up before turning to the Analogies themselves the relation between the schemata of the relational categories and the Analogies as principles "The schemata of pure concepts of the understanding are the true and only conditions which procure for these concepts relation to an object, and thence signification (*Bedeutung*)"⁵¹ Schemata are as integral to Kant's attempt to surmount the Humean challenge as the transcendental ideality of space and time. Hume demanded that metaphysicians present a birth certificate for concepts like cause and effect to demonstrate their nonempirical origin and acquisition without in any way relying on the unwarrantable theses of rationalist dogmatism (abstractionism, innatism, preformationism, supernatural intervention, and so forth)⁵² Kant deemed this demand wholly justified To meet it he went so far as to reduce such concepts (that is, pure concepts of an object) to sheer logical functions of judgment, utterly devoid of objective content, and thus metaphysically so barren that even Hume might be able to countenance the claim that they have their origin in pure understanding and are acquired through the mere act of thought (judgment) itself.⁵³ Schemata of transcendental imagination become necessary in consequence of this stripping away of everything extralogical from the categories in order to supply them with objective content and relation

The categories have this peculiarity only by means of a universal sensible condition can they have a determinate signification and relation to an object When this condition is omitted from the pure category, it then contains nothing but the logical function of bringing the manifold under a concept From this function by itself, i e , the form of the concept, we cannot cognize and distinguish which object falls under it since abstraction has been made from the sensible [condition] under which alone objects can fall under it Therefore, the categories require, in addition to the pure concept of the understanding, determinations of their application to sensibility in general (schemata), without which they would not be concepts through which an object may be cognized and distinguished from others but only so many ways of thinking an object

252–3) both portray what inferential thought finds before it, before it sets to work conjoining perceptions in relations of necessary connection Kant almost certainly came across this passage in the German translation of Beattie's *Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth* (1772), of which there is a modern edition by F Wolf (Stuttgart-Bad Constanz Friedrich Neumann, 1973) The passage is quoted almost in entirety in Beattie's *Essay*

⁵¹ CPR, A146/B185

⁵² See KMM, chap 3

⁵³ See esp Kant, *Prolegomena* §28 and §39, KGS, vol 4

for possible intuitions [which] cannot be defined without going in a circle because the definition would itself be a judgment and thus have to make use of this [logical] function⁵⁴

Yet if it is only through schemata that categories become more than mere forms of judgment, one may well wonder whether my elucidation of the problem of the Analogies does not commit Kant to circularity. For the objective signification and relation to objects the categories of relation acquire through their schemata are strictly temporal: the permanence of the real in time (substance), the reality which, whenever posited, is invariably succeeded by another (cause and effect), and the simultaneity, in accordance with a universal rule, of the determinations of one substance with those of another (community)⁵⁵. But if time is what alone can give objective meaning to the categories of relation, how can these concepts in turn be exponents constitutive of time in the field of appearance? That is, if, as I claim, time derives its objectivity from the categories of relation, then it does not seem possible that these categories in their turn can derive objective sense and signification from time, and it follows either that the teachings of the Schematism and the Principles conflict or that Kant has presupposed each in his explanation of the other.

This difficulty can actually be resolved quite easily, via the interpretation of transcendental idealism expounded above. The schemata are determinations of the *pure* time intuition of the Transcendental Aesthetic.⁵⁶ Since this time is not real but ideal, it is imperceptible and so itself in need of objectivization in the field of appearance.

⁵⁴ *CPR*, A244–5, see also A242–5, A248–9, B305, A321/B378, A349, B378, B428, and B431. The logical dimension of Kant's theory of experience is perhaps the most important of all, yet also the least satisfactorily treated and most neglected. The only study of the Transcendental Analytic I know which gives full due to Kant's logic, especially his metaphysical deduction of the categories from the logical forms of judgment, is Béatrice Longuenesse, *Kant et le pouvoir de juger* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1993). It is a welcome antidote to the generally prevailing tendency to diminish or ignore the metaphysical deduction and derive the categories from Newtonian science by way of principles of time-determination, as well as to those of an ahistorical bent who pour scorn on Kant's logic without troubling to obtain the information necessary to understand and evaluate it (by a study especially of Christian Wolff and Georg Meier, together with *KGS*, vol. 14, and Kant's students' lecture notes).

⁵⁵ See *CPR*, A143–4/B183–4. I translate *Zugleichsein* by "simultaneity" in preference to Kemp Smith's "coexistence", see note 98 below.

⁵⁶ See *CPR*, A138/B177. Keep in mind that the time intuition is nothing more than a form of synthesis, see sections I and II-A above.

Even space and time, their concepts likewise so pure of everything empirical and it so certain that they are represented in the mind completely a priori, would be without objective validity and without sense and signification [*Sinn und Bedeutung*] if their necessary use in [the constitution of] objects of experience were not shown, indeed, their representation is a mere schema which always relates to the reproductive imagination which summons up [*herbeiruft*] the objects of experience, apart from which space and time would lack signification. An object cannot be given to a concept otherwise than in intuition, and even a pure [sensible] intuition, though possible a priori in advance of the object, can itself only acquire its object, and thence objective validity, through the empirical intuition of which it is the mere form.⁵⁷

From this it is plain that there is neither inconsistency nor circularity in Kant's reasoning in the *Analytic of Principles*. On the one hand, the categories of relation are the basis of principles of necessary connection between distinct appearances, and although these connections exist only in and for empirical thought, not immediate intuition, the real time-determinateness of appearances (that is, their existence in relations of succession and simultaneity), in conformity with the principle of pure synthetic unitary time, may be inferred from them. In this way, by means of these conceptual surrogates, pure space and time attain empirical objective sense and signification. On the other hand, real time-determinateness could not be inferred from the categories of relation (which in themselves are mere logical functions) were it not for pure time as determined by the schema (that is, "the phenomenon, or sensible concept of an object, in agreement with the category"),⁵⁸ hence, we are only able to comprehend and utilize the categories of relation as pure concepts of an object of intuition by means of the sense and signification they acquire on the basis of transcendental determination (schemata) of pure time. The circle is virtuous: pure time gives the categories of relation the sensible sense and signification that enables us to infer objective temporal relations between appearances from their necessary connections,⁵⁹ and thereby bestow empirical and objective sense

⁵⁷ *CPR*, A156/B195 and A239/B298 (I have added "sensible" based on Kant's addition—see Kant, *Nachtrage* 118, *KGS*, vol. 23). The categories too are said to be "the pure schema of possible experience", A237/B296.

⁵⁸ *CPR*, A146/B186. Despite Kant's characterization of schemata as sensible concepts, they should be thought of as intuitions (that is, as intuitions fashioned in accordance with the rule expressed in a concept, as in mathematical construction, see *Critique of Judgment* §59, *KGS*, vol. 5).

⁵⁹ These connections are arrived at, presumably, in the Humean associative manner, based on the formal time relations of immediate apprehension.

and signification on pure time. The result, therefore, is empirically real and objective spaces⁶⁰ and times which nonetheless conform a priori (thanks to categorial exponents) to the pure synthetic unitary space and time of the Aesthetic (that is, to the original synthetic unity of apperception of the Analytic)

III

A. *The Solution in the First Analogy*⁶¹ As in the subsequent Analogies, Kant's starting point in the first is the thesis that all apprehension in intuition, as subject to pure time, is successive. (Note that perceptible qualitative change is irrelevant: even if qualitative identity

The relations thus inferred count as pertaining to the existence of the appearances themselves rather than merely to our empirical consciousness of them (that is, they count as distinct from and independent of their apprehension). Because the categories are not concepts specifically of space and time, they require surrogates of their own which are (namely, schemata), in order thereby to stand in relation to the specific variety of appearance that results in view of the peculiar constitution of our faculty of intuition.

⁶⁰ "In all experience something must be sensed, and this is the real of sensible intuition. Consequently, the space in which we are to set up experience regarding motions must also be capable of being sensed, i.e., must be indicated by what can be sensed, and this space as the sum total of all objects of experience and itself an object of experience is called *empirical space*. Now, such space insofar as it is material is itself movable. But a movable space, if its motion is to be capable of being perceived, presupposes again another enlarged material space in which it is movable, and this enlarged space presupposes just as well another, and so to infinity. The space in which motion is perceived is a relative space, which itself moves again", Immanuel Kant, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, Ak 481, KGS, vol. 4. But because these relative spaces and times are explicated by means of concepts which obtain their objective sense and signification from the pure synthetic unitary space and time of the Transcendental Aesthetic, the uniqueness and unicity of the latter are nevertheless guaranteed never to be violated (that is, space and time remains, always, one). For the relation of the latter to the concept of absolute space and time, see CPR, A430/B457, A452/B480.

⁶¹ Since detailed textual analysis of Kant's solution to the problem of the Analogies would protract this essay unacceptably, I shall restrict myself to a series of remarks pertaining to my central theme: the importance of transcendental idealism to the elaboration of Kant's theory of experience.

is maintained, appearance is to be apprehended in intuition as a succession)⁶² Since our sensibility is so constituted as always to intuit (apprehend) a manifold as successive whether it actually exists as such or not, the question arises how it is possible to determine the temporal relations in which the manifold exists *objectively*, that is, distinct from and independently of the order of intuition. If time were perceptible, we could simply read off the temporal positions of each appearance and thereby determine their temporal relation to one another. Since time is the pure, merely ideal form of sensibility, however, it is altogether absent from appearance (perceptible reality), and appearances as such are thus devoid of temporal position and relation. So too they would remain were it not a condition for universal self-consciousness, and thence of experience and its objects, that all appearances stand together in a single, synthetic unitary time.⁶³ For this reason, the possibility of experience demands a time-surrogate existing right in perceptible reality itself—something real that, as permanent, constitutes an unalterable substratum in relation to which succession and simultaneity may be represented objectively, that is, in a manner distinct

⁶² Those considering, say, Kant's house example (see *CPR*, A190–1/B236–7) often overlook the fact that it is not necessary to walk around the house for the problem of whether the apprehended manifold is successive or simultaneous in the object to arise: standing quite still our apprehension is still successive. Perspective (which presupposes an objectively real space in which perceptions already exist) seems to me posterior to Kant's real question. For a different view see William Harper, "Kant's Empirical Realism," in *Kant on Causality, Freedom, and Objectivity*, ed. William Harper and Ralf Meerbote (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).

⁶³ It is of the first importance to recognize that Kant's *sole* warrant for the objective validity of the categories—that is, their necessity not only to our thought of objects (which Hume could and did affirm) but to the objects themselves—is their role in the objectification of pure synthetic-unitary space and time (that is, the original synthetic unity of apperception), which thereby renders possible both experience and its objects. There is no comparable warrant for Kant's metaphysics of nature or his transition to physics (in the *Opus Postumum*, *KGS*, vols. 21–22): their principles can lay claim to objective validity only insofar as they constitute instances and/or applications of the transcendental principles of the *Analytic of Judgment*. Thus, without the transcendental philosophical grounding provided in the first *Critique* (especially the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories), they could count only as mere Humean necessities of *thought*.

from and independent of the order in which appearances are apprehended in intuition. This "permanent in relation to which alone appearances can be determined in relations of time is substance in appearance, that is, the real of appearance which, as substrate, remains ever the same through all change" ⁶⁴

Anyone considering the First Analogy is apt to be perplexed by Kant's contention that the representation of objective change presupposes not merely a relatively permanent substratum but an absolutely permanent one. The explanandum seems neither to demand nor to warrant a claim that for every change not only must something continue identically the same before, during, and after the change, but something must exist permanently both into the past and into the future. Our perplexity vanishes, however, once we recognize that Kant's real explanandum is not objective change (which can only be cognized empirically) but objective time, the presupposed "substratum (as permanent form of intuition) in which all change of appearances has to be thought" and which "remains and does not change" ⁶⁵ Clearly nothing except what exists permanently, and is thinkable only through a pure concept original to pure understanding (substance), can serve as exponent of pure time. An impermanent basis of time-determination could not guarantee the unity of time essential for possible experience, for, as time-proxy, its beginning and end would be token the beginning and end of time itself. Alternatively, the representation of any such beginning or end would be possible only in relation to something else at least relatively permanent in respect to it, and this something would have to be itself absolutely permanent or else a regress would ensue (just as if one were to ascribe succession to time itself, in which case "one would have to think another time in which this succession would be possible") ⁶⁶ Indeed, since pure synthetic unitary time is the form of (the unity of) sensibility, with only

⁶⁴ CPR, B225

⁶⁵ CPR, B224-5, see also A182-3

⁶⁶ CPR, A183/B226. The advent of a new substance implies that something comes into existence that is not a determination of any substrate but is itself a substrate of determinations. There would thus be a first state of that substance, that is, a determination without any predecessor. Since this determination could not be referred to any other determination as its successor, it would be temporally indeterminate, that is, (since time itself is not perceptible) its existence could not be determined in relation to synthetic unitary time. To suppose that this determination could be effected simply by referring it to the state of *another* substance begs the question: it assumes that the second substance exists in time relations of precedence and simultaneity

a relatively permanent time-surrogate multiple sensibilities might result and there "would not be cognition but a rhapsody of perceptions, unsuitable for a (possible) consciousness in which perceptions were connected (*verknüpfen*) in an orderly union (*Zusammenhang*) according to rules, and so too for the transcendental and necessary unity of apperception."⁶⁷ Thus, only by means of an absolutely permanent, unalterable reality can appearances be set into time (and vice versa) and "*existence* in different parts of the time series acquire a *magnitude*, entitled duration "⁶⁸

The preceding should also serve to make clear why Kant deemed himself the first philosopher actually in a position to demonstrate the principle that all change in the objects of perception (appearances) must be thought in relation to an unchanging permanent substratum (substance). Empirical grounds suffice only to warrant the supposition of something relatively permanent (for instance, the sun, or the stars in the night sky), but never anything absolutely permanent; they thus can make possible time-determination within a limited sphere but never—as only a surrogate of genuine synthetic unitary time can—serve as a basis on which to unify all *possible* realities of perception in one universal experience. Nor do mere conceptual considerations suffice, since there is no contradiction in supposing that something be given in intuition that lacks relation to a permanent ("appearances can certainly be given in intuition without functions of the understanding")⁶⁹ A permanent reality can be proved necessary only if appearances are to have real existence in synthetic unitary time and space, and so only "under the condition of empirical thought in one experience, and thence only mediately and indirectly."⁷⁰ This conditional character is what makes the principle of permanence synthetic, and so unprovable from mere conceptual considerations alone. Any attempt by the dogmatic rationalist to demonstrate that the transient

with respect to the first, and so presupposes that both substances already exist in one and the same time—yet it is precisely because any such time (that is, an objective time prior to and independent of categories of necessary connection) is lacking that conceptual exponents are necessary at all. Hence, an object of perception without a predecessor is not a possible experience. See *CPR*, A188/B231.

⁶⁷ *CPR*, A156/B195–6

⁶⁸ *CPR*, A183/B226 "Since this substrate thus does not change in its existence, its *quantum* in nature can be neither increased nor diminished", B225

⁶⁹ *CPR*, A90/B122

⁷⁰ *CPR*, A160/B200

existence of objects of perception entails a permanent existent is bound to remain open to Hume's charge that we may simply be mistaking a necessity of our thought of objects for a necessity of the objects themselves⁷¹ The only way to lay the Humean doubt to rest and to link all changes in appearance to substance (as its determination) is by reference to the conditions for possible experience, and above all to a synthetic-unitary time in which appearances exist in time relations distinct from and independent of their apprehension⁷² In particular, by showing that objective time—even the flux in which Humean perceptions ostensibly have their existence⁷³—is entirely a function of a principle of pure understanding founded on pure concepts of necessary connection, and not vice versa, Kant cut the ground out from under a Humean-style psychologistic account premised on repeated observations of perceptions, the successive existence of which (that is, existence in one time, hence one sensibility) is simply presupposed

B The Solution in the Second Analogy The first and decisive mistake in virtually all commentary on the Second Analogy is the seemingly innocuous assumption that Kant's starting point is the thesis that "representations as such *have* a temporal order, but nothing about the temporal order of *what they represent* can be inferred from their own temporal order"⁷⁴ That representations as such do *not* have a temporal order is, in my view, the very *raison d'être* of the Second Analogy. For it is one thing to say that representations are apprehended as successive in empirical consciousness (owing to the form of sensible intuition, pure time) and quite another to say that representations themselves have temporal order (that is, *exist* in temporal relations of

⁷¹ For Hume, the objects that appear are one and all perceptions. He held that, for all we are able to know of self-subsistence by pure reason alone, it makes just as much sense to regard perceptions themselves as self-subsistent as any supposed substrate they may be thought to have. See Hume, *Treatise*, 207, 233–34, 244, 252.

⁷² See *CPR*, A184/B227–8, A736/B764–5.

⁷³ Kant, of course, believed he had demonstrated that representations do not *exist* as a flux (they are merely apprehended as such in intuition), especially through the use made of the First Analogy to refute Cartesian skeptical idealism (see note 33 above). Thus the notion, current through Hume and beyond, that the time in which appearances exist exactly mirrors the successive-ness of their apprehension is denied by Kant. Kant's expressed opposition is converted to full agreement if his transcendental idealism is interpreted in the usual manner.

⁷⁴ Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 244, see also pp. 248–9. This formulation is his, but the assumption it expresses seems to me quite general.

succession) To equate the two, it seems to me, is to presuppose precisely what Kant set out to demonstrate in the Second Analogy: how, through the category of cause and effect, representations which in themselves are devoid of temporal determinateness first acquire it, and so come actually to exist, in their own right, in objective relations of succession, distinct from and independent of their subjective apprehension.⁷⁵ Confounding the two is a direct and unavoidable consequence of adherence to the standard view of transcendental idealism, according to which appearances are preimaginatively given—and so independently of understanding and empirical thought exist—in temporal succession.⁷⁶ Thus, quite apart from saddling Kant with the starting point of the empirical idealists (especially Hume) to whom he was opposed, this sets him the impossible task of warranting, entirely a priori and without invoking a Cartesian *deus ex machina*, inferences from the immediately apprehended temporal order of one set of existents to the temporal order of another set of existents which are never immediately given. It is, therefore, little wonder that interpreters have made Kant the butt of repeated accusations of fallacious reasoning, the “*non sequitur* of numbing grossness”⁷⁷ being only the most famous: their misunderstanding of the most fundamental doctrine of his philosophy leads them to situate his endeavor to exhibit the category of cause and effect as the source of a constitutive principle of experience in the wholly inhospitable setting proper to Descartes and Berkeley, thereby dooming it to failure.

The hopeless predicament in which Kant, or anyone, is placed if he assumes that representations as such have a temporal order and

⁷⁵ This is why, until they are subordinated to the principle of the Second Analogy, appearances “are in no way differentiated from their apprehension, i.e., their being taken up into the synthesis of imagination”, *CPR*, A190/B235. Apprehension, as we have seen, concerns merely the ideal form of appearances in their intuition, not their reality as objects of perception, hence, as realities (as defined in the Anticipations), they are not in time at all.

⁷⁶ Again Guyer: “The manifold of subjective states occurs or is given successively. That is, any pair or series of distinct representations, whether they represent states of affairs which coexist but are successively or states which succeed one another and thus comprise the several states of an actual event or alteration, themselves succeed one another”, Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge*, 171, 243–4. Although this assumption is usually implicit, I have never seen it denied and an interpretation of the Second Analogy built thereon.

⁷⁷ Strawson’s phrase (echoing Lovejoy)

then attempts to reckon with the problem of inferring from their temporal order the imperceptible order of the objects they represent is, in essence, Descartes' predicament. The Cartesian (or, in Kant's terminology, *skeptical* or *problematic*)⁷⁸ idealist holds that the only objects ever given to us are our own perceptions, and that their situation and relations alone are perfectly known. Since the objects perceptions represent are, by contrast, never directly given to us, how matters stand with them can only be known by inference from the perceptions whose cause we presume them to be. Now, these unperceived objects are supposed to come in two varieties—momentary events and enduring things—and the problem is how to distinguish one from the other via their representations. If representations truly mirrored their objects, we should expect momentary perceptions to represent events and abiding ones to represent enduring things, yet since *all* apprehension is successive,⁷⁹ this simply is not the case. (For instance, it is impossible to distinguish successively apprehending one enduring perception from apprehending a succession of exactly resembling ones, each representative of a distinct event.) The more pressing question thus becomes, How can fleeting perceptions represent enduring things? One possibility is that, by displaying a *qualitative* identity over time, a series of perceptions warrants our inferring the *numerical* identity of their object. But were that so, then, as soon as the qualitative identity were broken (as by a mere blink of the eyes), we would have to infer that the object had, at that moment, ceased to exist, nor would it follow from a qualitative change in its perception that the represented object must have ceased to exist (Descartes's beeswax, for instance) or even have changed (the change may only have been in the lighting, angle of view, or the like). Finally, one must ask what feature it is of perceptions themselves that prompts us to suppose that they are merely mental representations of things unperceived outside the mind, that is, how do they convey to us the idea that not they but things we never perceive are the true reality?

It is generally supposed that Kant's own questions in the Second Analogy were of this type, and that he believed the key to their solution lay in the subordination of perceptions a priori to the law of cause and

⁷⁸ See *CPR*, A377, B274

⁷⁹ As immediate objects of consciousness, perceptions can be supposed to exist only so long as they are perceived, and since one cannot perceive the immediate past or future, they were generally regarded as momentary existents

effect (as that which can alone permit "the *justification, verification, or confirmation* of the judgments about empirical objects that we make on the basis of our representations of them")⁸⁰ The category of cause and effect is conceived not as originally bestowing temporal order on our representations but as determining the order they already have (in virtue of being given by the senses as a flux), that is, *fixing* it, rendering it *necessary* Thus, once I determine that *X* is the cause of *Y*, I know not only that *Y* succeeds *X* but that it *must* succeed it, so that even if the representation of *Y* should sometimes precede that of *X* in apprehension, I still know that the object *X*—or *event* as may now be called—precedes the event *Y* Since the objective temporal order may thereby diverge from the subjective order of apprehension, the supposed purely epistemological goal of the Second Analogy is, in this manner, achieved

Since Cartesians distinguish representations from the objects they represent as two distinct kinds of entity—mental and material—they could find such an account acceptable Kant's transcendental idealism, however, led him to regard material objects themselves as mere representations, indeed as "nothing but the sum (*Inbegriff*) of [successively apprehended] representations"⁸¹ The Kantian idealist is therefore obliged to assign to one and the same series of representations not one but two distinct, potentially divergent temporal orderings: their *immediately* intuited subjective succession in apprehending imagination and their *inferred* objective succession in discursive understanding Thus means that, with the Cartesian option of distributing these divergent sequences among different sets of existents excluded, the Kantian has no choice but to regard one time series as real and the other as fictitious whenever they diverge (for instance, when I see or smell the smoke before seeing the fire) Which is it to be the existents we immediately apprehend, or those never given to us and known only by inference from those which are? Hume's answer is well known,⁸² and the fact that the standard account of the Second

⁸⁰ Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge*, 246 Guyer of course is not alone in every interpretation known to me, Kant's solution to the problem of experience in the Analogies reduces, in the end, to epistemic indispensability of one kind or another See, for instance, the interpretations of Harper, Robinson, Allison, and Melnick

⁸¹ *CPR*, A191/B236, see also A104ff

⁸² See his criticism of double existence theories, Hume, *Treatise*, 210–18

Analogy requires us to give essentially the same answer Hume did serves more than anything else to expose its basic interpretive fallacy For the assumption that representations have temporal order prior to and independently of their subordination to the inferential principle of cause and effect leaves its proponent no choice but to view the subjective time series as the true one and to regard the objective time series superadded in understanding as fictitious (however indispensable this fiction may be epistemically).

Had Kant been ready to content himself with so patently fictitious a species of "objectivity," he need never have sought an alternative to Hume's account Hume never questioned the indispensability of the principle of cause and effect to our thought of objects, indeed, he deemed it so essential to all reasoning regarding matters that he thought that upon its removal, "human nature must immediately perish and go to ruin"⁸³ He opposed only the inference, common among philosophers, from the indispensability of the principle of cause and effect for our thought of objects to its necessary (or even possible) validity in respect of the objects themselves "Obscurity and error begin then to take place, and we are led astray by a false philosophy . . . when we transfer the determination of the thought to external objects, and suppose any real intelligible connexion betwixt them, that being a quality which can only belong to the mind that considers them"⁸⁴ Therefore, for Kant actually to refute Hume, he needs to show nothing less than that the objects themselves (Hume's perceptions, Kant's appearances), insofar as they belong one and all to a single, unitary sensibility, are subject to the universal law of cause and effect epistemic utility, even indispensability, is simply not enough

The standard account of the Second Analogy is incapable of yielding anything more than an epistemically indispensable principle of cause and effect because of its transcendental realist assumption that appearances have temporal order prior to their subordination to the principle of cause and effect. For what is this if not to say that their order as appearances is in fact already fixed and neither can nor needs to be determined by any principle of pure understanding? Moreover, in attributing such an order to them, the

⁸³ Hume, *Treatise*, 225 Kant was well aware that Hume recognized the indispensability of the principle of cause and effect to human understanding—see the Preface to the *Prolegomena*

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 168

proponents of this interpretation have already, whether wittingly or not, presupposed the very brand of objectivity whose possibility Kant set out to explain in the Second Analogy, for that which exists in a time series is, as such, an event, and thence an object. That is, by assuming that the order in which representations are apprehended is also the order they have, upholders of this view reify representations as occurrences—be it in a mind, a brain, or, as Hume would have it, a “place” of which we lack even “the most distant notion.”⁸⁵ If any objective necessity at all is to be salvaged for the temporal order of representations, it can only be through relation to their thing-in-itself *ground* (or transcendental object *substrate*), which Kant deems the source of the affections of sense.⁸⁶ But since however transcendental idealism is construed it leads to the denial that either things in themselves or their affective agency (attributed to them by Kant with doubtful legitimacy)⁸⁷ are in any way temporal (or spatial), this species of transcendently real necessary connection quite clearly cannot be equated with the objective succession whose possibility the Second Analogy is supposed to have established. What remains then for the upholder of the standard account? Since, on this view, the existence of appearances (including the temporal order in which they exist) is completely independent of understanding, this faculty is in no position to exercise the least influence over appearances, and any legislative, constitutive role in respect of appearances is precluded. Already having a temporal order of their own, representations are necessarily indifferent to any law of time-determination which the understanding might flatter itself it can impose upon them. It may well be that we cannot think an object for appearances without regarding them as subject to the

⁸⁵ Hume, *Treatise*, 253. In my view, Hume was agnostic regarding the ontological status of perceptions, that is, whether they are mental, physical, neutral monistic, or whatever. See Waxman, *Hume's Theory of Consciousness*, ch. 6-B. Nevertheless, he *objectified* perceptions as *events* insofar as he regarded them as *existing* in relations of temporal succession. Kant, by contrast, sought to explain what Hume merely presupposed: how perceptions first acquire the status of events, and thence of genuine objects (and here too the “place” of their occurrence is initially undefined, see note 33 above).

⁸⁶ See CPR, A30/B45, A250–2.

⁸⁷ I can think of no justification consistent with the constraints Kant placed on the objective employment of the concept of cause and effect to warrant his use of the manifestly causal notion “affection” in reference to things in themselves. The notion “cause” seems similarly misapplied at A288/B344, A494/B522, and A496/B524.

law of cause and effect, and, in this purely subjective, epistemic sense of "experience," then, the pure concepts of understanding are essential to its possibility. But what use is it that we cannot help thinking or believing them to be subject to this law if nothing constrains the objects themselves—that is, their own, objective constitution—to conform to our representations? As Hume demonstrated (at least to Kant's satisfaction), neither faith nor even logical necessity⁸⁸ can make it so in reality (that is, of the appearances themselves). Clearly, therefore, so long as we assume that representations already have temporal order, we condemn Kant to fail in his attempt in the Second Analogy to demonstrate that the law of cause and effect holds not only of our thought of objects but of the objects themselves.

The challenge confronting interpreters of Kant is that, in order to divest themselves of this assumption, they need radically to change their construal of transcendental idealism. So long as this doctrine is thought compatible with representations existing in succession prior to and independently of imagination and understanding, they are left with the alternative of supposing either that Kant simply failed to see that a divergence between the subjective and the objective succession of appearances exposes the latter as merely fictitious (albeit indispensable), or that his real aims were much more modest than his recurrent assertions that understanding legislates to nature, is constitutive of objects, and so forth, would lead one to suppose. Those interpreters who do not scruple to attribute the most elementary lapses of reasoning to a thinker of Kant's caliber, even in the formulation of cardinal tenets of his philosophy, are apt to favor the former alternative, whereas the latter is likely to appeal to those who cannot believe Kant capable of overlooking something so obvious to us. Because, however, the prevailing conception of transcendental idealism has wedded

⁸⁸ "Abstract or demonstrative reasoning . . . never influences any of our actions, but only as it directs our judgment concerning causes and effects", Hume, *Treatise*, 414. For Hume, apart from belief in the reality of what the senses and memory present, all belief in real existence is predicated on the relation of cause and effect (see pp. 86, 153), hence, the *application* of logic and mathematics to reality (that is, to the world constituted by custom, see p. 108) is contingent on causation. See Waxman, *Hume's Theory of Consciousness*, pt. 2, esp. chap. 4-C. The same position is, if anything, clearer still in Kant, for whom the subordination of appearances to the forms of understanding (that is, to the logical functions of judgment) is founded on imagination and its schematism.

the latter alternative to the assumption that appearances have temporal order prior to synthesis in imagination, members of this camp end up transforming Kant's theory of experience into epistemology (or even phenomenology), and are left propounding the distinctly unspectacular claim that such an approach is at least to be preferred to Humean psychology. But quite apart from the manifest incompatibility of such a thesis with Kant's iterated aims, it renders the vast conceptual edifice and complex argumentation of the first *Critique* utterly superfluous for so modest a goal—we can only regard its complexity as a sign of groping confusion. I, for one, find such an approach less palatable than the simpler, more straightforward notion that Kant was somehow blind to the fact that objectivity, as presented in his system, is just as fictitious as it is in Hume's. But we have no need to embrace either alternative provided we are willing to reexamine the assumption fundamental to both that representations, simply as given, already have temporal order.

A straightforward, compelling solution to Kant's problem in the Second Analogy emerges directly when we distinguish the successive-ness of the apprehension of appearances in imagination from the temporal order—and initial lack thereof—of these appearances themselves. Such a distinction is only possible if we suppose that pure time is the merely ideal form of the apprehension of intuitions in imagination, with no original, intrinsic application to the realities of perception defined in the Anticipations (that is, the matter of phenomena, that in them corresponding to sensation). From this it follows that, in relation to immediate consciousness (intuition and perception), the realities of perception are, temporally speaking, a blank slate. The possibility of experience, demanding as it does the realization in appearance of synthetic unitary time, thus requires a principle of inferential understanding constitutive of the temporal order of representations in respect of their existence. This demand, Kant believed, could not be satisfied otherwise than by a principle founded on the category of cause and effect. In its original signification, this category is merely the logical form of hypothetical judgment. Thanks to the transcendental schema furnished by imagination, however, it acquires a temporal interpretation as “the real upon which something else inevitably follows in conformity with a rule.”⁸⁹ Accordingly, the Second Analogy is a “Principle of Time Sequence in accordance with the Law

⁸⁹ CPR, A144/B183

of Causality,"⁹⁰ that is, a synthetic a priori proposition in which causal connections are understood as constitutive of time order. Its contention is that if appearances are subject a priori (universally and necessarily) to laws⁹¹ of cause and effect, then, on the basis of their necessary connections (that is, their relations of existential dependence), it will *always* be possible to infer an objective temporal sequence. Since this means moreover that the only temporal existence appearances have is that derived from the principle of pure understanding, there is no temporal existence prior to or independent of it with which it may conflict (for the successiveness of apprehension pertains only to the form, which, as ideal, cannot enter into perception and confer existence in time upon appearances). There is thus no prior time series with which the time series arising from the determination of sensibility by discursive understanding might be compared and in relation to which it might be degraded to a mere fiction (that is, a necessity of thought), accordingly, it fully merits its appellation as objective succession.

To be sure, this objective succession, like the subjective order of apprehension, exists only in and through acts of pure spontaneity (imagination, understanding). In Kant's system, however, for something to have no existence outside imagination and/or understanding does not make it an idle fiction: if it can be demonstrated to be a necessary condition of possible experience, then it has as much objectivity as anything in human cognition *can* have. The subjective succession of the synthesis of apprehension lacks all cognitive value because, in it, appearances are temporal only in form, not in reality (that is, they lack any temporal relation to one another). Indeed, since the temporal order of intuition has no validity of the (atemporal) realities apprehended in it, we are constrained to regard this temporal order as fictitious, for since apprehended appearances as such lack

⁹⁰ Title of principle in B edition, *CPR*, B232

⁹¹ I use the plural deliberately: the principle of cause and effect demonstrated in the Second Analogy is not itself a law of appearances but simply the pure form (that is, the principle) of empirical laws (as the principle of the Axioms of Intuition is not itself an axiom or that of the Anticipations of Perception an actual anticipation), see *CPR*, A126–8, B165, A159/B198, and *Prolegomena* §36, *KGS*, vol. 4. Kant's concern, unlike Hume's, was never with particular causal inferences: as a transcendental philosopher, his problem was to establish the universal, a priori validity of the concept of cause and effect and the principle founded thereon (that is, of Hume's causal maxim of *Treatise*, 78–82, see the Preface to the *Prolegomena*).

temporal existence, they fail to qualify as genuine events (even in Hume's unknown "place") By contrast, the objective succession resulting from the universal subordination of appearances to laws of cause and effect not only endows appearances with existence in time, distinct from and independent of their apprehension, but everywhere subjects their temporal ordering to rules In consequence, their temporal existence exhibits the coherence and regularity characteristic of nature and demanded by natural science.⁹²

Since the Second Analogy is a nonmathematical synthetic a priori proposition, and so has no "object" capable of being constructed a priori in intuition, only a demonstration of its necessity for possible experience can suffice to establish it as objective a priori.⁹³ Kant sought to meet this demand by relating the Second Analogy to the First, in the following manner The possibility of experience depends on the possibility of all appearances existing together in one and the same time (and thence in one universal self-consciousness) Since time is an ideal form with no reality in the field of appearance, the temporal determination of appearances presupposes something in perception the existence of which is permanent The only concept adequate to think such an existent is substance, schematized as the permanence of the real given in perception Since this concept must be valid a priori (universally and necessarily) of all appearances if it is not to be merely contingent that they exist in one time, then, since unitary time is necessary for possible experience, so too is the a priori objective validity of the category of substance. Where the universal validity of the Analogy based on the concept of cause and effect is concerned, this means that if events lacked relation to a substance, there would be nothing to guarantee that the temporal relations we deduce from them will belong to one and the same time, and so form a single, unique temporal order; hence, the only assurance that a time series so determined will exhibit uniqueness and unicity (see section II-A above) is for all causality to be referred to the agency of substances (which, as permanent, serve as unitary time's proxy in appearance). In other words, since the only way for the Second Analogy

⁹² Since order of temporal existence is entirely a function of causal relations and is in no sense independent of them, Kant's principle furnishes an a priori grounding of the anisotropy (unidirectional, irreversible character) of objective time It may also be reconcilable with relativity theory, see note 102 below

⁹³ See esp *CPR*, A719–22/B747–50 and note 63 above

to discharge its function as a principle of possible experience is for it to play a role in the constitution of objective unitary time, objective validity a priori can only pertain to causality if—and only so far as—it is understood to express the activity and passivity of substances. Accordingly, appearances must be determined a priori not merely as events but as changes in the determinations of substances (that is, as signalling alterations in the permanent substratum of perceptible reality, and so precluding their being events in a Humean-type indeterminate place). For Kant, therefore, it is a necessary albeit synthetic truth that all causality derives from substances.⁹⁴

When Kant's problem in the Second Analogy and his solution to it are set in their proper context, we can see that the issue is not so much one of determining an object *through* representations as determining these representations themselves as objective.⁹⁵ So long as representations are assumed already to have a temporal order—an order corresponding to the subjective flux apprehended in inner intuition—this is sure to escape one, and Kant is instead saddled with the impossible task of deducing cause and effect relations from earlier-later relations rather than vice versa.⁹⁶ What we therefore need to recognize is that, for Kant, there is no such thing as an earlier-later relation of appearances until appearances have been subordinated to laws of cause and effect *that is* the meaning of Kant's second dynamical principle of pure understanding.⁹⁷

⁹⁴ This secures the proposition that "causality leads to the concept of action, this in turn to the concept of force, and thereby to the concept of substance", *CPR*, A204/B249

⁹⁵ The only object Kant thought of as genuinely corresponding to appearances is the atemporal, aspatial transcendental object *X*. See *CPR*, A109–10 and A250–1

⁹⁶ The assumption that representations have temporal order (that is, the standard interpretation of transcendental idealism) also undermines Kant's treatment of the Third Antinomy. For if the succession of appearances were not *constituted* by causal relations, it would be independent of them, in which case, the fact that the regress of *causes* is *in indefinitum* would not of itself entail that the regress of *predecessors* could not go on *in infinitum*. Nor could this be remedied by reference to Kant's treatment of the First Antinomy, since that Antinomy is only mathematical, not dynamical, that is, it does not concern a regress of *existents* (namely, events). In other words, the standard interpretation presents us with a regress of existents (say, states of consciousness, as in Leibniz) which, as prior to and independent of the regress of causes, is not bound by the limits intrinsic to causal synthesis.

⁹⁷ Although one can only speculate, a distinction between a subjective past-present-future series of perceptions (relative to individual self-consciousness)

C The Solution in the Third Analogy The Second Analogy addresses the question of the possibility of events, only in the Third Analogy does Kant offer an explanation of the possibility of enduring things, in the form of a community of dynamically interacting substances. Crucial to his argument is the introduction of space into the statement of the principle, "All substances, insofar as they can be perceived as simultaneous in space, are in thoroughgoing interaction."⁹⁸ His reasons for doing so are unclear. At one level, it may be because different substances, owing to their permanence and status as time-proxies, cannot exist in different times without violating time's uniqueness; hence, an interactive community of substances is possible only if substances exist in different parts of space.⁹⁹ At a more basic level, however, it should be kept in mind that, for Kant, pure space is itself only a form of synthesis in imagination, and so just as formal and ideal as pure time, hence, far from advancing matters, its inclusion in the Third Analogy is actually a broadening of the problem to which conceptual exponents, being able to endow pure intuition with objective sense

and an objective earlier-simultaneous-after series of experience (relative to universal self-consciousness) seems implicit in Kant's philosophy

⁹⁸ *CPR*, B256 (though space is not mentioned in the A edition version of the principle, it is presumed throughout, as its proof at A212/B259 makes clear). I have departed from Kemp Smith by rendering "*zugleich*" as "simultaneous" rather than "coexistent." His liberties of translation do more harm in the Second Analogy (for instance, "*Wirklichkeit*" as "event" rather than "reality" or "actuality," "*erkenne*" as "apprehend" instead of "know" or "cognize," the bracketed insertion of apprehension at A194/B239 which contradicts the sense of successive *existence* that is in question, and the persistent bracketed insertion of "field of" before "appearance"). Still, his preference for "coexistence" hinders understanding of the Third considerably. It introduces the notion of existence into what is merely a formal (not a real) predicate of perceptions. Kant's task in the Third Analogy is to account for the objectivization of simultaneity relations through necessary connections, the *outcome* of which is then real coexistence, that is, to explain how the *formal* predicate "simultaneity" can be supposed to hold a priori not merely formally of our *intuition* of appearances but of the reality (actuality) we *perceive* in them as well. His solution is founded on the category of reciprocity, which, when provided with its schema, makes possible a community of dynamically interacting substances, and thence simultaneous existence.

⁹⁹ Only the simultaneous can interact, but interaction requires that the acted upon reality be external to the reality acting upon it. Since being external in respect of time means existing in different parts of one and the same time and therefore being nonsimultaneous, the externality of *interactive* realities must be defined in terms of space, not time, that is, they must exist in different parts of space and the same part of time. (Allowance should be made, however, for the possibility that we might have had other forms of intuition than these.) See esp. *CPR*, B291ff and A381.

and signification, are the solution. Thus, the only way the realities of perception may be set into relations of space (that is, endowed with existence in space) is by means of a principle of necessary connection, and in particular a principle constitutive of an objective simultaneity distinct from and independent of the successiveness of apprehension. That is, while the pure space intuition alone can render such simultaneity representable, nothing save a principle of necessary connection from which simultaneity may be inferred can objectify space (see section II-D above).

While the Third Analogy is as much an account of objective space as of objective time, Kant chooses to restrict his focus mainly to the latter since time alone is a form of *all* appearances, outer no less than inner (space enters into the account of *universal* self-consciousness only insofar as its objectivization is a condition for that of time). Now, prior to empirical thought and the introduction of a principle of necessary connection, simultaneity relations, like the modes of time considered in the previous Analogies, apply only to the form of our apprehension of appearances (their intuition as simultaneous in imagination),¹⁰⁰ not to the appearances themselves (their existence as realities of perception). The Third Analogy is therefore not a principle of empirical laws enabling us to discover the unknown simultaneity relations that appearances already have (that is, in which they supposedly already exist), but a principle of laws originally constitutive of these relations (as derivable from laws of necessary connection).

What sort of principle is required? Just as unidirectional necessary connection forms the basis of objective succession, bidirectional necessary connection, according to Kant, is the basis of objective simultaneity. That is, there must be reciprocal determination minimally, a circle of determination (*community*) maximally. *X* and *Y* are simultaneous substances if at least one state of each is an effect of the other, even if this is not the case, if a state of each is an effect of some other substance at least one state of which is itself an effect (direct or indirect) of the other. Either way, it is crucial that the causal dependence go in both directions so that at least one state of *X* and one of *Y* is directly or indirectly dependent on a state of the other, as only reciprocity of determination permits inference to objective simultaneity.

¹⁰⁰ See *CPR*, A30/B46 (time as form of *Zugleichsein* of sensations)

The Third Analogy, like the First, concerns substances, not their states. bidirectional causal determination (reciprocity) makes possible an inference from objectively successive states to the objective simultaneity (coexistence) of the substances to which they pertain; it does not permit us to conclude anything as to the simultaneity of different states.¹⁰¹ The fact that Kant did not include a principle of the simultaneity of states in his system of principles suggests that he did not deem it a condition for objectifying synthetic unitary time and space. Three Analogies apparently sufficed: one conceptual surrogate (exponent) for the permanence of time, another for time-order (successiveness), and a third to ensure its uniqueness, for if any two permanents failed to be determinable as simultaneous, there would be two unconnected time-surrogates, and thence two distinct times. Since this is all that Kant deemed necessary for the constitution of objective time and space, and since these are all he deemed necessary for the unity of apperception and the possibility of experience, the transcendental philosopher has no brief (nor remaining categories) to formulate a principle of the simultaneity of states, thus has instead to be discovered in actual experience through reliance on empirical concepts and laws.¹⁰²

¹⁰¹ That Kant's concern was the simultaneity of substance is clear from the formulation of the principle in each edition and from his conclusion to the B edition proof: "Thus the simultaneity of substances in space cannot be cognized in experience save on the assumption of their reciprocal interaction", B258. It is, moreover, a necessary consequence of the fact that the category of community, on account of the logical function from which it is derived, is not subordinative like that of cause and effect, but coordinative. For this means there can never result from this category anything but a community of equals, independent of one another, it thus can only apply to substances, never to their states (which, in the Second Analogy, are subordinated to their predecessors). See *CPR*, B112–13.

¹⁰² It is worth remarking that since the Third Analogy is concerned not with the simultaneity of transitory things but that of absolutely permanent substances, it may well be reconcilable with the relative (and empirical) space and time of twentieth-century physics. Indeed, the same seems to be true of the Second Analogy as here interpreted. For in science too cause and effect relations are generally thought to determine time-order and not vice versa, and even if (contrary no doubt to Kant's own expectations) such relations fail to yield a single, fixed, universal time series, this poses no problem for Kant's system so long as (1) both the uniqueness and unicity of space and time are preserved and (2) there remains only a single dynamical community of (permanent) substances. So far as I am aware, nothing in contemporary science either postulates or implies the absence of such a community, indeed, insofar as all present-day matter is traced back to a "Big Bang" (not

Crucial to correctly comprehending the Third Analogy is to understand why the possibility of experience demands a principle that only the category of community, derived from the form of disjunctive judgments, is capable of furnishing. Consider first what would follow given a plurality of substances without any causal links between them. Bearing in mind that for Kant the very a priori objective validity of the concept of substance rests on its status as a surrogate for time in appearance, the absence of such connections renders it impossible to say of any one of these substances that it is simultaneous with any other—despite the fact that the existence of each is of permanent duration. For what is there then to justify the claim that rather than individually constituting a multitude of different, entirely disjoint times, these permanents—lacking necessary connections as they do—together constitute a single, unitary time? If time were a perceptible reality and not merely an ideal form of intuitive apprehension, there would be no difficulty in the matter since we could then, simply by perceiving the time containing them, directly read off their simultaneity (or lack thereof) without regard to necessary connections between their states. Even granting that the imperceptibility of time and that substantiality (that is, permanence of existence) cannot be known empirically, it might still be thought possible to determine the simultaneity of the substances through a determination of the simultaneity of their states. But this, of course, Kant could never allow it requires that these states belong to one and the same experience, and since unity of experience is possible only given the uniqueness and unicity of objective time, the substances to which these states belong must be assumed to exist in (that is, stand proxy for) one and the same objective time, this, however, presupposes precisely what was to be demonstrated! For Kant, therefore, the imperceptibility of time, together with the postulated absence of all necessary connections between these substances (from which time relations might alone be inferred), implies that these substances must be altogether devoid of

conceived as an absolute, that is, transcendental, beginning of time), such a community seems to be a tenet of recent cosmology (of course, from Kant's point of view, any theses pertaining to permanent substances are presuppositions, not part, of natural science). By contrast with transcendental philosophical principles of nature, however, both Kant's metaphysics of nature and transition to physics, insofar as they import eighteenth-century empirical concepts of matter and force into their a priori (but not pure) synthetic cognition, are incompatible with contemporary science. See note 115 below.

real, objective relations of simultaneity, accordingly, each permanent must be supposed to demarcate a distinct time of its own, utterly unconnected with any of the others. For the transcendental idealist, however, this is but to render experience impossible: with many times, there can be no a priori synthetic unity of the manifold in sensibility, and, therefore, no transcendental apperception. So, in the eventuality of there being more than one substance, the possibility of experience requires a principle of pure understanding to provide for laws of necessary connection whereby to preserve the uniqueness of time.

Nevertheless, one may wonder why a new category of relation, distinct from cause and effect, is necessary to yield such a principle. After all, according to Kant, "only that determines the place of the other in time which is its cause, or the cause of its determinations",¹⁰³ where the existents concerned are substances of permanent duration, would not a connection running simply in one direction suffice to place any two in the same time (that is, to constitute a simultaneity relation)? Yet, unidirectional causal connection would suffice to permit the inference to simultaneity only if time had an objective reality in appearance all its own, distinct from and independent of substances, and were not wholly a function of their causal relations. For if, instead of being constitutive of temporal relation, causal connections were, as interpreters commonly suppose, merely its markers, then the mere existence of a causal connection one way or the other between two permanent existents would, of course, suffice for simultaneity (that is, imply coexistence). Causal connections, however, are not mere markers of temporal relation for Kant. For him, real objective simultaneity of substances (as distinct from the apprehended variety) is nothing over and above the necessary connections that constitute it, and since the absence of causal connections running both ways would, therefore, not suffice to yield a bidirectional relation like simultaneity, an additional pure concept of the understanding—the category reciprocity—proves necessary for the constitution of objective time.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ *CPR*, A212/B259

¹⁰⁴ Accordingly, the only way to understand how a pure concept of reciprocity can be necessary to an account of objective time is to conceive the realities of perception as originally lacking temporal determinateness altogether, and so as needing (for the sake of possible experience) to be endowed with existence in time. Posit for time the least independent objective reality—even if only as the super-imaginative form of sensations (as on the standard interpretation of transcendental idealism)—and any principle founded

So, because there are no imagination-independent, objective time relations by which to infer that substances with any causal connection at all are in the same time, each substance must instead put every other in the same time with it through bidirectional necessary connections, direct or indirect, with at least one of the other's states. Where the interaction is direct, "reciprocity" is the more appropriate expression, where indirect, "community", either way, the category necessary for a possible experience in which there is more than one substance is that founded on the logical form of disjunctive judgments.

When conceived according to the form of disjunctive judgments, predicates are regarded as mutually exclusive, as exhausting all the possibilities relevant to a given cognition, and so as together demarcating a sphere within which the truth of that cognition lies—for instance, "The world exists either through blind chance, through internal necessity, or through an external cause."¹⁰⁵ When substances are conceived in accordance with this form, they are thought of as reciprocally determining one another, and thereby constituting a whole (a system, or nexus). Of course, there is no implication that the nexus they define is itself a real individual—something actually containing these substances, of which they are parts or constituents, for since the category by itself has no meaning beyond the sheer logical form, it does not suffice to define a real individual, merely a conceptual sphere (For instance, regarding "male" and "female" as mutually exclusive does not imply that the things of which each predicate is true are parts or constituents of a single individual, it simply means that objects conceived as falling within the sphere they jointly define must be thought of as one or the other). There is, however, a single exception where the sphere demarcated through the use of the disjunctive form of judgment assumes the status of a real individual. Insofar as the community established through the causal interaction of substances is constitutive of objective synthetic unitary time, the sphere thus demarcated will have all, and precisely, the features of the unique variety of individuality attributed in the Transcendental Aesthetic to pure time and space (that is, uniqueness and unicity). Of course, since the individuality of objective time and space is based entirely on dynamical relations of

on the category of reciprocity is thereby rendered redundant (that is, unable to be deemed constitutive of possible experience)

¹⁰⁵ *CPR*, A73–4/B98–9

necessary connection, it remains merely a *qualitative unity*—a community of dynamically interrelated realities (denominated “nature”)—rather than a *quantitative whole*—an aggregate sum of parts (denominated “world”).¹⁰⁶

IV

By way of conclusion, let us see if we can make sense, in light of the above, of Kant's claim that his transcendental philosophy, in diametrical opposition to the monadology of Leibniz, demonstrates that objects consist entirely of relations (that is, that substance, as phenomenon, contains no intrinsic denominations).¹⁰⁷ This claim may seem problematic. For if it so happened that nature contained only one substance (time-proxy), then that substance would be entirely devoid of external relations (temporal as well as spatial), and so could not be conceived as having *any* extrinsic denominations at all. Nor could we make sense of how this one substance might consist entirely of relations by referring it to space and time, for if, as maintained here, Kant holds that objective space and time are constituted through substance, substance surely cannot be thought of as *originally* consisting of spatial and temporal relations. (In fact, his pure concept of substance contains no objective content at all, merely the logical form of categorical judgment.) This difficulty, however, has a quite simple

¹⁰⁶ “Together [the Analogies] therefore say all appearances lie, and must lie, in one nature, because without this a priori unity, no unity of experience, and thence no determination of objects in experience, would be possible”, *CPR*, A216/B263. Kant distinguished “world” from “nature,” with the former designating the quantitative whole, or magnitude, of the real, the latter the qualitative whole, or dynamical unity, of the real, see *CPR*, A418–9/B446–7. In his view, the world has no magnitude, and, therefore, is neither infinite nor finite but indeterminate (see A503–4/B531–2 and A518–23/B546–51), thus, while the sphere of reality is a qualitative unity of apperception (see B131), it is not a quantitative unity (only that contained within the world, which must be conceived as extensive magnitudes, has determinate quantitative unity).

¹⁰⁷ See *CPR*, B67, A265/B321. Intrinsic denominations refer to properties founded in the thing denominated, extrinsic denominations to properties outside the thing denominated (that is, to relations). Leibniz, in his metaphysics, reduces all relations to properties of objects, while Kant, in his transcendental philosophy, reduces all properties to relations. (Only the reality corresponding to sensations may be deemed an exception, but this cannot be cognized a priori beyond the principle of the Anticipations of Perception itself, see *CPR*, A175–6/B217–8.)

solution. A solitary substance would necessarily be devoid of any causal connections to other substances, and so would lack that precisely which is necessary to yield objective relations of succession and simultaneity. Since it would then not suffice to constitute objective time and space, the concept of substance would lose relation to that alone which can give it a priori objective validity: possible experience.¹⁰⁸ The objective validity of the category of substance as a condition of possible experience thus goes hand in hand with that of community, community is not just necessary to possible experience under the condition that there happens to be more than one substance, but is necessary to it unconditionally (that is, if experience is to be possible at all).¹⁰⁹ Accordingly, the relations of which objects of experience consist are one and all relations of necessary connection, given to inferential empirical thought alone, which, thanks to schematism, are the same as the objective relational nexuses of space and time.

Does the position here ascribed to Kant conflict with his supposed attachment to Euclideanism? It might seem so. For if space, like time, is constituted by inference from necessary connections between substances, and the being of these substances is constituted wholly by such connections (contrary to Leibniz's view), does this not threaten to revive Kant's long since discarded precritical position, in "Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces" (1747), that the nature of space is contingent on the necessary connections which happen to hold, or not to hold, among existing substances (such that, say, there might have been an inverse cube law instead of an inverse square law)?¹¹⁰ The answer seems to me to be no. The necessary connections of the theory of experience laid down in the Analogies obtain their sense and significance vis-à-vis the objects of sensibility via their schemata, which are nothing more than determinations of *pure* synthetic unitary space and time (see section II-D above), hence, the empirical spaces and times determined by these connections are subject a priori to conditions of the uniqueness and unicity of space and time.

¹⁰⁸ See esp. *CPR*, A737/B765 and note 63 above.

¹⁰⁹ "Each substance must therefore contain in itself certain determinations in the other substance, and at the same time effects of the causality of that other; that is, the substances must stand, immediately or mediately, in dynamical community, if their simultaneity is to be cognized in any possible experience", *CPR*, A212/B259.

¹¹⁰ See Immanuel Kant, "Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces," §§ 9–11, *KGS*, vol. 1.

(and so of original apperception and possible experience). In other words, in contrast with Kant's early precritical view, the relations that constitute objective space and time are themselves subordinate a priori to the pure space and time which, in the critical system, as the basis of the apriority of mathematics, ensure that whatever axioms and propositions hold of mathematics will likewise apply to appearances

Of course, one might well question whether Kant's system entails the truth of Euclideanism, either in respect of pure or empirical intuition. Kant himself made quite clear that the transcendental space of the Aesthetic is not to be equated with the space of geometry (which presupposes it)¹¹¹ and that the Axioms of Intuition are not themselves mathematical axioms and do not imply or entail any mathematical proposition¹¹² Kant thus seems to have left himself no way of mandating, by transcendental philosophy alone, what may or may not be constructed in pure intuition¹¹³ Indeed, despite many appearances to the contrary, it was perhaps never his intention to espouse a narrow Euclideanism at all (or to commit himself to any position in what we today call philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of physics) We should be careful not to read into the words of a philosopher of another age the concerns of our own, however much they may seem to imply a given position on a topical subject. In the modern sense of the issue, Kant never explicitly took a stand on, or even so much as addressed the question of, the mathematical (not to be confused with the logical) possibility of non-Euclidean geometry His abiding concerns regarding mathematics during the period of the critical philosophy (all inseparably bound up with transcendental idealism) were these (1) to show that mathematics is not empirical, an affair of reproductive imagination; (2) to show that mathematics is not analytic, an affair simply of concepts and logic (with no role for sensibility), and (3) to show that *whatever* might be proved a priori in mathematics has necessarily to be valid of appearances in intuition I doubt that it was ever his intent to utilize transcendental philosophy to prescribe or limit what *specific* pure intuitions geometers and other mathematicians may or may not construct, or to regulate which mathematics a physicist may or may not employ

¹¹¹ See esp *KGS*, vol 20, p 419, quoted in *KMM*, 81–2

¹¹² See *CPR*, A733–4/B761–2

¹¹³ See note 93 above

It should not be forgotten that, in Kant's day, no one had succeeded in turning the idea of a non-Euclidean geometry into a credible system of mathematics, there thus was nothing yet about which to take a position, pro or con. Still, could he have been presented with the writings of Riemann, I see no reason to believe Kant would have declared them not to be mathematics. For Kant, mathematical insight is not given to us through passive contemplation of the pure forms of sensibility, space and time, for these themselves are utterly indeterminate. Rather, it arises through the determination of pure intuition by the understanding's utilizing concepts obtained by reflection on the act of intuition.¹¹⁴ Unlike pure concepts of understanding (which are in effect native to this faculty), mathematical concepts have to be fabricated, built up one mark at a time, through construction in pure intuition. Mathematics is thus historical in a sense transcendental philosophy is not: mathematicians take the concepts bequeathed them by their predecessors and, by means of pure imagination, enrich them, broaden their scope, and sometimes invent entirely new ones.¹¹⁵ It is part and parcel of such a process of building from the ground up that

¹¹⁴ See *Prolegomena* §38, KGS, vol. 4, and CPR, A714-5/B741-2. Michael Friedman argues, quite persuasively in my view, that Kant's notion of pure intuition should not be construed as a kind of insight or seeing; see Michael Friedman, *Kant and the Exact Sciences* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), pt. 1, esp. pp. 89-93. He fails, however, to consider the possibility outlined here that we are, if not wrong, then without sufficient warrant to read Euclideanism, or any definite position in what we would call "philosophy of mathematics" and "philosophy of physics" into Kant's remarks on geometry. I also differ with him on arithmetic and on logic. I believe that, for Kant, the relation of arithmetic to pure time is essentially the same as that of geometry to pure space. I hold too that Kant would have regarded modern quantificational logic just as he did number as presupposing the schematism of the category of quantity, and so as involving sensibility. He thus would likely have deemed it a branch of mathematics rather than of pure logic, which, in his sense, is delimited by the understanding taken in isolation. I plan to develop these and related views in a future paper.

¹¹⁵ The historical conditionedness pertaining to mathematics holds also, in my view, for Kant's applications of transcendental philosophy in the metaphysical first principles of natural science and the transition to physics. For example, since its central concept of matter must be derived from actual experience and so is a product of empirical reflection (see, for instance, CPR, A847-8/B875-6), a metaphysical first principle can only be as good as the concept of matter attained at a given time, and a different such work would have to be written today from that of the seventeenth or eighteenth century, or the fourth century B.C. As with mathematics, however, this does not compromise its a priori necessity, it merely qualifies and restricts it. See also Buchdahl, *Kant and the Dynamics of Reason*, 35-6.

what once seemed completely general and fundamental may be shown—in the light of subsequent work and without the a priori necessity of the original construction being in any way compromised—to be particular and conditioned. Such has proven to be the lot of Euclidean geometry, and I see nothing that would prevent Kant from accepting this situation while continuing at the same time to maintain the theses both of the Aesthetic—that whatever geometry asserts it asserts necessarily and a priori—and of the Axioms—that whatever geometry asserts of pure intuition necessarily holds of empirical intuition as well.¹¹⁶

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¹¹⁶ There is today considerable controversy regarding the nature and purpose of Kant's final, unfinished opus, the *Transition to Physics*, in *KGS*, vols 21–2, especially the aether deduction. In my view, its relation with the work of the 1780s, as elucidated here, is the following. Although the *Critique of Pure Reason* furnishes a warrant for affirming a priori the existence of a community of substances (given that the objectification of space and time is a condition for possible experience), neither it nor the *Metaphysical First Principles of Natural Science* (1786) permit one to say anything about the nature of these substances, and, in particular, whether they are heterogeneous matters or all one and the same kind of reality (quality). For the Anticipations of Perception enable us to anticipate only that the empirically real has a magnitude (and that this magnitude is intensive), but nothing as to the *quality* of this reality (including its homogeneity or heterogeneity). However, in the wake of Lavoisier, Kant came (temporarily, perhaps) to believe that he could deduce a priori, as a condition of possible experience, the homogeneous nature (as aether, caloric) of the substances that objectively realize space and time. Since this proof is not offered as part of transcendental philosophy *per se* but only as a link between the system of nature outlined in the *Metaphysical First Principles* and actual physics, it should, in my view, be regarded as no less historically conditioned than the latter work (see previous note), thus, transcendental philosophy does not stand or fall according to the validity of the aether deduction. For a detailed study of the issues involved and a somewhat similar approach to dealing with them see Friedman, *Kant and the Exact Sciences*, pt 2, esp pp 310–15.

METAPHYSICAL NARRATION, SCIENCE, AND SYMBOLIC FORM

DONALD PHILLIP VERENE

THIS ESSAY ADDRESSES TWO QUESTIONS: (1) Is the search for scientific truth a self-sufficient activity? or (2) Does scientific right reasoning depend upon a form of truth-telling that lies beyond the limits of scientific investigation? Put differently, is there a sense of metaphysics as a form of human culture that is the embodiment of this general sense of truth-telling?

The answers to these questions involve the relationship of science, philosophy, and metaphysics. As a means for answering them I wish first to examine Ernst Cassirer's conception of science as a symbolic form. Then I wish to join this conception with Giambattista Vico's conception of metaphysical narration. Cassirer understands science, like culture, as arising from the distinctively human power to form the world through symbols. Scientific truth depends upon a particular use of this power of symbolic formation that exists within that system of symbolic forms we call culture.

Vico understands the "civil world," or culture itself, to arise from a special sense of imagination (*fantasia*) that forms universals within its narrations. Within these narrations are stated the primordial truths of human culture upon which science is later to depend. My aim is to put Cassirer's conception of science together with Vico's conception of metaphysical narration. It is a long-standing point that scientific thinking involves metaphysical presuppositions. My interest is not in the interconnection of science and metaphysics as a traditional logical or epistemological question, but in their interconnections as cultural activities. I wish to approach this through Vico's original association of metaphysical knowledge with the basic human act of narrating a truth.

I

Science as Symbolic Form. Cassirer's notion of the symbol is a transformation of the Kantian notion of the "schema," that is, the

notion of a "sensuous-intellectual form" that lies at the basis of knowledge. Kant reaches this notion of a schema through a process of making distinctions within his transcendental analysis of the elements of experience. Cassirer wishes to find this schema in experience as a *phenomenon*. He does so in his discovery of the symbol as the medium through which all knowledge and culture occur. Cassirer understands his philosophy as an idealism that he, in fact, traces back to the problem of form in Plato, but he insists that the object of which he speaks is truly "there." It is not a creation of the mind of the knower. This is a point on which he insisted in a lecture to the Warburg Institute in 1936, "Critical Idealism as a Philosophy of Culture," and later, to his students at Yale in the 1940s.¹ The notion of the perceptual object as something "there" being pregnant at the same time with something that is "not there" Cassirer connects to Leibniz's term *praegnans futuri*, as well as to the psychology of perception.

In his full phenomenology of knowledge (*Erkenntnis*), which Cassirer claims derives most directly from Hegel rather than Kant or Husserl, he distinguishes three basic functions of consciousness.² These might be thought of as basic ways in which sensory content is symbolically pregnant for the knowing consciousness. The expressive

¹ Ernst Cassirer, "Critical Idealism as a Philosophy of Culture," in *Symbol, Myth, and Culture: Essays and Lectures of Ernst Cassirer 1935-1945*, ed. Donald Phillip Verene (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 64-91. Cassirer's statement to his seminar students regarding the external world is on pp. 193-5. See Donald Phillip Verene, "Cassirer's View of Myth and Symbol," *Monist* 50 (1966): 553-64; Donald Phillip Verene, "Kant, Hegel, and Cassirer: The Origins of the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 30 (1969): 33-46; Donald Phillip Verene, "Cassirer's Concept of Symbolic Form and Human Creativity," *Idealistic Studies* 8 (1978): 14-32; Donald Phillip Verene, "Cassirer's Philosophy of Culture," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 22 (1982): 133-44; and Donald Phillip Verene, "Cassirer's 'Symbolic Form,'" *Il cannocchiale Rivista di Studi Filosofici* (Jan.-Sept. 1991).

² Ernst Cassirer, *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen*, 3 vols. (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1953-54, 1923-29), 3 vi-vii; *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, 3 vols., trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953-57), 3 xiv-xv. This will be cited hereafter as *PSF*, with the German edition's page numbers followed by the page numbers of the English translation. Cassirer's debt to Hegel and its relation to his Kantianism remains very poorly understood. I broached this question in 1969 in "Kant, Hegel, and Cassirer," and John Michael Krois has taken great care to explain fully the limits of Cassirer's Kantianism and neo-Kantianism in his *Cassirer: Symbolic Forms and History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987).

function or *Ausdrucksfunktion* does not separate knower and known. It forms the object mimetically. It is the object "felt" and portrayed as a benign or malignant force. Culturally this function is developed in the symbolic form of myth. The representational function or *Darstellungsfunktion* enacts a separation of knower and known. It is typified by the analogical power to "liken" things into groups, to develop a referential relation between knower and known and attain a logic of classification of objects. Cassirer sees this as tied to the powers of language, of *logos* as separated from *mythos*. This is the power of language to organize the world as a system of discrete objects. The significative function or *Bedeutungsfunktion* is the power of the knower freely to construct symbol systems through which the known can be ordered and which themselves can become elements in wider systems of symbols. This is dominated by what Cassirer calls the purely "symbolic." This function has its shape in the symbol systems of modern logic, in mathematics, and in the theoretical structures of modern science. Here the thought of the knower constructs worlds of pure meaning that have their own coherence of form, and which in the modelling, empirical, and experimental activities of science find loci in experience and provide consciousness with a formal articulation of what is there.

Cassirer claims that "the symbolic process is like a single stream of life and thought which flows through consciousness, and which, by this flowing movement produces diversity and cohesion, the richness, the continuity, and constancy, of consciousness."³ Thus in metaphysical terms Cassirer regards the symbol as that which bridges the gap between life (*Leben*) and thought, or—as he often uses as the opposite of *Leben*—spirit or *Geist*.⁴ To exist as a human is to be at

³ *PSF*, 3 235, 3 202

⁴ Cassirer's most complete statement currently in print on the distinction between *Leben* and *Geist* is his essay, "'Geist' und 'Leben' in der Philosophie der Gegenwart," *Die neue Rundschau* 11 (1930) 244–64, "'Spirit' and 'Life' in Contemporary Philosophy," trans. Robert Walter Bretall and Paul Arthur Schulpp, in *The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer*, ed. Paul Arthur Schulpp (Evanston: The Library of Living Philosophers, 1949), 853–80. This essay, which due to Cassirer's death appeared in place of the customary "Philosopher's Reply" in the *Library of Living Philosophers* volume, contains much of Cassirer's view of Hegel.

The theme of *Geist* and *Leben* is the subject of a fourth volume of Cassirer's *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen*, which was left in manuscript, titled "Zur Metaphysik der symbolischen Formen." A German edition of this is forthcoming with Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg. An English edi-

the juncture of life as it is formed or flows into one of the various directions of the mind or spirit. In his essay of the early 1920s, "Der Begriff der symbolischen Form im Aufbau der Geisteswissenschaften," Cassirer gives perhaps his most fundamental definition of symbolic form: "Under a 'symbolic form' each energy of spirit should be understood through which a spiritual meaning or content is joined to a concrete sensory sign and is inwardly adapted to this sign."⁵ Each *Energie des Geistes* is an act in which consciousness internalizes the sensory content in a certain way such that this content can ultimately be formed as an object of knowledge.

Every symbolic form is at once a way of knowing the object and a way of the subject defining itself in relation to the object. These acts of consciousness do not just designate forms of knowledge. These forms of knowledge correspond to fundamental forms or directions of man's cultural activity. Thus myth as well as science, although polar opposites, are on Cassirer's view both forms of knowledge. Myth does not differ from science as a form of knowledge because myth and science employ different categories as a means to delimit the object. They share the same categories (which they also share with every other symbolic form) but they differ in the interpretation and employment of these categories. This leads to what Cassirer calls a difference in "tonality" (*Tonung*) among the symbolic forms.⁶ Mythical thought and scientific thought both employ the category of cause, but what counts as a causal relation in myth differs radically from what counts as such in science. Each symbolic form has its own "inner form," and it is this *innere Form* that the philosophy of symbolic forms seeks to bring out.⁷ Each form of culture is to be understood on its own terms, as having its own inner logic through which consciousness acts and in which knower is related to known.

In one sense Cassirer's conception of the symbol derives from the essay "Das Symbol" (1887) of the Hegelian aesthetician Friedrich

tion is also forthcoming, *The Metaphysics of Symbolic Forms*, trans. John Michael Krois, ed. Donald Phillip Verene (New Haven: Yale University Press).

⁵ Ernst Cassirer, "Der Begriff der symbolischen Form im Aufbau der Geisteswissenschaften," in *Wesen und Wirkung des Symbolbegriffs* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1956), 175.

⁶ *PSF*, 2:79, 3:17, 2:61, 3:13.

⁷ *PSF*, 1:4-5, 1:73-4.

Theodor Vischer, and from Heinrich Hertz's view of the symbolic character of knowledge in the introduction to *Die Prinzipien der Mechanik* (1894)⁸ But even more than this, I think, Cassirer's notion of the symbol is directly derived from what caught his imagination in his first book of systematic thought, *Substance and Function* (1910)⁹ In the first chapter of this work Cassirer advances a conception of the logic of modern science based upon the generalized notion of a mathematical function Although he presents this as a conception of the logic of science that will provide a theory of concept formation that will actually fit with the workings of modern science, what he offers is a statement in purely formal terms of the interrelationship between universal and particular that is the inner form of the symbolic form itself

Aristotelian class logic has failed to offer an adequate theory of the concept for the way in which modern science works, because its universal is based upon a process of abstraction from the particular such that the universal loses its power to make specific determinations of the particular Cassirer shows how, in the notion of a function, the principle by which a series is ordered can never be a member of the series it orders, yet it has the power to determine the next member of the series Thus $F(a, b, c, \dots)$ provides a model of the interconnection of the universal (F) and the series of particulars ($a, b, c, \dots$)¹⁰ The bond that exists within the two logical levels of this sense of serial ordering is exactly what Cassirer later attributes to the notion of the symbol, which is at once something sensory and also the bearer of a meaning

Cassirer can speak of science, as he does in *An Essay on Man*, as "the highest and most characteristic attainment of culture," because in science these two levels of the symbolic process are fully articulated

⁸ See Verene, "Cassirer's 'Symbolic Form,'" 292-3 Also see Friedrich Theodor Vischer, "Das Symbol," in *Philosophische Aufsätze Eduard Zeller, zu seinem fünfzigjährigen Doctor-Jubiläum gewidmet* (Leipzig Fues's Verlag, 1887), esp 169-73, 192-3, and Heinrich Hertz, *Die Prinzipien der Mechanik* (Leipzig F. A. Barth, 1894), 1-3

⁹ Ernst Cassirer, *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff Untersuchungen über die Grundfragen der Erkenntnis* (Darmstadt Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1976, 1910), *Substance and Function*, trans William Curtis Swabey and Marie Collins Swabey (Chicago Open Court, 1923)

¹⁰ Cassirer, *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff* 22-34, *Substance and Function*, 18-26, see also *PSF*, vol 3, pt 3, ch 1

and self-consciously developed.¹¹ In science, for Cassirer, thought or spirit truly becomes a function of itself. It can develop itself according to the basic power and principles of its own nature. The primordial bond between sense and significance that is achieved on the level of symbolic pregnance now becomes its own dynamic as *Erkenntnis*, scientific or theoretical knowing. What Hegel would attribute to the full activity of philosophical knowing, Cassirer attributes to the broad activity of modern science. In science so understood, consciousness becomes the conscious and deliberate owner of the symbol of the power to construct the world in symbols. The knower becomes the owner of the object. The spirit which Galileo articulates in *Il saggiatore*, that the language of nature is written in mathematical symbols, seems completely fulfilled.¹²

The other symbolic forms, although they too form the object, do not form the symbol. In myth or art or language, the knower's access to the world is attained through the particular symbolic process of the particular form, but that symbolic process is never fully commanded by the knower. In such symbolic forms the nature of the symbol is never fully articulated or penetrated. The process of symbolic formation always in some sense guides the knower in apprehension of the object. In myth, art, and the like, unlike in science, the knower never guides the symbol with the freedom of making systems of symbols that arise directly out of the power of the symbol. In science, thought creates systems of order that are fully and formally determinate and which can generate further systems. In science, thought seems truly to own itself and the world at once, because it owns the symbol in the way that no other form of knowledge or cultural activity does.

What emerges from Cassirer's conception of science as symbolic form is that science is the master of the symbol. Science becomes the true possessor of the symbol, which is the power upon which all knowledge, as well as culture, depends. The other forms of culture, such as myth, religion, art, history, and, in a sense, language—what have been grouped together as the *Geisteswissenschaften*—are symbolic forms; but in them the knower is, in various ways, dominated by

¹¹ Ernst Cassirer, *An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944), 207.

¹² See Cassirer's discussion of this in Ernst Cassirer, "The Influence of Language upon the Development of Scientific Thought," *Journal of Philosophy* 39 (1942): 309–27.

the symbol. The knower is dependent on the symbol. In such forms the knower is always attempting to attain knowledge of his own being, in contrast to knowledge of the object. These forms are always energies of the spirit toward self-knowledge. As Cassirer explains in the first chapter of *An Essay on Man*, one or the other of these symbolic forms, at various times and periods, becomes dominant as the basis for man's knowledge of himself. In the *Geisteswissenschaften*, the symbol is always something through which man is attempting to find himself, to find his own nature. The symbol is permanently problematic for the symbolic forms of the *Geisteswissenschaften*.¹³

When the symbol emerges as science, when it takes on the inner form of what we know as science, a change takes place between the knower and the symbol. Science, as Cassirer emphasizes, initially passes through a mythic stage and later through what he calls a linguistic stage—a stage of descriptive and classificatory thought. Even particular sciences progress through such stages in their own unique developments on Cassirer's view. But once science has emerged, once the purely significative function of consciousness has emerged, the knower takes a new and unprecedented command of the symbol, of the very process through which knowledge and culture are made. In what are traditionally designated as the *Naturwissenschaften*, the problem of self-knowledge is put aside. Science arises through the knower's shifting all attention to the formation of the object. This is true even of the behavioral sciences, which treat the self as an object for investigation and which have nothing to do with the problem of self-knowledge in the above sense.

With its attention on the known, on the object side of the knower-known relationship, science seems to transcend culture. Whereas we can and must speak of myth, art, religion, or language as imbedded in various actual cultures—and thus we speak of Chinese mythology, Greek religion, African art, American history, or the Indo-European languages—we can speak of science in no such terms. There is no such thing, in the proper sense, as Russian science, German science,

¹³ See Cassirer, *An Essay on Man*, 21. See also the discussion of the difference between "nature-concepts" and "culture-concepts" in Ernst Cassirer, *Zur Logik der Kulturwissenschaften. Fünf Studien* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1971), 56–86, and Ernst Cassirer, *The Logic of the Humanities*, trans. Clarence Smith Howe (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960), 117–58.

or American science, unless we are speaking descriptively of the particular forms of social institutions that underlie the scientific community and vary according to historical group. Lysenkoist science or Nazi science are contradictions in terms because they were politics masquerading as science. True science is universal and is the same throughout all cultures. When science is done properly it is done the same, regardless of place. Although there is a symbolic form of art or myth that is articulated when the inner form of art or myth is articulated apart from its existence in particular cultures or periods, this unity is different from that of science as described above. Science is different because it appears to bring with it its own unity, to command its own standpoint apart from whatever culture in which its activity is actually taking place. Science appears this way because it seems to command the symbolic process itself and to be a form of thought solely of the object.

II

The "Science" of Metaphysical Narration Cassirer wishes to conceive science as symbolic form in order to include it in culture. He wishes to show that it is one form of knowledge among many, all of which together comprise a system of symbolic forms that defines the limits and nature of human culture. But there is an unresolved tension within the system of symbolic forms itself since science seems to own the symbolic itself. The resolution of this tension, I think, is not possible within Cassirer's system. I wish to turn to the philosophy of Vico in an effort to discover how it is possible to have an adequate philosophy of science as symbolic form.

There can be no science of culture in the sense of science as described above. The power of science is to form the object or the knower as object. There is no science of the knower as knower. Another way to put this is that there can be no science of self-knowledge in the ancient Socratic sense. The most that can be attempted in this direction is to deny the meaning of any such knowledge, as B. F. Skinner has done in *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*.¹⁴ There is no meaningful way to turn scientific knowing back upon the humanities, upon

¹⁴ B. F. Skinner, *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* (New York: Knopf, 1971).

humanistic knowing, and offer a knowledge of them. But the reverse is not true. There is no scientific knowledge of science itself, but there is a humanistic knowledge of science. That is, there is a humanistic knowledge of what science is and how such knowledge is part of human culture.

My thesis, with its roots in Vico, is that culture is where the self encounters itself, and that at the heart of culture is self-knowledge. It is my view that the essence of humanistic thought, of the humanities themselves, is narration. I count philosophy as one of the humanities. To follow Vico, philosophy is that part of the narrative approach to experience that constitutes the essence of humane letters, that attempts to make humanistic knowledge into a special kind of science.

Vico's *Scienza nuova*, his "principles of new science concerning the common nature of nations," is a science of culture, but what Vico means by "science" must differ from what has above been discussed as science.¹⁵ Vico is commonly called the founder of the philosophy of history. Cassirer adds to this appellation. Throughout his works Cassirer refers to Vico as the founder of the philosophy of the *Geisteswissenschaften* as well as the founder of the philosophy of mythology.¹⁶ In *The Problem of Knowledge* Cassirer calls Vico the "true discoverer of the myth" (*der eigentliche Entdecker des Mythos*).¹⁷ The one truly original part of Cassirer's philosophy, and a feature that sets him off from all other major thinkers of the twentieth century, is his grounding of his theory of knowledge in a theory of myth. Directly at the base of this Cassirer places Vico. In his view, Vico is also the first to understand the way to conceive the humanities generally as

¹⁵ Vico wrote his work in two versions. The earlier is commonly referred to as the *Scienza nuova prima* (1725) and the later as the *Scienza nuova seconda* (published in 1730 and partially revised in 1744). Hereafter all references are to the paragraph enumeration of the so-called Laterza edition of the *seconda* (this enumeration is common to the English translation), Giambattista Vico, *La scienza nuova seconda*, vol. 4 of *Opere di G. B. Vico*, 8 vols. in 11 (Bari: Laterza, 1911–41), *The New Science of Giambattista Vico*, trans. Thomas Goddard Bergin and Max Harold Fisch (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968).

¹⁶ Cassirer's references to Vico are traced out in Donald Phillip Verene, "Vico's Influence on Cassirer," *New Vico Studies* 3 (1985): 105–11.

¹⁷ Ernst Cassirer, *Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit*, (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1957), 4:300; Ernst Cassirer, *The Problem of Knowledge*, trans. William H. Woglom and Charles W. Hendel (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), 296.

forms of knowledge, the issue that occupied not only Cassirer but also Dilthey and influenced the development of hermeneutics down to Gadamer and beyond.¹⁸ What Cassirer misses in Vico is Vico's conception of narration and the conception of the relationship between rhetoric and metaphysical knowledge, upon which all of Vico's *New Science* rests.

It is not possible here to recreate the rich and complicated features of Vico's total thought. I wish only to introduce Vico's views in an effort to suggest how the limits of science are to be understood. This can be accomplished, I think, first by attention to Vico's complaint against Polybius, a complaint that he reiterates in various places. He makes it prominently in axiom 31 of the *New Science*, where he says, "from this point begins the refutation of the false dictum of Polybius that if there were philosophers in the world there would be no need of religions. For without religions no commonwealths can be born, and if there were no commonwealths in the world there would be no philosophers in it" (par. 179). Vico's reference is to *The Histories*, where Polybius holds the view that the cohesion of the Roman state was due to the institution of religious superstition in public and private life.¹⁹ Polybius believes that although this was successful, it might not have been necessary if it were possible to have had a state composed of wise men. The term "philosopher" (*filosofo* or *sapiens*) here is not intended in the narrow sense of someone schooled in philosophy as a particular discipline but more in the sense of the *sapiens*, the knower. Vico's point is that a society of thinkers or cognizers is an impossibility. A society of reasoners who are held together by their processes of evaluating arguments and good reasons for acting or not acting in certain ways (a dream held in high regard by all sorts of modern ethicists and cognitive scientists) is not meaningful or desirable.

Another way to put this is that a body of persons sharing the rational pursuit of truth, common conducting of experiments and investigations, and so forth, is not a culture. Such activity presupposes culture in order to occur, it is in no way at the heart of culture itself. Vico speaks of the *borna de'dotti*, the conceit or arrogance of scholars.

¹⁸ A helpful account of this is Thomas M. Seebom, "The Problem of Hermeneutics in Recent Anglo-American Literature," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 10 (1977): 180-98, 263-75.

¹⁹ Polybius, *Histories* 6.56.

"who will have it that what they know is as old as the world" (par 127) It is this *borra* that is natural to science's seeming possession of the symbolic process itself Science is modest about how much it knows of the nature of things, but its propensity is toward immodesty about the method of right reasoning that will lead to truth Science appears as a kind of independence from all else but its own aims, as that form of thinking toward which thought and culture have always been tending and in which much of the hope of the world of nations is to be placed All of this is well known It is the old division between scientific truth and values, with the emphasis placed on the need to discover some way to understand value so as to allow, if not for a science of values, then for the discovery of some method for proper thinking in values The problem on this level is misconstrued, because what is required is not a new conception of values but a reconception of the ancient project of self-knowledge To pursue self-knowledge requires a notion of knowing that is more fundamental than that of scientific thinking, and one that allows science to be kept in perspective

Vico claims that there are three principles of his science which are also the principles upon which all nations are founded and which they hold in common These are three human customs religion, marriage, and burial (pars 330-37) Religion, which Polybius would attempt to exclude, is the first of these By religion Vico means those primordial orderings of the world upon which any society is founded, or what we would today call myth Man lives in a mythical world before he lives in a logical, empirical, or scientific world The first humans, for Vico, live in an age of gods—that is, the first humans organize their world in terms of gods, for them all things are full of gods They first name the thunderous sky Jove, and once in possession of the first act of naming they name all things in the world as gods the sea, the earth, flora and fauna, and so forth The first power of language is that of the metaphor and the fable or myth, and, as Vico says, "every metaphor is a fable in brief" (par 404)

In Vico's view, humans originally make their world through their power of *fantasia* (imagination). *Fantasia* is communal. It is responsible for the myths or fables made in common by any nation in its beginnings. It expresses the fundamental images upon which any civilization is built *Fantasia*, not ratiocination, is the primordial faculty from which all human institutions spring. Vico's notion of *fantasia* is in the sense of universals (*universali fantastici*) that *fantasia*

makes has close ties with Cassirer's conception of *Ausdruck* (expression).²⁰ *Fantasia* is the faculty by means of which we give form to the world as felt. *Fantasia* is a thought of the passions. In Vico's picture the first humans, who are simply giants roaming the great forests of the earth, experience thunder and lightning. They experience fear of this (*spavento*). They form this feeling of the thunderous sky as Jove, who is a kind of giant of a different order than they, and whose body is the sky itself. Jove is an *Urphanomen* in terms of which all their particularized sensations of the sky can be organized (Vico says every nation has its Jove).

Jove is an imaginative universal (*universale fantastico*), a kind of universal formed through the power of *fantasia*, not through intellectualization.²¹ The fable or the myth is based in this power of the imaginative universal. A myth, Vico says, is always a *vera narratio* (par 401). By this Vico means that a myth is always a true story, and it is a true story because a myth always states an *archē*. The myth is what is first, and is that from which all else must be drawn and developed. By its very nature it states a first truth. There could never be a society of intellectual knowers because what intellectual truths they formulate and seek could never derive directly from the world itself. Their intellectual truths always are implicitly framed by and traceable back to those original meanings first formed in *fantasia* that are embodied in what Vico calls religion.

Fantasia for Vico is above all a faculty of "making." It is certainly tied to the ancient conception of *poiein* (meaning both to make, and to compose poetry), upon which Plato plays in *Republic* 10, and which is preserved in the Latin *poeta*. The first wisdom of humanity was poetic, or what Vico calls *sapienza poetica*, and because this power of poetic making is concerned with the actions of the gods in the world Vico often speaks of the first thoughts of humanity as those of the "theological poets." Because human society is first of all made by men, it is possible in Vico's terms to have a true *science* of the

²⁰ See Donald Phillip Verene, "Vico's Science of Imaginative Universals and the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms," in *Giambattista Vico's Science of Humanity*, ed. Giorgio Tagliacozzo and Donald Phillip Verene (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 295-317.

²¹ For a statement of the logic of imaginative universals see Donald Phillip Verene, *Vico's Science of Imagination* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), chap. 3.

principles of humanity. In the most famous lines of Vico's *New Science* this point is put thus: "But in the night of thick darkness enveloping the earliest antiquity, so remote from ourselves, there shines the eternal and never failing light of a truth beyond all question that the world of civil society has certainly been made by men, and that its principles are therefore to be found within the modifications of our own human mind" (par 331)

The anthropologist Edmund Leach has analyzed the similarities between this famous claim of Vico and Claude Lévi-Strauss's conception of the role of myths in the origins of humanity. Leach concludes that Lévi-Strauss's conception of his "science of mythology" is very close to Vico's. He says, "thus, in effect, Lévi-Strauss, like Vico, affirms that 'the principles of the world of civil society are to be found within the modifications of our own human mind' "²² Among various statements of Lévi-Strauss's position Leach finds the following to be closest to the point of Vico's claim. Lévi-Strauss says, "thus there is simultaneous production of myths themselves, by the mind that generates them and, by the myths, of an image of the world which is already inherent in the structure of the mind."²³ Leach also reminds the reader of Lévi-Strauss's principle concerning the communal and "archaic" nature of myths, which expresses a very Vichian point, namely, that men do not think themselves through myths but myths think themselves through men without their knowing it. Vico, like Lévi-Strauss, holds that the "first science to be learned should be mythology" (par 51). This is a point which Cassirer, in his own way, holds in his grounding of modern theory of knowledge in theory of mythical thought. Vico's conception of a science of mythology is quite modern. As Leach puts it, "In this discussion [that is, Vico's conception of imaginative universals as the logic of myth] Vico is really concerned with the same basic problem that repeatedly confronts the anthropologist when he meets with totemic phenomena. What is really

²² Edmund Leach, "Vico and Lévi-Strauss on the Origins of Humanity," *Gianbattista Vico: An International Symposium*, ed Giorgio Tagliacozzo and Hayden V. White (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969), 317.

²³ Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Mythologiques: Le Cru et le Cuit* (Paris: Plon, 1969), 346; Claude Lévi-Strauss, *The Raw and the Cooked: Introduction to a Science of Mythology*, trans John and Doreen Weightman (New York: Harper, 1969), 341.

meant when the Bororo Indians say that they are red parrots, the Dinka say that they are lions, or the Nuer say that human twins are birds?"²⁴

Myth is the heart of all humanistic knowledge for Vico. The myth is the master key to how all human institutions and systems of thought are originally made. A sense of the myth and of the "made" hold the key to a science of human culture. This is a science which "science" as we normally understand it cannot provide, and which this "science" presupposes. Vico makes clear what he means by science in his early work, *On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians* (1710)²⁵. There he formulates his famous principle that "the true is the made," or that the "true is convertible with the made" (*verum esse ipsum factum* or *verum et factum convertuntur*). Vico finds the principle of the convertibility of *verum* and *factum* illustrated in mathematics. What is true in mathematics is true because we make it. He makes a distinction between science (*scientia*) and consciousness (*conscientia*). The latter might best be rendered as "witnessing consciousness," thus preserving something of its meaning as both consciousness and conscience.

Natural science is not *scientia* but *conscientia*, because the object in nature that is the object of natural science is not made by the activity of natural science. Its truths are not made by the methods of investigation of natural science but are more properly "found" by it in nature. Science, then, in this view becomes a special kind of "witnessing" of nature—of that of which the knower is not the cause. God stands to nature as converter of true and made. But the natural scientist is in principle external to and not the maker of the object of his investigation. The role of experiment, Vico holds, is so important in natural science because it simulates the conversion of true and made. In the experiment we seem almost to be the maker of the object understood. Man stands to mathematics as God to his creation. Later in the *New Science*, Vico expands his conception of *scientia* to the world of civil things (*cose civili*) or human culture. Here a science is truly possible because the objects of our investigation "have certainly been made by men," and thus men can make a knowledge

²⁴ Leach, "Vico and Lévi-Strauss on the Origins of Humanity," 313.

²⁵ Giambattista Vico, *De antiquissima Italorum sapientia*, vol. 1 of *Opere di G. B. Vico* (Bari: Laterza, 1914), chap. 1, *On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians*, trans. L. M. Palmer (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), chap. 1.

the principles inherent in these cultural institutions. Man stands to culture as maker to made.

What is the form of thought that will yield this science of culture that is more properly a science than is any science of nature? Vico is quite clear on this. It is a narrative science. Nothing else will do. In his presentation of "method" in the first book of the *New Science*, Vico makes it very clear that the "decisive proof," that which *regna in questa Scienza* (par. 348), depends upon the reader meditating and narrating to himself the "ideal eternal history traversed in time by the history of every nation in its rise, development, maturity, and fall" (par. 349). He reiterates the claim quoted above: "For the first indubitable principle posited above is that this world of nations has certainly been made by men, and its guise must therefore be found within the modifications of our own human mind. And history cannot be more certain than when he who creates the things also narrates them" (par. 349). Vico calls his new science a "new critical art" that is to be identified with metaphysics: "questa Nuova Scienza, o sia la metafisica" (par. 31). The new science is above all a metaphysics based in the human power of narrative truth-telling.

The details of human culture must be meditated, that is, they must be brought into the mind and digested, inwardized, and otherwise fully absorbed. These details (what Vico calls philology—the languages, deeds, laws, and customs of a people) must then be made into a narrative truth. This means, for Vico, that these details must be ordered so as to make a necessity, so that we have a knowledge *per causas*. We must have a knowledge "through the causes." The story must offer what Vico calls an ideal eternal history (*storia ideale eterna*), which Vico describes as fulfilling the conditions of a story that "had, has, and will have to be" (*dovette, deve, dovrà*). In saying this Vico is quoting the ancient principle, attributed to the Muses and first stated by Hesiod in the *Theogony*.²⁶ The Muses govern the arts of humanity, their mother is Memory (*Mnemosyne*) and their father is Zeus (*Jupiter* or *Jovans*). The new science, then, is based in an act of cultural memory. Vico says that memory is the same as imagination: *la memoria é la stessa che la fantasia* (par. 819). This act of cultural memory must take the form of a narration in which events remembered are ordered in a pattern of necessity, of causes. In Vico's terms this is a science which reveals "what providence has wrought in history" (par. 342).

²⁶ Hesiod, *Theogony* 36–39

Ultimately Vico's ideal eternal history is a science based in poetic and in rhetoric. It is based in poetic because its narration is like a myth. Like a myth it claims (1) to relate a true story, and (2) to relate a complete story. It purports to be true and complete. Such narration is rhetorical because it is, above all, a speech. It must be eloquent, not in the sense that it is finely spoken or charming, but in the ancient sense of eloquence as the complete speech, the saying of all that can be said on a subject. As Quintilian says, "For the verb *eloqui* means the production and communication to the audience of all that the speaker has conceived in his mind."²⁷ We may add, in this case, that what the Vichian scientist has conceived in his mind is the whole of culture, the whole world of "civil things." The ancient impulse to the myth in order to produce a *vera narratio* now must become joined with rhetoric. The natural production of myths by the mind, of which both Vico and Lévi-Strauss speak, must now be deliberately attempted by the Vichian scientist in his speech. This requires the well-known principles of composition of *inventio* (discovery of materials), *dispositio* (arrangement of them), and *elocutio* (formulation of them in language). Vico's science proceeds by these principles, which are compatible with the view that the true is the whole. Vico, like Hegel, holds to the view that the true is the whole. Only narration can provide adequate form for such a sense of truth.

III

Conclusion Vico has his own way of making this speech, the details and adequacy of which I have examined elsewhere.²⁸ My concern is only to have gotten to the idea of such a speech itself, and to have suggested how it is connected to the idea of narration. Science as we ordinarily know it (what Vico calls *conscientia*) can have nothing to do with this sense of a "science of narration," because as Cassirer shows, science associates truth only with the object and, as we may now add, with the part. Scientific truth is always a search for

²⁷ Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria*, viii, pr 15-16

²⁸ See Verene, *Vico's Science of Imagination*, Donald Phillip Verene, "Imaginative Universals and Narrative Truth," *New Vico Studies* 6 (1988): 19, and Donald Phillip Verene, *The New Art of Autobiography: An Essay on the 'Life of Giambattista Vico Written by Himself'* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), esp. chap. 4.

the achievement of right reasoning about the nature of some part of what there is. The object of science is never the whole. There can be no science of the whole in this sense. A way that this can be immediately seen was mentioned earlier—science never is of the knower himself, there is no science of self-knowledge.

Another way I can put my point is in rhetorical terms. Science as we ordinarily understand it, as a specific activity that takes place within culture (a symbolic form), is essentially *ratio*. This is to say that it depends ultimately upon the drive of the mind to seek satisfaction in the “list,” the “method,” the ordering up of what is before the mind. *Ratio* has close connections with the abstractive power of language as *logos*. But over and against *ratio* is *narratio*.²⁹ *Narratio* is the drive of the mind toward satisfaction in the telling of something, that is, in the recreating of the thing in words, the representing of the genesis of the thing in question. This is connected to the metaphorical power of language, to *mythos*. *Ratio* is by nature an order of parts. *Narratio* is by nature a whole, a story is complete—beginning, middle, and end. A story fully told needs nothing further to be said, but it may, of course, be told again.

In having said this I do not mean that narrative is not present within scientific thought. Narratives are certainly employed in scientific thought, for instance, in pathology, general medicine, life sciences, geology, cosmology, and so forth. Narrative thinking is no doubt important to every field of science at some points, even the so-called exact or mathematical sciences. In this respect scientific thought is itself deeply indebted to the primordial activity of the myth, the activity in which we first learn what a story is. My larger point is that science does not transcend culture, instead, science presupposes culture. We know what culture is only if we are able to make a narrative knowledge of the whole of it. This is tied to the pursuit of self-knowledge of the knower that can never be reached by *ratio*. The order achieved by *ratio* can be elegant. It can be elegant in the sense that logicians speak of the elegance of a set of propositions or of a proof, or in the sense that a scientific theory can be ascribed elegance. But only *narratio* can be eloquent, that is, only in relation to *narratio* can the complete speech be the aim. The “crisis of man’s knowledge

²⁹ A very fruitful treatment of this theme is John D. O’Banion, *Reorienting Rhetoric: The Dialectic of List and Story* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992).

of himself" of which Cassirer speaks in the first chapter of *An Essay on Man* cannot be solved by any elegant set of understandings, by any reflective theories. It can be solved only by eloquence (*eloquentia*), by a form of thought that Vico called "wisdom speaking"—*sapienza che parla*. *Sapientia* understood as wisdom is always a grasp of the whole of things and *eloquentia* is the presentation of this grasp in speech³⁰

Finally, what is the role of narrative in science? I have tried to suggest that science, at least as conceived as symbolic form, because of its interest in the object and its separation from the role of the symbol in self-knowledge (the knower's interest in the knower), naturally resists narration. Science falls most naturally to *ratio* instead of *narratio*. My point is that whatever the precise role narration takes in science and in particular sciences or particular phases of their investigations, narration is a rhetorical form not generated by science. Narration itself must come from that sense of humanistic thinking that takes culture as both human wisdom and the project of man's self-knowledge writ large. At the origin of culture itself is the act of narrative knowing—the myth. At the point of humanistic or philosophic thought is again the narrative, as the natural form in which to grasp culture as a whole. Because narration exists as myth and as the form in which culture can be known, narration is available to scientific thinking, to play a role in its purposes.

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³⁰ Vico declares at the end of his autobiography, "L'eloquenza altro non é che la sapienza che parla", Giambattista Vico, *Autobiografia*, ed. Mario Fubini (Turin: Einaudi, 1960), 86. The greatest contemporary exponent of the tradition of wisdom-speaking is Ernesto Grassi. See his *Rhetoric as Philosophy: The Humanist Tradition* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1980).

BOOKS RECEIVED

SUMMARIES AND COMMENTS*

IAN BELL AND STAFF

ANSELL-PEARSON, Keith *Nietzsche contra Rousseau* Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1991 xvii + 284 pp \$49.95—In this important book, Keith Ansell-Pearson undertakes an ambitious study of Nietzsche's moral and political thought. The focus of this investigation is Nietzsche's complicated account of the crisis of modern political life. In order to secure a point of entry into this forbidding dimension of Nietzsche's thought, Ansell-Pearson deploys a novel—and highly successful—interpretative strategy. He proposes that the strengths and weaknesses of Nietzsche's critique of modernity are crystallized in Nietzsche's *Auseinandersetzung* with the philosopher whom he takes to be emblematic of modernity, Jean-Jacques Rousseau. "Nietzsche contra Rousseau" thus furnishes a synecdochical distillation of "Nietzsche contra modernity."

Ansell-Pearson persuasively demonstrates not only that Nietzsche misunderstood Rousseau, but also that many of the criticisms Nietzsche levels against Rousseau would be more accurately addressed to Nietzsche himself. Ansell-Pearson thus locates in Nietzsche's enmity for Rousseau the resentment of modernity that ultimately compromises the philosophical value of Nietzsche's otherwise perspicacious critique of modernity. Although Nietzsche was loathe to admit it, the tension between the ethical and political aspects of his own thought mirrors a similar tension that he detects in the thought of Rousseau.

Nietzsche's prescriptions for political reform, which evince the romanticism and resentment he attributes to Rousseau, eventually betray the promise of his critique of modernity. Nietzsche's experiment with "great politics" simply fails to address the political alienation that Ansell-Pearson identifies as "the major cause of the metaphysics of resentment" (p. 223). Ansell-Pearson figures Nietzsche as a misguided champion of the will whose romanticism blinded him to the peculiar political conditions of modernity. "In his thinking on the nature of the political, Nietzsche shares the delusion which has served to inspire the politics of the modern age, namely, the belief that it is possible to gain control of the historical process and to subject it to the mastery of the human will" (p. 223). Thus deluded, Nietzsche entrusts the redemption of modernity to

* Books received are acknowledged in this section by a brief resume, report, or criticism. Such acknowledgement does not preclude a more detailed examination in a subsequent Critical Study. From time to time, technical books dealing with such fields as mathematics, physics, anthropology, and the social sciences will be reviewed in this section, if it is thought that they might be of special interest to philosophers.

the enigmatic *Übermensch*, who, by sheer dint of a strength of will unrivaled in late modernity, will forcibly transform the sagging political institutions of Western Europe. This political teaching of violence and force stands in direct opposition, Ansell-Pearson claims, to the nonviolent ethical teaching developed in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. "In the story of Zarathustra's downgoing the emphasis is on the ethics of courage and commitment, in the conception of great politics, however, the emphasis is on force and belief" (p. 224). Ansell-Pearson concludes that Nietzsche's ethical vision of a polity beyond nihilism and resentment would be best ensured by something like Rousseau's concern with justice—hence the fundamental irony of Nietzsche's critique of Rousseau.

Ansell-Pearson's thesis is both provocative and promising, for Nietzsche's critique of modernity would certainly seem to disallow any of the recuperative schemes that are popularly attributed to him, including those rehearsed by Ansell-Pearson. Yet the "ethical" and "political" Nietzsches juxtaposed in this book—as well as the constitutive tension that binds them—remain somewhat elusive. The "deluded" champion of the will, who reactively turns to "great politics," is certainly not the Nietzsche who wrote, for example, *Twilight of the Idols*, which advances his most trenchant critique of the political institutions of modernity as well as his classic debunking of voluntarism. Nor is the Nietzsche who preaches an ethic of tolerance and commitment immediately discernible in the dark pages of *Zarathustra*. These critical observations are not intended, however, to detract from the formidable accomplishments of Ansell-Pearson's book. *Nietzsche contra Rousseau* represents an important contribution to political theory, for it sheds considerable light on Nietzsche's oft-misunderstood critique of modernity. Ansell-Pearson admirably demonstrates the bounties to be harvested from a serious consideration of Nietzsche as a political theorist.—Daniel W. Conway, *The Pennsylvania State University*

BEINER, Ronald. *What's the Matter With Liberalism?* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992. viii + 197 pp. \$28.00—Despite its nonscholarly sounding title, this work is a trenchant reinterpretation of certain crucial aspects of Aristotle's thought for the contemporary age, and an excellent survey of the "liberal-communitarian" debate today. The author seeks to restore the philosophical language and concerns of classical moral theory, which he sees as having perennial importance, as against the "thinness" of contemporary liberal theorizing. The work has a prefatory note, including Václav Havel's warning about Western smugness, and a short Index. Footnotes, often substantial, are placed at the bottom of the page. The author's consciously chosen strategy is to raise problematic issues, and questions for further study, rather than to try to establish an unassailable theoretical structure.

In the Prologue Beiner advances the idea of "the theorist as storyteller," to restore and extend the possible purview of political philosophy. Just as great literature is meant ultimately to offer some basis on

which to meditate on the way to live, so genuine philosophy cannot remain (or pretend to remain) strictly neutral as to what constitutes "the good life" The second chapter, "Liberalism," points out some inadequacies of the liberal theories, and of the common communitarian critiques Beiner criticizes "the liberal dispensation" of an "ethosless ethos," but also eschews the label of "communitarian," embracing instead the "republican" ideal of a rational-discursive public realm The third chapter, "Moral Vocabularies," boldly lays out the contrast between the "thinness" of the central liberal concepts of values, rights, and individual autonomy vis-à-vis the Aristotelian *summum bonum*, unity of the virtues, and prudence Beiner extolls the Aristotelian idea of practiced virtue accessible through *phronesis* as one which is readily available to common human understanding and experience The "neutrality principle" of liberalism is exposed as a sham Neither liberal theory nor liberal practice can be neutral—the idea of neutrality itself presupposes a conception of the good life

In the fourth chapter Beiner argues that "rights talk" is a worse guide to conduct than is "goods talk," and that the former actually leads to intemperance and fanaticism in the polity According to Beiner, everything meaningful in the debate over rights can be subsumed into the language of the good, while rescuing society from the atomizing effects of rights talk The fifth chapter, "Citizenship," assails liberal theory for neglecting the problem of citizenship in society Beiner stresses the importance for human beings of participation in a public realm, pointing out the dangers of the remoteness of governmental decision-making processes today, particularly in military nuclear policy He hopes that society's seeing political citizenship as an urgent issue will itself be a positive step The sixth chapter, "Socialism?" suggests that socialism is the only real alternative to liberalism today The concrete, if distinctly utopian, goals of full employment, decent employment, and "the Plato principle" (no person's income in society shall exceed any other person's by a ratio of more than five to one) are suggested as measures to be worked toward which could begin to restore citizenship in contemporary society The epilogue discusses, in a generous spirit, the limits of theory It suggests again, following the author's interpretation of Aristotle, that *phronesis*, not *theoria*, is the key to a good life It calls on present-day theory to be more critical of present-day society; especially by taking into account different models of human existence than those prevalent today

The following questions are some that may be addressed to the book First, the disingenuously made political suggestions would realistically require massive revolutionary changes in society (and its ruling elites) to be accomplished They also seem virtually impracticable economically, as well as largely tangential to solving what Beiner himself calls the "spiritual impasse" Second, there is the problem of various conflicting ideological definitions of what is moral and immoral, good or evil, if we accept with Beiner that human persons should strive for "the good" to become fully human Third, a philosophically judgmental perspective would seem theoretically to imply the distribution of goods based roughly on the degree of one's approach to moral virtue—if practiced virtue is to be meaningfully enhanced—rather than on very

generous workfare for everyone. Fourth, Beiner's reluctance to consider traditional religion, nationalism, or ethnic identity—which, like socialism, tend toward an equalitarian ideal (albeit within one's own community)—as possible answers to the problem of community, seems programmatically to leave most human societies—possibly excepting America—devoid of their essential definitional contents —Mark Wegierski, *Canadian-Polish Research Institute*

BOURKE, Vernon J. *Augustine's Love of Wisdom. An Introspective Philosophy*. Purdue University Series in the History of Philosophy. West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1992. 234 pp. Cloth \$27.00, paper \$13.75—The series of which Bourke's study is a part has two professed aims: to engage students with the history of philosophy by way of text and commentary, and to offer teachers of philosophy a summary account of scholarly perspectives on important historical figures. In principle these somewhat disparate aims can both be served if the text selected touches upon the central concerns of the philosopher under discussion, and if the commentary develops the appropriate connections. Naturally this task will be more difficult for less systematic thinkers, and for thinkers less easily assimilated to the concerns of contemporary philosophers. Having to find Augustine his place within this series, Bourke clearly had his work cut out for him.

Part 1 of Bourke's commentary consists of a brief review of Augustine's life and writings, followed by an encapsulation of his sensibilities and predilections as a philosopher. To his credit, Bourke resists the temptation to impose a retrospective coherence on the "variety of inner discoveries" (p. 21) which animated Augustine's lifelong quest for wisdom. In place of edifice or architectonic, he sets forth themes and variations in Augustine, some of method, some of substance. The principal theme, which enters into other themes as a leitmotif, is what Bourke refers to as Augustine's introspective method, or his interiorism. In the section of Part 1 devoted specifically to this topic, Bourke follows the lead of Anton C. Pegis and argues that Augustinian philosophy bears a close affinity to the interiorism of Plotinus and other Neoplatonists, in that "Augustine's way of doing philosophy involves a turning away (*aversio*) from distractions of sense experience to the inner actions and data of one's own consciousness" (p. 22). Like Plotinus, Augustine believed that the most important realities to be comprehended—the soul and God—had to be distinguished from physical bodies before they could be comprehended. But Augustine's interiorism is unique in at least two respects. He does not on the whole denigrate the body, and he envisions the return of the soul to God in intimately personal terms. In other words, Augustine reunites mind and body by wedding philosophy to confession. In his version of the quest for wisdom, the manner of seeking, however tortuous, is ultimately incorporated within the wisdom sought, and flesh is thereby reconciled to spirit.

Bourke brought this profound Augustinian insight to everyone's attention in his 1945 study, now a classic, of Augustine's life and philosophy. He returns us to this insight in Parts 2 and 3 of the present work, his translation and analysis of the first thirty chapters of book 10 of the *Confessions*. This material contains Augustine's most sustained discussion of the nature and limits of memory, and for an illustration of the theme of interiorism Bourke could not have made a better choice. Although *memoria* as it is discussed in book 10 refers in part to the recollection of past events, it has for Augustine the wider significance of his mind's ability to distinguish mental images from their material exemplars, and therefore to discern, dimly perhaps, the extent of its own activity, of its ability to create. In memory the mind becomes aware of itself, and if sufficiently attentive, it also becomes aware of the power behind its power to create. Memory for Augustine is met at the crossroads of philosophy and theology, it is, to use Bourke's metaphor, "the hinge on which the door from his early Platonism opens to the more personal thinking in the great writings of his maturity" (p. 8).

Part 2 includes the Latin text alongside of the English translation, the latter being Bourke's own. His rendition of book 10 is accurate and serviceable, but it is regrettable that he chose to retain the now anachronistic declension of the second-person singular, as in "Grant what Thou dost command and command what Thou wilt." Part 3, Bourke's section by section commentary on chapters 1–30, situates the material on memory within the broader compass of Augustine's corpus. His analysis supplies context, both philosophical and historical, but makes no attempt to settle controversial issues of interpretation, Augustine is allowed to speak for himself.—James Wetzell, *Colgate University*

BUSSANICH, John. *The One and Its Relation to the Intellect in Plotinus*. A Commentary on Selected Texts. Philosophia Antiqua, A Series of Studies on Ancient Philosophy, vol. 49. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1990. 258 pp. \$90.00.—The study of Plotinus's *Enneads* is beset with difficulties. In this book (originally a doctoral dissertation), Bussanich examines nine important passages from books 3, 5, and 6 on the relation of the One to the Intellect. The passages are relatively short (from half a page to three or four pages) but provide material for a detailed philological and philosophical commentary.

Bussanich begins each of his nine chapters with a very short introduction, presents a translation of the passage to be discussed and then comments on it. His translation stays close to the original text. His option to select a number of passages concerning the same theme has certain advantages. A disadvantage is that it is difficult to isolate one theme from the rest of the *Enneads*. The commentary presents the interpretations of the leading scholars in the field, followed by an evaluation, and sometimes by the author's own new solution.

The One is an overflowing spring, remaining itself while producing what comes after it. The procession of the Intellect raises many problems, as does its relation to Soul. The Intellect received the power to produce from the Good and breaks into multiplicity. In his commentary on *Ennead* 5.5.7–8 (Chap. 5) Bussanich discusses Plotinus's metaphysics of light and its historical background as well as negative theology. In its conversion the Intellect turns away from the intelligible objects to go inwards. The distinction between subject and object disappears, the intellect itself becomes light. This passus is a fine account of natural mystical experience. We would suggest that the "theophanic event" described by Plotinus is likely to be the intuition of one's own being in its deepest core. In this way the unity of all things (monism) is experienced.

Chapter 7 comments on *Enneads* 6.7.35.19ff. Bussanich dwells on the assertion that the soul negates the intellect in its ascent to mystical union. He is inclined to think (contra the common opinion) that the soul may lose its lower self in this union (p. 189) and may cease to exist as a distinct being. Plotinus's mysticism is monistic (p. 190). Chapter 8 deals with the properties of the Good and its will. Chapter 9 examines the identity of procession and conversion when the self becomes conscious of itself as preintellectual entity.

The commentary contains a wealth of information. Bussanich considers the historical sources and mentions the relevant modern interpretations, but his notes are somewhat disappointing with regard to the philosophy of Plotinus. His treatment of the text of Plotinus is conservative and deserves praise. Future students of Plotinus will have to take into account this learned and carefully written work. What is lacking, though, is an extensive doctrinal summary of the conclusions arrived at—Leo J. Elders, *Instituut voor Wysbegeerte en Theologie*.

CASCARDI, Anthony J. *The Subject of Modernity*. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1992. x + 316 pp. Cloth, \$49.95, paper, \$16.95—This book is another "post-modern critique of modernity," in this case concluding with a brief suggestion that a "reinterpretation of the concept of 'aesthetic judgment' that originates in Kant," under the name of "aesthetic liberalism," can solve the problems of modernity (p. 302). The argument is that there is a distinctively modern but self-contradictory conception of the self. But what is really at issue is the modern conception of rationality, broadly defined, rather than any more focused conception of the self.

The modern conception of reason, which is closely aligned with the rise of modern science, may well be credited with the "disenchantment" of the world, but is in turn the source of a new range of gods and demons associated with values, desires, and the will. While the modern self is defined in terms of its freedom to choose from among a plurality of values, it is at the same time dependent on

a conception of reason that proves powerless to make meaningful distinctions among values (p 39)

Cascardi bases his sweeping generalizations on readings of a few authors such as Descartes, Cervantes, Hobbes, Pascal, and Hegel (as read by Kojève). As this list suggests, his analysis is based almost exclusively on *early* modern authors, who in many cases were at best incompletely modern. The diagnosis of tensions in the first gropings towards new conceptions of theoretical and practical reason at the very outset of the modern period can hardly prove that no coherent secular or "disenchanted" conception of reason subsequently was or could be formulated. In spite of the allusion to the "rise of modern science" as the explanation of the "disenchantment of the world," reflection on the actual accomplishments of modern science beginning in the seventeenth century is glaringly absent from Cascardi's work. There is no argument that the history of modern science has shown the modern conception of reason to be fundamentally flawed, but only complaints about the conceptions of reason held by a very small number of philosophical and literary figures.

The book consists of five chapters diagnosing the failures of modernity and a sixth exploring the "Possibilities of Post-modernism," concluding with the recommendation of "Aesthetic Liberalism." The first diagnostic chapter discusses "the 'disenchantment' of the world," the "assumption that there are no intelligible essences, and no natural order inherent in the world" (p 43). This characterization is bizarre, since the aim of the modern conception of theoretical reason, questioned by Hume but reasserted by Kant, was nothing less than to ground the assumption that there *is* a natural order inherent in the world without appealing to any extramundane or divine guarantee of the type still employed by the only partially modern Descartes. The second chapter, "The Theory of the Novel and the Autonomy of Art," focusing primarily on Georg Lukács's *Theory of the Novel* and Cervantes' *Don Quixote*, tries to show that traditional values taken seriously in ancient epic can only be ironically represented to the modern mind. The third chapter, "Secularization and Modernization," attempts to show that the modern frame of mind is never really secular but only secularized, preserving and indeed defining itself against a tacit reference to the kind of transcendent essences or values it supposedly rejects, and that without appeal to such forces secular reason can never succeed in constituting genuine norms (see p 139). But the story of modernization that Cascardi ascribes to Habermas, Blumenberg, and Rorty—namely, that it is an attempt to develop genuinely secular conceptions of norms and reason that retain no hidden appeal to the transcendent (pp 145–53)—is simply rejected without explanation. In the fourth chapter, "The Subject and the State," Cascardi extends his argument to political thought, relying almost exclusively on Hobbes to show that the modernist conception of persons as self-interested rational agents collapses when transcendence is reintroduced in the form of the absolute state. The vast response to Hobbes, however, beginning with Locke and culminating with Kant's attempt to derive both the necessity and the limitations of coercive public law from the conception of freedom itself, is totally ignored, undermining Cascardi's

pretense to be analyzing the characteristic form of modern political philosophy. In the fifth chapter, "Subjective desire," Cascardi uses Hobbes and the Hegel of the *Phenomenology's* master-slave dialectic to argue that the modern conception of desire is only a desire to be recognized by other persons, which can never be satisfied because it must also destroy those whose recognition is needed. This is of course a reductive approach to the subject, which fails to consider the much more subtle view of human needs put forth by the Hegel of the *Philosophy of Right*, just for starters.

In the final chapter, Cascardi finally turns to "aesthetic liberalism." After three hundred two pages of critique, this is dealt with in eight pages. Cascardi's claim is that Kant's conception of aesthetic judgment gives us an intellectually respectable model for a type of thought which would preserve the autonomy of individual subjectivity while also permitting the kind of reference to something more than merely individual, such as the "supersensible substrate of humanity," which has been unsuccessfully repressed by modernity (p. 308). Unfortunately, Cascardi pays no attention to the complexity of Kant's analysis of aesthetic judgment and the difficulties surrounding his introduction of the indeterminate conception of the supersensible to solve the antinomy of taste. Above all, Cascardi fails to consider the implications of Kant's assignment of aesthetic judgment to reflective judgment, with the concomitant regulative rather than constitutive interpretation of its claims. By these architectonic signposts Kant attempts to show precisely how cautious we must be in attempting to supplement the objective constraints of theoretical and practical reason with the subjectively encouraging hints and analogies characteristic of the aesthetic. Such caution is missing from Cascardi's sudden resolution of the difficulties of modernity.

This book is simplistic both in its diagnosis of the failings of modernity and its solution to them. Missing throughout is any sense of how difficult it has been for thinkers such as not only Descartes and Hobbes but also Locke, Hume, Kant, Mill, Darwin, and Rawls to free reason from myth. In my view, we are not in a position where we can comfortably look back on that project and smugly point to its shortcomings, but are still very much in the middle of it—Paul Guyer, *University of Pennsylvania*.

DENYER, Nicholas. *Language, Thought and Falsehood in Ancient Greek Philosophy*. New York: Routledge, 1991. xi + 222 pp. \$65.00—Denyer sets out to explain a puzzle about early (pre-Aristotelian) Greek philosophers. Why are these early thinkers (including Plato) so worried about the possibility of false statement and false judgment? Denyer begins by pointing out that modern philosophers are more worried by truth for them the problem is to explain how we can make true judgments, not how false ones are possible.

In chapter 2, Denyer gives an account of the problem of false saying in the *Euthydemus*, using his analysis here as a basis of his account in

the remainder of the book. There follows a chapter on Parmenides and others who dealt with the intertwined problems of being, not-being, and falsity, then follow chapters on Plato's *Republic*, *Cratylus*, *Theaetetus*, and *Sophist*. The book closes with a rather puzzling chapter on Aristotle and why "though [he] takes it for granted that there can be falsehood, he is equally prone to take it for granted that by and large our thoughts are true" (p. 183). The chapter is puzzling because it does not really connect with the rest of the book, for Denyer rightly claims that Aristotle hardly notes the problem of falsehood and often purports to fail to appreciate all the fuss about not-being. Along the way, Denyer develops his own version of Plato's account of falsity in the *Sophist*, explaining what he thinks is correct and incorrect in the account. Throughout there are a number of references to modern philosophers.

The father of the problem of falsity is Parmenides, and so it is surprising how little discussion of Parmenides there is: pages 24–26 offer a summary of Parmenides' position which the author does not substantiate, and which is clearly based on the interpretations of Owen and Barnes. This treatment seems far too skimpy, even in a short book, for the philosopher who is acknowledged by Plato to be the source of the difficulty. The rest of the chapter on Plato's contemporaries, those Sophists and philosophers who wrestled with the problem of falsity, is illuminating and helpful. Denyer correctly stresses that the problem of not-being and falsity is rooted in a view of meaning as naming, along with a hyper-referential theory of meaning (pp. 9–14).

The discussions of Platonic dialogues focus, naturally enough, on those passages that deal with the problems of false judgment and speech, but because there is no scene-setting, one often feels as though one has come into the middle of a conversation (as indeed one has). The discussion of the *Sophist* begins at 255a (though there is a quick summary of the arguments beginning at 243b). Denyer makes many admirable points, including his stressing that Plato's point was not to make identity and predication unambiguous. But though Denyer mentions that Plato claims in the *Sophist* that being is in as much need of explanation as not-being, and that the problem must be solved before an account of falsity can be given, the point is not followed up. Denyer never mentions the discussion of parricide on Father Parmenides at 241d, nor the crucial claim at 251a that it is necessary to show how one thing can be called by many names.

The book is apparently aimed at upper-level undergraduates and graduate students who do not read Greek, and who have a fairly strong background in philosophy. There is little textual discussion, and little effort is made to demonstrate that the explanations and interpretations offered are supported by the texts. There are few footnotes and the index is minimal. There is no separate bibliography. The book is free of typographical errors, but the publisher's price is exorbitant.—P. A. K. Curd, *Purdue University*

1990 ix + 332 pp n p—This book is the second volume of a two-part study, *The Metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas in a Historical Perspective*. In the first part, the author concentrated on Aquinas's understanding of "common being", in this part he considers Aquinas's account of the existence and nature of God. Elders largely follows the order of the first questions of Aquinas's *Summa theologiae*. He begins by examining Aquinas's views about the demonstrability of God's existence and then devotes considerable attention to the Five Ways. Succeeding chapters present and discuss Aquinas's account of standard divine attributes: simplicity, perfection, goodness, infinity, immutability, eternity, and unity. There are then two chapters on knowledge, one on our knowledge of God, and one on God's knowledge of himself and of other things. The last three chapters examine God's creation and conservation of things in the world, His power over creation and His providential guidance of it.

Elders's grasp of Aquinas's material and of the history of Western philosophy is exemplary, and scholars within the Thomistic tradition will undoubtedly find a great deal in his expositions of Aquinas with which they can agree. Considered, however, as a contribution to a dialogue with those who are not already committed Thomists, the book is less successful. Elders not infrequently limns Aquinas's position in lines that reproduce the letter of Aquinas's thought but fail to capture its spirit. To take just one example, consider what Elders has to say about Aquinas's account of God's knowledge. In explaining Aquinas's position on the question whether God knows things other than himself, Elders says that for Aquinas God knows things other than himself insofar as he causes them. "The importance of this [point] cannot be strongly enough emphasized. God's knowledge of things other than himself can only be based on his causality. He knows things because he is their cause and he knows them in and through his causality" (p. 230). Elders goes on to say that according to Aquinas, God knows "all things which exist at any time, whether past, present, or future. God's knowledge knows whatever will come to be in the succession of time" (p. 234). What Elders apparently does not see here is that the positions he is ascribing to Aquinas commit Aquinas to a thoroughgoing theological determinism which leaves no room for human free will at all. As Elders describes it, Aquinas's position is that God knows everything occurring in time in virtue of his causing it to occur, and that would include, of course, actions on the part of any human will, sinful as well as virtuous, since actions of the will are also things that "come to be in the succession of time."

The appearance of inconsistency in Aquinas's thought is only strengthened by what Elders goes on to say about Aquinas's account of God's knowledge of future contingents. Aquinas holds that God does know future contingent things, and Elders is concerned to show that Aquinas's position here requires the doctrine of divine eternity. Future contingents, Elders says, "can be considered in their causes, [but] since these are not determined to one effect, they cannot give certitudinal knowledge" (p. 237). Instead, Elders argues, the real presence of future contingent things to God in his eternity is required for God to know them. "Without their being present, God cannot know them with certitude" (p.

239) The reason Elders gives for this claim is that God “knows these things as they exist in reality. There is no science without existing things as its object” (p. 238). Now Elders in fact emphasizes the point that God’s knowledge of future contingents, like His knowledge of everything else, is just a function of His causality. “God’s knowledge is a *causal* knowledge so that God knows things because he makes them. With regard to this point, the same applies to God’s knowledge of FCT [future contingent things] as to that of other things” (p. 238). But if God knows things only insofar as he causes them, then to hold, as Elders does, that a consideration of the causes of future contingent things is insufficient to give knowledge of them is equivalent to saying that God cannot have knowledge of future contingents. Furthermore, although it is the case for human knowledge that whatever is known must already be the case, this is not so for divine knowledge on the account of it Elders has given, namely, that God knows whatever He knows in virtue of causing it to be. In God’s case, knowledge is logically prior to and causative of the existence of what is known. It is a mistake, then, to say as Elders does that without “their being present, God cannot know them with certitude.” Rather, the converse is the case: without God’s first knowing them, they cannot be. For God there are no existing things without divine science as their cause, rather than no divine “science without existing things as its object.”

So if Elders is right in the claim that God’s knowledge is always and only causative, then not only is a consideration of the causes of future contingents *sufficient* for God’s knowledge of them, contrary to what Elders supposes, but in fact knowledge of the causes is the *only* way in which God can know future contingents, and the doctrine of eternity is not needed at all. On the other hand, if Elders is right in supposing that knowledge of causes is insufficient for knowledge of future contingents, then it must be the case that God’s knowledge of future contingents is not just a function of God’s causality, contrary to what Elders says. As Elders presents Aquinas’s position on God’s knowledge of future contingents, then, it looks inconsistent: for Aquinas it both is and is not the case that God knows future contingent things solely in virtue of causing them. The appearance of inconsistency seems to me to be an artifact of Elders’s presentation, however, and not a feature of Aquinas’s account itself, and I am inclined to suppose that here too the problems with Elders’s presentation stem from an inability to capture the heart of Aquinas’s account.

For reasons of this sort, Elders’s book is likely to be successful mainly in addressing those already committed to Aquinas’s views in natural theology, who will find much in Elders’s exposition to agree with — Eleonore Stump, *Saint Louis University*

FERREIRA, Jamie M. *Transforming Vision: Imagination and Will in Kierkegaardian Faith*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991. 176 pp. \$39.95—Thanks in large part to a stimulating article by David Wisdo,

Kierkegaard scholars have of late been very much taken up with the question, Was Kierkegaard a volitionalist on matters of faith? That is, did Kierkegaard understand faith to be an act of will or an ineffable gift of grace? In this signal contribution to Kierkegaard scholarship, Ferreira tries to deconstruct this and other dichotomies

Against the nonvolitionalists, Ferreira rightly contends that the claim that faith is a gift is compatible with the view that its bestowal requires a certain activity on the part of the individual who is to receive it. Moreover, even if faith be a miraculous largess, it still exists as a human activity, and as such is open to description

There can be no doubt that Kierkegaard begs for a volitionalist reading. From one end of the corpus to the other he stresses the importance of the will, choice, and decision. In two of myriad instances Kierkegaard writes, "What is it to believe? It is to will (what one ought and because one ought)", and again, "The conclusion of belief is no conclusion but a resolution." While I will leave the reader to judge whether or not the author of this book does justice to such passages, Ferreira reasons that there can be no "either/or" between the will and grace because for Kierkegaard the will never functions in isolation but rather "informs or is to be predicated of all our activities" (p. 33)

Kierkegaard offers many descriptions of what it means to believe in God, the most widely circulating of which is his image of the "leap of faith." The leap has traditionally been understood in volitionalist terms, as a conscious choice to live within the categories of faith. In a fresh reading of this image, Ferreira argues that what Kierkegaard meant to emphasize with this description was the "qualitativeness and freedom of the transition" (p. 33) to faith. Ferreira suggests that the best mirror with which to capture Kierkegaard's vision of the transition to faith is the image of a gestalt shift in perspective. While God must provide the condition for this radical revision, the passage to faith is best understood as the cumulative work of imagination. One cannot choose to see the world in a new way, nevertheless, this radical shift in perspective engages the will in the sense that it could not take place without the individual's active attention. While Ferreira acknowledges that choice may come to play a role in the life of faith, it is the act of concentration rather than conscious decision that Ferreira associates with Kierkegaard's understanding of the will.

One of the most important virtues of Ferreira's study is her ability to bring a number of Kierkegaardian concepts to bear upon one another. Thus, Kierkegaard's views on choice are made to answer to his beliefs about the surrender of reason. And Kierkegaard's often repeated claim that faith is a passion is applied as a corrective to the leap of faith imagery. On this second score, Ferreira argues that if faith is passion then the way we come into faith must resemble the transition into other passionate states. After scrutinizing various theories of emotion, Ferreira concludes that we do not choose what we feel, and so the leap of faith cannot be a conscious choice.

There is much that I would gainsay in Ferreira's study and a number of issues that I wish she would have investigated, such as the impact of her analysis on the critical subject of Kierkegaard's understanding of sin. Just the same, *Transforming Vision* is without a doubt one of the

premier works of Kierkegaardian scholarship to come out in years. It is rigorously and yet gracefully reasoned, nuanced in its readings, rich in resonances, considered as a meditation on Kierkegaard's understanding of the imagination, Ferreira's work is nonpareil —Gordon D. Marino, *Massachusetts Institute of Technology*

FICHTE, Johann Gottlieb *Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy (Wissenschaftslehre) nova methodo (1796/99)* Edited and translated by Daniel Breazeale. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992. x + 494 pp. \$49.95—Fichte is one of the small handful of philosophers on the highest level. But he is still relatively unknown, even in Germany, for a variety of reasons. These include the difficulty of his thought and its expression, which impedes even native Germans, the relatively greater attention paid to Kant and Hegel, and perhaps even to Schelling, and the lack of a critical edition of his writings. In English-language philosophical circles, beyond these handicaps, knowledge of Fichte is further impeded by the persistent paucity of good, or even any, translations of important items in his bibliography.

In order to indicate why this work is important, a word about Fichte's career will be necessary. His career was determined by several incidents, including the early appointment of this gifted thinker to a chair in Jena when his initial text was mistaken for Kant's much awaited work on religion, and the need to have a text for his first series of lectures. Lacking a suitable manuscript, Fichte, who was in the process of elaborating his own position, chose to present it in the form of lectures whose text was printed and distributed to his students before each class. The result was *Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge (Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre)* (1794), Fichte's best known and most influential text. Fichte was dissatisfied with the form of his work composed in great haste. Much of his later writing consists in an ongoing effort to refine and restate his basic theory in acceptable form.

The present translation contains texts belonging to Fichte's effort to restate his *Wissenschaftslehre* during the period 1796–1799. There is no original manuscript for this work. Instead, there are two detailed student transcripts. These transcripts were discovered accidentally in 1980 in a German library and one of them was published in German in 1982. The present volume consists in a deliberate conflation, or composite, based on the most important portions of both texts. As Breazeale points out, since we do not possess an original manuscript, anyone who desires to learn Fichte's view in this stage of his development should study both of the available transcripts.

Breazeale is obviously a gifted translator, and this is a superior piece of work. Even in the best of circumstances, Fichte is a difficult writer. Breazeale's translation is fluent, precise, and perhaps most important of all for those who need encounter this thinker in English only, it is readable. His main contribution lies in his unusual success in making an author whose German is already complex, difficult even for a native,

speaking an immediately accessible, readily intelligible English. This is a significant accomplishment, important for the development of any kind of following in English-language philosophical circles. In comparison to other translations of Fichte, Breazeale's renderings are slightly more vivid, further, he on occasion usefully decomposes Fichte's complex sentences—which other translators such as Heath and Lachs tend to preserve—into separate English sentences. The German-English glossary will be helpful for those who need to check the rendering of particular terms. Breazeale has provided a detailed, useful introduction in which he situates Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo* in the development of Fichte's theory. This is an excellent translation by the ranking Fichte scholar working in English at present, accompanied by a full, useful scholarly apparatus, likely to be of interest to Fichte scholars and all those concerned with the development of German idealism.—Tom Rockmore, *Duquesne University*

GARBER, Daniel. *Descartes' Metaphysical Physics*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992. xiv + 389 pp. Cloth, \$60.00, paper, \$23.95.—Garber easily achieves his stated goal of providing "a book that pulls together various aspects of Descartes' metaphysical approach to the world of body and presents them in a systematic and coherent way, a kind of handbook of Cartesian physics" (p. 3). Such a work has indeed long been needed. The result, however, is more than just a handbook, for Garber's careful attention to historical context sheds considerable light on Descartes' mechanism.

As befits a work on mechanism, the book's central topics are matter (or body) and motion. Garber begins, however, with a useful intellectual biography of Descartes. Perhaps most interestingly, Garber stresses the importance of Descartes' early (1618) encounter with Isaac Beeckman. Beeckman, Garber suggests, stimulated Descartes' early thoughts on the conservation of motion, the corpuscularian nature of matter, and the connection between mathematics and physics.

In the second chapter, Garber discusses the general nature of Descartes' philosophical project. Here, Garber defends the controversial claim that Descartes' early views on method, as expressed in the *Rules for the Direction of the Mind* and the *Discourse on the Method*, were more or less abandoned in his later work. Instead, Garber highlights the role of Descartes' conception of a hierarchy of knowledge, ordered according to subject matter, in shaping his mature thought. Garber's project, then, is to show how Descartes' physics "grows from and is nourished by its metaphysical roots" (p. 63).

Chapters 3–5 focus on Descartes' metaphysics of body. Garber analyzes Descartes' geometrical conception of body and his arguments for that conception, fleshing out the account by examining the various ways in which Descartes sought to distinguish his own view from scholastic hylomorphism and from atomism. Garber concludes that Descartes' attempts to discredit scholasticism are ineffective against a certain type

of scholasticism with a somewhat Leibnizian flavor. Descartes' denial of the void is illuminated by an examination of the Cartesian response to Pascal's attempts to produce an experimental proof of the vacuum. The important theological dimensions of seventeenth-century debates on the nature of space are brought out through a discussion of Descartes' correspondence with the Cambridge Platonist Henry More.

The topic of motion is first broached in chapter 6. Garber argues that Descartes' attempts to define motion are shaped by his concern to make the distinction between motion and rest a nonarbitrary one. Descartes' laws of impact require that there be such a distinction, for they dictate that the outcome of a collision depends upon which body is at rest. Descartes also appears to require an account of motion which allows motion to individuate particular bodies, here Garber suggests that Leibniz was right in maintaining that motion alone cannot do the job. Chapters 7–8 provide a thorough analysis of Descartes' laws of motion, with due attention to the evolution of his views and to historical context.

The book concludes with an examination of God's crucial role in the Cartesian system. The laws of motion, in Descartes' view, flow from God's activity. Garber argues that Descartes' God is not a cinematographer, causing motion by recreating the world in different configurations. Rather, God causes motion in some more direct way, "by way of an impulse that moves matter in a way that we can comprehend only through immediate experience" (p. 277). This interpretation, Garber suggests, helps to explain Descartes' derivations of the conservation laws, as well as his apparent willingness to grant causal powers to minds. It appears, however, to raise questions about the status of the "divine shove" which God is said to conserve.

With this book, Garber ensures that future work on Descartes (and on modern philosophy generally) will be informed by a much clearer picture of the complex interplay between Descartes' physics and metaphysics —
Lisa Downing, *University of Pennsylvania*

GAVIN, William Joseph. *William James and the Reinstatement of the Vague*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992. xi + 227 pp. \$37.95—
Gavin argues that the restoration of "the vague and marticulate" to its proper place in experience is vital for James's texts (pp. 45, 86, 92). In the first part, "Interpretations," he shows how religious concerns led to the metaphysical notion of "reality as vague." In line with the "unfinished" Jamesian text, the second part offers "Conversations" with texts of Peirce, Dewey, Marx, Rorty, and Derrida. The third, "Applications," true to the "directional" thrust of James's text, puts that text to work in modern art and medicine (p. 13).

Since reality is broader than the "known" and the "knowable" (p. 49), philosophy's "linguistic pronouncements" give "epistemic clarification" but fail to fathom the "thickness" and "depths" of reality (pp. 174, 50, 89). "Real" signifies "inexhaustible fecundity" (p. 94), "profusion" (pp. 92, 159), and "jewellike" experience glistening in diverse ways (p. 154).

James is best designated "radical realist," for being can be "alluded to," but not "captured," by language (pp 91, 79). Our focus here has an "illogical subconscious periphery" (p 148), the "fringe" of an "unfinished continuum" of "selective choices" (p 23), where interpretations of reality become part of its content (pp 121-2).

In James's "relational metaphysics," the universe is "incomplete" (p 178), possessed of a "vagueness" which is not, ontologically, a "fall from grace" (pp 178-9). This "metaphysics of pure experience" (p 77) discloses Being (p 85) through language as the "way" to, or "conduit" for, pure experience (pp 88, 92). But the "insufficiency" of language (p 89) means that it cannot go "all the way down" (p 187) into the tissue of reality. Language is ambiguous both liberating and insulating (p 170), necessary and betraying (p 82). Though tempted to put language aside, simply to act (p 185), James never stops writing, and this is the "crux" (p 186) for Gavin. Language is thus saved for James—and James is saved for writing—by the way in which we "preperceive the present moment through the concepts of the past" (p 67), by the way we "create" reality in naming it, in linguistically molding it (p 72) into "a leading," where each word and sentence is a "sliding focalization" for something *more* (p 74).

The unfinished Jamesian *text* thus defers and defies closure: writing is "eternal incompleteness" (p 10), and the text is "an activity," a sustained effort to continue the will to believe (p 55), a way to get on with the choice to go on (p 190), a "return" to experience (p 192) as a mode of nurturing the "fragile self" (pp 134-5). Reality is beyond linguistic formulation but is accessible only through the concepts with which we talk and which are made for practice, not "insight" (pp 158, 90). Language is the "house of pure experience" (p 90), but the "whole of pure experience" cannot be confined by language (p 91).

The power of the provocative vagueness of the Jamesian text to restate the "fluency" which *is* human life itself (p 191) confronts late modern culture where "the other is now no longer to be taken for granted at the experiential level of everyday life," which is ruled by "immediacy" (p 167) and "locked in the eternal present" (p 164). Since the "primordial, prereflective form" has been displaced by "a conceptual paradigm" which "espouses immediacy as optimal" (p 177), and since immediacy is the opposite of the vague or mysterious (p 169), the act of belief of the Jamesian textual act of naming the unnameable can be released for the sake of "transcending the immediacy" of the present (p 164). This entails "empathy" with experience—both that of the other and that of the past—which is "performative" and "reaffirms the indeterminate" (p 170). Thus, the "affective" suggests that the basic trait of reality is its ambiguity (pp 172-3). If what saved James was the will to continue to articulate this ambiguity, what saved this will to the text-as-directional was a steadfast sense of "reverence" as a "ladder to the most exalted truths" (p 183). Gavin makes Jamesian writing the object of this reverence and provides not only a rich exegesis of James's unfinished textual arch, but a spur to his reader to address the meaning of the activity of writing as "pure experience"—Gerald J. Galgan, *St. Francis College, N.Y.*

HEIDEGGER, Martin *Parmenides* Translated by A. Schuwer and R. Rojcewicz Bloomington Indiana University Press, 1992 xv + 170 pp \$29.95—This work is a translation of volume 54 of the Heidegger *Gesamtausgabe*. The original German volume is the text of a lecture course given from 1942 to 1943 at Freiburg and amended by Heidegger before its publication in 1982. The translators provide a brief Foreword with background and examples illustrating their principles of translation. The translation itself is well done, accurate, and clear.

The organization of this volume is complex, and is explained briefly in an editor's afterword. The work is divided into an Introduction and two parts. Each part is divided into sections and each section includes "recapitulations." In these summaries Heidegger repeats the main points of the section, but he often develops ideas unanalyzed in the section proper. Depending on one's sympathies with Heidegger's project, the repetition in these portions of the work will be found either tiresome or usefully reinforcing.

The title of the Introduction indicates that Heidegger is offering a meditation (*Besinnung*) on Parmenides' poem. The meditation begins with a reflection on lines 22–32 of the first part, particularly Parmenides' reference to "the goddess." Heidegger rejects the prevailing view, that this use of deity is only a mythic prelude to "abstract" (Heidegger's word) philosophizing. Instead, Heidegger asserts that when Parmenides appeals to the goddess, he refers to truth: "the truth"—itself—is the goddess" (p. 5).

This identification sanctions Heidegger's development of a four-part series of "directives" based on the primacy of the notion of truth in Parmenides' poem. Part 1 of the lecture series is devoted to the first three directives: truth is concealment, *unconcealedness* "indicates that truth is wrenched from concealment and is in conflict with it" (p. 26), *unconcealedness* refers to a realm of "oppositions" in which truth stands. The brief Part 2 concerns the fourth directive: the open space of the clearing of Being. In neither of these parts does Heidegger analyze the sections of the poem generally thought to contain its most philosophically important themes, the Way of Truth and the Way of Seeming.

Since it is axiomatic for Heidegger that truth is historical and that philosophy and poetry are frequently allied pursuits, the ways in which Heidegger develops the four directives range far and wide: the figures treated include Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Descartes, Leibniz, Anaximander, Nietzsche, Burckhardt, Schelling, Homer, Hesiod, Theognis, Kierkegaard, Grimm, Livy, Spengler, Fichte, Pindar, Schopenhauer, Holderlin, Herder, Sophocles, and Rilke. Heidegger's approach to this diversity of subjects depends, in large measure, on deriving meanings from a number of Greek words consonant with his reading of the history of truth (and a fortiori, the history of philosophy and poetry). As a result, the reader must be prepared for many of Heidegger's etymological reflections.

The central themes concerning truth advanced in this volume have already appeared in a number of texts published around or after the time these lectures were given. Heidegger frequently illuminates phenomena unconsidered in these works, however, or adds detail to figures or notions he has already examined. We find an instance of the latter in the

remarks on the myth of Er in the *Republic* (pp 97–9), and of the former in an incisive treatment of handwriting and the leveling effect of technology's way of expediting handwriting—for example, “the typewriter makes everyone look the same” (p 81)

In view of the current interest in Heidegger's connections with the Nazis, one may wonder whether these lectures add to our awareness of how Heidegger saw the wartime situation in the land of “poets and thinkers” (a phrase Heidegger uses several times) Heidegger generally ignores current events, here and elsewhere, but toward the end of the final lecture, he says that “a moment of history is approaching, whose uniqueness is by no means determined simply, or at all, on the basis of the current situation of the world and of our own history in it” (p 162) This may be a veiled allusion to Germany's position in World War II, but Heidegger then adds that what is at stake in this regard are only “beings”, the decisive question is, “How are beings supposed to be saved and secured if the essence of Being is undecided, unquestioned, and even forgotten?” (p 162)

On the whole, this work is a useful supplement for understanding Heidegger's desire to question “the meaning of Being”—David A White, *DePaul University*

HENRICH, Dieter *Aesthetic Judgment and the Moral Image of the World* Stanford Series in Philosophy Stanford Stanford University Press, 1993 ix + 99 pp \$29 50—This slender volume consists of four lectures which the author gave on various occasions during the past decade The first two, from which the volume gets its title, are called “Interpretations”, they are linked by their concern, in whole or in part, with Kant's *Critique of Judgment* The two remaining lectures, called “Applications,” discuss the relevance to political philosophy of the concept of autonomy

“The Moral Image of the World” interprets Kant's critical undertaking as an ongoing attempt to adapt what he learned from Rousseau, most notably that without a moral image of the natural universe in which we must act our moral conduct would be undermined After sketching Rousseau's view, Henrich outlines an explanation of this image which Kant never published but of which he left traces in the *Critique of Pure Reason* Between the first *Critique* and the *Groundwork*, however, Kant became aware of the ambiguities in this theory, revised his account of moral motivation and of the structure of reason, and in the *Critique of Practical Reason* based the image of the world on the final purpose of moral action, the highest good Although this account prevails in the *Critique of Judgment*, there are, Henrich suggests, symptoms that Kant was aware of its weakness and of the need to account for the source from which the notion of a final purpose is generated His efforts, the lecture concludes, were unsuccessful but opened a philosophical perspective that can be profitably pursued, as Henrich attempts to do in his “applications ”

"Kant's Explanation of Aesthetic Judgments" tries to clarify Kant's position that the pleasure expressed in judgments of taste results from the harmonious play between imagination in its freedom and understanding in its lawfulness. The reason Kant could produce his aesthetic theory so quickly, Henrich suggests, was that he had long since derived its contents from Baumgarten and Meier and needed only to integrate those contents into his theory of knowledge, a theory congenial to them because understanding was already involved in perception. Yet the precise relation between imagination and understanding eluded Kant and has continued to puzzle his commentators. Henrich attempts to clarify the relation by means of Kant's position, stated in the Schematism chapter of the first *Critique*, that possession of a concept requires the ability to apply it or "exhibit" it in intuition. "Exhibition" seems an unpromising source of explanation for judgments that are not applications of a concept: its origin in Kant's account of determinant judgment may have prevented his seeing its relevance to judgments of taste. Henrich, however, sketches a theory in which reflective judgment compares the state of imagination with possible concepts in general, prior to the acquisition of any particular concept. He concludes by noting the weaknesses of contemporary formalist aesthetic theories and the strengths of Kant's theory.

"The Contexts of Autonomy" questions the possibility of justifying and communicating the notion of human rights within a context far removed from the view of a rational agent and of nature in which the notion originated. After sketching the origin, development, and deterioration of this view, Henrich suggests that it could, without requiring an impossible return to the convictions of its originators, revive the notion of human freedom and allow for a way of talking about human rights that would be meaningful to cultures whose self-image is alien to the Western political tradition.

The concluding lecture, "The French Revolution and Classical German philosophy," traces the correlation between the political upheaval in France and the genesis of classical German philosophy to the emergence of a new image of rational agents as autonomous, structuring institutions by principles of reason. The fact that this lecture, as the author's Preface notes, was given shortly before the collapse of the East German regime adds emphasis to his conclusion about the ongoing nature of the task and the problems it involves.

As the above summary suggests, the four lectures differ in the breadth of the brush strokes used. From the perspective of textual analysis, "Kant's Explanation of Aesthetic Judgments" is the most satisfying. They are, however, uniformly thought provoking.—Mary Gregor, *San Diego State University*

JOHANSEN, Jorgen Dines. *Dialogic Semiosis: An Essay on Signs and Meaning*. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993. xv + 357 pp. \$25.00.—In response to continental structuralist approaches in contemporary semiotics, Johansen has drawn from Pierce a dialogic model of

language meaning. This project organizes the book. In Part 1 Johansen explicates and critiques the approaches of the French structuralist Saussure and the Danish linguist Hjelmslev. In Part 2 he expounds the philosophy of language of the American pragmatist Pierce. In Part 3 he advances his own dialogic model, which crystallizes his proposed union of continental text theory and the general Piercean theory of signs and meaning. The book succeeds in establishing a connection between the study of the formal properties of the sign and the theory of meaning.

In Part 1 Johansen critically analyzes the basic concepts employed in Saussure's and Hjelmslev's text theories. He shows how their methodology is based on a prior assumption, namely, that to carry out the method one must know the language in question. That one can interpret meaning is a precondition for their analyses. This raises the issue of whether it is feasible to analyze a text in purely formal terms without taking account of the referential and communicative aspects of language. Johansen concludes that structuralism's neglect of these aspects renders it unable to explain how language means something.

Part 2 takes the reader on a journey through the labyrinth of Pierce's philosophy of language, showing how his theory of the signifying and interpretative process deals with questions of meaning, cognition, reference, truth, reality, experience, and community. He clarifies some of Pierce's basic triadic distinctions and their interrelations: (1) firstness, secondness, and thirdness, (2) qualisign, sinsign, and legisign, (3) icon, index, and symbol, (4) representamen, object, and interpretant, and (5) energetic, emotional, and logical interpretants. He makes the nuances of Pierce's semiotics as comprehensible as possible. For instance, Pierce's icon-index-symbol distinction is often criticized on the grounds that few pure instances of these sign categories exist. Using material from Pierce's unpublished manuscripts, Johansen rejects the assumption that these are exclusive categories and holds that they concern three modes of functioning of any sign. He explains the distinction with interesting examples, such as Tinbergen's ethology of stickleback fish mating rituals and the developmental human psychology of Piaget and Bruner. These discussions develop his criticisms of structuralism that meaning is not merely a question of formal code but of both code and reference, and that reference occurs not just through signs functioning as symbols (that is, in virtue of an arbitrary relation to their objects) but also through signs functioning as icons (that is, in virtue of similarity to their objects) and indices (that is, in virtue of part-whole or causal relations to their objects).

Part 3 proposes a Piercean model of the basic elements of the dialogic situation and their relations: utterer, sign, object, interpretant, interpreter. It connects the model to pertinent views of Socrates, Aristotle, Hjelmslev, Habermas, Apel, Austin, Freud, Searle, and Russell, and finishes by showing how to apply it (for example, to the traffic light treated as text).

The reading is quite difficult, being permeated by extended discussion of technical terms and their subtle interrelations. The clash between formal and pragmatic approaches is well developed, however, and the book contains many insights. It argues persuasively that pragmatism

can elucidate the preconditions of the understandability of speech and of text meaning—preconditions ignored by purely formalist approaches at their own peril. Thus, a pragmatic philosophy of language and of communicative and social interaction can make an invaluable contribution to contemporary semiotics —Harmon R. Holcomb III, *University of Kentucky*

JUDSON, Lindsay, ed. *Aristotle's Physics: A Collection of Essays*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991. x + 286 pp. \$65.00—A common theme uniting this excellent collection is that Aristotle in the *Physics*—both *qua* scientist and *qua* philosopher—is worthy of our attention and should be taken seriously. The ten essays, all of them new, cover much of the *Physics* (though somewhat unevenly: four are on topics from *Physics* 2). The choice of contributors was excellent. Many have written on similar topics in the past, and have here brought their expertise and insights to bear on the same issues as they appear in the *Physics* (for example, Robert Bolton on dialectic, David Charles on teleology). The essays are uniformly of a high quality. What follows are descriptions of each one, no doubt too short to do justice to any of them.

The *Physics*, though traditionally seen as empirical, is today generally viewed as paradigmatically dialectical. Robert Bolton, in "Aristotle's Method in Natural Science: *Physics* I," challenges this trend. He claims that *Physics* 1.1 (along with *Posterior Analytics* 2.19 and other parts of the corpus) shows that dialectic is not the primary method in Aristotle's conception of natural science. Bolton concludes that "however crude [Aristotle's] description or use of the method may be, his endeavours belong, in spirit, with those which we now think of as clearly scientific" (p. 29).

The next two essays—Julius M. Moravcsik's "What Makes Reality Intelligible? Reflections on Aristotle's Theory of *Aitia*," and Cynthia A. Freeland's "Accidental Causes and Real Explanations"—both deal in rather different ways with the manner in which Aristotle's theory of four causes (*aitiai*) is a theory of explanation. I found Freeland's article especially interesting. Whereas most today (including to some degree Moravcsik) see *aitiai* as explanatory factors but *not* as causes, she argues that they are in fact both.

In the fourth contribution, "Chance and 'Always or For the Most Part' in Aristotle," Lindsay Judson examines the analysis of chance found in *Physics* 2.4–6 and the way it fits into Aristotle's account of causality. Judson shows how a proper understanding of chance improves our understanding of Aristotle's concept of "always or for the most part." The essay includes an excellent discussion of how the concepts of "always," "for the most part," and "rarely" relate to the concepts of "by nature" and "incidentally."

In what is perhaps the best essay in this collection, "Teleological Causation in the *Physics*," David Charles investigates whether Aristotle's

account of teleological causation in the *Physics* is defensible. In the *Physics*, teleological causation is very different in the case of natural organisms and in the case of human agency. Not only do these cases differ ontologically, but the latter case is purposeful whereas the former is not. Is there a unified account in *Physics* 2 that explains both of these? Charles answers in the negative. This lack of a unified account, he claims, creates problems for such key notions as nature and natural process, which are defined in terms of teleological causation.

In the sixth essay, "Aristotle's Potential Infinites," William Charlton writes that we can understand Aristotle's finitism only by looking at the kinds of infinity he rejects. Aristotle rejects four kinds: an infinitely large body or quantity of material, an infinitude of parts as undivided wholes, an infinitude of points, an infinite number of actual things. In each of the last three, Aristotle argues (somewhat successfully, Charlton claims) for the possibility of what scholars call a "potential infinite."

The seventh contribution is Michael Inwood's "Aristotle on the Reality of Time." Inwood claims Aristotle considers two problems for the reality of time: (1) time is made up of parts that do not exist: past and future (the now is not a *part* of time), (2) there are reasons for doubting the existence of the now (on which time depends). Inwood examines these two problems, and then discusses Aristotle's implicit solution to both of them. It is incorrect to regard time as an entity composed of parts. The now is not a part of time, but neither is it simply the meeting-point of past and future. Thus, "its occurrence *now* is sufficient to secure the existence of time" (p. 177). In Inwood's opinion, this solution "is involved and often obscure and ambiguous, but it is neither negligible nor obviously incorrect" (p. 178).

The next essay is "Aristotle on Continuity in *Physics* VI" by David Bostock. In contrast to Ross's favorable view of Aristotle's account of the continuum, Bostock thinks it "leaves a number of important gaps, is at times seriously muddled, and contains some plain mistakes" (pp. 179–80). In the course of the essay, Bostock attempts to defend this view and to present a possible account of why Aristotle makes the mistakes he does.

In "Aristotle's Mathematical Physics: A Reconstruction," Edward Hussey asks, What role does mathematics play in Aristotle's physical theories? He attempts to answer this by investigating Aristotle's theory of physical change and theory of motion. Hussey concludes, "Aristotle's mathematical physics is not a failure, it is a triumph of creative theorizing married to physical insight and respect for the observable facts" (p. 242).

The final essay is Mary Louise Gill's "Aristotle on Self-Motion." She claims that there seems to be a problem in *Physics* 8. In *Physics* 8.5, Aristotle says an infinite regress in the explanation of particular changes can be avoided because changes are ultimately caused by a self-mover. But in *Physics* 8.6, he writes that an animal—which is certainly a self-mover—derives the impetus for its own motion from features in its environment (that is, not from itself). Gill demonstrates how we can appeal to features in the environment without generating an infinite regress and without denying that animals are self-movers.

This collection includes a bibliography, an *index locorum*, and an index of names. One flaw is that it contains no general introduction to

the nature of the *Physics*. Nevertheless, it is an excellent secondary source for anyone wishing to take a serious look at the *Physics* —Robert Mayhew, *Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University*

KOVACS, George *The Question of God in Heidegger's Phenomenology* Evanston Northwestern University Press, 1990. xxi + 326 pp. Cloth \$39.95, paper, \$15.95—In this book Kovacs interrogates Heidegger's thought in order to cast light on what the author calls the problem of God. The author, who simply assumes that Heidegger's theory can be described as phenomenology, provides a careful, informed study of this problem throughout Heidegger's published writings. The book contains a preface and twenty-six chapters, and is divided into four parts. According to Kovacs, it is clear through the analysis of Heidegger's published writings that although Heidegger is indifferent to theism and atheism, the question of God receives a new form and meaning in his phenomenology.

Kovacs pursues this theme in a systematic fashion within the chronological framework of Heidegger's writings. The main point of the first part of his study is to show that there is a question of God in Heidegger's phenomenology. Kovacs maintains that "the ontological difference, the core of Heidegger's phenomenology, implies a problem of God" (p. 37).

The second part concerns the relevant insights of *Being and Time*. Kovacs maintains that Heidegger provides a process of demythologization, or a critical examination of the usual, or metaphysical, approach to God. By "demythologization," Kovacs understands "neither an affirmation nor a negation of God, but a transformation of the traditional philosophical approach to this problem" (p. 113). Since Heidegger does not deny God, and also does not provide a treatise on the topic, this theme remains as a problem for Heidegger on several levels. For Kovacs, the examination of the question of being implies the rethinking of the God question which becomes a phenomenological problem. The phenomenological approach is, in the author's opinion, a new approach to this problem.

In the third part, written from the perspective of the questioning attitude that Heidegger later invokes, Kovacs argues that "the questioning attitude overcomes the metaphysical concept of God" (p. 172), leading to the possibility of a new approach. For the author, Heidegger's silence about God indicates his concern for this question (see p. 188).

The fourth part concerns some clarifications of the question of God. Kovacs takes up different aspects of the question in chapters devoted to atheism, the meaning of transcendence, the nature of the world and creation, the "other," and questioning beyond Heidegger. He maintains that Heidegger's view of God is not a "final opus" but a way of thinking that is always underway (see p. 242).

The concluding reflections in Part 5 argue that Heidegger's contribution does not lie in a doctrine of God but in a new way of asking the

question about God. In a positive evaluation, Kovacs insists that Heidegger's thinking shows the need for a rethinking of the problem, "a new way of discovering and looking at the relation of human being to a living God" (p. 251). In a short critical assessment, Kovacs identifies Heidegger's indifference toward any anthropological interpretation of human existence, or toward the interpretation of being as finite, as limits on his thought on the question of God.

Kovac's discussion of Heidegger's thought is informed, careful, and systematic. Obviously, for Heidegger, what the author calls the problem of God can only be addressed within the framework of a wider meditation on being. Kovacs does a fine job in interrogating Heidegger's thought of being with respect to the problem of God. Yet other than the concern to go beyond traditional perspectives, it is unclear what even the most careful study of Heidegger's thought can contribute to this problem.—Tom Rockmore, *Duquesne University*

LORD, Carnes, and O'CONNOR, David K., eds. *Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian Political Science*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991. vii + 255 pp. \$45.00.—This book consists of an introduction by Carnes Lord and nine essays: Stephen Salkever on Aristotle's social science, Carnes Lord on Aristotle's anthropology, Abram Shulsky on Aristotle's economics, Josiah Ober on Aristotle's sociology of class, status, and Order, David O'Connor on Aristotle's conception of justice, Stephen Salkever on Plato and Aristotle on women, soldiers, and citizens, Waller Newell on Aristotle on monarchy, Barry Strauss on Aristotle on Athenian democracy, and Richard Bodéus on Aristotle on law and regime.

One theme of the book is that Aristotle's political writings contain ideas that complement, or are superior to, current approaches in the social sciences. A second theme is that Aristotle's political writings cannot be taken at face value. These writings are practical and, according to Aristotle, practical sciences are not meant simply to increase knowledge but to bring about improvements in how human beings live. In other words Aristotle wrote to persuade, hence not only will his arguments tend to be colored by the nature and concerns of his intended audience (so that knowing the historical context becomes a key to understanding those arguments), but they may be misleading as to what he really thought (for to be effective in persuasion he might need to hide truths too dangerous or disturbing to make explicit). It becomes necessary to read Aristotle's words with an eye for irony, indirection, deliberate omission, and the like.

The first of these themes is perhaps best illustrated by giving concrete examples of where Aristotle is superior or complementary to contemporary thought. All of the essays do, in some way or another, give such examples, but those by Ober, O'Connor, and the first one by Salkever do so most successfully. Ober rightly refutes the idea that Aristotle's analysis of politics can be viewed as proto-Marxism (that analysis is far more subtle and realistic), O'Connor rightly points up the greater richness in

Aristotle's analysis of justice and injustice over modern theories, Salkever rightly stresses that Aristotle's method offers a third way between that of the modern empiricist and hermeneutic schools

The second theme is more problematic because it is based on a certain inference Aristotle wrote with a practical intention and therefore he wrote obliquely, ironically, or the like, and his real views are not those that appear on the surface This inference has a certain attractiveness but it is by no means uncontentious, either as a thesis about practical writings or as a thesis about what Aristotle meant by practical writings But while the essays use the thesis, sometimes extensively, none of them treats of it directly The thesis is least effective in Strauss, who brings it in as a sort of *deus ex machina* to excuse Aristotle from bias in his critique of Athenian democracy It is more effectively used by Salkever in his second essay (which discovers an interesting feminist slant in both Plato and Aristotle), and with some, though lesser, effectiveness by Shulsky, Newell, and Bodéus (several of whose points are, I think, just misunderstandings of Aristotle's argument) Its use in Lord's essay is most noteworthy for there it justifies—in the discussion of the naturalness of the city—leaving behind the famous *Politics* 1.2 and concentrating instead on scattered hints about *thumos* and on the writings of Plato and Polybius The strangeness of this will strike any reader, and though Lord reaches some intriguing conclusions as a result, his procedure really needs more sustained defense than it gets

Nevertheless, this is a valuable collection The essays do constitute an important addition to the growing literature on Aristotle's political thought and moreover illustrate an approach to that thought that needs to be taken seriously—Peter Simpson, *City University of New York, College of Staten Island*

MACEDO, Stephen *Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue, and Community in Liberal Constitutionalism* New York: Clarendon Press, 1991. viii + 306 pp. \$15.95—This book is best understood if one places it into the specific context of present-day debates about the shortcomings of American liberalism With Alasdair MacIntyre and other communitarians on the one hand, and the "new constitutionalist right" on the other hand, mainstream liberalism in the United States reaching from Dewey to Rawls appears to be under pressure Macedo does his best to salvage it without relying on support from left-wing communitarians or moderate defenders of social democracy such as Charles Taylor or M. Walzer The title "liberal virtues" is, after all, almost provocative, at least we begin to hear it that way, having become accustomed to separating virtue from liberalism and attributing an almost premodern meaning to the term virtue Therefore Macedo puts much effort into a reconstruction of the historical ancestry of American liberalism and shows that liberalism was integral to the constitutional history of the United States He takes his argument through a consideration of a number of relevant Supreme Court decisions, all the while clearly recognizing that republican

and democratic virtues have sources other than those available through constitutional adjudication. What interests the author is the relation between the public virtues of reasonableness, tolerance, critical reflection (and others) as *moral* virtues and their legal counterparts. He thus makes a case for a liberal public morality or ethos, without which political liberalism or liberalism in constitutional law cannot overcome a "shortfall of legitimacy and moral justification" (p. 115).

In my view, chapter 6, "Freedom, Autonomy and Liberal Community," as well as chapter 7, "The Liberal Virtues," are the most important chapters of the book. In chapter 6 Macedo argues persuasively that for liberals there need not be a conflict between autonomy and allegiance to a community. It just happens to be the case that liberals value membership in "many overlapping communities, and a regulating membership in an overarching, abstract universalistic community" (p. 239), or a "vast, heterogeneous, liberal, 'extended republic'" (p. 238). Thus autonomy or the capacity to reflect critically on inherited beliefs and commitments goes hand in hand with a commitment to the value of pluralism.

To speak of liberal virtues therefore means to describe a form of personhood compatible with and shaped by a public structure of values. This structure is defined by publicly justifiable rights and "government by law." Liberal virtues are virtues which permit constructive and well-reasoned participation in institutions. Thus liberal virtues are virtues which enable citizens to value participation and discussion, these help them engage in open-ended public dialogue, an activity one might claim is virtuous in and by itself. For Macedo, there still exists a liberal ethos in modern societies. It is the ethos of public debate and communication, of critical reflection, and of respect for the reasonableness of another's opinions. The communitarian critique of liberalism has no promising alternative to offer other than various forms of moral perfectionism and of the primacy of the good life (as an ideal) over a structure of public life which both presupposes and values diversity. It remains to be seen whether liberal pluralism is plausible on these grounds or whether it has misconstrued communitarianism. Macedo may also have failed to take note of positions which spell out the dilemma of liberalism with some force while they also seek a solution in its general framework (Habermas, Rorty, and perhaps even Foucault). —Dieter Misgeld, *The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education*

MALCOLM, John. *Plato on Self-Predication of Forms: Early and Middle Dialogues*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991. 231 pp. \$55.00—Malcolm argues that all middle-dialogue Platonic Forms are at the same time universals and self-predicating in that they are paradigm cases. This renders them vulnerable to the Third Man argument. Early-dialogue Forms, by contrast, exemplify themselves only when it is legitimate for them to do so, and are therefore exempted from the Third Man. Beauty, for example, may reasonably be supposed to be a beautiful thing "as a

general nature" (p. 22), and this exemplification, Malcolm argues, gives no hold to the nonidentity that generates the Third Man. In the middle dialogues, however, Plato is wrong to take Forms as both universals and paradigm cases. The source of this trouble is not the logico-linguistic error of confusing the name of a Form with its description, but Plato's failure to distinguish two types of things that may be called Forms: the universal *F* and perfectly *F* things.

Malcolm has done a great service by providing us with a book we can use for many years as a handbook on modern interpretations of Platonic metaphysics. Although his position is interesting in its own right, the chief value of the book is its thorough discussions of most of the views about Plato's metaphysics that have been proposed in English over the last thirty years. The list of authors Malcolm sets out to refute includes many whose work has made Plato interesting to recent philosophers: Gregory Vlastos, G. E. L. Owen, R. E. Allen, R. S. Bluck, David Bostock, J. Gosling, Alexander Nehamas, Nicholas White, Richard Patterson, and Henry Teloh. His accounts of these authors are clear and accurate. Malcolm has a gift for expressing with sympathy and care views that he will later reject. This book should be a required text for any graduate seminar on Plato's metaphysics.

Each of the authors Malcolm discusses has tried, in his own way, to explain the central paradoxes that seem to make the theory of Forms succumb to the Third Man argument. Malcolm's views are on the whole simpler and less attractive philosophically than those he attacks. His is a sober, workaday account of Plato's metaphysics that fits many texts well, and honestly admits to the passages that it must stretch to accommodate. Still, the result of the book is a diminished Plato, a figure less exciting philosophically than the hero of the other authors.

The main work of the book is done in two sustained arguments: one that Forms are universals (chap. 4), and the other that they are paradigm cases (chap. 5–7). Malcolm's argument that Forms are universals attempts to refute views of Bluck, Allen, and Teloh. Generally, those who take it as primary that Forms are paradigms are reluctant to agree that Forms are also universals in the sense of shared characteristics. Indeed, since the concept of a universal is not explicit in Plato, Malcolm is obliged to show why this concept—which is imported from Aristotle—illuminates Plato. Malcolm's argument at this point begs the question: he simply assumes that universals are ontologically more fundamental than paradigms (p. 60), but gives us no reason to think that Plato held this view. What drives Malcolm to his conclusion is his conviction that the Third Man argument would have no purchase on the Forms if they were not universals, since he believes that if a Form were a paradigm without being a universal, there would be no sufficient reason for assuming the nonidentity of that Form with its instances (p. 59). It is not clear, however, that Plato supplies the nonidentity assumption for this reason. Malcolm could strengthen his case by saying more about what he understands by "universal" and why he finds the concept helpful in understanding Plato.

The argument that Forms are paradigm cases is developed at much greater length, and is far more powerful. Malcolm is especially useful in distinguishing and untangling two related theses that have been

confused in recent discussions that the Form *F* is not an *F* thing, and that the Form *F* is *F* nonunivocally. Malcolm must also distinguish between what a Form is *qua* Form and what it is *qua* the specific paradigm that it is. As Forms, the Form of change is unchanging, and the Form of two is one, as paradigms, however, the first is undergoing change, and the second is two units. How, in the realm of pure being, can the same thing be changing and unchanging at the same time? Malcolm tries to mitigate the paradox in this by saying that the Form for change *portrays* what it is to change (p. 89). If that is the case, however, it is hardly accurate to call it a paradigm *instance*.

Malcolm's preferred view is that the Form *F* is *F* univocally with other *F* particulars, which differ from it in being only approximately *F*, the Form and its instances differ not in the property they have, but in the degree to which they have it. His defense of the approximation view (chap. 7) is vigorous and interesting. To accommodate the model-copy relation between Forms and instances, Malcolm must allow that a copy is an approximation of its original. But this will not do for the relation between a portrait and its model: the difference between them is not a matter of degree, so that the portrait of Simmias is called Simmias only by equivocation. Malcolm's answer to this objection is that although the portrait may perfectly have some features of the original, it cannot have all of them, and in this its deficiency lies (p. 117). That this is a very different sort of deficiency from that of approximation does not trouble Malcolm.

The notes are thorough, and there is a fine bibliography. Three handy indexes (subject, name, and locorum) complete the volume—Paul Woodruff, *The University of Texas at Austin*.

MANSFIELD, Bruce. *Interpretations of Erasmus c. 1750–1920: Man on His Own*. Erasmus Studies, vol. 11. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992. xxii + 512 pp. \$75.00—This volume is a sequel to *Phoenix of His Age: Interpretations of Erasmus c. 1550–1750*, the author's earlier study of Erasmus's reputation from the time of his death until the middle of the eighteenth century. The present volume offers a fascinating account of the reception of Erasmus during the period from around 1750 to the first quarter of the present century. The volume is divided into a brief introduction and two parts: a shorter first part covering the ages of Enlightenment, Romanticism, and Revolution, and a longer second part dealing with the nineteenth century and after. Mansfield's two books look for an explanation for the continued interest in Erasmus during the past four centuries on the part of persons of quite different persuasions and backgrounds.

The present volume focuses upon the uses to which Erasmus's name and reputation have been put during the decades from the Enlightenment to the early years of this century. Mansfield studies many individual authors, often key figures in European intellectual history, such as Voltaire, Gibbon, Herder, Coleridge, Ranke, Hallam, Pattison, Froude,

Dollinger, Pastor, and many others. He has grouped these men by their various commitments and associations as, for example, Catholics, Protestants, liberals, and romantics. Twin chapters, for example, sketch nineteenth-century Catholic and nineteenth-century Protestant views of Erasmus's relation to Catholic orthodoxy, tradition, and scholasticism on the one hand, and of his relation to the Reformation on the other. On the assumption that there is a connection between the lives and historical situations of the individual authors and their responses to Erasmus, Mansfield presents the reader with a brief biographical sketch of the principal interpreters of Erasmus's many-faceted writings in each of the ages covered, as well as with an indication of the principal features of their interpretation and evaluation of Erasmus. The result is not one portrait of the "real" Desiderius Erasmus, but multiple vignettes, these are so varied in the way they view and assess Erasmus that the result at times verges on a complete relativism.

This fault is mitigated only by clear scholarly advances in such things as the dating and publication of Erasmus's letters. The cumulative effect of this meticulous study does, nonetheless, gradually bring the reader, though quite indirectly, to a better knowledge of this great Renaissance scholar, humanist, and reformer. For the earlier, confessionally polarized assessments, often unquestioned and repeated by succeeding generations, gradually neutralize one another, and more modern studies reveal different facets of the personality, historical background, friendships, interests, and work of Erasmus. The reader is thereby led to see a greater complexity in the object of the volume's study that prevents one from categorizing Erasmus as merely fitting one or more stereotypes. Rather, the many studies converge to disclose an Erasmus who was not simply Catholic or Protestant, not simply reformer or humanist, not simply skeptic or liberal, but "a man on his own," as the subtitle of this volume claims—a subtitle which is itself drawn from Erasmus's own words *homo pro se*.

Mansfield's study concludes with seventy-four pages of endnotes, thirty pages of bibliography, and a twenty-seven-page index. The bibliography includes not merely the primary sources for the period studied, but also secondary, more modern works on Erasmus. There are also twelve pages of portraits or photographs, mainly of some of the principal interpreters of Erasmus, but also of title pages of a few of the more important studies on him.—Roland J. Teske, *Marquette University*

MERRELL, Floyd. *Signs Becoming Signs: Our Perfusive, Pervasive Universe*. Advances in Semiotics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991. xii + 249 pp. \$39.95.—Merrell's task in this work is to transform the Peircean tradition of semiotics in the light of more recent work in such research areas as chaos physics, topological theory, and the newer quantum theories. Relying on the theories of David Bohm, among others, Merrell develops a conventionalist conception of semiotics that stresses

the constructive power of signs to shape space, time, and the basic contours of the human process. The approach is an evolutionary one, but it is not confined to the neo-Darwinian biological framework. Evolution is seen in terms of the movement from a primal state of pure firstness (Peirce's concept of potentiality and pure feeling) to the determinate world of interaction.

Merrell contrasts the "semiotically real" with the "actually real," denying that we have access to the latter, and reworks the former concept in terms of species-specific *Umwelten* that function as meaning horizons for living systems. Each organism will have its own semiotic environment that shapes its encounters with the world and with it, its own "internal" structures, however minimal. The organism cannot escape from its web of signification and remains trapped within a semiotic universe that is continuous with its complete internal reference.

On the topological side, using the concepts of boundary and neighborhood, Merrell refers to a kind of "quantum interconnectedness" that holds the world together. Quantum events are also semiotic events, insofar as they participate in Peirce's sign-object-interpretant triad. Behind all quantum events is the n -dimensional monad that is atemporal. This monad is akin to Peircean firstness, but points to an even deeper layer that Merrell, following Peirce, calls the domain of absolute nothingness. He makes some interesting comparisons between topological notions (and the mathematics of infinite series) and the Lacanian psychoanalytic model of the "line of desire." The correlation of psychoanalysis and mathematics, when rethought from the standpoint of topology, represents a striking advance for semiotic theory.

Following Hartshorne, Merrell privileges asymmetry over symmetry, arguing that symmetry is a special case within the much more ubiquitous domain of the asymmetrical. Time and space, emergent from Peirce's absolute nothingness, are asymmetrical and yet internally self-referential. In Bohm's terms, the manifest orders are unfolded and explicate, emerging from the primal realm (the monad) that is enfolded and implicate. Mind is pervasive throughout the universe (Merrell accepting Peirce's panpsychism) and part of the explicate orders, living as a tissue of connectedness.

Chaos is thus more basic than order. Natural human languages are deceptive in that they live in a kind of idealized realm of signification that shapes impressions of sense in arbitrary ways. Peirce's commitment to the dynamic object and to sheer secondness is downplayed, while his sense of developmental thirdness is transformed within a conventionalist context. The later Wittgenstein is read not as a regional ontologist of independent forms of life but as a kind of postmodern semiotician for whom each language game is arbitrary.

Merrell's book is thoroughly committed to a kind of antirealist position. Many will find his reading of Peirce to be far too tilted toward a subjective idealism (not toward the objective idealism that Peirce affirmed in his later cosmology). The use of chaos physics in semiotics reinforces the notion that signs are not so much correlated to objects as they are part of an infinite web of signification in which signs link with

each other alone Merrell's work is rich and evocative, but represents a form of pansensuoticism that ironically denies the independence of the very nature that is sought —Robert S Corrington, *Drew University*

NORTON, Robert E *Herder's Aesthetics and the European Enlightenment* Ithaca Cornell University Press, 1991 xi + 257 pp \$39.95—This study of Herder's aesthetics is a welcome addition to the continued scholarly rehabilitation of Herder Norton limits his study to the first fifteen years of Herder's intellectual activity, which he finds preoccupied with questions of aesthetics Norton takes issue with much of what has been said and written about Herder's aesthetics

Throughout his work Norton makes clear his central objective to bring out Herder's rational and analytical approach to the subject, which "gathered its conceptual support and critical authority from the psychological theories of the 'philosophes', and perhaps most directly from his famous teacher, Kant" (p. 165) Norton feels obliged to stress this side of Herder's approach "because of the tendency in the research to see Herder as a so-called philosopher of feeling (*Gefühlsphilosoph*) who both advocated and practiced a subjectivistic or irrational approach to art based alone on intuition and 'empathy'" (p. 165 n. 11)

Norton's volume thus constitutes a forceful effort to correct long-held misperceptions and to place Herder firmly into the aesthetic paradigm of the European Enlightenment Norton considers the six chapters of the book as "actually constituting successive layers of one continuous argument" (p. 9) The argument sees Herder "consistently applying the methodological procedure of analysis, which we have seen was one of the distinctive possessions of the European Enlightenment," and seeking "to establish an aesthetic theory that was in every respect a truly philosophical science" (p. 48)

With impressive rigor and reference to many works in the relevant Enlightenment literature, Norton sketches the philosophical background to which he finds Herder beholden The first three chapters present a careful exposition of the problems that underlie Herder's philosophy of aesthetics by reference to his early *Versuch über das Sein* (1764), the two editions of the *Fragments* (1767) (though Norton does not make sufficiently clear that the second edition of the *Fragments* so amply cited by him was not published until after his death), the prize-winning *Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache* (1772), and the "Shakespeare Essay" (in *Von deutscher Art und Kunst* [1773])

The core of Norton's study, chapters 4–6, is devoted to Herder's philosophy of aesthetics proper, which is found in the first and fourth "groves" (*Waldchen*) of Herder's *Kritische Walder* (1769), and in the *Plastik* (1778) It should be noted that the "Fourth Grove" of Herder's *Kritische Walder*, like the second edition of Herder's *Fragmente*, was not published until after his death, in this case, unlike the case of the second edition of the *Fragmente*, Norton takes due notice of this equally

lamentable fact by pointing to Robert J. Clark's remark that publication at an earlier date "could have changed the entire course of German aesthetics." In the end, "what could have been," but, by not appearing in time or by not being written at all, was not, looms large in Norton's final evaluation of Herder's "arrested" philosophy of aesthetics (p. 237). Norton is eminently successful in showing the effectiveness of Herder's analytical methodology and his painstaking examination within its particular cultural setting of every work of art accessible to him. Herder's approach resulted in a stunning evocation of the pageant of the past by means of a synthesis unparalleled up to that point in time.

Norton focuses on the rational and analytical in Herder's works and he accepts a periodization that chops up Herder's life into epochs and places, for example, he locates the essential development of his philosophy of history in the years after 1774. Justified as this shift in interpretation may be, it presents to the reader a thinker whose thought may be viewed as having been "arrested" in stages. Norton is eager to establish Herder's "secular and unmystical historical standpoint," so clearly distinct from and superior to Hamann's standpoint (p. 70). In so doing, he neglects the Herder who wrote the sermons of the Riga and Buckeburg years, and who conceived the essential characteristics of his encompassing philosophy of history (*Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit* [1774]), his interpretation of Genesis (*Archäologie des Morgenlandes* [1769], *Älteste Urkunde des Menschengeschlechts* [1774, 1776]), and who wrote a number of other, powerful religious treatises at the very time that he was grappling with the problems of aesthetics. Of course, given his self-imposed focus, Norton cannot be expected to deal effectively with the personal universe of thought within which Herder's philosophy of aesthetics was generated. The work of Hans Adler, which advocates access to Herder's mind by understanding it to be rooted in a "gnoseological anthropocentrism

that is embedded in a conceptual theodicy," suggests a much needed counterpoint to Norton's forceful brief—Ernest A. Menze, *Iona College*

ROBERTS, Julian. *The Logic of Reflection: German Philosophy in the Twentieth Century*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992. viii + 307 pp. \$30.00—This book is a rich and provocative synthesis of the history and the doing of philosophy. In that synthesis, the author's detailed analysis of four principal figures (Frege, Wittgenstein, Husserl, Habermas) converges on his own representation of philosophy in "the logic of reflection"—a version of transcendentalism that Roberts traces to its Kantian source. The provocations of the book are no less clear and usually, although not uniformly, fruitful.

One might question the evident overstatement in the book's subtitle, given that Roberts, addressing twentieth century German philosophy, finds for Heidegger only ten preliminary and dismissive pages and fewer pages still for the neo-Kantians whom he himself follows, and given also

his ahistorical stance on the philosophers whom he does discuss. The issues of how, in other than the loosest sense, Wittgenstein is a German philosopher, or what the relationship is among the four philosophers principally considered, or what other lines of philosophical development in Germany compete with the line emphasized here are left largely untouched.

The claims by Roberts for a metaphilosophical view grounded in the "logic of reflection"—"transcendental" rather than "realist", "dialogical," not "monological"—are urged explicitly in the book's Introduction and Conclusion and more subtly in the critical history developed between them in which Roberts's sure dialectical grasp and skill as an explicator are notable. His contention in the individual chapters that are devoted to his four principal figures is not that they are committed to the philosophical program he himself advocates, but that in *both* their major contributions and the objections to which their work is (he claims) open, they point in that direction, there is, in effect, a systematic and unified philosophical moral to be drawn from their otherwise different stories. Thus he finds in both Frege and Wittgenstein the common thesis that "the structures of truth and certainty are only very inadequately rendered in natural language" (p. 55). In Frege and Husserl he finds an equally vigorous argument against "psychologism" the reduction of logic (or reason as such) to psychological matter-of-fact, "the effects of neuro-chemistry, habituation, or whatever" (p. 159). To move between this traditional Scylla of Platonizing dogmatism (of which Roberts finds Frege himself in part guilty) on the one hand, and the Charybdis of empiricist skepticism on the other, is to recognize both that there is knowledge which is more than "merely" empirical and that such knowledge also "is determinate it has boundaries. But drawing the boundary does not itself fall within that bounded determination" (p. 29). Thus emerges the transcendental move to the *conditions* of knowledge which, for Roberts, is all that philosophy can reasonably hope to discover. The detail of this positive side of Roberts's argument, cumulative through the analyses he gives of the four thinkers on whom he focuses, is suggestive more than demonstrated, although always imaginative and resourceful. An example is his contention (which he claims to be a transcendental condition for the Kantian view of rationality) that "ethics is the grounding meta-discourse of logic" (p. 31), since the latter assumes "the interaction of distinct minds"—in Roberts' own terms, "dialogical acquisition" (p. 286).

No brief summary can do justice either to the close and intense reading that Roberts gives of the philosophers he scrutinizes or to the architectonic he builds on their work, the gaps that arguably disrupt this architectonic (why, for example, is it a *necessary* condition for my knowing that I also know "whether 'you' know things that can disrupt my universal generalisations" [p. 286]?) are incentives, it seems to me, for the elaboration of what is already an unusually imaginative and sustained philosophical project.—Berel Lang, *State University of New York at Albany*

Press, 1992 ix + 187 pp Cloth, \$29.50, paper \$9.95—In this excellent introductory study, Schulte provides a clear, concise account of Wittgenstein's life and works. Schulte captures the flavor of Wittgenstein's life: the passion and intensity, as well as the desire for solitude and loneliness which inform his writings. The first chapter presents a sensitive and thoughtful picture of Wittgenstein as a man who loved to make things. We suffer with Wittgenstein as he lives to see the suicides of three of his four brothers and contemplates suicide himself, and we feel gladdened when an uncle persuades Wittgenstein to choose a creative endeavor—the writing of his first book. Schulte portrays Wittgenstein in search of the “decent” life. His book is to be commended for introducing us to the Wittgenstein whose forceful personality so markedly colors his work.

The second chapter deals with the *Tractatus*. Schulte warns us away from treating the *Tractatus* as “either a presentation of a systematic ontology or a treatise exclusively on the logical syntax of language” (p. 44). His exposition leads one toward the unstated but pressing issues in Wittgenstein's early work. Schulte seeks to recapture the sense of the *Tractatus* to which Wittgenstein alludes in his Preface.

Wittgenstein wants to lead the reader to a certain point through the book's style, as well as through hinting at its intention, he wants to influence the reader's personal attitude, winning him over and obtaining his consent regarding certain matters not open to meaningful discussion. Therefore, he is seeking to stimulate a reaction akin to aesthetic pleasure that cannot be completely articulated in words. If this reaction is elicited, then according to the author, the purpose of the book has been achieved (p. 46).

Schulte deals evenhandedly with both the logical and ethical dimension of the *Tractatus*. This chapter discusses facts, states of affairs, names, objects, elementary propositions, the showing-saying distinction, sense and nonsense, solipsism, ethics, and mysticism. Schulte draws the important distinctions, and indicates where the controversies in the scholarship lie. He then directs the reader to the secondary literature and does not become absorbed with competing interpretations of the text at this introductory level. Schulte does use Wittgenstein's notebooks as well as his letters to supplement his reading of the *Tractatus*.

The third chapter addresses the “connecting links” binding Wittgenstein's early thought to his later work. Schulte addresses Wittgenstein's criticism of science as the primary method for giving sense to events—or as the only useful or acceptable method of interpreting foreign cultures. This chapter contains a further discussion of the ethical as well as a discussion of the magical, of grammar, and of the foundation of mathematics. The inclusion of this connecting material is a strong recommendation for Schulte's book as the introduction to Wittgenstein of choice. The treatment of material from *Philosophical Remarks* and *Philosophical Grammar*, *Culture and Value*, “Lecture on Ethics,” as well as “Remarks on Frazer's *The Golden Bough*,” offers the reader a coherent and complete introduction to Wittgenstein's thought preferable

to those introductions which treat the *Tractatus* and the *Philosophical Investigations* only

Chapters four through six explore the issues addressed in the *Philosophical Investigations* and discuss both the ideas as they appear in the *Investigations* and their relevant roles in other of Wittgenstein's works. Chapter four is devoted to the language game. Chapter five takes up the idea of criterion, and thus deals with personal identity, the grammar of sensation, philosophical psychology, rule following, and private language. The book concludes with a discussion, in chapter six, of certainty.

I found this book informative and enjoyable, uncomplicated yet subtle and enlightening. I enthusiastically recommend it for students, those who are approaching Wittgenstein for the first time, those who need a refresher course, and those who know Wittgenstein well but would like a refreshing overview of his thought.—R. Shannon Duval, *The Pennsylvania State University*

SIMON, Yves R. *The Tradition of Natural Law: A Philosopher's Reflection*

Edited by Vukan Kuc. Introduction by Russell Hittinger. New York: Fordham University Press, 1992. xxxi + 194 pp. \$19.95.—This clearly written and finely argued text is based on a course taught by the late philosopher Yves Simon at The University of Chicago in 1958. The lectures and discussions were edited and published in 1965. This book handles the topic in six concise chapters which probe the problems confronting natural law theory in terms of definition, history, doctrine, and its future. The value of the text is heightened by Russell Hittinger's crisp introduction that focuses Simon's effort by noting, "Simon believes that the greatest danger to the tradition of natural law is not its cultured critics, but rather the tendency of its allies to reduce natural law to an ideology in order to form a political or legal consensus about objective values" (p. xviii). Despite this danger, which Simon outlines in detail, the distinction between ideology and philosophy need not imply a radical separation of the two, for "the content of an ideology is not necessarily at variance with the truth of philosophy" (p. 24).

Simon uses analogies generously to render highly abstract concepts concrete, and to make the more densely reasoned sections of his arguments clearer. Notice this pedagogy (pp. 47–8) in his discussion of why scientists frequently fail to grasp the logic of natural law: "Who questions that an acorn and an oak tree are related as nature folded and nature unfolded, as nature in its initial condition and nature in its accomplished condition?" (p. 47). The clarity of this essential proposition fails to cause unanimous assent, in part because "there are no natures and no final causes in mathematics" (p. 47), thus "whenever the interpretation of nature is mathematical, and insofar as it is mathematical, final causes are out of the picture" (p. 48). This line of reasoning raises, in turn, the juxtaposition of values to nature, as in the subjective notion of value in

economics, as opposed to a more objective view of the value of things in themselves

Simon's insights have application for some of the most pertinent issues and common philosophical mistakes of our day. On the topic of the common good, for example, he is careful to identify the myth of the common good as something external to man. He describes this as the temptation to think of the human community as if it were a work of art, the aesthetics of which are independent of any moral judgment on the means that might have produced it. (There may be bad means, as in the case of Gauguin abandoning his family to create his paintings.) The power of the politician is not final, Simon asserts, because the "final decision concerning the affairs of the state belongs to moralists" (p. 95). Asking if a particular instance of positive law is just or unjust implies a higher or natural law, and this principle extends to the whole of the political system (pp. 112–13). In countering the pragmatists who would argue that a natural law defense of democracy is obsolete and who see democracy vindicated by the mere fact that "it works," Simon asks what it means to say that something "works." He answers that "working is the most teleological thing in the world," which brings us back to natural law, if we believe in a reality that has meaning (p. 114).

In his discussion of how one comes to know the natural law, Simon explores the paradox of everyone's acting as though there were a natural law, yet not being able to incorporate it intellectually. Simon's epistemology holds that cognition and inclination are "two ways in the determination of judgment. [T]he inclination leading to the knowledge of natural law is not a purely intellectual affair [but includes] the honest will, and the expert is the prudent, the wise" (pp. 125, 131). Simon's epistemology is somewhat reminiscent of John Henry Newman's holistic approach in his "Illative Sense," as outlined in *A Grammar of Assent*, as well as of Michael Polanyi's epistemology in *Personal Knowledge*. The reasonable philosophical framework of natural law is lucidly outlined in the pages of this fine collection. It should be of great value to those seeking to grasp the depth and richness of this ancient yet enduring tradition—Robert A. Sirico, *The Acton Institute*

SISON, Alejo G. *La virtud, síntesis de tiempo y eternidad. La ética en la Escuela de Atenas*. Pamplona: EUNSA, 1992. 471 pp. n.p.—One of the crossroads or paradoxes of which human beings are constituted is that of time and eternity. Of course, our life consists of movement, but we would not be able to understand this were we not in some way or another over and above this plane, ensconced in some form of eternity, that is, in a mode of existence that transcends time. Thus extremely peculiar, and if you wish, dramatic, situation, readily prods to an interpretative effort. Does eternity mean that we are immortal? Or, on the contrary, is our life an absurdity, an ever-unfulfilled promise? Should we then inhibit our dreams, or should we rather intensify our desires with the hope of the infinite?

There exists a practical response to this paradox, one that goes beyond pure theory, and it was brilliantly developed by the great thinkers of the School of Athens. The solution lies in virtue. Virtue is acquired in time and it demands time, but once possessed—and virtue is something possessed as its very name in Greek indicates—it supposes perfection in its possessor, that is, a transcendence over pure flux or movement. If virtue implies some perfection—the just man, for example, is not he who is learning to be one, but he who in essential matters already knows how to act justly—and if at the same time it is something possessed, then it indicates two ways in which human beings are beyond time. On one hand, if that which is perfect—virtue is perfect activity—is spoken of as having reached its term or end, and if a thing remains active despite its already being constituted, this is due to its being something more than pure flux. On the other hand, whoever is capable of possessing—and to possess denotes an act—a perfection is in a certain sense over and above it. Only from the standpoint of eternity can eternity be possessed.

As is well-known, the School of Athens distinguishes between intellectual and moral virtues. The technical and artistic habits are not clearly recognized as virtues. The end result of this attitude is, to Sison's mind and to my own, far from satisfactory. It has caused many to think—erroneously, I think—that the intellectual virtues do not have anything to do with the will, and that, on the contrary, moral virtues constitute the place proper for the will. Moreover, it leaves hanging the human status of work, for it does not recognize virtue in *technē*.

I understand that all virtue, including the artistic and technical ones, supposes the presence not only of the intellect, but also of the will. For this reason, I can claim virtues as *mine*, and claim that they are fully human. The distinction among them lies in the different use of knowledge and will that each one implies. Thus it is proper to say that they are different *forms*, since, as a matter of fact, they can be distinguished from one another.

Ordinary language relates “the perfect” to the “divine” a virtuoso violinist, someone irreproachably just, or wise men such as “the divine Plato.” The reason behind this is that virtue is at once a knowledge and a power that transcends temporality. Yet, it cannot be acquired without time. Virtue is, therefore, a practical—that is, a real—form of the synthesis or union, in this world, of time and eternity.

Sison's work addresses fully the topics that I have so far alluded to. He demonstrates an enviable command of Athenian philosophy, and at the same time utilizes the recent bibliography with great ease. He is clear in his exposition, not only of the general themes, but also of details. Original and profound in his conceptions, he initiates a highly interesting dialogue which I hope will continue. Those in whom the study of ethics has awakened an increasing interest in contemporary society will find in this book an invaluable point of reference. It will surely lead to heretofore unknown worlds, without which such an Ethics would be but the mere external ornament of a life that continues to be vacuous.—Rafael Alvira, *Universidad de Navarra*

VALBERG, J. J. *The Puzzle of Experience* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. 227 pp. \$45.00—A central theme of metaphysics has been the status of the object of experience. Vahlberg asks us to reconsider whether the object of sensory (for example, visual) experience is an external or an internal object, that is, one whose existence is, respectively, independent of or dependent on experience.

In Part 1 he formulates this "puzzle of experience" as the following antinomy. Driven by a Cartesian-style "problematic argument" concerning the relation between the world and our experience, we conclude that the object of experience is an internal object. Remaining "open to our experience" of the world, we maintain, nevertheless, that the object of experience is an external object. In Part 2 he develops and evaluates the main proposed solutions, arguing persuasively that no solution is adequate and that the puzzle is genuine. The book reads like a mystery story in which an innocent is murdered but all the suspects are eliminated. Vahlberg concludes that "we are forced to deny what we find it absurd to deny: the presence of the world in experience" (p. 217).

On one hand, our causal picture of experience enables us to consider the possibility of having experiences uncaused by external objects, experiences qualitatively identical to those caused by external objects. The potential irrelevance of external objects to the nature of experience implies that the objects of even veridical experiences are internal objects. Suppose each of us is looking at a book. We are committed to something like (a) "Were God to eliminate the book but ensure that the activity in (the visual part of) my brain remains the same, how things are in my experience would remain the same" (p. 13). Had God intervened, the object present in experience would have remained the same. So this object, the object on which I have been focusing (regardless of whether God intervenes), is not the book. So it must be an internal object.

On the other hand, in acquiring and reflecting on any picture of the world, including our causal picture, it is inevitable that we accept (b) "The world (external objects) is (are) present in experience" (p. 42). When we open up to our experience we cannot help but believe that the objects present to us are external objects. So the internalist conclusion is absurd.

A natural diagnosis is that there just has to be something wrong with the internalist reasoning. Vahlberg develops the following objections and replies. (1) After God intervenes my experience would have no internal object (reply: if so there would be nothing present in experience and so no experience, contrary to [a]). (2) The object after God intervenes is not identical with what is present before such intervention (reply: continuity of brain activity creates continuity in the internal object). (3) The argument's concept of experience is inadequate (reply: a more refined conception cannot undo the facts that generate the internalist reasoning, for example, because such and such happens in our brains, things are thus and so within our experience). (4) The argument's concept of externality is inadequate (reply: the puzzle will reemerge on a Kantian or phenomenalist conception of externality). (5) The argument should be ignored (reply: Strawson's appeal to Hume and Wittgenstein merely explains why the puzzle exists and does not

obviate the need to solve it) Vahlberg concludes by showing how the philosophical puzzle is rooted in a commonplace but incomprehensible thought: my brain causes external objects to become experientially accessible

Vahlberg makes a courageous effort at living with the tension in finding the absurd internalist conclusion to be supported by an impeccable train of reasoning. He tries to include nonphilosophers in his audience ("The book on my table is an example of what philosophers call a 'material (physical) object'. It fills out space." [p. 8]). But they would be hard pressed to follow his subtle distinctions and analyses. Fortunately, he provides enough challenging ideas to reinvigorate the topic for those familiar with it.—Harmon R. Holcomb III, *University of Kentucky*

ZAGZEBSKI, Linda Trinkaus *The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge*

New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. vii + 215 pp. \$29.95—It has appeared to many that if God knows exactly what we are going to do before we do it (that is, possesses foreknowledge), and God's beliefs cannot be wrong, then we never have it in our power to refrain from doing what we do and thus never really act freely. Zagzebski's goal is to demonstrate that appearances are in this case deceiving, that incompatibilistic human freedom is compatible with God's infallible knowledge of all that (from a human perspective) has occurred, is occurring, and will occur in the future.

Zagzebski begins by assessing the three standard solutions to the foreknowledge dilemma. The Boethian (and Thomistic) solution denies that God knows what we will do *before* we do it by denying that God's beliefs are in time. Ockhamistic solutions accept that God exists in time but either deny that God's beliefs are *really* about the past or contend that God's beliefs about the past are unique in that they do not require that the past be necessary, that the past be fixed and unalterable. The "middle knowledge" solution assumes that God's knowledge of the future is based on counterfactuals of freedom—on his knowledge of what will in fact occur under every possible set of conditions—and that the truth of such counterfactuals is not incompatible with human freedom.

Zagzebski rejects the middle knowledge solution because she believes its proponents can offer no plausible explanation for God's knowledge of counterfactuals. The other two solutions she considers incomplete. The solution she offers in their place is what she identifies as Thomistic Ockhamism. It is Ockhamistic in that she believes that God exists in time and takes seriously the necessity of the past. But it is also Thomistic in that she believes that the difference between our beliefs and God's beliefs is not simply that ours are infallible and God's are not. Rather, the important difference, as she sees it, is that our knowledge is divided into discrete units while nothing that God knows is essentially distinct from His knowledge of anything else. For example, our knowledge of what we did last year is distinct from our belief that $2 + 2 = 4$ or from our belief that it will snow tomorrow, while such is not the case

for God. God's knowledge is essentially a simple vision, a single indivisible state of knowing.

But if this is so, she argues, then we have a solution to the foreknowledge dilemma. If God's knowledge is essentially a single indivisible state of knowing, then this same simple vision contains both the accidental belief that I freely choose to do certain things (in this world) and the accidental belief that I freely choose not to do these same things (in other possible worlds). Thus it cannot be said that what God knows essentially necessitates what I do in this or any other world.

Much of what Zagzebski argues is highly controversial. Her claim, for instance, that God's knowledge is essentially a single indivisible state of knowing will initially strike many as dubious. Moreover, her Augustinian contention that God can respond to whatever free creatures choose to do in such a way that His ends will always be accomplished is rejected by many. I know of no other book, however, that so clearly sets forth the full range of traditional and contemporary perspectives on the foreknowledge dilemma. It will therefore prove to be of great value to the philosophical community.—David Basinger, *Roberts Wesleyan College*

ZUCKERT, Catherine H. *Natural Right and the American Imagination: Political Philosophy in Novel Form*. Savage, Md: Roman and Littlefield Publishers, 1990. xi + 271 pp. \$48.00.—The principal authors whose fiction is drawn upon in this fine book are James Fenimore Cooper, Nathaniel Hawthorne, Herman Melville, Mark Twain, Ernest Hemingway, and William Faulkner. This book, which is clear and straightforward in its presentations, is obviously useful for providing graphic illustrations for, and heightening interest in, political science courses. The openness of students to engaging stories is thereby put to salutary use by a political scientist who always has something instructive to say about the often-familiar fiction that she discusses.

This book is also useful for suggesting significant implications of thinkers such as Rousseau, Nietzsche, and Heidegger. The abstract speculations to which much of modern thought is susceptible are fleshed out here by the application of metaphysical notions to the everyday life that can often be found in novels. We are helped thereby to see, perhaps better than we might otherwise be able, the dubious aspects of various contemporary intellectual movements. Consider, for example, Zuckert's comments on Melville's *Moby Dick*:

Ahab seeks not simply to comprehend, but to conquer, with his mind. In this respect, he represents the dominant thrust of modern science, which explicitly seeks to relieve the human condition through a conquest of nature. Like Descartes, Ahab suspects that his senses deceive him. "All visible objects, man, are but as pasteboard masks." It is all, indeed, the work of an "evil demon." For "in each event," Ahab thinks, "some unknown but still reasoning thing puts forth the

moldings of its features from behind the unreasoning mask " Where his mind fails him, Ahab would use his lance "If man will strike, strike through the mask!" What Ahab hates above all is not the destructiveness or malice that he attributes to the white whale, but its inscrutability He wants a reason for his suffering, where there is none, he pursues justice by wreaking vengeance on the agent (p 108)

It would be instructive to learn how professional metaphysicians among us, whether or not Cartesian, regard what is said in this book about the status of nature in modern thought It should also be revealing to see what is to be made by them of the following Nietzschean assessment by Heidegger "From a metaphysical point of view, Russia and America are the same, the same dreary technological frenzy, the same unrestricted organization of the average man" (p 194, n 59)

Consider, furthermore, what Zuckert says about both the philosophical and the rhetorical implications of what American novelists are trying to do

Our novelists usually presented their political teaching indirectly—even covertly—because they recognized popular resistance to explicit preaching The indirect presentation was not merely a matter of rhetorical technique, however If the goodness of human life is not externally visible, American political institutions ultimately must be founded in an appreciation of the beauty of the inner life of an ordinary person As Cooper and his successors realized, that beauty cannot be described historically or analyzed theoretically It can only be revealed through the work of the literary artist

Because such revelations are explicitly fictional, their political and philosophical import has generally been ignored Should contemporary readers become more aware of the ontological and epistemological limitations not merely of "science" but of discursive reason more generally, however, they might—as Martin Heidegger has argued—come to see the way in which poetic "fiction" not only can but also does shape communal human existence (p 242)

An underlying teaching of Zuckert's book is that there are, in nature, standards of right and wrong which are capable of being reliably discovered by human reason What are professors of philosophy saying these days—and what should they be saying—about this old-fashioned teaching?—George Anastaplo, *Loyola University of Chicago*

CURRENT PERIODICAL ARTICLES

PHILOSOPHICAL ABSTRACTS*

AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Vol 66, No 4, Autumn 1992

Cantor and the Scholastics, ROBIN SMALL

Georg Cantor introduced a new branch of mathematics with his theory of transfinite numbers. At the same time, his concept of the infinite suggested a solution to some old philosophical problems. Cantor's own position, however, is not always what one might expect from a champion of the actual infinite. For instance, he firmly rejects the idea of an infinite past time. This article examines Cantor's philosophical arguments about the eternity of the world, in the context of his acquaintance with the scholastic tradition, and his dialogue with representatives of the contemporary Neo-Scholastic movement.

Theism and Moral Objectivity, JONATHAN JACOBS and JOHN ZEIS

The thesis articulated in this paper is that theism complements morality in a way which is complex, fundamental, and pervasive. The nature of moral motivation and reasons, the scope of morality, its ground, content, and efficacy are all subtly transformed and enriched by theistic belief. The ethical views of Philippa Foot, Gilbert Harman, Thomas Nagel, and Iris Murdoch are introduced for contrast and are found to be incapable of accounting for the objectivity and inescapability of moral requirements. It is then argued that a theistic conception of ethics, which provides a metaphysical and epistemological grounding for morality in the personal being of God, provides a better explanation of the inescapability and objectivity of ethics than do nontheistic views.

The Replaceability Argument and Abortion, SCOTT CALEF

Classical utilitarian proponents of animal liberation agree that pain is evil, whether human or animal. Nevertheless, some utilitarians have also suggested that it is morally permissible to kill painlessly a happy animal if

* Abstracts of articles from leading philosophical journals are published as a regular feature of the *Review*. We wish to thank the editors of the journals represented for their cooperation, and the authors of the articles for their willingness to submit abstracts. Where abstracts have not been submitted, the name and author of the article are listed.

the slain animal is replaced by another, equally happy animal which would not otherwise have existed. This has come to be known as the Replaceability Argument. The article attempts to demonstrate the implications of this argument for the abortion debate. After drawing comparisons between fetuses and nonhuman animals it is argued that the consistent utilitarian position is to affirm the moral permissibility of abortion only if the fetus is replaced by another which would not otherwise have existed. Since this is impractical, the implication is that classical utilitarians ought either to seriously modify or to abandon a pro-choice stance on abortion.

A Woman and a Man as Prime Analogical Beings,
PRUDENCE ALLEN

The purpose of this paper is to consider the application of Mieczyslaw A. Krapiec's theory of analogy to the related identities of woman and man. In the first part of the analysis a summary and description is given of two forms of analogy in Krapiec's realistic metaphysics: infra-ontic analogy and inter-ontic analogy. Infra-ontic analogy pertains to the ways in which an individual woman or man can be considered as analogical with herself or himself. Inter-ontic analogy pertains to how the word "woman" or "man" can be used to indicate the ways in which women are analogous to one another or men are analogous to one another. Treated of next is how a man and a woman might be considered as analogous to one another as prime analogical beings. The uniqueness of the prime analogical relation is identified in the capacity to form community with the blessing of fertility, in biological, intellectual, or spiritual dimensions. Finally, some consideration is given to theological aspects of the application of this theory of analogy to the relation between communities of human persons and God as a communion of three divine persons.

Aquinas and the Moral Status of Animals, PETER DRUM

It is argued that Aquinas's thought can plausibly be interpreted as implying that the higher animals, at least, have imperfect moral status. This is because his criterion of moral considerability is that a good-possessor must will—or at least must have the capacity or potential to will—his, or her, or its ends, and unreflective animals only do this imperfectly. Therefore, Aquinas's thought supports the commonsense position regarding kindness to animals: that they deserve some consideration for their own sakes, but genuine human interests outweigh animal claims.

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Vol. 30, No. 3, July 1993

Is the Future Really Real? JAN FAYE

It is still very controversial as to whether or not past, present, and future are objective temporal properties of the world, and as to what the ontological

significance is if they are. Prigogine has put forward a physical argument in favor of the existence of tenses and an objective becoming. This paper rejects Prigogine's conclusion as one which does not follow from his premises. Only philosophical arguments can prove or disprove the idea of objective becoming, and all such arguments militate against it. Even if, as Zelicovici and Abner Shimony wrongly suggest, the claim of objective becoming should be treated as the attribution of existence, and not as the ascription of a property, the idea of an ontic difference between the past and the future is open to similar philosophical objections.

Recent Work on the American Professional Military Ethic: An Introduction and Survey, JAMES H. McGRATH and GUSTAF E. ANDERSON

The paper offers a comprehensive philosophical introduction to the professional ethic of the individual American soldier. After critically surveying relevant military periodicals, recent books, and professional conferences, the paper presents and interprets an inclusive selection of the basic traditional documents that constitute the profession's formal ethic. An informal ethic of military virtues and values—especially obedience, competence, character, honor, and the warrior ethos—is also described.

Rule Consequentialism is a Rubber Duck, FRANCES HOWARD-SNYDER

The paper argues that rule consequentialism, in spite of its name, is not a form of consequentialism. This follows from the fact that any morality which endorses agent-centered rules is not a form of consequentialism, and that rule consequentialism does so. This view is defended against objections including the claim that rule consequentialism and act consequentialism are really equivalent, an objection to the agent-centered account of the distinction between consequentialism and nonconsequentialism, and the claim that rule consequentialism is somehow, perhaps "indirectly", agent-neutral. Finally it is argued that this way of reclassifying rule consequentialism is helpful since rule consequentialism shares important strengths and weaknesses with other forms of nonconsequentialism. In particular, it seems to be vulnerable to the "self-defeatingness" attack that Samuel Scheffler raises for deontology.

The Virtue of Modesty, AARON BEN-ZE'EV

There are three major cognitive accounts of modesty: (a) The agent knows his or her superior worth but does not reveal it in speech or behavior; in this sense the agent is insincere. (b) The agent underestimates his or her worth; in this sense the agent is ignorant. (c) The agent does not overestimate his or her worth; in this sense the agent is realistic. It is argued that the basic assumption underlying the first two accounts is false. The basic assumption of the third account is correct, but is insufficient for characterizing modesty since genuine modesty is an evaluative virtue and not a cognitive virtue. Accordingly, a fourth account of modesty is suggested: (d) The

agent evaluates his or her fundamental human worth as similar to that of other people, in this sense the agent is a type of egalitarian

Wittgenstein's Woodcutters: The Problem of Apparent Irrationality,
MARK RISJORD

When a social scientist finds speech or behavior which is apparently irrational, he typically adjusts his interpretation. The appearance of irrationality is removed by retranslating or putting the behavior in a wider context. What principles govern such changes in interpretation? Many believe that interpretive change is governed by norms of rationality shared by the interpreter and interpretees. The arguments for this position are elucidated and criticized. This article argues that a social scientist should change his interpretation just in case the change increases its explanatory coherence. Coherence permits a wider scope for hypotheses, including the supposition that a group has norms of rationality different from the social scientist's. Contrary to some powerful antirealist arguments, therefore, relativism is not precluded by the epistemology of social science. Since a coherence view of interpretive change permits the discovery of different norms of rationality, whether alternative norms exist becomes an empirical question.

Two Concepts of Theodicy, HENRY J. SCHUURMAN

INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Vol. 33, No. 1, March 1993

Issues In African Philosophy Re-examined, FIDELIS U. OKAFOR

The debate concerning the existence or nonexistence of African philosophy has taken a new turn in the last two decades. This article, while admitting that the debate has yielded positive results nevertheless, regards the exercise as a futile dissipation of intellectual energy. It identifies the main causes for the rejection of African philosophy. The article affirms the existence of African philosophy. But African philosophy is culture-relative and demands a relativity in method which need not conform with the method established by Western science and philosophy, which itself is culture-determined. Philosophical relativism is of course consequent upon cultural relativity. The goal of African philosophy and the vocation of African philosophers differ from those of their Western counterparts since every philosophy and every philosopher is situated in a particular historico- and socio-political milieu.

INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Vol 33, No 2, June 1993

The Metaphysical Aspect of Tenses in Proclus, PAUL PLASS

In Neoplatonism spatial and temporal entities are located at the end of ontological chains extending up through various metaphysical planes. Since all chains converge in the One, a fan-like pattern is formed increasingly extended and multiple at lower levels, increasingly unified toward the top. The complex Greek verb system is organized by Proclus around three tenses (past, present, future) marking out the multiple aspect of empirical time. The past enjoys ontological priority over the other tenses because it represents a higher level in the hierarchy of causes from which time is derived. Unlike present and future, the past does not flow, it is therefore knowable and serves as a surrogate of eternity. The general orientation of Greek culture toward the past as source of paradigmatic truth is thus reinforced by Platonic metaphysical paradigms.

"I Can Wait 40 or 400 Years" Gandhian Satyagraha West and East,
W. J. STAROSTA and A. G. CHAUDHARY

The analysis considers two competing interpretations of the events of Gandhi's 1930 Salt March. Whereas the Western explanation reflects time-bound notions of civil disobedience and political manipulation, the Eastern explanation turns to Vedic traditions to note the inexorable force—even over the span of numerous lifetimes—of sacrifice, the power of self-cleansing and bearing witness, and the force of guided human suffering. Neither explanation is argued to be more adequate than the other, since both account adequately for the circumstances studied.

Deontologism and Moral Weakness, JOHN PETERSON

Can a person who believes it is better to do x than y choose to do y (moral voluntarism [MV]) or not (moral intellectualism [MI])? MI is implied by psychological and ethical eudaemonism (PE and EE), psychological and ethical hedonism (PH and EH), and psychological and ethical Nietzscheanism (PN and EN). Since PE, PH, and PN are the only plausible psychological generalizations from which MI is deduced, it follows that, if PE, PH, and PN are false, then MI goes unsupported. But PE, PH, and PN are false. MV is justified by a deontological definition of the statement, "It is better to do x and not y ." This is ED. It is better for a person s to do x and not y =df, (i) it is right for s to do x and (ii) s 's doing y is either wrong or morally neutral. Unlike EE, EH, and EN, ED passes the open-question test. But assuming ED, MI becomes, counterintuitively, "It is not possible for a person s to choose to do x over y when s believes it is right for s to do y and s 's doing x is either wrong or morally neutral."

Hegel, Kolb, and Flay Foundationalism or Anti-Foundationalism?
JAMES P. KOW

The article's thesis is that metaphysically, in Hegel's view, the finite order of human experience requires the infinite—absolute spirit—for its own coherence and integrity. Flay and Kolb, although astute Hegelian scholars, have underestimated the importance of the constructive character of the infinite in Hegel's thought. Despite their contextualist overtones in explicating Hegel, their interpretations drive to the conclusion that Hegel is even more of a foundationalist than the epistemological foundationalists. A defense rooted in Hegel's *Logic* and employing the Hegelian notion of ground refutes their contentions. Hegel's philosophy is a systemic holism grounded not so much in foundationalism or antifoundationalism, but in the prospective completed infinity of spirit. Without the presence of infinite spirit an unnecessarily attenuated version of human finitude is our lot. But the mutual career of the finite and the infinite frees us from this fate.

Eternity and the Special Theory of Relativity, ALAN G. PADGETT

The article is critical of recent attempts to use the Special Theory of Relativity to defend and explain the doctrine of divine timelessness. It focuses on the work of Kretzmann, Leftow, and Stump. It is pointed out that according to the Special Theory there are temporal absolutes, such as absolute past or absolute simultaneity, between events in the light cone. Problems with the use of temporal terms such as "simultaneity," "duration," and "present" are raised, even while granting that such usage may be analogical.

Jonathan Edwards' Twelfth Sign, MICHAEL L. RAPOSA

*Derrida and Madhyamika Buddhism. From Linguistic
Deconstruction to Criticism of Onto-theologies*, CAI ZONG-QI

The Sign Over the Barber's Shop, HEINZ-GERD SCHMITZ

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 90, No. 4, April 1993

*Persons and the Satisfaction of Preferences: Problems in the
Rational Kinematics of Values*, DUNCAN MACINTOSH

If one can get the targets of one's current wants only by acquiring new wants (as in the Prisoner's Dilemma), is it rational to do so? Maybe not, for this could justify adopting unsatisfiable wants, violating the rational duty to maximize one's utility. Further, why cause a want's target if one will not

then want it? And people *are* their wants. So if these change, people will not survive to enjoy their wants' targets. But one need not rationally advance one's future wants, only current ones, rational choice seeks not utility (the coobtaining of a want and its target), but satisfaction (the eventual obtaining of what is now wanted), and persons survive *rational* changes of values. Otherwise, it would be irrational to care now about what happens after one dies. Thus reflection on the rational revision of values illuminates personal identity and the bases and aims of rational choice.

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Vol 90, No 5, May 1993

How to Believe a Conditional, D. H. MELLOR

The theory that conditionals express inferential dispositions is developed and defended in detail. It is first shown to make David Lewis's so-called triviality results compatible with Ernest Adams's thesis that our degrees of acceptance of conditionals are measured by our conditional credences in their truth conditions. Then the causal connections of these inferential dispositions with relevant beliefs are used to distinguish the acceptance and truth conditions of the two main types of conditionals, called "factual" and "hypothetical." This is shown to vindicate Dudman's classification of future-referring conditionals with hypothetical conditionals. A realist interpretation of these dispositions is argued for and shown to dispose of various counter examples to the theory, and to enable it to cope with embedded conditionals. Finally the theory is shown to refute Adams's thesis.

Logical Atoms and Combinatorial Possibility, BRIAN SKYRMS

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Vol 90, No 6, June 1993

On Some Alleged Limitations to Moral Endeavor,
CATHERINE WILSON

In the last twenty years, a number of philosophers have rejected moral and political theories which, like Kant's and Rawls's, are "objective" in their appeal to abstract considerations of justice and fairness. They have tried to direct attention to the worthiness of the "good life," which is directed to the completion of individual projects, the use of individual talents, and the satisfaction of personal desires. The author criticizes this development, arguing that the moral philosophy involved is in fact an ideology constituting, in the context in which it is developed, an unacceptable apology for affluence and social privilege. It is argued that the general problem for metaethics, which

is not adequately addressed in contemporary moral philosophy, is to escape such ideologies while coming to terms with human nature and contingency

Mice, Shrews, and Misrepresentation, AUSTEN CLARK

Sometimes shrews look like mice We consider such episodes to be transitory illusions, misrepresentations This article presents an information-theoretic rationale explaining why such instances are instances of misrepresentation It defends an old fashioned information-based approach to the problem of mental representation In that defense information theory is used in a new way to assess the relative epistemic performance of rival systems of representation The result breathes new life into old doctrines

JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
Vol 31, No 3, July 1993

The Truth Evaluability of Stoic Phantasiai Adversus Mathematicos VII 242-6, CHRISTOPHER SHIELDS

Orthodox Stoics endorse each of the following propositions (1) *phantasiai* are true or false (that is, are truth evaluable), (2) only *axiōmata* are truth evaluable, and (3) no *phantasia* is an *axiōma*, since *phantasiai* are impressions in the soul, and hence material, whereas *axiōmata* are *lekta*, and hence immaterial These propositions cannot be true together, consequently, if the Stoics hold each in an unqualified form, they have an incoherent doctrine about the semantic character of *phantasiai* Although there are some challenging ontological questions concerning why and in what sense the Stoics maintain (3), the issue at hand is best regarded as a semantic problem, at least insofar as the seeming inconsistency is to be resolved by appeal to purely semantic considerations the Stoics do not endorse proposition (1) in an unqualified way, and so do not commit themselves to this inconsistent triad

Christian Wolff's Criticisms of Spinoza, JAMES C MORRISON

The article attempts to provide a general survey and critical appraisal of Wolff's attempt to refute Spinoza's philosophy In Part 1 the general historical background and motivation for Wolff's refutation is set out, namely, the charge that he, like Spinoza, was a "fatalist," and his consequent dismissal from the University of Halle Parts 2 and 3 present a survey of Wolff's interpretation and specific criticisms of Spinoza In Part 4 it is argued that Wolff's major charge of fatalism—that is, the view that the actual world is the only possible world—is based on a misunderstanding Spinoza is better described as a determinist because he allows for hypothetical as well as absolute necessity To this extent his position is basically the same as Wolff's

Kantian Moral Motivation and the Feeling of Respect,
RICHARD McCARTY

The prevailing, "intellectualist" view of Kantian moral motivation is that respect for the moral law is properly conceived as a purely cognitive motivational attitude. While some intellectualist interpreters acknowledge Kant's comments about respect's affective aspect, or "moral feeling," they deny this feeling can play any motivational role in acting from duty. This article advances an alternative, "affectivist" view of Kantian moral motivation that Kant assumed the feeling of respect does indeed play a motivational role. Textual evidence from Kant's early lectures in ethics to his final ethical writings supports the affectivist interpretation. Moreover, Kant's view of moral weakness (human frailty) requires the assumption that moral feeling can play a quantifiable motivational role. The affectivist view can also be made consistent with Kant's view of freedom.

Karl Jaspers and Scientific Philosophy, JAMES O. BENNETT

Jaspers' work provides an extensive commentary on the relationship between philosophy and science in the broad sense (*Wissenschaft*). It is argued that Jaspers maintains two incompatible views. The more extreme "exclusive view" rules out the legitimacy of academic philosophy, and it even calls into question the possibility of philosophical criticism and debate. It is argued that the more moderate "dual aspect view" is preferable. It affords a cogent basis for opposition to the view that philosophy is a purely impersonal, collective enterprise, while nevertheless allowing for appreciation of the objective aspects of philosophical endeavor.

Consciousness and Self-Knowledge in Aquinas's Critique of Averroes's Psychology, DEBORAH L. BLACK

Clarke's Extended Soul, EZIO VAILATI

THE MONIST

Vol. 76, No. 1, January 1993

Structures of Normative Theories, JAMES DREIER

The article first considers the relation between two distinctions among kinds of normative reasons and theories: the consequentialist-nonconsequentialist distinction, and the agent-neutral-agent-centered distinction. It argues that the former is a dubious distinction, since on the most plausible understanding of a "consequence," every sensible normative theory is consequentialist. It then explains some substantive mistakes of normative (especially

moral) theorizing engendered by confusing the consequentialist-nor consequentialist distinction with the agent neutral-agent centered distinction. It urges that theorists' attention should be focused more sharply on the latter distinction. Finally, the article shows how disputes between advocates of agent neutral normative theories and advocates of agent centered theories can best be adjudicated from the more abstract perspective of metaethical theories like contractualism or virtue theory.

Agent-Relativity, Reason, and Value, ROBERT M. STEWART

Samuel Scheffler has argued that ethical theories that impose agent-relative constraints which sometimes keep us from doing the most good or preventing the most harm are implausible and even paradoxical. This article is an examination of Scheffler's arguments against such nonconsequentialist theories, particularly what he terms "standard" deontological views and the virtue-based approach of Philippa Foot. His objections are shown to be avoided by a hybrid position that combines elements of both deontological and virtue ethics, emphasizing the distinction between what it is morally right to do and what an agent has reason to do. Moreover, the basic assumption that there is an impersonal point of view representing agent-neutral moral values and reasons (as defended by Thomas Nagel and others) is revealed to be unacceptable, all values and reasons are thus, in the relevant sense, agent-relative.

Deontology and Agency, DAVID McNAUGHTON and
PIERS RAWLING

Constraints are a defining feature of deontological moral systems. There is considerable debate, however, over how constraints are to be characterized and defended. Authors such as Thomas Nagel, Derek Parfit, and Samuel Scheffler view constraints as best characterized in terms of agent-relative reasons. On this characterization it is natural to suppose that if there are constraints they arise from an agent's justifiable concern with her own agency. But there is, perhaps, an alternative to this agent-focused rationale: constraints might be best defended via considerations of the victim of wrongdoing. Richard Brook and Frances Kamm favor such a view. The current authors argue that the latter are mistaken, and, after clarifying the nature of agent-relative reasons, urge an agent-focused rationale for constraints as the best hope of defending them against the consequentialist.

Personal Integrity, Practical Recognition, and Rights, ERIC MACK

Two arguments are presented connecting moral individualism's core assertion within the theory of the good, namely, that value is agent-relative, with moral individualism's core assertion within the theory of the right, namely, that each person has a natural right of self-ownership. The Personal Integrity and Moral Symmetry Argument maintains that the inclusion within morality of an original claim for each person to special, discretionary control over himself is essential to fostering persons' pursuit of their self-chosen ends.

The Practical Recognition Argument maintains that the fact of others' existence as beings with rational ends of their own rationally requires practical recognition in the form of respecting each other person's discretionary control over his own person

Group Membership and Political Obligation,
MARGARET GILBERT

John Simmons has characterized the problem of political obligation as that of explaining and, if this can be done, justifying the sense many people have that they are obligated to support their government. Simmons himself concludes this sense cannot be justified. But why do many people feel this way? This article proposes that there is an everyday notion expressed in talk of "our" government such that those who use this language understand themselves to be under an obligation. Being part of a "we" in the relevant sense entails obligations.

The Reality of the Moral Self, LAURENCE THOMAS

Wise Maxims/Wise Judging, NANCY SHERMAN

THE MONIST
Vol 76, No 2, April 1993

Organ Transplants, Death, and Policies for Procurement,
DAVID LAMB

The paper examines moral issues concerning the kinds of donors or sources of organ supply, looking first at some of the problems with live donation and then at problems with post-mortem donation. Emphasis is placed on a principle of separation, where questions concerning transplantation are separated from issues concerning the definition of death. The debate on brain death is addressed in the following section, where a defense of the brainstem, or lower brain, formulation is provided. This is followed by an assessment of cultural attitudes towards neurological criteria for diagnosing death. The final section examines policies for organ procurement and covers the debate on proposals for a contracting out system and recent practices involving elective ventilation prior to death.

Epicureanism and Death, WALTER GLANNON

Epicurus maintained that death is not bad because as persons we cannot experience anything after we die. Furthermore, since we cannot experience

anything in the state of postmortem nonexistence, it follows that it is irrational for persons to be concerned about death. Recently, some philosophers have rejected the Epicurean Experience Principle and have defended instead the Deprivation of Goods Principle, which says that death may be bad to the extent that it deprives a person of the goods he would have enjoyed if he had not died when he actually did. This article argues that the Deprivation of Goods Principle is untenable because it implicitly assumes that all states of affairs are held fixed between the time of a person's actual death and the later time when that person might have enjoyed the goods of which death purportedly deprives him. The principle fails to account for the repercussions that come in the wake of one person's death. Moreover, it ignores the likelihood that if everyone were to live well beyond the time at which they die, then each person might be better off—but all persons would be worse off as a consequence. In the light of these problems, Epicureanism and its core Experience Principle provide a more tenable response to the question of whether death is or is not bad.

Death and the Stories We Don't Have, JOSEPH A. AMATO

The article argues that contemporary cultures lack stories about death and its implications. He contends that death insists on the use of metaphors and narratives that philosophy traditionally has shunned since its origins. In contradiction to much fashionable contemporary critical thought, it is argued that there is an irreducible difference between the "then" of narrative and the "then" of explanation. It is concluded that the philosopher's role is to prepare the way for free thinking and living cultures, and that the philosophers find consolation in the fact that it is better to have no common stories other than those provided by cultures of the central state, of secular ideology, and of mass society.

Last Words, ROBERT KASTENBAUM

Communications offered from the lips of a dying or condemned person have been cherished in both Eastern and Western traditions. More specifically, "last words" have often been accorded a privileged status from epistemological and moral-obligatory standpoints. Is this privileged status justified? Various claims for the "specialness" of last words are examined. Contextual analysis raises doubts that any of these claims is sufficient to establish privileged status, for example, the contention that "the person close to death knows more, better, or differently." The moral-obligatory claim is complicated by the frequent selective preservation and distortion of last words for political and religious purposes. Alternative interpretations of last words are offered, emphasizing their use as rhetorical devices and as unique self-narratives. Finally, consideration is given to the possibility that our knowledge of death is always mediated by symbols and constrained by particular knowing-contexts; therefore it might be wiser to consider each death within its unique context rather than continue to propagate universal propositions.

Peter Singer on Euthanasia, HERLINDE PAUER-STUDER

More on Euthanasia A Response to Pauer-Studer, PETER SINGER
AND HELGA KUHSE

Is 'Brain Death' Actually Death? JOSEF SEIFERT

My Own Death, PIERS BENN

NOUS

Vol 27, No 1, March 1993

Proper Functionalism and Virtue Epistemology, ERNEST SOSA

A discussion of virtue epistemology, and especially of Alvin Plantinga's recent two-volume treatise, *Warrant The Current Debate* and *Warrant and Proper Function*. The paper cannot possibly do justice to the scope and richness of that work, and takes up only some of what seem the most important and original proposals and compares them with some relevant alternatives. Recent views of Alvin Goldman are also discussed in some detail. Considerable agreement is found with the views of both authors, but several problems are raised for each, and a contrasting view is sketched briefly. Since the disagreements involved seem *relatively* small when compared with the large areas of agreement, it seems appropriate to consider the three sets of views to be varieties of a single more fundamental option in epistemology—one which puts the explicative emphasis on truth-conducive intellectual virtues or faculties, and is properly termed "virtue epistemology."

Why We Need Proper Function, ALVIN PLANTINGA

This piece is a reply to the articles by Richard Feldman and Ernest Sosa, it stresses the importance of the notion of proper function

NOUS

Vol 27, No 2, June 1993

*A Revised Formulation of the Logic of Sense and Denotation.
Alternative (1)*, ALONZO CHURCH

This paper is a sequel to "Outline of a Revised Formulation of Logic of Sense and Denotation." Like the earlier paper it is a contribution, not to

Fregean semantics, but to the logic of the intensional entities which are to serve as senses of names. But it differs from the earlier paper in taking Alternative (1) as criterion of identity of concepts rather than Alternative (2). Under Alternative (1) propositions are identified with Frege's *Gedanken*, that is, concepts of truth-values, and the proposal is that propositions in this sense shall be taken as objects of assertion and belief. This is thought to be preferable to the use of proposition surrogates as treated in the paper, "Intensionality and the Paradox of the Name Relation," because (as explained in the last section of the paper) this latter requires the use of a language in which no two primitive constants have the same denotation.

A Problem in the Frege-Church Theory of Sense and Denotation,
NATHAN SALMON

There is an inconsistency among claims made by Alonzo Church concerning Frege's distinction between sense and denotation taken together with plausible assertions by Frege concerning the sense that an expression allegedly takes on in positions in which it has *ungerade Bedeutung*, denoting its own customary sense. It is argued that the most plausible resolution of the inconsistency, in light of Church's own arguments, is to reject Church's Fregean solution to the Paradox of Analysis. Yet adopting an alternative solution involves abandoning the theory of sense and denotation in the form in which it has been staunchly advocated by Frege and Church. The inconsistency in the Frege-Church theory of sense and denotation thus goes to the heart of that theory.

Toward a Credible Agent-Causal Account of Free Will,
RANDOLPH CLARKE

According to agent-causal accounts of free will, when an agent acts with free will, he is an uncaused cause of his action. Such accounts are widely regarded as untenable, primarily because they have failed to provide an adequate account of how an agent-caused action can be rational and rationally explicable, and because they have failed to render the notion of agent causation intelligible. The first of these problems is solved by recognizing that causation of actions by agents is compatible with universal, probabilistic event causation. Progress is made toward a solution to the second problem by drawing on a realist (or nonreductionalist) account of event causation. The causal relation is taken to be one of the basic constituents of the universe, definable without reduction, and agent causation is held to differ from event causation only with regard to one of the relata, not with regard to the relation.

The Problem of the Many, Many Composition Questions, and Naïve Mereology, DAVID H. SANFORD

Three topics in Peter van Inwagen's *Material Beings* receive attention. (1) How, for example, can a table be a collection of atoms when many collections of atoms have equally strong claims to be that table? This is Peter Unger's "Problem of the Many," which Van Inwagen invokes fuzzy sets to

solve. An alternative treatment of vagueness, supervenience over many-valued valuations, provides a better solution. (2) The Special Composition Question asks just how parts compose a whole. One who rejects van Inwagen's answer in terms of constituting a life need not provide some alternative answer. If all answers to this special question are inadequate, there are many composition questions that are not so difficult. (3) Naïve mereology studies ordinary, common-sense beliefs about part and whole, it questions, for example, the alleged transitivity of "part of." Some of the speculations here on naïve mereology do not bear directly on *Material Beings*.

On the Transfer of Necessity, TIMOTHY O'CONNOR

Recent discussion of the compatibility of human freedom and causal determinism has focused on a formal modal argument for incompatibilism. Central to this argument is a principle (which Peter van Inwagen has dubbed the " β -rule") governing the transfer of the modality of "power necessity" across propositions. This paper addresses a range of purported counterexamples to the principle. It is first shown that several of the examples suggested may be circumvented by a simple, independently motivated modification of the principle. It is then argued that the other examples recent authors have put forward are unsuccessful for various reasons. Hence, the result of the present examination is that we have yet to see any compelling argument for rejecting the intuitively attractive β -rule, and so the case for incompatibilism remains strong.

Naïve Mereology, Admissible Valuations, and Other Matters,
PETER VAN INWAGEN

This article is a brief reply to David Sanford's article, "The Problem of the Many, Many Composition Questions, and Naïve Mereology," which appears in the same issue of this periodical.

The Representation of Causation and Hume's Two Definitions of 'Cause', DON GARRETT

THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Vol. 43, No. 172, July 1993

The Meaning of 'If' in Conditional Propositions,
GEOFFREY HUNTER

Possible worlds, probabilistic and assertibility theories of conditionals all go wrong in two different ways. (1) Each theory's account of the truth (or assertibility) of particular conditionals is wrong. In each case the theorist believes that his theory gives a correct account for all the conditionals he is

concerned with, whereas in fact there is no single criterion by which we assign truth (or assertibility) to particular conditional propositions (2) Each theory comes up with wrong answers about logical truths involving conditionals There is nothing in common to the determination of the truth of all particular conditional propositions What is in common is not the way truth is determined but the function of the word "if" "If" is a logical particle, and its meaning consists in its logical powers alone Two axiomatic systems of relevance logic for conditionals are presented, one with, and one without, contraposition as a theorem

Intention Detecting, RICHARD HOLTON

Crispin Wright has argued that our concept of intention is an extension-determining concept This he thinks provides an explanation of why we are so good at knowing what we intend, and it does so by subverting the idea that we detect our own intentions This paper has two aims The first is to find a way of making sense of Wright's claim that intention is extension-determining, this is achieved by comparing his position to that of analytic functionalism The second is to show that even if intention is an extension-determining concept, Wright is wrong in concluding that we do not detect our intentions His conclusion results from a conflation of two questions First, Do we detect our intentions? Second, Do we detect the concept of intention itself? The extension-determining account returns a negative answer only to the second

Putnam's Resolution of the Popper-Kuhn Controversy, CHHANDA GUPTA

PHILOSOPHY

Vol 68, No 264, April 1993

James and Bradley on Understanding, ROBERT STERN

This article offers a comparative assessment of the views of William James and F H Bradley on the topic of human understanding and its limits It is argued that while both have a distrust of the conceptual aspects of thought, and so share the view that the human intellect will always fail to gain absolute knowledge, they develop this idea very differently thanks to the divergence in their respective philosophical outlooks whereas Bradley developed his philosophical outlook in the context of a post-Hegelian intellectualist rationalism, James developed his in the context of his pragmatic humanism The nature of the dispute between James and Bradley on this issue is explored as an important turning point in the philosophical *Weltbild* of the twentieth century, and as an example of a clash between these two fundamentally opposed philosophical traditions

PHILOSOPHY
Vol 68, No 265, July 1993

Innocence, ELIZABETH WOLGAST

Of all moral conditions, innocence seems the best and most desirable. Against a background of guilt and offense, innocence is better the way something clean is better than something soiled, it is a state of unalloyed trust, of virtue unconscious of wrong. Though we lose it early, the loss is profoundly regrettable and life thereafter is second-best. This view of innocence and its place in morality is called into question by this article. It is argued that experience with wrong, both one's own and others', and recognition of it through censure and shame, are essential to moral understanding—and thus to moral maturity. In this light innocence signifies a lack instead of an asset, a fact that should be accounted for in moral theory. Some suggestions along this line are made.

Norman Malcolm: A Memoir, ANTHONY SERAFINI

Norman Malcolm left the world a most distinguished legacy in philosophy. This essay looks back at some personal aspects of Malcolm's career as well as at his work in epistemology, the philosophy of religion, and the philosophy of mind, including his assaults on behaviorism, identity theories, functionalism, and so forth. The article contends that critics have misunderstood Malcolm, particularly his work on the "trace" theory of memory. *Inter alia*, it argues also that, popular misconceptions notwithstanding, neither Malcolm nor Wittgenstein disavowed the existence of introspectible "inner" states. The essay dissents also from the popular belief that Malcolm endorsed Wittgenstein's views uncritically, pointing to several places where Malcolm clearly rebukes Wittgenstein for overlooking critical logical points. It is later maintained that Malcolm's "ordinary-language" approach has limitations which Malcolm may not have taken sufficiently seriously. In general, it is argued that Malcolm was a philosopher of immense integrity, clarity, and originality.

Sport: An Historical Phenomenology, ANTHONY SKILLEN

Through an examination of values and dimensions of sport from Homer to the present, this article contests historicist views that deny the place of universal meanings in this central area of human life. The article focuses on the heroic and Olympic ethos of glory, the public spectacles of Rome, and the "Christian Muscularity" of the Victorians to develop a cohesive picture of sport's core features. Use is made of Arendt and Ryle in attempting an informal analysis that relates children's play to professional sport without imposing a "definition."

Madness and Method, RODGER BEEHLER

The clinical practice and writings of Oliver Sacks provoke the question of how far persons elect those various states referred to under the expressions "psychosis," "insanity," "madness." This possibility is explored by examining some data from R. D. Laing's 1960s researches reported in *The Divided Self*. An interpretation of this data is offered that opposes in important respects Laing's theory of psychosis, and supports the possibility implied by Sacks' findings. The general intelligibility of such an election of madness is discussed briefly at the end.

On Kripke's and Goodman's Uses of 'Grue', IAN HACKING

PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
Vol. 53, No. 2, June 1993

Logical Cognition. Husserl's Prolegomena, and the Truth in Psychologism, ROBERT HANNA

Frege's devastating critique of logical psychologism leaves philosophers of logic with an important problem: if logical propositions exist independently of human acts of thinking, then how *can* they be thought by thinkers? Husserl's *Prolegomena to Pure Logic* contains a thorough critique of psychologism, but avoids Frege's problem by developing a theory of logical cognition. This theory involves a weak form of psychologism that is consistent with anti-psychologism. Husserl's theory of logical cognition thus manages to bring out the truth in psychologism while rejecting its most rebarbative features.

The Virtues of Common Pursuit, NANCY SHERMAN

We tend to think of virtues as self- and other-regarding. Indeed, in general we think of morality as a matter of how we attend to individuals, whether it be ourselves or others, and in the case of others, strangers or loved ones. This article questions this picture. In addition to caring about self and others we care about the fact that we do things together. That is, we care about the fact of community. This is perspicuous in Aristotle's account, and indeed his work is often appealed to by "communitarian" writers on this account. On an Aristotelian view, the fact of our human sociality is an architectonic feature of our particular brand of good living, and structures the various ways we employ other abilities and powers in the task of living well. In a less recognized way, however, Kant also argues for the importance of affiliation in his account of the virtues. Sociality is a constitutive fact of our human nature that must be protected alongside our need to restrain our rational capacities from manipulation and abuse. Yet the nature of our sociability is at heart marked by antagonism and competition. Ours is an "unsocial sociability" that preys on

betrayal as much as it positively attends to need and limitation. This contrasts with Aristotle's more genial view and ultimately, it is argued, accounts for the different regard for community in the two accounts.

Skeptical Problems, Semantical Solutions, DAVID CHRISTENSEN

An antiskeptical strategy that has attracted some attention recently is a distinctively semantical one: it invokes considerations about how words get their meanings to show that the skeptic's alternative hypothesis about the world could not be true. This antiskeptical strategy has struck many as suspect, roughly because it seems to use purely linguistic considerations to answer substantive questions about the extralinguistic world. This paper first defends the legitimacy of this sort of semantical antiskepticism, showing that the worries that have been expressed about it in the literature are without foundation. It is then argued that precisely this sort of antiskeptical argument must play a crucial role in epistemology. It provides our only defense against a very simple form of skeptical challenge which would, if unchecked, undermine our knowledge in virtually every area.

Contingency, Apriority and Acquaintance,
THOMAS C. RYCKMAN

This article considers Kripke's Neptune example, and the claim that it is a case of contingent a priori knowledge, as a puzzle for the Millian theory of names. It explains the appearance of apriority. It presents, explains, and evaluates accounts offered by Keith Donnellan and Simon Blackburn; they are sympathetic to the Millian theory and they maintain that Leverrier was not in a position to have (a priori) knowledge *because* he was not in a position to have belief (and knowledge entails belief). It is argued that the general point of view adopted by Donnellan and Blackburn—that believing a given proposition entails being acquainted or in touch with it (and its constituents)—is antithetical to the Millian theory and does not solve variants of the puzzle at hand. The author offers his own account of why, though (contrary to Donnellan and Blackburn) Leverrier *was* in a position to have knowledge (contrary to many interpretations of Kripke), he did not have a priori knowledge.

The Elimination of Experience, WILLIAM SEAGER

Daniel Dennett has recently argued that the philosophical notion of "qualia" is conceptually incoherent. On such a view, the maze of philosophical puzzles and paradoxes which qualia engender are evidence of an intellectual illusion which is to be dispelled by the outright elimination of the offending notion in favor of some purified, and unspecified, replacement. Against Dennett, it is claimed first that the cardinal features of qualia—namely, ineffability, intrinsicness, privacy, and immediate accessibility—can be given a "minimal interpretation" under which they can be safely combined within a modest and reasonably uncontentious conception of qualitative experience, which does not deny the manifest mystery of consciousness. After outlining this minimal interpretation the article employs it in a detailed consideration of

Dennett's problematical thought experiments, revealing them to be generally unconvincing as attacks on the notion of qualia, and in fact dependent on a dangerous degree of unredeemable verificationism

Burge on Content, REINALDO ELUGARDO

This paper examines Tyler Burge's notion of intentional content as presented in his linguistic arguments against individualism. It is argued, through a critical evaluation of one of his thought experiments, that his conception of content is incoherent. Part of the problem lies with Burge's claim that terms which occur obliquely in indirect psychological discourse describe the way the subject of the attribution thinks of their referent. At the conclusion of the paper, a brief argument against his claim is offered.

Visualizing in Arithmetic, M. GIAQUINTO

Could visual imagination be a means of discovering (as opposed to merely coming to believe) general truths in arithmetic? It is natural to suspect that the answer must be no, even if visualizing could be a means of discovering general truths of geometry. In the light of a couple of putative examples of arithmetical discovery by visualizing, two reasons—the only serious reasons the author knows of—for this negative answer are considered. It is argued that the first of these reasons, the “particularity objection,” rests on a fallacious view about visualizing. It is then argued that the second reason rests on a correct view about visualizing, the possibility of “unintended exclusions”, that this does block the putative examples of discovery by visualizing, but that modified examples are not blocked by it. It is concluded that despite natural initial doubts, visualizing may yet turn out to be of epistemic value in arithmetic.

DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS, 1992-93*

The University of Alberta

(27) (24) (18)

University of Arizona

(37) (8) (17)

ANGELO CORLETT, "Moral Compatibilism Rights and Compensation Responsibility Punishment " Adviser Joel Feinberg

KIHYEON KIM, "The Defense Activation Theory of Epistemic Justification " Adviser Alvin Goldman

RUSS SHAFER-LANDAU, "Moral Indeterminacy " Adviser Joel Feinberg

LEOPOLD STUBENBERG, "Consciousness and Qualia " Adviser Keith Lehrer

CLARK WOLF, "A Theory of Intergenerational Justice " Adviser Joel Feinberg

The University of Arkansas

(23) (15) (8)

Boston College

(139) (108) (15)

MUSTAFA ABU-SWAY, "The Genetic Development in Al-Ghazzaliyy's Epistemology " Advisers Patrick Byrne, Merlin Schwartz

PAULO CESAR DUQUE ESTRADA, "Gadamer's Rehabilitation of Practical Philosophy " Advisers Jacques Taminaux, David Rasmussen

JANE FREIMILLER, "Relative Purposiveness in Kant's Third Critique " Advisers David Rasmussen, Richard Cobb-Stevens

ARTHUR HIPPLER, "Impediments to Aristotle's Life-Sciences " Advisers Ralph McInerney, Thomas Hibbs

DAVID LANG, "Matter, Physical Quantity, and Place in Scholastic Cosmology The Influence of Eucharistic and Eschatological Physics " Advisers Norman Wells, Ronald Tacelli

JEAN-MARIE MAKANG, "The Problem of Democratic Inclusion in the Light of the Racial Question W E B DuBois and the Emancipation of Democracy " Advisers Oliva Blanchette, David Rasmussen

ELIZABETH MEADE, "Thinking in the World The Ethical Thought of Hannah Arendt " Advisers Jacques Taminaux, Richard Cobb-Stevens

* The three figures below each institution's name refer to (1) the number of graduate students enrolled in its philosophy department, (2) the number of "full-time" graduate students as the term is understood by the institution, and (3) the number of faculty members teaching in the graduate program

PAUL O'CONNOR, "Lonergan's Analysis of the Cycles of Economic Life and the Dynamism of Human History" Advisers Patrick Byrne, Frederick Lawrence

JOHN RANIERI, "Vision and Order Eric Voegelin on Society and Social Change" Advisers Frederick Lawrence, Patrick Byrne

GORDON ZINIEWICZ, "Democracy and Imagination The Practical Idealism of John Dewey" Advisers Richard Cobb-Stevens, Francis Soo

Boston University
(58) (52) (22)

WILLIAM FALCETARO, "The Progress of Leach The Recovery of the Classical Ideal of the Active Life in Florentine Civic Humanism" Adviser Leroy Rouser

University of British Columbia
(22) (18) (12)

KURT PREINSPERG, "Rational Disagreement About Social Justice" Adviser M McDonald

Bowling Green State University
(43) (40) (18)

KENN CUST, "A Just Minimum of Health Care" Adviser Christopher Morris

Brown University
(36) (29) (12)

JOHN GIBBONS, "Issues in Externalism" Adviser Jaegwon Kim

AMY SCAMMELL, "Anomalous Monism and the Causal Efficacy of the Mental" Adviser Jaegwon Kim

GEORGE STRANDER, "A Pragmatic Approach to the Qualitative Study of Reasoning" Adviser Ernest Sosa

ROBERT WELSHON, "Mental Events" Adviser Ernest Sosa.

Bryn Mawr College
(2) (0) (4)

The University of Calgary
(21) (20) (14)

CHRISTOPHER HADFIELD, "Transcending Naturalism" Adviser John A Baker

PETER OKEKE, "John Dewey and Democracy" Adviser Robert X Ware

The University of California at Berkeley
(49) (42) (20)

KAYLEY NANCY VERNALLIS, "Leading a Meaningful Life " Adviser Richard Wollheim

The University of California at Davis
(32) (29) (12)

DAVID LOPEZ, "The Question of a Sartrean Ethics " Adviser William H Bossart
MARINA A L OSHANA, "Autonomy as a Social Phenomenon " Adviser John M Fischer

The University of California at Los Angeles
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DONALD MICHAEL BROWN, "Evolutionary Intermediacy, Ideal Judges, and Intuitionistic Logic " Adviser David Kaplan
MABEL WAI LIN EICKEMEYER, "The Relationship of the Duties of Virtue to the Categorical Imperative " Adviser Robert Adams
MICHAEL JOHN THOMPSON, "Some Remarks on the Role of Generality in Practice " Adviser Gavin Lawrence

The University of California at Riverside
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DAVID BRUCE ALBERT, "Event Horizons of the Psyche Synchronicity, Psychedelics, and the Metaphysics of the Consciousness " Adviser John Martin Fischer
KENNETH DICKEY, "Meaning and Explanation Davidson on Metaphor and Malaprops " Adviser Alexander Rosenberg
DWIGHT FURROW, "Against Theory Continental and Analytic Challenges in Moral Philosophy " Adviser Bernd Magnus

The University of California at Santa Barbara
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FRODE BJORDAL, "A Theory of Knowledge " Adviser Anthony Brueckner
TODD M FURMAN, "Living in the Gettier Fallout " Adviser Anthony Brueckner Awarded in 1992
GARY N KEMP, "Frege's Philosophy of Logic " Adviser Peter Hylton
VALERIE BEATTIE SANTOS, "Fairness in the Original Position A Defense of John Rawls's Original Position " Adviser Christopher McMahon

The University of California at San Diego

(41) (40) (14)

MICHELLE GILMORE-GRIER, "Kant's Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion"
 Adviser Henry E. Allison

NEELAM SETHI, "Different Dimensions of Scientific Knowledge" Adviser
 Philip Kitcher

The Catholic University of America

(105) (54) (20)

JOSE ANTONIO RIVERA FERNANDEZ, "Political Autonomy and the Good
 in the Thought of Yves R. Simon and Luis Munoz Marin" Adviser Rob-
 ert Sokolowski

SUSAN CANTY SELNER, "The Metaphysics of Creation in Thomas Aquinas'
De Potentia Dei" Adviser John Wippel

MICHAEL W. TKACZ, "The Use of the Aristotelian Methodology of Division
 and Demonstration in the *De Animalibus* of Albert the Great" Adviser
 William A. Wallace

The University of Cincinnati

(26) (21) (13)

ALISON BAILEY, "Mothers, Birthgivers and Peacemakers: The Problem of
 Maternal Thinking in Feminist Peace Politics" Advisers W. E. Morris
 and Alison Jaggar

The City University of New York

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CARL KENDALL, "Pragmatism and the Grounds of Epistemology: Naturalized
 Consequences of C. I. Lewis's Criticism of Kant's Theory of 'Sinn und
 Bedeutung' in Concept Formation" Adviser Marx Wartofsky

MARIE PARRICE, "Buddhist Aspects of Spinoza's Thought" Adviser Joan
 Stambaugh

EDDY SOUFFRANT, "The Ethics of Colonialization and John Stuart Mill"
 Adviser Virginia Held

Claremont Graduate School

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BRIAN E. BUTLER, "Taking Rorty's Liberal Ironist Seriously: A Portrait of
 the Circumscribed Poet" Advisers Alfred R. Louch, Steve Erickson,
 John Roth

GARY HULL, "The Rise of Rationalism in the 19th Century" Advisers Alfred
 R. Louch, Scott Warren, John Roth

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- LAURANCE PECK, "Social Power Its Nature, Function, and Context " Adviser Dale Jameson
 KATRINA WALKER, "Personal Identity and the Nature of Persons " Adviser Carol Cleland
 SAMUEL WALKER, "On the Status of Hobbes's Laws of Nature " Adviser John Carnes Awarded in 1992

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- TIMOTHY EVES, "Integrating the Care and Justice Perspectives A Contribution to the Feminist Ethic of Carol Gilligan " Adviser John Troyer

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- MOHAMMED ABDALLAH, "The Logic of Social Ensembles A Study in Organicism " Adviser Stephen Houlgate
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- GILLIAN GREENWALL BROCK, "On the Moral Importance of Needs " Adviser Michael Ferejohn
 CHRISTOPHER HORVATH, "Species Concepts and the Theoretical Modes of Speciation " Adviser Robert Brandon
 MICHAELLE ANNE LAROCQUE, "Reductionism, Non-Reductionism and Personal Identity " Adviser David H Sanford
 JOHN P LEMOS, "A Defense of Pluralistic Character-Morality." Adviser Michael Ferejohn

Duquesne University

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 WILLIAM WELTON, "Civil Religion in Plato's Laws Choristry and Preludes " Adviser: Ronald Polansky

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JAMES R GOETSCH, JR, "Vico's Axioms A Study of the Methodology of the *Scienza Nuova* in the Light of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*" Adviser Donald Phillip Verene

JUDITH A JONES, "The Metaphysics of Intensity" Adviser Thomas R Flynn

DAVID K KITE, "An Unscientific Physics Hegel and Whitehead on the Philosophy of Nature" Adviser Donald Phillip Verene

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RORY WEINER, "Cooperative Beneficence and the Macro-allocation of Health Care in the United States" Adviser R M Hare

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EILEEN GRIECO, "Love and the Act of Contemplation in Modern Thomism" Adviser Deal W Hudson

JOHN ROSS, "An Examination of the 'Seeing-As' Discussion in *Philosophical Investigations* Part II" Advisers Vincent Cooke, Robert Roth

Georgetown University
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CYNTHIA ANDERSON, "Kant's Theory of Measurement" Adviser Jay Reuscher

LEONARD DANIEL FERENZ, "Social and Ethical Impacts of Life Extending Technologies and Interventions into the Aging Process" Adviser Robert Veatch

KEVIN ARTHUR KRAUS, "Hoping in the Healing Process An Integral Condition to the Ethics of Care" Adviser Ed Pellegrino

PATRICIA VON GAERTNER MAZZARELLA, "Can Eternal Objects Be the Foundation for a Process Theory of Morality?" Adviser Ed Pellegrino

The University of Guelph
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SUSAN J HOFFMAN, "The Ethical Dimension in Gadamer's Hermeneutics" Adviser Jakob Amstutz

MICHAEL WALSH, "Blanshard on Truth and Necessity" Adviser John Leslie

Harvard University
(41) (41) (15)

- HILARY BOK, "Freedom of the Will and Moral Responsibility" Advisers John Rawls, Thomas Scanlon Awarded in 1992
 DAVID CHOW, "Conflicts of Values in Law and Morality" Advisers John Rawls, Thomas Scanlon
 HARVEY CORMIER, "William James's Redefinition of Truth" Advisers Stanley Cavell, Hilary Putnam
 ANDREAS FØLLESDAL, "The Significance of State Borders for International Distributive Justice" Advisers John Rawls, Thomas Scanlon Awarded in 1992
 ELCHANAN FRIEDLANDER, "Expressions of Judgement" Advisers Stanley Cavell, Hilary Putnam, John Rawls
 SANFORD SHIEH, "De-Psychologizing Intuitionism the Anti-Realist Criticism of Classical Logic" Advisers Warren Goldfarb, Charles Parsons

University of Hawaii
(55) (50) (14)

- FRANK G AVANTAGGIO, "Intrinsic Value of Species" Adviser Lenn E Goodman
 CASSANDRA L PINNICK, "Rationality Theory and the Strong Programme in the Sociology of Knowledge A Critique" Adviser Larry Laudan
 HENRY G SKAJA, "Getting Clear on Confucius Pragmatic Naturalism as a Means of Philosophical interpretation" Adviser Roger T Ames

The University of Illinois at Chicago
(38) (29) (16)

- JERRY KAPUS, "Truth and Explanation" Adviser Anil Gupta
 DORAN SMOLKIN, "The Non-Identity Problem" Adviser Shelly Kagan
 TIMOTHY SNOW, "Subjectivity and Objectivity in Theory of Well Being" Adviser Richard Kraut
 MARIAM THALOS, "Measurement and Macroscopic Quantities" Adviser Michael Friedman

The University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
(48) (48) (17)

- CRAIG STEVEN GREEN, "Longing for the Good The Growth of Moral Order in the Ethics of F H Bradley" Adviser James Wallace
 MARJORIE HASS, "Interpreting Negation A Semantic Theory of Negation For Standard and Non-Standard Logic" Adviser Timothy McCarthy
 KEVIN HILL, "Language, Mind and Reality Nietzsche's Overcoming of Metaphysics" Adviser Richard Schacht
 PAUL FRANKLIN JOHNSON, "After McIntyre A Critical Assessment of the Historical Method of Value Inquiry" Adviser Richard Schacht
 MICHAEL THEODORE ROTH, "The Poetics of Resistance Heidegger on the Line" Adviser Art Melnick

WILLIAM PARK VAUGHAN, "In the Event of Words Art, Technology, and Language in the Later Heidegger" Adviser Richard Schacht

Indiana University
(51) (51) (16)

STEPHEN RONALD CRAIG HICKS, "Foundationalism and the Genesis of Justification" Adviser Karen Hanson

YIN-BIN NING, "A Post-Philosophical Essay on Knowledge/Power Richard Rorty, Anti-Foundationalism, and the Possibility of an Alternative Epistemology" Adviser Milton Fisk

The University of Iowa
(40) (40) (11)

SOONOK CHOI, "A Critical Discussion of Bonjour's Coherence Theory of Empirical Knowledge" Adviser Evan Fales

GORDON KNIGHT, "Noema, Sense and Object in Husserl's Phenomenology" Adviser Guenter Zoeller

PATRICIA M MATTHEWS, "Kant on the System of the Mind A Resolution to the Doubling Problem of Taste in the Critique of Judgment" Adviser Guenter Zoeller

MICHELLE M ROTERT, "Thought Experiments and Philosophical Analysis. An Examination of the Method of Counterexample and the Legitimacy of Appeals to Pre-theoretical Institutions" Adviser Evan Fales

Johns Hopkins University
(41) (30) (9)

MAURO DORATO, "The Reality of the Future Spacetime Physics and the Objectivity of Temporal Becoming" Advisers Stephen Barker, Dennis Des Chene

PAUL C GENEST, "Socratic *Eros* and *Philia*" Advisers Richard Bett, Dennis Des Chene

LARRY D KRASNOFF, "Kant and the Possibility of Politics" Advisers J B Schneewind, Edward Minar

The University of Kansas
(59) (46) (18)

JOHN DUFFIELD, "The Divine Fire of Francis Bacon" Adviser Richard Cole.

WILLIAM THEODORE MEHL, "Virtue Ethics Exploring the Foundations of an Ethical Life" Adviser Richard De George

The University of Kentucky

(30) (30) (17)

- MITCHELL GABHART, "Freedom in Necessity The Moral Psychology of Spinoza's Rationalism" Advisers Daniel Frank, James Manns
 JOHN INGLIS, "Aquinas and the Historiography of Medieval Philosophy A Reevaluation" Advisers Daniel Frank, Daniel Breazeale
 ZHENMING ZHAI, "The Transition from Descriptive to Normative through Radical Choice in Communicative Argumentation" Adviser Ronald Bruzina

Loyola University of Chicago

(112) (91) (34)

- GEORGE TREY, "Solidarity and Difference The Politics of Enlightenment in the Aftermath of Modernity" Adviser David Ingram

Marquette University

(59) (43) (27)

- MYLENE BAUM, "Heteronomy as Condition for Freedom in Levinas' and Sartre's Ethics" Adviser Andrew F Tallon
 DIANE M CAPLIN, "Essentially Human Democracy in the Thought of Yves R Simon" Adviser Mary F Rousseau
 CHRIS E CURRY, "Reconnoitering the Role of Essence in Light of Esse The Existential Thesis of Phelan, Clarke, and Carlo" Adviser John D Jones Awarded in 1992
 DONNA HOGANS ENGELMANN, "The Right to Dissent Hannah Arendt's Defense of Civil Disobedience" Adviser Michael G Vater
 JANETTE M HODGE, "Martin Heidegger's Notion of Repetition and the Problem of Historical Meaning" Adviser John D Jones

The University of Massachusetts

(55) (45) (15)

- ANDREW G BLACK, "Occasionalism in the Malebranche-Arnauld Debate" Adviser Robert C Sleigh, Jr
 JOSE R SILVA DE CHOUDENS, "Preestablished Harmony and Corporeal Substance in Leibniz" Adviser Robert C Sleigh, Jr
 CHERYL LYNNE HUGHES, "Heidegger and Levinas The Problem of Ethics" Adviser Leonard H Ehrlich
 THEODORE R SIDER, "Naturalness, Intrinsicity, and Duplication" Adviser Phillip Bricker

The Massachusetts Institute of Technology

(30) (24) (11)

- TRACY ISAACS, "Actions and Events A Study in Ontology and Ethics" Adviser Judith Thompson

- DIANE L JESKE, "The Persistence and Importance of Persons " Adviser
David Brink
BRIAN ULICNY, "Issues in the Philosophical Foundations of Lexical Seman-
tics " Adviser James Higginbotham
CATHERINE WOMACK, "The Crucial Role of Proof A Classical Defense
Against Mathematical Empiricism " Adviser James Higginbotham

McGill University
(29) (29) (17)

- ASTRID VICAS, "The Nature of Fictional Discourse " Adviser J McGilvray

McMaster University
(45) (36) (16)

- CLAUDIO DE ALMEIDA, "Russell on Meaning and Denotation The Argument
of 'On Denoting' " Adviser N Griffin

The University of Miami
(35) (27) (10)

- VICTOR COSCULLUELA, "The Ethics of Suicide " Adviser Alan Goldman
MARC EDELSTEIN, "Moral Dilemma Resolution in Health Care " Adviser
Alan Goldman
ESTHER NEPOMECHIE, "Skepticism An Overview " Adviser Leonard
Carrier

The University of Michigan
(50) (50) (20)

Michigan State University
(56) (38) (26)

- LARRY S HAUSER, "Searle's Chinese Box The Chinese Room Argument and
Artificial Intelligence " Adviser Herbert E Hendry
MICHAEL W JANKOVIK, "Environmental Philosophy Pragmatic Recon-
struction " Adviser Richard T Peterson
BERNARD J MULVEY, "Sartre and Foucault on Knowledge and Practical
Commitment " Adviser Richard T Peterson
BRUCE K OMUNDSON, "Moral Pluralism, Nonsentient Nature, and Sustain-
able Ways of Life " Adviser Martin Benjamin

The University of Minnesota
(75) (75) (20)

- CARL BRANDT, "Ethics and Public Policy The Case of Affirmative Action
Programs " Adviser H E Mason

- JEREMY IGGERS, "Journalism, Ethics, and the Public Interest" Adviser
Douglas Lewis
CHARLES WALLIS, "A Computational Theory of Knowledge" Adviser
Ronald N. Giere

The University of Missouri at Columbia
(40) (32) (9)

- GEORGE MUMMERT, "The Altruism of Mysticism" Adviser John Kultgen
Awarded in 1992

Université de Montréal
(114) (52) (24)

- NORMAND BAILLARGEON, "L'art comme manifestation sociale autonomie
de l'art et engagement de l'artiste selon André Breton" Adviser Pierre
Gravel
MARIE-ANDRÉE CHARBONNEAU, "Epistémologie et psychanalyse chez le
premier Lacan" Advisers Yvon Gauthier and Claude Lévesque.
SPASS SPASSOV, "L'explication téléologique de la vie chez J. Monod et F.
Jacob" Advisers Venant Cauchy and Yvon Gauthier

The University of Nebraska
(32) (32) (10)

- MELANIE WRENN ARMSTRONG, "The Indispensability of Virtue Ethics: A
Study of the Relative Merits of Virtue Theories and Rule Theories with
Special Emphasis on Life Plans and Models for Behavior and Character" Adviser Robert Audi
YORAM LUBLING, "Persons and Experience: John Dewey's Philosophy of
the Self" Adviser Philip Hugly
NANCY ANN SLONNEGER, "Anomalous Monism and the Charge of Epiphe-
nomenalism: The Causal Responsibility of Mental Events" Adviser
Edward Becker

The University of New Mexico
(53) (42) (11)

New York University
(38) (6) (12)

- JOHN DANISI, "The Life of the Mind: William James and Contemporary Phi-
losophy" Adviser Robert Gurland

The State University of New York at Binghamton

(31) (30) (19)

The State University of New York at Buffalo

(52) (45) (18)

- RANJOO HERR, "Procedural Autonomy An Account of Autonomy Compatible with Contingency" Adviser C Korsmeyer
 SEUNG-CHONG LEE, "Wittgenstein's Attitude Toward Contradiction" Adviser N Garver
 THERESA MCGARRITY, "Ethical Skepticism and the Decision to be Moral" Adviser R Hull
 HYURYUN PARK, "Aesthetic Supervenience in the Ontology of Art" Adviser C Korsmeyer

The State University of New York at Stony Brook

(53) (42) (25)

- DAVID ABRAM, "Inconceivable Earth Language and the Ecology of Sensory Experience" Adviser Edward S Casey
 THOMAS P BROCKELMAN, "Re-reading Modernity through Modernism A Psychoanalytic and Semiotic Interpretation of Modern Art and Architecture" Advisers Edward S Casey, Hugh J Silverman Awarded in 1992
 JEFFREY JAY GAINES, "The Habitual Body-Subject A Study in Descartes and the Biron-Bergson-Merleau-Ponty Lineage" Adviser Edward S Casey Awarded in 1992
 ANTHONY JOSEPH STEINBOCK, "Homeworld/Alienworld Towards a Generative Phenomenology" Adviser Donn Welton
 MARK BASIL TANZER, "Ethics and Human Purpose Toward a Heideggerian Ethics" Adviser David B Allison Awarded in 1992
 THOMAS R THORP, "Politology" Adviser Dick Howard

Northwestern University

(40) (40) (15)

- PABLO DE GRIEFF, "Temporal Aspects of the Representation of the Moral Point of View" Adviser Thomas McCarthy
 LEE MARC HORVITZ, "Substance Metaphysics and Theories of the Moral Agent Heidegger and Foucault on Ethics" Adviser David M Levin Awarded in 1992
 CATHERINE A LUDLUM, "Plato's Account of Friendship" Adviser Kenneth Seeskin
 RICHARD NEAL MANNING, "The Resurrection of Coherence A Critical Analysis of Contemporary Coherentist Epistemology" Adviser Arthur Fine Awarded in 1992

The University of Notre Dame

(70) (70) (35)

- JON T BEANE, "The Development of the Notion of Concupiscence in St Augustine" Adviser Frederick Crosson

- ROBIN A COLLINS, "Epistemological Issues in the Realism/Antirealism Debate An Analysis and a Proposal" Adviser Alvin Plantinga
 WILLIAM C DAVIS, "Thomas Reid on Moral Epistemology and the Moral Sense" Adviser C F Delaney
 SUSANNE E HILL, "The Role of *Theoria* in *Eudaimonia* in the Aristotelian Corpus" Adviser Alasdair MacIntyre
 STEVEN J JENSEN, "Intrinsically Evil Acts According to St Thomas Aquinas" Adviser Ralph McInerney

The University of Oregon
 (37) (21) (10)

- DOUGLAS GROOTHUIS, "To Prove or Not to Prove Pascal on Natural Theology" Adviser Robert T Herbert
 LEILANI ANNE ROBERTS, "The Ontology of Privacy" Adviser Cheyney Ryan

The University of Pennsylvania
 (37) (37) (10)

- R LANIER ANDERSON, "The Influence of Perspective An Interpretation and Defense of Nietzsche's Epistemology" Adviser Alexander Nehamas
 CURTIS A BOWMAN, "Kant, Jacobi, and the Transition to Post-Kantian Idealism" Adviser Paul Guyer
 MARK L KOONTZ, "Schopenhauer's Critique of Kant's Foundation for Morals" Adviser Paul Guyer
 FREDERICK J RAUSCHER, "Kant's Other Metaphysics Transcendental Idealism and the Metaphysics of Morality" Adviser Paul Guyer
 MARK R TALBOT, "Hume and the Problem of Empirical Knowledge A Study of Hume's Epistemology Concerning Matters of Fact" Adviser James F Ross

The Pennsylvania State University
 (42) (30) (17)

- JIAYING CHEN, "Name, Meaning and Meaningfulness" Adviser Alphonso F Lingis
 DUANE H DAVIS, "The Development of Subjectivity and the Communion of Language From Merleau-Ponty to Schrag" Adviser Joseph J Kockelmans
 BRIGITTE SASSEN, "On the Nature and Scope of Creativity A Kantian Approach" Adviser: Joseph J Kockelmans

The University of Pittsburgh
 (61) (55) (22)

- ANNA GRECO, "Cognitive Instability, Unpersuadability of the Knower, and the Deceptiveness of the World A Study in Plato's Epistemology" Adviser John McDowell

- ALEC WALEN, "A Kantian Criticism of Consequentialism " Adviser David Gauthier
- IAKOVOS VASILIOU, "Misperceptions of Aristotle His Alleged Responses to the Skeptic " Adviser Jennifer Whiting
- AMY MORGAN SCHMITTER, "Descartes' Representation of the Self " Adviser Annette Baier
- MITCHELL GREEN, "Illocations and Attitudes " Adviser Nuel Belnap
- IRAD KIMHI, "Causation and Non-Reductionism " Adviser Robert Brandom
- CHRISTOPHER HITCHCOCK, "Probabilistic Causation in Scientific Explanation " Adviser Wesley C Salmon
- BENNETT W HELM, "Significance, Emotions and Objectivity Some Limits of Animal Thought " Adviser John Haugeland
- CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS, "Reason, Persons and Artworks " Adviser Annette Baier
- DAVID BOONIN VAIL, "Motions of the Mind Thomas Hobbes and the Science of Moral Virtue " Adviser David Gauthier

Princeton University

(35) (35) (20)

- FRANK E DORING, "An Epistemic Theory of Conditionals " Adviser Gilbert Harman
- IAN GOLD, "Color and Other Illusions A Philosophical Theory of Vision " Adviser Gilbert Harman
- ALAN HAJEK, "The Conditional Construal of Conditional Probability " Adviser Bas van Fraassen
- JOHN W KONKLE, "Aristotle and John Philoponus on Beginningless Change " Adviser Michael Frede
- MARK VAN ROOJEN, "Ethical Relativism and Ethical Reasons " Adviser Gilbert Harman

Purdue University

(49) (29) (20)

- ERIN McKENNA, "Revising Models of Utopia in Light of Feminist and Pragmatist Perspectives " Adviser Charlene Haddock Seigfried
- ANN LISBETH PIRRUCCELLO, "Beauty and the Eyes of Perfection A Study in the Thought of Simone Weil " Adviser Don Mitchell
- ROBERTO SALINAS, "The Naturalness of Naturalism Essays in Realism and Meta-Epistemology " Adviser Rod Bertolet
- ELIZABETH WAKEMAN, "Autonomy, Second-Order States, and Critical Reflection " Adviser Lilly-Marlene Russow

Queens University

(44) (40) (18)

- GERRARD H HATHERLEY, "Friedrich Nietzsche and the End of Morality " Adviser Michael A. Fox

JUSTINE J NOEL, "Hume's Science of Aesthetics Human Nature and the Century of Criticism " Adviser Albert P Fell

ELIZABETH RUCKI, "Disrupting Humor A Critical Study of Philosophical Theories of Humor " Adviser Carlos G Prado

Rice University

(19) (19) (10)

DRAGANA BOZIN, "Alternative Scales for Extensive Measurement Combining Operations and Conventionalism " Adviser Richard E Grandy

KEVIN W WILDES, "The View From Somewhere Moral Judgment in Bioethics " Adviser Baruch A Brody

The University of Rochester

(30) (30) (12)

JEELOO LIU, "On Individualism as a Theory of Content " Adviser Richard Feldman

DOROTHY MCKENZIE, "Toward a Theory of Basic Judgment " Adviser Richard Feldman

Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey

(55) (46) (25)

GARY GATES, "The Semantics of Belief Fundamental Problems with the Representational Model of Thought " Adviser Jerry Fodor Awarded in 1992

Saint Louis University

(40) (25) (18)

ELLEN M REHG, "Paul Ricoeur and the Reconstruction of the Human Person in the Philosophy of Reflection " Adviser John F Kavanaugh

Southern Illinois University at Carbondale

(48) (48) (14)

KATSUHITO AOKI, "Topological Twist in the Heart " Adviser Garth Gillan
DARRELL LEE JOHNSON, "Kantian-Consequentialism " Adviser Mark Johnson

YANG-JIN NOH, "Relativism Without Confrontation Putnam, Rorty, and Beyond " Adviser Mark Johnson

RALF SOMMERMEIER, "John Dewey's Theory of Communication and Its Implications for Democratic Change " Adviser Elizabeth R Eames

Stanford University
(44) (44) (18)

- TAYLOR CARMAN, "Heidegger on Meaning and Practice " Adviser Eckart Forster
HASOK CHANG, "Measurement and the Fragmentation of Quantum Physics " Adviser Pat Suppes
LISA HALL, "Individualism, Mental Content, and Cognitive Science " Adviser John Perry
PAUL KJELLBERG, "Zhuangzi and Skepticism " Adviser P J Ivanhoe
SUSAN LEVIN, "Words' Semantic Constitution as a Guide to Reality The Cratylus Reconsidered " Adviser Julius Moravcsik
XIAORONG LI, "On the Applicability of Rawls's Theory of Justice " Adviser Debra Satz
PATTI NOGALES OZDEMIR, "A Philosophical Examination of Metaphor " Adviser John Perry
MICHAEL O'ROURKE, "Reference and Intention " Adviser John Perry

Syracuse University
(49) (45) (20)

- PHILLIP NEAL GOGGANS, "The Ontological Question " Adviser Peter van Inwagen
DANIEL THOMAS HOWARD-SNYDER, "Does Evil Render Atheism Rational?" Adviser William P Alston
ERIC T OLSTON, "Human Persons, Human Organisms Why Psychology is not Relevant to Personal Identity " Adviser Peter van Inwagen
DANIEL D RIEGER, "Religious Truth-Claims and the Diversity of Religious Traditions " Adviser William P Alston
LAURA E WEED, "The Structure of Thinking " Adviser Stewart Thau

Temple University
(60) (49) (14)

- YOUNG SOOK LEE, "An Inquiry into the Concept of Nature " Adviser Jitendra Mohanty
SUSAN ROBBINS, "The Kingdom of Ends " Adviser John E Atwell
CHRISTINA D SCHUES, "Changes of Perception " Adviser Jitendra Mohanty

The University of Tennessee
(74) (52) (15)

The University of Texas at Austin
(99) (96) (28)

- STEVE BEST, "Politics of Historical Vision Marx, Foucault and Habermas " Adviser Douglas Kellner
STEVE HILTZ, "Concerning Thought, Truth, and Realism " Adviser Ed Allaire

- JEFF LEON, "Political Philosophy, Metaphysics, and Philosophical Systems" Adviser Douglas Browning
 MARK LEON, "Towards a Truth Theory for the News" Adviser Douglas Kellner
 RANDY MAYES, "Toward a Cognitive Theory of Explanation" Advisers Nicholas Asher and Robert Causey
 MATTHEW MCCOY, "The *Aitia* of Generation and Destruction in Plato's *Phaedo*" Adviser James Hankinson
 MARYANN SPURGIN, "The Ontological Quarrel Between Plato and the Poets" Adviser Louis Mackey

The University of Toronto
 (144) (141) (72)

- DEBORAH JEAN BROWN, "'Swampman of la Mancha' and other Tales about Meaning" Adviser R B deSousa
 SUSAN LESLIE CAMPBELL, "Expression and the Individuation of Felling" Adviser R B deSousa
 MICHAEL JOHN LATZER, "Leibniz's Doctrine of Evil" Adviser E J Kremer
 HUGH EDMUND MILLER, "Proving God and Proving Man The Idea of God in Hegel and Levinas" Adviser Graeme A Nicholson
 ROBERT DONALD MURRAY, "The Explanation of Human Action A Critical Analysis of Davidson's Theory of Action" Adviser B D Katz
 ABRAHAM SCHOENER, "Heracitus on War" Adviser B Inwood
 PETER GEORGE TRNKA, "The Politics of Epistemology" Adviser F Cunningham
 IAN LESLIE WILKS, "The Logic of Abelard's *Dialectica*" Adviser C Normore
 PHILIP MARK WRIGHT, "Beyond the Bounds of Sense The Rational System in Kant's Three Critiques" Adviser G Nagel

Tulane University
 (39) (39) (11)

- JEFFREY BELL, "The Problem of Difference Phenomenology and Poststructuralism" Adviser John D Glenn, Jr

The University of Utah
 (48) (24) (16)

Vanderbilt University
 (56) (48) (15)

- JEFFREY ALLEN MITCHELL, "Reasons's Different Tastes Nietzsche, Dewey and the Affective Component in Valuation" Adviser John Lachs
 JULIET T RUMBLE, "Entangled Freedom Self-Recognition and the Captivity of the Will in Kierkegaard's Thought" Adviser Charles E Scott

The University of Virginia
(33) (28) (12)

- EDWARD JAMES WEBER BLATNICK, "The Refutation of Anti-Realism " Adviser Richard Rorty
JAMES ANTHONY DOYLE, "Freedom, Altruism and the State A Rousseauian Conception of Politics " Adviser A John Simmons
DOUGLAS MARTIN DRABKIN, "Perfect Goodness Imperfectly Known " Adviser James Cargile.
MICHAEL STUART MCKENNA, "Responsibility Without Free Will A Cognitivist's Approach " Adviser George B Thomas
ALBERT JEROME PIACENTE, "The Naturalization of Philosophy A Critical Examination of the Philosophy of Hilary Putnam " Adviser Richard Rorty

Washington University
(34) (24) (18)

- KIMBERLY MARICIC, "An Analysis of Probability Interpretations for the Physical Sciences " Adviser Robert Barrett
JOHN MICHAEL PALMER, "Against Mystery Naturalism and Behaviorism in the Philosophy of W V Quine " Adviser Robert Barrett

The University of Washington
(42) (37) (12)

- PAUL OPPERMAN, "Aristotle's Theory of Perception Physiology and Psychology " Adviser S Marc Cohen

The University of Waterloo
(39) (29) (17)

- ANDRE BLOM, "In Defense of Euthanasia The Epicurean View of Death " Adviser Jan Narveson
NIRMALYA CHAKRABORTY, "An Inquiry into Meaning In the Light of W V Quine and D Davidson " Adviser James Van Evra
PHILIP DAVID CROWELL, "Tillich and Gadamer on Relativism The Hermeneutics of Play and the Double Perspective " Advisers Richard Holmes, James R Horne

Wayne State University
(26) (25) (11)

- DAVID J MCGRAW, "In Defense of Realism " Adviser Lawrence Powers
HARUN RASHID, "Critical Thinking, Reasoning, and Logic " Adviser Richard B Angell.

The University of Western Ontario
(60) (54) (23)

- ROBERT B BUTCHER, "Moral Dilemmas and Virtues " Adviser Robert W Binkley Awarded in 1992
- PATRICIA EASTON, "The Myth of Cartesian Rationalism An Examination of Experience in Le Grand, Desgabets, and Regis " Adviser Thomas M Lennon
- THOMAS HEYD, "A Reassment of Locke's Theory of Cognition of the External World " Adviser Thomas M Lennon
- MARIN MARINOV, "Critical Examination of Connectionist Cognitive Architectures " Adviser William G Demopoulos Awarded in 1992
- ANGELA SCHNEIDER, "Drugs in Sport, the Straight Dope A Philosophical Analysis of the Justification of Banning Performance-Enhancing Substances and Practices in the Olympic Games " Adviser Robert W Binkley

The University of Wisconsin
(120) (50) (21)

- CHRISTINE CUOMO, "Ecological Feminism as Environmental Ethic " Adviser Claudia Card
- MICHAEL MCFALL, "The Natural Selection of Morality Ethics from the Darwinian Point of View " Adviser Marcus Singer

Yale University
(32) (27) (14)

- SCOTT DAVIDSON, "Mortality, Fear, and Ignorance The Political Implications of the Limits of Human Knowledge and Power in Hobbes's Portrait of the Self " Adviser John Smith
- LEWIS GORDON, "Bad Faith and Antiracist Racism A Study in the Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre " Adviser Maurice Natanson
- NOBUO KAZASHI, "Four Variations on the Phenomenological Theme of 'Horizon' James, Nishida, Merleau-Ponty, and Schutz " Adviser Maurice Natanson
- ERIC L KRAKAUER, "The Disposition of the Subject Adorno's Dialectic of Technology " Adviser John E Smith
- SONJA SULLIVAN, "Mental State Content and the Ontological Autonomy of Psychology " Adviser Ivan Fox
- JORGE M VALADEZ, "A Metastructure for Analyzing Ontological Frameworks " Adviser Ivan Fox
- CHRISTOPHER WAHREN, "Speaker-Occasion Meaning and Commitment " Adviser Carol Rovane
- ROBERT WESTLEY, "Fourteenth Amendment Jurisprudence Race and the Rights of Groups " Adviser Georgia Warnke

York University
(60) (52) (32)

- AVSHALOM ADAM, "Towards a Critical Historiography of Philosophy " Adviser Ian C Jarvie

CARLOS JACQUES, "Reflections on Knowledge, Reason and Power" Adviser Lorraine Code

RICHARD REINER, "A Framework for Theories of Bounded Rationality" Adviser Joseph Agassi

DOREEN SILVER, "In Support of the Foundational Importance of 'An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision' in the Philosophy of George Berkeley" Adviser Stanley Tweyman

TAYLOR WILSON, "F H Bradley's Principles of Logic" Adviser Don MacNiven

VISITING PROFESSORS FROM ABROAD, 1993–1994

Heiner Bielefeldt University of Heidelberg	The University of Toronto Fall 1993–Spring 1994
Myles Burnyeat Robinson College	Princeton University January 1994–May 1994
Ruth Chang Oxford University	The University of California at Los Angeles Fall 1993–Spring 1994
Paul Cruysberghs Catholic University of Leuven	Duquesne University Spring 1994
Rom Harré Oxford University	State University of New York at Binghamton August 1993–September 1993
Bernard Harrison University of Sussex	The University of Utah September 1993–December 1993
Rolf Peter Horstmann Ludwig Maximilians Universität, Munich	The University of Pennsylvania September 1993–December 1993
Koichi Kasamatsu Nihon University	The University of Toronto Fall 1993–Spring 1994
Richard Kearney University College Dublin	Boston College Spring 1994
Mark Leon University of Witwatersrand	Brown University August 1993–January 1994
Li Linan Hunan Normal University, China	Southern Illinois University at Carbondale August 1993–December 1993
Raymond Monk Southampton University	York University January 1994–May 1994
Karne Neander Australian National University	Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey September 1992–June 1993
Derek Parfit Oxford University	Harvard University Fall 1993
Itamar Pitowsky Hebrew University of Jerusalem	The University of Western Ontario Fall 1993

Alexander Razin Moscow State University	The State University of New York at Buffalo January 1994–June 1994
Francois Recanati Ecole Polytechnique	The University of California at Berkeley Fall 1993
José Antonio Robles Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México	The University of New Mexico September 1993
Svetozar Stojanovic University of Belgrade	The University of Kansas Fall 1993
Andrzej Szahaj Nicolaus Copernicus University, Poland	The University of Virginia September 1993–June 1994
Johan van Benthem Reeksuniversitet, Holland	Stanford University April 1994–June 1994
Jan Max van Ophuijsen University of Leiden	The Catholic University of America Fall 1993–Spring 1994
Zbigniew Zwolinski Warsaw University	The University of Notre Dame Fall 1993–Spring 1994

NORTH AMERICAN PROFESSORS ABROAD, 1993–1994

Nicholas Asher The University of Texas at Austin	Paul Sabatier University Fall 1993–Spring 1994
Luc Bovens The University of Colorado	Hebrew University of Jerusalem Fall 1993–Spring 1994
David S. Clarke, Jr. Southern Illinois University at Carbondale	Southern Illinois University Nakajo, Japan June 1993–December 1993
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ANNOUNCEMENTS

The Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology announces a call for papers for its eighty-sixth annual meetings to take place March 31–April 2, 1994, in Atlanta, Georgia. Submissions in any area of philosophy of not more than 10 pages in length are welcome. Submission forms are available from Robert Burton, Department of Philosophy, University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia 30602, telephone 706-542-2823. In addition, Ph.D. candidates and those who have received their Ph.D. within the last five years are eligible to compete for the Richard M. Griffith Memorial Award. A cash prize of \$300 and a plaque will be awarded for the best philosophical paper. For membership applications, more information about the Griffith Award, or general information about the 1994 conference contact Dorothy Coleman, Department of Philosophy, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia 23187, telephone 804-221-2728.

The Department of Philosophy at the University of Dayton announces a call for papers for The Twenty-first Annual Richard R. Baker Philosophy Colloquium, on "Augustine on Human Goodness," which will take place on April 8–9, 1994, at the University of Dayton. The Colloquium will focus on the theme of human goodness in Augustine's metaphysical, ethical, and political philosophy from 386 A.D. through 395 A.D., but also welcomes papers related to the theme of human goodness found in Augustine's later works, including his theological writings. Papers should have a reading length of about 35 minutes and should be submitted in duplicate with a one-page abstract to Raymond Herbenick or Patricia Johnson, Department of Philosophy, Jesse Philips Humanities Center, University of Dayton, Dayton, Ohio 45469-1546, telephone 513-229-2933.

The North American Kant Society and Memphis State University announce a call for papers for the Eighth International Kant Congress, to be held March 1–5, 1995, in Memphis, Tennessee. Both invited and submitted presentations will be included. Contributions about any aspect of Kant's philosophy, and especially concerning the essay *Zum Ewigen Frieden*, are welcome. In addition, reports on the status of Kant studies in areas outside Western Europe and North America are being solicited. Submitted contributions may be English, French, or German, the deadline is March 1, 1994. Detailed paper submission specifications are available from the Organizing Committee, Eighth International Kant Congress, Department of Philosophy, Memphis State University, Memphis, Tennessee 38152.

The Department of Philosophy at the University of Western Ontario announces a call for papers for "Logic and the Workings of the Mind: Ramus to Kant," a conference to be held at the University of Western Ontario in June 1995. The theme of the conference will be the relation between logic, epistemology, and "faculty psychology" in early modern philosophy. Papers are being solicited on topics exploring the influence of early modern logic on

early modern philosophy, or early modern "faculty philosophy" on early modern logic. Papers should be focused primarily on the content of early modern logic text books. The deadline for submissions is September 1, 1994. For additional information contact Thomas M. Lennon, Early Modern Logic Project, Department of Philosophy, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada N6A 3K7.

The University of Virginia announces a conference to be held October 10-11, 1993, at the University of Virginia, "Jerusalem and Athens Revisited: Leo Strauss and Judaism." Speakers will include Hillel Fradkin, Kenneth Seeskin, Allan Arkush, Gillian Rose, Werner Dannhauser, and David Novak. For more information contact David Cox, Department of Classics, New Cabell Hall, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia 22903, telephone 804-924-3008.

University College London announces the first of a regular series of Keeling Colloquia on Ancient Philosophy. The first conference will be held on February 16-18, 1994, and will consider Aristotle's moral philosophy in connection with recent work on moral realism. The principal speakers will be Bernard Williams, John McDowell, Pierre Aubenque, Sabina Lovibond, Jonathan Lear, and David Charles. Commentators will be David Wiggins, Rosalind Hursthouse, and Troels Engberg-Pedersen. Papers from the colloquium will be published by the University College London Press. Information may be obtained from Robert Heinaman, Department of Philosophy, University College London, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT, England.

The School of Philosophy at the Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C., announces its fall 1993 lecture series, "Plato and Platonism." Lectures are held each Friday, September 3 to December 10. The speakers are, in chronological order, Kenneth Dorter (University of Guelph), Stanley Rosen (The Pennsylvania State University), Jan Max Van Ophuijsen (Leiden University), Reginald Allen (Northwestern University), Dominic O'Meara (Fribourg University), Ronna Burger (Tulane University), Daryl Tress (Trinity College), John Rist (University of Toronto), Fred Miller (Bowling Green State University), Anne Wiles (James Madison University), Mitchell Miller (Vassar College), Kurt Pritzl (The Catholic University of America), Charles Griswold (Boston University), Thérèse-Anne Druart (The Catholic University of America). For additional information contact the School of Philosophy, The Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C. 20064, telephone 202-319-5259.

The Center for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Notre Dame announces five fellowships for the 1994-95 academic year. The Distinguished Scholar Fellowship (one available) offers a stipend of up to \$30,000 and is intended to provide time for reflection and writing to those whose work is in the forefront of current research in the philosophy of religion and Christian philosophy. The Postdoctoral Fellowship (two available) provides a stipend of \$25,000 and is offered to those whose tenure at the Center would allow them to make progress in theistic philosophy and to disseminate and expand this work through teaching and writing. A Visiting Graduate Fellowship (one available) provides a \$9,000 stipend to a philosophy graduate stu-

dent at another institution who is working on a dissertation in philosophy of religion or Christian philosophy and who would profit from a year at the Center. The Extraordinary Fellowship (one available) offers a \$25,000 stipend to a scholar who may not qualify for one of the above scholarships, but who would benefit from a year at the Center. This is open to foreign scholars and those outside of philosophy (for example, humanists from other fields, theologians, and so on). Distinguished Scholars and Postdoctoral Fellows will ordinarily be asked to teach one class each semester. Fellows will have access to many of the university's facilities, to the activities of the philosophy department, and to the special activities of the Center (for example, its weekly colloquia). Those with sabbatical support are welcome to apply. Applicants should see that the Center receives each of the following: (1) a complete curriculum vitae (or transcript, for graduate student applicants), which should include a list of publications and names of three people you will ask to send letters of recommendation on your behalf, (2) three letters of recommendation, (3) a statement of no more than three double-spaced pages stating the fellowship for which you are applying and the project on which you would like to work while at the Center, (4) one published or unpublished paper. All material should be sent to Alvin Plantinga, Director, Center for Philosophy of Religion, 330 Decio Hall, P O Box 1068, Notre Dame, Indiana 46556. The deadline for Distinguished Scholar and Extraordinary Fellowship applications for 1994-95 is December 1, 1993, for all other fellowships, April 1, 1994.

The *Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik* announces that it will publish its first issue in the latter half of 1993. The *Jahrbuch* will be distributed on a worldwide basis and is intended to provide an international forum of interaction between philosophers and legal scholars on ethical and jurisprudential issues of current relevance. Contributors are invited to submit articles or book reviews for future volumes in German or English to *Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik*, Institut für Strafrecht und Rechtsphilosophie, Kath.-Kirchenplatz 9, 8520 Erlangen, Germany. Two copies of the manuscript must be submitted, one of which should not contain the author's name.

The Department of Philosophy, University of California, Riverside is pleased to announce that Howard Wettstein has assumed the position of chair of the department, and that Georgia Warnke has been appointed Professor effective July 1, 1991. Paul Hoffman has been appointed Assistant Professor effective July 1, 1992.

Nicholas Rescher, University Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh, has recently been awarded two honorary degrees in recognition of his contributions to philosophy. One is the *Doctor honoris causa* from the National Autonomous University of Córdoba, Argentina, the other is a Doctor of Humane Letters from Lehigh University, where he served on the faculty for some years in the 1950s.

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
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
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ARTICLES

LOGICAL IMPLICATION AND THE AMBIGUITY OF EXTENSIONAL LOGIC

EDWARD POLS

I

COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY RESPONSES to the twentieth-century revolution in logic have usually started from the assumption that there is in fact a body of theory for which the name 'extensional logic' is appropriate. Debate has centered not on that assumption but rather on such questions as whether that logic includes every important feature that belongs in a proper logic and whether it excludes all features that should be excluded from that ordered realm. Revisionist logicians have usually supposed that extensional logic, for all its power and versatility, does not express the tight bond between meanings that is of the very essence of the logical connection, and they have labored to provide an alternative intensional logic that does indeed express it.¹

The main target of their criticism was what used to be called material implication, and the gravamen of their charge was that the connection between two propositions one of which logically implies

¹ Two earlier drafts of this paper, one dating from the spring of 1992, the other from February 1993, were circulated for comments. Although the argument has remained essentially the same through the three versions, the version now published has been much clarified by my efforts to respond adequately to the perceptive comments I received. I am especially grateful to David Braybrooke, William Craig, Henry W. Johnstone, Christopher B. Kulp, John F. Post, Scott Sehon, and Theodore A. Young for their incisive and, in some cases, extensive comments. This paper, if it is read by many who have spent their careers working in extensional logic, may be rejected summarily; it may offend some intensional pieties as well. It is therefore important to add that I do not mean to lend authority to my heretical thesis by suggesting that I have convinced any of these generous colleagues that it is sound. In general, however, their comments confirmed my belief that the thesis is worthy of being put to the test of publication.

the other cannot be established merely by virtue of the falsity of the antecedent proposition or the truth of the consequent one.² That momentous connection may properly be said to exist, they claimed, only if it is a genuine entailment (G. E. Moore), only if it is an implication that deserves to be called strict or rigorous (C. I. Lewis's strict implication, Ackermann's *strenge Implikation*); only if the antecedent is genuinely relevant to the conclusion (Anderson and Belnap). One early consequence of that dispute was the invention of modern modal logic—logic modal in the sense that it deals with the logical connections between propositions to which, as single propositions, some modal force is ascribed. In this paper I am not concerned with logic that is modal in that sense but with the more restricted sense of modality that is essential to any intensional logic: that in which the meanings of two propositions are so related that the truth of one necessitates the truth of the other.

The dispute about intension and extension has never had a satisfactory philosophical resolution. It is doubtful that philosophers would have tolerated such a situation for so long if the disputed features of extensional logic had any very practical consequences, but they do not. The paradoxes of material implication, for instance, can lead to no practical harm. The same sublime logician's gesture that decrees that ' $p \supset q$ ' shall be made true by the falsity of ' p ' prevents us from using the formula ' $\sim p \supset (p \supset q)$ ' in the detachment of ' q '. The teaching of logic is therefore still based on the assumption I began with: there is indeed a logic that we may call, without reservation, extensional; its anomalies must be accepted, for they come from its extensional design, and that extensional design is the source of its power. Textbooks generally begin by laying out the main lines of the propositional calculus understood as an unambiguously extensional system. The chief methodological difference from the days of *Principia Mathematica* (*PM*) is the use of some version of natural deduction instead of *PM*'s axiomatic method.

Modern textbooks usually make one important concession to those who do not believe that extensional logic is really logic. They concede that there is something philosophically offensive about the notion of material *implication*, and in place of that notion they offer

² I use the term 'proposition' rather than 'statement' or 'sentence' not to make a tendentious point but because 'proposition' is used in *Principia Mathematica*.

what they take to be a more noncommittal one, 'the conditional' The formula ' $p \supset q$ ', they say, is to be understood as expressing not just logical implication but certain other connections as well—causal connection, for instance. The conditional, represented by ' $\supset$ ' or some alternative symbol, expresses a certain minimal sense all such connections have in common That is plausible enough if we attend only to the row of a truth table in which it is laid down that the conditional is false if its antecedent is true and its consequent false. It seems no help at all in the case where the conditional is made true by the falsity of its antecedent or the truth of its consequent, for although that too is part of the minimal sense of the conditional as represented by ' $\supset$ ', it is not part of the sense of implication.

In this essay I call intensional implication *logical implication*, and I examine its meaning with two purposes in mind. My first purpose is to challenge the assumption that *PM*-type calculi are in fact and without reservation extensional systems I argue instead that logical implication in the very strictest sense pervades everything that is important in such calculi. They are, of course, designed to be extensional, and their symbolic connectives are accordingly given extensional definitions, but in practice the assertion of such formulas as ' $p \supset q$ ' and ' $\sim p \vee q$ ' in arguments and rules—and thus the assumption of their truth—overrides, or puts out of play, that extensional design. So-called extensional logic is intensional in all its most vital parts. To put the matter in terms of the metalanguage–object-language distinction, a feature of the metalanguage—logical implication—that was not meant to characterize the connectives of the object language has in fact insinuated itself into the object language at that language's most important points. If that should be true, there is a profound ambiguity at the heart of logic of that kind, for the paradoxes and certain related oddities are not put out of play, and what they express is indeed extensional.

In the argument that follows, I locate this ambiguity in the two distinct senses given such expressions as ' $p \supset q$ ' and ' $\sim p \vee q$ ' in *PM*-type calculi: on the one hand, the sense that appears whenever such expressions are assumed to be true, either in the course of arguments or in rules—the sense that leads, for instance, to conditional proofs whose consequents could, in principle, be detached without contradiction—on the other hand, the sense that appears in the principle of addition, the paradoxes, and the related principle that any proposition follows from a contradiction. If my conjecture

proves to be well founded, all arguments of the former kind in so-called extensional logic are not legitimate in some diminished extensional sense but in the fully intensional sense of logical implication itself. They are indeed entailments; they are indeed instances of a strict, or rigorous, logical necessity that operates between meanings, finally, they are indeed instances of the relevance of one proposition to another³

My argument about the ambiguity of extensional logic depends upon the achievement of my second purpose, which is to elicit the basis of an intensional propositional calculus from a rigorous attention to the meaning of expressions by virtue of which a logical implication is asserted to exist. These expressions may be propositions in natural language in which the phrase 'logically implies' or some equivalent appears, but they may also be formulas in which propositional variables replace propositions and in which the existence of the relation of logical implication is explicitly asserted by virtue of a symbol designed to do just that. The two cases—natural language propositions joined by 'if-then', 'logically implies', 'entails', and the like, and propositional variables joined by an intensional symbolic connective—need differ less than is generally supposed. Given a controlling symbolic connective that expresses logical implication precisely, we can develop an intensional calculus merely by attending to the *meaning* of logical implication and eliciting consequences from that meaning. This procedure gives us all we need for the restricted sense of modality mentioned above and all we need for relevance between propositional variables, which is rightly regarded as essential to the existence of the intensional relation of logical implication. The consequences thus elicited provide both a demonstration of the intrusion of logical implication itself into extensional

³ I owe a good deal to C. I. Lewis's distinction between the intensional and the extensional disjunction in his early article "Implication and the Algebra of Logic" (*Mind* 21, no. 84 (1912) 522–31), in which the theoretical justification for his later systems of strict implication is succinctly given. Lewis associates the extensional disjunction with the material implication of the "algebra of logic"—in effect, with *PM*-type calculi—and the intensional disjunction with inferential or strict implication. He does not argue, as I do here, that *PM*-type calculi are ambiguous. Lewis's article is reprinted in *Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis*, ed. John D. Goheen and John L. Mothershead (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), 351–9. It was in that collection that I encountered the article for the first time, but only in the eighties—far too late to read a brilliant and original piece by the best of my graduate school teachers.

calculus and the basis for an alternative calculus that is openly intensional.

II

The investigation of the meaning of logical implication relies on our capacity to see at least some of the logical implications of the propositions, concepts, or notions we encounter and on our related capacity to recognize when a supposed logical truth is indeed what it purports to be. There is nothing in the least unusual about proceeding in this way. Like the founders of symbolic logic, we are in what Sheffer called the logocentric predicament. To acknowledge the predicament, to resolve not to try to lift ourselves out of it, is to put ourselves in a position to make constructive use of it. The logocentric predicament is concrete and complex: we ourselves who do logic are both in it and part of it.

In what follows I use a connective, ' $\supset$ ', that is half symbol, half mnemonic, to represent logical implication. Although I consider certain propositions that could play a role in a formal propositional calculus based on intensional principles, I do not intend to develop a formal calculus here. I explore instead the *meaning* of logical implication, and of certain related logical notions, by way of what is in effect an informal protocalculus. Logical implication does not occur only in formal systems, indeed, it is inherently systematic only in the sense that the world itself is a system in which logical implication manifests itself wherever there are ontological necessitations that give rise to propositional necessitations. But it would be unwise to suppose that the world is a system in anything like the sense in which, say, *PM* is a system. So at the outset I shall merely be looking for ways in which logical implication displays itself in certain basic relations between propositions. From this procedure rules of inference can be elicited, and these can be codified and imparted in due course to a formal propositional calculus—one bound to proceed by these rules alone. Alternate rules can always be found, but only if elicited in the same way—elicited from nothing but our understanding of logical implication itself.

It has been traditional to suppose that logical implication manifests itself most clearly when we are dealing not with two propositional variables but with two propositions of known content. In that case, it has been supposed, we are dealing with the meanings of the two propositions, and so the connection is clearly intensional. Thus, in the example

- (a) 'Chicago is about 800 miles west of Boston' LI> 'The sun sets earlier in Boston than in Chicago'

the meaning of the first proposition clearly necessitates the meaning of the second, and the truth of the first proposition accordingly necessitates the truth of the second. We are dealing with the meaning of English words as they are now used in a commonsense setting, and it is a contingent fact that those words are used in one way rather than another. But we are not dealing with a mere linguistic convention, for the two propositions express a single concrete situation, each making salient, or calling attention to, a different aspect of it. As for the concrete situation, it is pervaded by necessities: the difference in position, here expressed in terms of east and west, is also a difference in relation to the sun. Though it is physical, it is by no means only physical, for the way English is in fact used is also a concrete matter and so part of the total situation—part indeed of the temporal nature of concreteness, for language itself changes slowly, in response to many concrete factors and seldom in response to a deliberate change in convention. The same point could have been made with the familiar example

- (b) 'John is a bachelor' LI> 'John is not married'

for in that case too there is a concrete ground for the logical implication: John's life as it is and the way English refers to a certain feature of it. Notice that I have deliberately chosen two examples that manifest what I call one-way logical implication⁴. They can be easily turned into two-way implications: the second, for instance, becomes a two-way logical implication if we change 'is not married' to 'has never married'.

To see that certain other examples are instances of logical implication we must supplement our grasp of a commonsense setting and commonsense language with at least a modest grasp of a body of theory that enframes the example. The antecedents of the following examples make informal allusion to such bodies of theory.

- (c) 'Newton's four laws are approximately true' LI> 'A large lead sphere, placed close to one of two equal weights on a sensitive balance, will deflect the balance'.

⁴ I avoid the term 'biconditional' because of its long association with extensional logic.

- (d) 'The position of the electron is determined with perfect accuracy' $\text{LI}>$ 'The momentum of the electron is completely uncertain'.
- (e) ' $E = mc^2$ ' $\text{LI}>$ 'A single relatively small bomb made of an appropriate fissionable material can destroy a city'

Here, too, the consequents have been chosen to produce one-way logical implications.

It is traditional wisdom that when we turn away from propositions with known content to propositional variables, the case must be different. We are then, so the story goes, dealing only with the truth or falsity of the propositions represented by the variables, with what is extensionally the case, thus with extension rather than intension. If we wish to reproduce what I am calling logical implication in a calculus, we must therefore take special precautions to introduce necessity and relevance, because we cannot fall back on meaning to supply those factors. As we now turn to the protocalculus, we shall, I suggest, find that the traditional wisdom is wrong, and that the theme of meaning is present also in an appropriate calculus setting and can in fact supply those other factors.

Suppose we know nothing of the content of the propositions we are dealing with: we are back with the propositional variables of *PM*—mere placeholders for propositions about which nothing can be said but that they are either true or false. Suppose also that these are to be connected by the familiar symbols for 'and', 'or', and 'not', but not by the symbol for material implication (the conditional), which we replace by ' $\text{LI}>$ '. It is our purpose to focus on the meaning of logical implication itself, but we do not define it at the outset in terms of 'and', 'or', and 'not' but rather ask what, in terms of these other notions, is *logically implied by the meaning of the notion of logical implication*. We begin by assuming the truth of the proposition ' p logically implies q ', and we write that assumption as formula (1).⁵

$$(1) p \text{ LI}> q$$

⁵ I take expressions like ' $p \text{ LI}> q$ ' to be propositions, despite the absence of information about the content of the component propositions that might instantiate the variables. Thus I use the term 'proposition' both about what the variables represent and about the molecular expression that contains the variables. But in much of what follows I use the neutral term 'formula' in discussing molecular propositions.

In the domain of logic a certain reliance on fiat is inevitable. "Let ' $p \text{ LI} > q$ ' be true," we say, and then go on to consider what follows from it.⁶ In this setting neither empirical evidence nor appeal to authority is necessary, although if we were in the domain of common sense or in that of science, we should not be content to proceed without assuring ourselves that there was some ground for believing that the propositions we had in mind were appropriate substitution instances for ' $p \text{ LI} > q$ '. Here, in the domain of logic, we simply assume that (1) is true and therefore also assume that there are some concrete grounds for its being true and, moreover, necessarily true. Appropriate substitution instances—propositions that meet the prescriptions of ' $p \text{ LI} > q$ '—would therefore display the kind of connection we have already seen in examples (a)–(e).

To make this assumption we must already command some features of an exceedingly complex logical situation. We must, for instance, already have some rational awareness of what 'logically implies' means, even though it is the aim of our investigation to increase and deepen our knowledge of that meaning. Moreover, the very definiteness of our claim about the relation of the two propositions in (1) cannot be sustained unless we also take it for granted that p does not logically imply $\sim q$ as well. We are innocent, as we should be at this point, of the thought that ' $p \cdot \sim p$ ' might in fact be the case, and that, if it were the case, we could conclude, in an extensional setting, ' $q \cdot \sim q$ '. In short, we are in effect, in this intensional setting, taking for granted the combined principles of excluded middle and contradiction, which, with the help of a symbol for *exclusive* disjunction that is the inverse of the usual symbol for inclusive disjunction, we may express by the

⁶ Although I am offering an alternative to extensional logic, it is clear enough that extensional logic also has frequent recourse to the assumption of truth. The conventional truth table, for instance, is a method of deriving the truth value of a formula or proposition from the truth values of propositional variables, truth values that are successively *assumed* as we consider the various conjunctions of variables. But the assumption of truth takes many other forms in extensional logic. The sign of assertion used in *PM*, for instance, represents an assumption of truth, so does the writing down of the first formula in a contemporary conditional proof, and so also does the invocation of any rule such as *modus ponens*. Much is made of this feature of *extensional* logic later in this paper. For the moment, however, I am using the assumption of truth in an *intensional* setting. Needless to say, to assume the truth of a formula is no guarantee that, in the course of an intricate argument, that assumption will not turn out to be in conflict with other assumptions.

formula ' $A \wedge \sim A$ ', in which A stands for any proposition.⁷ The relation between ' $p \text{ LI} > q$ ' and ' $A \wedge \sim A$ ' is worth some comment. To say that we take ' $A \wedge \sim A$ ' for granted is to suggest that it is presupposed by ' $p \text{ LI} > q$ ' and that ' $p \text{ LI} > q$ ' therefore logically implies ' $A \wedge \sim A$ '. On the other hand, in assuming the truth of ' $p \text{ LI} > q$ ' we are merely assuming that, in the case of any two propositions so related in meaning as to be appropriate substitution instances for ' $p \text{ LI} > q$ ', the truth of the first necessitates the truth of the second; and with *that* meaning for ' $\text{LI} >$ ' the truth of ' $p \text{ LI} > q$ ' cannot necessitate (in the same sense) the truth of ' $A \wedge \sim A$ ', which is itself already necessary. The role of ' $A \wedge \sim A$ ' in the logical situation we only partly command is difficult indeed. At the least, that formula warns us that if we assume that both p and not p are true, then our assumption of the truth of either variable may be nonsense. Indeed, one motive for alternative logics that would dispense with the principle of the excluded middle (one component of the formula we are considering) is that there are empirical situations—especially in the physics of the very small and evanescent—in which, far from assuming that both p and not p are true, we find ourselves not entirely clear about *what* we are assuming when we assume that *either* of the alternatives is true. What role, then, does ' $A \wedge \sim A$ ' play in the complex logical situation we are considering? Clearly it does not imply the truth of ' $p \text{ LI} > q$ '. The following formula expresses at least part of the logical situation we are considering.

$$(2) (A \wedge \sim A) \text{ LI} > [(p \text{ LI} > q) \text{ LI} > \sim(p \text{ LI} > \sim q)]$$

In this restricted sense of 'presuppose', even the assumption of the truth of a single variable presupposes ' $A \wedge \sim A$ '

$$(2a) (A \wedge \sim A) \text{ LI} > (p \text{ LI} > \sim \sim p)$$

Indeed, ' $A \wedge \sim A$ ' is so prepotent a presupposition that although it does not preclude our encountering ' $p \cdot \sim p$ ' in the course of an argument—and indeed does not preclude our attempt to elicit a contradiction in the course of a *reductio ad absurdum* argument—it does preclude

⁷ The symbol here used for exclusive disjunction is used by some writers as a symbol for 'and', one good reason for using it for exclusive disjunction is that it reminds us of the Latin *aut*, as the usual symbol for inclusive disjunction reminds us of *vel*

our *assuming the truth* of a contradiction. We are not, I remind the reader, in an extensional setting just now, and, pending the development of my claim that extensional logic is ambiguous, my present claim is merely that within the intensional protocalculus there can be no analogue of the hallowed extensional principle that any proposition follows from a contradiction. We can only assume the truth of the principle ' $(p \cdot \sim p) \text{ LI} > q$ ' if we can conditionally assume the truth of its antecedent, ' $p \cdot \sim p$ ': the very meaning of the principle lays down the possibility of that conditional assumption. The appearance of ' $p \cdot \sim p$ ' in the course of an argument in the protocalculus stops us: rather than looking forward from the contradiction to what it purports to imply, we look back to find the peccant premise and remove it. A contradiction, in this intensional setting, signalizes the prior breakdown of logical implication rather than an opportunity for a step forward. Because an analogue of the principle of addition for the protocalculus would yield an instance, ' $\sim p \text{ LI} > (\sim p \vee q)$ ', that can be transformed into the formula ' $(p \cdot \sim p) \text{ LI} > q$ ', that principle too can have no analogue in the protocalculus. More generally, in this intensional setting a single propositional variable about which we know nothing else but that it is assumed to be true logically implies nothing but itself.

In any event, if we assume the truth of ' $p \text{ LI} > q$ ', our understanding of it tells us that p and q are relevant to each other, although, not knowing the content of any substitution instance, we do not know just how they are relevant. To assume that the first proposition logically implies the second is to assume also that their mutual relevance is such that the truth of the first necessitates the truth of the second. Although the variables ' p ' and ' q ' have no meaning other than that they stand for unknown propositions that can be true or false, an expression like ' p logically implies q ' is a proposition with a known meaning, and a very rich one. If we inquire into what that meaning is we are led to other meanings, just as when we ask what 'Chicago is about 800 miles west of Boston' means we are led on to other meanings. The very least we can say about the meaning of ' p logically implies q ' is that the meaning of ' p ' is relevant to the meaning of ' q ', and relevant in such a way that the truth of ' p ' necessitates the truth of ' q '. Thus, although intensional logic of this kind does not attribute modality to the propositions represented by single variables, it does attribute it to complex propositions containing at least two variables connected by ' $\text{LI} >$ '. When we assume the truth of ' $p \text{ LI} > q$ ' we also assume the necessity of that molecular proposition: we assume that the connection

between ' p ' and ' q ' is exactly the connection that exists in the substitution instances that are displayed as examples (a)–(e)—assume it even though in the present case we are dealing with variables rather than substitution instances

This meaning of ' p logically implies q ' then carries us on to the meanings of other propositions it necessitates, and we can form some of these with the materials laid down so far in the protocalculus. But to say in the face of this intensional content, this necessity, this relevance, that the complex proposition ' p logically implies q ' would be *made* true by this or that truth value of its components is to miss the point of it. By the logical fiat of our assumption it *is* true, and its truth is necessary rather than empirical: if we knew what ' p ' and ' q ' stood for—that is, if we were considering some substitution instance that fulfilled the prescriptions laid down by ' $p \text{ LI } q$ '—we could see and acknowledge the necessary truth of it, even as we now see and acknowledge the necessary truth of examples (a)–(e).

We are, however, not dealing just now with substitution instances but with formulas containing propositional variables, and so the assumption of necessary truth is still an assumption: we cannot by fiat make ' $p \text{ LI } q$ ' immune to falsification. Thus, a complex argument of which ' $p \text{ LI } q$ ' is an assumption, or in the course of which it is introduced as an assumption, may have other assumptions from which the conjunction ' $p \cdot \sim q$ ' can be deduced, thus falsifying ' $p \text{ LI } q$ '. Textbook problems in *extensional* logic often lead to situations of this kind when students are asked to produce symbolically expressed argument forms on the basis of natural language propositions. A textbook in *intensional* logic might well contain some natural language exercises the point of which was to demonstrate that certain substitution instances do not fulfill the prescriptions laid down by ' $p \text{ LI } q$ '.

In any event, it should now be clear that the meaning of ' $p \text{ LI } q$ ' *logically implies* some selection of the combinations of truth values that appear in the truth table which, in the usual account of extensional logic, is said to define the expression ' $p \supset q$ '. As these combinations are mutually exclusive conjunctions, let us join them by our symbol for exclusive disjunction, ' $\vee$ '. I write out the whole of the appropriate set of conjunctions as the consequent in the following formula, although the result is obviously redundant.

$$(3) (p \text{ LI } q) \text{ LI } [(p \cdot q) \wedge (\sim p \cdot q) \wedge (\sim p \cdot \sim q)] \cdot \sim (p \cdot \sim q)$$

The denial of ' $p \text{ LI } q$ ' is worth a passing glance, for it does not logically

imply the truth of the conjunct ' $p \cdot \sim q$ '; it merely adds that conjunct to the three that are set in exclusive disjunction in (3).

$$(3a) \sim(p \text{ LI} > q) \text{ LI} > [(p \cdot q) \wedge (\sim p \cdot q) \wedge (\sim p \cdot \sim q) \wedge (p \cdot \sim q)]$$

For the moment, however, we are concerned with (3). Although in (1) we assumed that ' $p \text{ LI} > q$ ' was true, and thus assumed its necessary truth, we do not assume the necessary truth of (3). We see it to be necessarily true, and we see that its truth is dependent upon the meaning of ' $p \text{ LI} > q$ '. If ' $p \text{ LI} > q$ ' is true, then the meaning of an appropriate substitution instance of ' p ' (whatever it may be) is so relevant to the meaning of an appropriate substitution instance of ' q ' (whatever it may be) that the truth of ' p ' necessitates the truth of ' q ', and this meaning in turn necessitates the truth of the complex expression that appears as the consequent.⁸ We see all this to be a logical truth. the meaning of the antecedent truly implies the truth of the consequent. The difference between (1) and (3) may therefore be summed up as follows. If (1) is assumed to be true, it must also be assumed to be necessary, (3) need not be assumed to be true, for it is seen to be necessary and thus seen to be true. It is a momentous difference, despite the shared feature of necessity. But the difference must not prevent us from noticing something equally momentous: nothing more is unfolded in the patently necessary truth of (3) than the *meaning* of (1), and that meaning is that from the truth of ' p ' the truth of ' q ' necessarily follows. The appearance of the second ' $\text{LI} >$ ' in (3) expresses this unfolding.

Although the usual extensional truth table has no relevance to instances of logical implication, an inversion of the usual truth-table method produces a table that sheds considerable light on the interesting, and often perplexing, meaning of ' $p \text{ LI} > q$ '. An *intensional truth table*, as I call it, is made by assigning truth values to the variables on the basis of the prior assignment of a truth value to the complex formula within which the variables are found. The point of the table is to display the truth values of the variables that are consistent with

⁸ Because considerations about necessary and impossible propositions are often thought to introduce paradoxes into calculi that are designed to be intensional, it should be observed that the complex left-hand member of the conjunct that makes up the consequent of (3) tells us that impossible and necessary propositions represented by single variables are excluded from consideration at this point: both ' p ' and ' q ' are represented as being sometimes true and sometimes false. In this context, then, ' $\sim(p \cdot \sim q)$ ' cannot be true just by virtue of the impossibility of ' p ' or the necessity of ' q '.

and those that are inconsistent with the *assumed* truth or falsity of the formula in which the variables occur. The term 'prior' is thus, in this context, tantamount to 'assumed'.

We begin by setting the value T to the left and the value F to the right of the formula to be examined, remembering that the assumption of these values applies not to the antecedent and consequent respectively but rather to the whole formula, we next write the truth possibilities under the variables in the usual way and number each of the rows, finally, in columns just under the prior values assigned to the formula we label the rows either 'consistent with prior value' (CPV) or 'inconsistent with prior value' (IPV).

Table 1

		T	F	
		$\underbrace{\hspace{1.5cm}}$ $p \text{ LI } q$		
I	CPV	T	T	CPV
II	CPV	F	T	CPV
III	IPV	T	F	CPV
IV	CPV	F	F	CPV

As one might expect, the column under the prior value T corresponds to the consequent of formula (3), the column under F to the consequent of formula (3a)—although the order of the conjuncts is different in both cases. It should be noticed, however, that if the prior value of the formula in Table 1 is T , certain inner meaning constraints appear in rows I and III: we cannot take those rows as mere conjunctions of extensional possibilities, for if the antecedent is first given the value T , it is necessary that the consequent have the same value; and if the consequent is first given the value F , it is necessary that the antecedent be given the same value—necessary, that is, if the prior value of T assigned to the formula as a whole is to be preserved. Row I thus illustrates the positive force of logical implication, while row III illustrates the one condition for falsification (as distinct from consistency with falsity)

The point of this last remark becomes more vivid if we consider what purport to be concrete instances of logical implication—that is, what purport to be appropriate substitution instances of the argument form in which 'LI>' is the main connective. It is only true instances

of logical implication—instances such as examples (a)–(e)—that display the meaning constraints just mentioned. There is, however, no point to applying the whole of the intensional table to such instances: they are known by inspection to be instances of logical implication, and so the prior value F need not be considered. If, on the other hand, we take a concrete instance that is not a logical implication but only either an empirical generalization or a coupling of propositions utterly irrelevant to one another, there is no point in assigning the prior value T . Consider “‘Holmes is playing his violin’ $\text{LI} >$ ‘Watson is writing up one of their earlier adventures.’” Some visitor to Baker Street might have found Holmes playing and Watson writing on his earlier visits, and he might mention that fact to Mrs. Hudson as she showed him out, she might then say, “Sir, one thing you can be sure of: if Mr. Holmes is playing his violin, Dr. Watson will be writing about their adventures.” The meaning of the example, however, tells us that we are not dealing with a logical implication, or even an empirical generalization, but rather with a rhetorical flourish; if it were an empirical generalization it would be an ill-founded one. When we accordingly assign the main connective the value F , the various rows reveal no inner meaning constraints, all represent possible states of affairs, and all are consistent with the prior value of F for the main connective.⁹

Returning to formulas containing propositional variables, we may now sum up the significance of the intensional truth table for such formulas: the prior falsity of the formula ‘ $p \text{ LI} > q$ ’ is consistent with

⁹ Examples like the Holmes-Watson one are common in exercises set in extensional logic textbooks. It is worth reminding the reader of the oddities generated when one deals with concrete propositions directly rather than with the argument forms the student is asked to replace them with. Consider, on the basis of the usual extensional truth table, a certain afternoon when Holmes is not playing but rather correcting the proofs of his monograph on the various kinds of cigar ash. During the same time, Watson is away courting the lady who was later to become his wife—a circumstance, to be sure, made irrelevant by the fact that Holmes is not playing his violin. Most of the time the conditional is therefore true. But occasionally Holmes becomes bored by the proofreading and turns to his violin for ten minutes at a time, so during those periods the conditional becomes false. On another afternoon, Holmes does not cease playing the violin for some two hours, while Watson writes about their adventures. Watson, however, is made uneasy when Bach is played on the unaccompanied violin, so whenever Holmes turns to Bach, he goes out for a stroll. For most of a long but interrupted period, then, the conditional is true, and for the course of three ten-minute strolls it is false.

whatever truth values we assign to the variables; its prior truth is consistent with all value assignments but row III, row III falsifies decisively because it is impossible if the formula is known or assumed to be true. Because of this last point, the intensional truth table may be used (under certain restrictions) as the basis for a decision procedure for an intensional logic; I describe this procedure briefly in section VI. Although such a procedure is useful in deciding whether formulas analogous to but more complicated than (3) are or are not necessary and therefore true, it does not, of course, apply at all to formulas like (1), in which there is only one occurrence of ' $\text{LI}>$ ', whose truth we assume, and whose necessity we thereby also assume.

I return now to formula (3) to consider whether it should have been written as a two-way logical implication. Let us take the whole of the consequent of (3) and assume it to be true—much as we might do if we took it as an assumption in a conditional proof. To make it salient that we are assuming the *whole* of the consequent to be true, let us once again place a bracket above it, even though in this case we are only concerned with the truth value *T*.

$$(4) \overbrace{[(p \cdot q) \wedge (\sim p \cdot q) \wedge (\sim p \cdot \sim q)] \cdot \sim(p \cdot \sim q)}^T$$

Given the *meaning* of (4), its prior (assumed) truth tells us (a) that one—and only one at a time—of the three conjuncts in the left-hand part must be true, and (b) that ' $p \cdot \sim q$ ' cannot be true. Although the only reference to time is the one implicit in the use of the exclusive disjunction, the prescriptions about truth are complete with respect to time. they come from the meaning of the total formula and so transcend particular times. Except for these prescriptions, the truth of (4) leaves the extensional situation open. In other words, in understanding the meaning of (4) and in understanding what its prior truth means, we also understand that the occurrence of any one of the conjuncts in its left-hand part is consistent with that truth and the occurrence of the conjunct ' $p \cdot \sim q$ ' inconsistent with that truth. In short, the prior truth of (4) lays down a relation of relevance and necessity between the meaning of ' p ' and the meaning of ' q '. What it prescribes for that relation is exactly what is prescribed by the assumed truth of ' $p \text{ LI} > q$ ', and so, although (4) is less perspicuous than (1), it is

nonetheless clear that (4) *logically implies* that p logically implies q . Let us therefore rewrite (3) as a two-way logical implication.

$$(5) (p \text{ LI} > q) <\text{LI}> [(p \cdot q) \wedge (\sim p \cdot q) \wedge (\sim p \cdot \sim q)] \cdot \sim(p \cdot \sim q)$$

We must now consider whether the right-hand part of the two-way logical implication displayed as (5) is redundant, as it appears to be. To answer this question we have only to assume alternately the truth of the two formulas conjoined in that part and determine what the truth of each prescribes in terms of the possible truth values of ' p ' and ' q '. What, in other words, does it *mean* for either of these formulas to be *true* when we have no independent knowledge of the truth value of ' p ' or ' q ' now or at any other time? Clearly the truth of the left-hand formula (exclusive disjunction) prescribes such a relation between ' p ' and ' q ' that one and only one of the formula's component conjuncts must be true, now or at any time, and this prescription excludes the possible truth of ' $p \cdot \sim q$ ' at any time. As for the right-hand formula, ' $\sim(p \cdot \sim q)$ ', in the absence of any extensional information, its truth prescribes such a relation between ' p ' and ' q ' that ' $p \cdot \sim q$ ' cannot be true, and so (' $A \wedge \sim A$ ' still being taken for granted in the sense specified earlier) also lays it down that at any time one of the remaining possible truth-value combinations—that is, one of the conjuncts comprised in the left-hand formula—must be true. Accordingly, each of the two formulas conjoined in the right-hand part of (5) logically implies the other, and each logically implies ' $p \text{ LI} > q$ '. That part of (5) is thus redundant and may be rewritten as a two-way logical implication

$$(6) [(p \cdot q) \wedge (\sim p \cdot q) \wedge (\sim p \cdot \sim q)] <\text{LI}> \sim(p \cdot \sim q)$$

Having come so far, we must also consider ' $\sim p \vee q$ ' and ' $p \supset q$ ', for they are both interchangeable with ' $\sim(p \cdot \sim q)$ ' in extensional logic. Our consideration may be summary, as with the other extensional formulas discussed earlier—and for the same reasons—*when assumed to be true*, each of these formulas both logically implies and is logically implied by the intensional formula ' $p \text{ LI} > q$ '

Just here it is important to remind the reader that I am not arguing that extensional logic is identical with intensional logic, but merely that it is ambiguous, and that certain of its formulas, when assumed to be true in the absence of any independent information about the

truth or falsity of either ' p ' or ' q ', logically imply ' $p \text{ LI} > q$ ' and are logically implied by ' $p \text{ LI} > q$ '. Keeping this in mind, we may now sum up, as formula (7), what we have learned about ' $p \text{ LI} > q$ ' and its relation, in certain circumstances, to what purport to be unambiguously extensional formulas

$$(7) \quad (p \text{ LI} > q) <\text{LI}> [(p \cdot q) \wedge (\sim p \cdot q) \wedge (\sim p \cdot \sim q)] <\text{LI}> \\ \sim(p \cdot \sim q) <\text{LI}> (\sim p \vee q) <\text{LI}> (p \supset q)$$

Formula (7), which is a logical truth in the intensional setting of the protocalculus, has one oddity worth mentioning: two of its component formulas, the first and the last, can appropriately be construed as ' p logically implies q '; in other words, when ' $p \supset q$ ' is assumed to be true in what purports to be an extensional setting, it is a mere notational variant of ' $p \text{ LI} > q$ '

A limited recourse to the intensional truth table may help reinforce my claim about (7). It would obviously not be appropriate to apply the intensional table without reservation to formulas that are defined as extensional, even if their extensionality is more honored in the breach than in the observance; and all of the component formulas of (7) except the first two are so defined. On the other hand, the intensional truth table does not *define* even ' $p \text{ LI} > q$ ', but is rather a logical consequence of the meaning of that formula. In any event, we are free to write a table for ' $p \supset q$ ' that is analogous to the intensional table, so long as we apply it to the designed *extensional* meaning of ' $p \supset q$ '—that is, we are free to write a table based, like the intensional one, on the assignment of the prior values T and F , in turn, to the whole of that formula. In Table 2 such a table is compared with the intensional table for ' $p \text{ LI} > q$ '.

Table 2

		$T \quad \swarrow \quad \searrow \quad F$ $p \supset q$				$T \quad \swarrow \quad \searrow \quad F$ $p \text{ LI} > q$		
I	CPV	T	T	IPV	CPV	T	T	CPV
II	CPV	F	T	IPV	CPV	F	T	CPV
III	IPV	T	F	CPV	IPV	T	F	CPV
IV	CPV	F	F	IPV	CPV	F	F	CPV

The table for ' $p \supset q$ ' will also apply to all the other formulas of (7) that are found in extensional calculi, provided we take those formulas in

their designed extensional sense. Notice, however, that *when we assume any of those formulas to be true*, it becomes irrelevant that rows I, II, and IV (unlike the same rows in the intensional table) are not consistent with their prior falsity—irrelevant because falsity is irrelevant. The only parts of Table 2 that are operative in that case are the parts that are the same for both the extensional formulas and ' $p \sqcup q$ '. I abstract those parts as Table 3. The prior value for both formulas is now T .

Table 3

		$\overbrace{T}$ $p \supset q$				$\overbrace{T}$ $p \sqcup q$	
I	CPV	T	T	CPV	T	T	
II	CPV	F	T	CPV	F	T	
III	IPV	T	F	IPV	T	F	
IV	CPV	F	F	CPV	F	F	

III

We may now generalize the argument by noticing that two distinct kinds of formulas that are not patently necessary logical truths are to be found in both extensional and intensional calculi. When formulas such as those linked by ' $\sqcup$ ' in (7) are assumed to be true, they express an extensionally indeterminate situation with respect to their variables, a situation about which certain prescriptions are made: each formula tolerates some, forbids other, truth-value possibilities of its variables. Let us call such complex propositions *prescriptive* and *extensionally open*. Included in this category are logical implications, disjunctions (inclusive or exclusive) that are *not* preceded by the sign of negation, and conjunctions that *are* preceded by the sign of negation. All contain open possibilities qualified by the necessity of the relation laid down between the component propositional variables—provided we assume the truth of the entire formula.¹⁰

¹⁰ This paragraph concerns those prescriptive, extensionally open formulas that are most central to the question of the ambiguity of extensional logic: formulas, such as (1) and the other component formulas of (7), that *when assumed to be true* must also be assumed to be necessarily true. But formulas that are seen to be necessary and thus true, such as (3), (5), (6), and (7), are of course also prescriptive and extensionally open.

Whether they occur in intensional or "extensional" calculi, all such prescriptive and extensionally open formulas stand in contrast with formulas that express a determinate truth-value situation with respect to one or more of their variables. These latter formulas include single propositional variables, conjunctions of such variables that are *not* preceded by the sign of negation, and disjunctions of such variables that *are* preceded by the sign of negation. Let us call such formulas *descriptive* and *extensionally closed*.

We are now in a position to define the ambiguity inherent in *PM*-type extensional calculi. When (a) assumed to be true in arguments or rules, formulas such as ' $p \supset q$ ', ' $\sim(p \cdot \sim q)$ ', and ' $\sim p \vee q$ ' have a prescriptive and extensionally open force with respect to their variables, a force at odds with their extensional definitions elsewhere in the calculus. Having their own prior truth values as formulas, they do not await truth-value determination by their variables but rather prescribe what values the variables may have, without, however, assigning a particular value to any of them. When, however, (b) they appear as consequent formulas in the principle of addition or in the related paradoxes, their prescriptive force is neutered by the known truth value (in that context) of one of the variables; with respect to that variable they are extensionally closed. Further, they owe their truth, as consequent formulas, to the truth value assigned that variable in the antecedents of the formulas in which they appear. They thus revert to their defined extensional status: though presenting the same appearance as elsewhere in the calculus, they are now descriptive and extensionally closed, as I argue in more detail in the next section.¹¹

It therefore seems safe to conclude that the argumentative strength of extensional calculi depends upon this intrusion of an intensional factor into a purportedly extensional situation. At this point it is useful to remind the reader of C. I. Lewis's distinction, in the article cited earlier, between the extensional disjunction, which he associated

¹¹ Because the question of the role of necessary and impossible propositions comes up again and again in discussions of intensional logic, it may be helpful to glance at their relevance to the claims I have just made. If we do indeed wish to claim that the formula ' $\sim p \vee q$ ' is true, and wish to do so either because ' $\sim p$ ' is true or because ' q ' is true, the formula is for that reason descriptive rather than prescriptive and so not replaceable by ' $p \sqcup q$ ' or by ' $p \supset q$ ' understood in a prescriptive sense. It does not matter whether the truth of ' $\sim p$ ' or ' q ' is contingent or necessary (as when ' p ' is impossible or ' q ' necessary), in either case the truth value of one of the variables is given, so the formula is extensionally closed with respect to that variable.

with *PM*-type calculi, and the intensional disjunction, which he associated with intensional calculi.¹² It will be clear that I have been representing a disjunctive formula comprised in (7), ' $\sim p \vee q$ ', as effectively intensional, not only in its appearance in the intensional protocolculus setting of (7) but also in its *effective* presence as an *unintended* intensional disjunction in calculi that are intended to be extensional. Lewis made the distinction between the two kinds of disjunctions with the help of concrete examples (substitution instances), the meaning of the two propositions disjoined being unrelated in the case of the extensional one and related in the case of the intensional one. I believe I have shown that the assumption of the truth of such a disjunction in the absence of any knowledge of the truth values of the variables is effectively the assumption that the disjunction is intensional; any substitution instances we give when we assume the prior truth of a disjunction must of course be intensional, but the concrete examples are not needed to make the point. If I am right about this, Lewis was mistaken to suppose that the extensional design of *PM*-type calculi means that only extensional disjunctions appear in such calculi; that is, he was mistaken to suppose that such calculi are unambiguously extensional. I single out the disjunctive formulas just here because they are at the center of Lewis's argument, but I am concerned, in this part of the present paper, with the intrusive intensionality of related formulas as well

Nevertheless, the logical importance of descriptive and extensionally closed formulas is considerable. Provided they are *assumed to be true*, such formulas have an intensional content sufficient to give rise to logical implications in the strictest sense. Thus, something also follows necessarily from the descriptive and extensionally closed conjunction of two variables, ' $p \cdot q$ '. Although this proposition expresses no relevance between the two components (except that they can be true together) and hence no relation of necessitation between them—we read it as merely ' p is true and q is true'—the proposition has at least the minimal intensional content I have just drawn attention to. It therefore assures us that the following two-way logical implication is what it purports to be, a logical truth.

$$(8) \ p \cdot q \sim(\sim p \vee \sim q)$$

Thus, although neither of the component propositions is prescriptive or

¹² See note 3 above

extensionally open, the proposition (8) as a whole expresses (a) the necessitation of the right member by the left member and the left member by the right member, and (b) the relevance of the two members to each other (the same variables appear in each). Proposition (8) is therefore both prescriptive and extensionally open, even though its components, considered in isolation from their setting in (8), are not.

A most important role of descriptive, existentially closed propositions is that of single propositional variables in rules of detachment. The following odd formula, redundant, but indubitably seen to be a necessary logical truth, suggests how the meaning of ' $p \text{ LI} > q$ ' itself logically implies such rules.

$$(9) (p \text{ LI} > q) \text{ LI} > [(p \text{ LI} > q) \cdot p] \text{ LI} > q$$

Nothing more is unfolded in that necessarily true formula than the *meaning* of ' $p \text{ LI} > q$ '. When we notice that there is no point in assuming ' $p \text{ LI} > q$ ' twice, *modus ponens*, likewise a necessary truth, emerges in its familiar form.

$$(10) [(p \text{ LI} > q) \cdot p] \text{ LI} > q$$

An analogous detachment rule for the protocalculus can be based on each of the other four component formulas of (7), although one of those formulas is excessively cumbersome, and another, ' $p \supset q$ ', is now seen to be a mere notational variant of ' $p \text{ LI} > q$ '.

IV

The argumentative force of ' $p \supset q$ ' (or one of its equivalents) in so-called extensional calculi rests upon its prescriptive and extensionally open status when it is assumed to be true. The discussion leading up to formula (7) shows that "extensional" surrogates for the intensional relation of logical implication are, because of this prescriptive and extensionally open force, not surrogates for, but rather instances of, logical implication. When, however, ' $p \supset q$ ' (or one of its equivalents) appears, in an extensional calculus, as the consequent in one of the paradoxes, it loses its prescriptive and extensionally open status. This loss is most salient when we rewrite one of the paradoxes, say, ' $\sim p \supset (p \supset q)$ ', in a form that makes its relation to *PM*'s principle of addition clear.

$$(11) \sim p \supset (\sim p \vee q)$$

We may read (11) thus "On the assumption that ' $\sim p$ ' is true, then either ' $\sim p$ ' is true or ' q ' is true or both are true, furthermore ' $\sim p$ ' is true." Under that assumption, then, ' $\sim p \vee q$ ' is, with respect to ' $\sim p$ ', descriptive and extensionally closed. So also is the ' $p \supset q$ ' it replaced, since ' $\sim p$ ' is the antecedent of that formula as well, this prevents our using these equivalent formulas in the detachment of ' q '. This decisively establishes the ambiguity of *PM*-type calculi, and it enables us to identify one of the two poles of the ambiguity: the principle of addition and its equivalent principles—that a false proposition implies any proposition, ' $\sim p \supset (p \supset q)$ '; that a contradiction implies any proposition, ' $(\sim p \cdot p) \supset q$ '. It is important to notice, however, that if we remove this pole of the ambiguity, the result will not be an extensional calculus purged of paradoxes but rather an intensional calculus along the lines of the protocalculus developed in this paper. Provided with a short list of natural-deduction rules, each of which can be drawn from our consideration of the meaning of ' $p \sqcup q$ ', such a calculus should be capable of all the positive things for which *PM*-type calculi have rightly been valued¹³

V

In this section I explore briefly the question whether the principle of addition, together with its transforms, has any other function besides providing the only clear-cut manifestation of extensionality in the ambiguous calculi I have examined. To this end, it is sufficient to look briefly at the meaning of (11), for whatever can be said about that formula applies to the principle in general.¹⁴

¹³ The excision of the principle of addition makes a difference in the metatheory of formal systems. The demonstration that a certain proposition cannot be deduced in a given formal system would no longer constitute a demonstration of its consistency, for if we do not accept ' $\sim A \supset (A \supset B)$ ', where ' A ' and ' B ' are any propositions, we cannot accept ' $(\sim A \cdot A) \supset B$ '.

¹⁴ It is hard to overstate the importance of the principle of addition for calculi that are designed to be extensional. It is worth reminding the reader that the principle of addition is older than the truth table and presumably furnishes both the inspiration and the justification for the table's oddities. Thus ' $q \supset (q \vee \sim p)$ ' can be transformed into ' $q \supset (p \supset q)$ ', and this is enough to justify rows I and II of the truth table for ' $p \supset q$ ' by virtue of this fact we can write *T* under the main connective, ' $\supset$ ', of that formula and so "make" ' $p \supset q$ '

Is anything definite said about 'q' in (11)? It is plain that we have picked the 'q' out of the air. not only could we have put some other variable in its place, we could also have substituted either a conjunctive or a disjunctive series of variables, and the length of the string is limited only by the number of variables we decree our calculus shall have. The spirit of infinity broods over our dubious enterprise.

$$(12) \sim p \supset [\sim p \vee (q \cdot r \cdot s \cdot \dots n)]$$

$$(13) \sim p \supset [\sim p \vee (q \vee r \vee s \vee \dots n)]$$

Confronted with this potential multitude of variables, we have no right to single out 'q': since the ' $\sim p$ ' of the consequent is true under the constraint of the antecedent, it is in true disjunction not only with any propositional variable but with *every* propositional variable, and so in effective disjunction with none in particular. This becomes even more salient if we add, as we have every right to do, the negative of each variable to the disjunctive string of (13) and then bind each pair—variable and its negation—together in an exclusive disjunction, a procedure appropriate enough to such pairs. The result of this is a disjunction of ' $\sim p$ ' with a disjunctive series of pairs, each of which merely reiterates the combined principles of contradiction and the excluded middle.

$$(14) \sim p \supset \{ \sim p \vee [(q \wedge \sim q) \vee (r \wedge \sim r) \vee (s \wedge \sim s) \cdot \dots n] \}$$

Nor need we avoid contradiction as we do in (14): the principle of addition allows us to replace the symbol for exclusive disjunction with the symbol for conjunction if we wish. The spirit of contradiction also broods over our enterprise. It is hard to see how we can read (14) as saying more than that $\sim p \supset \sim p$.

We can reach the same result by way of a conditional proof in a natural-deduction setting. I use the rules of Anderson and Johnstone, but sometimes add a more familiar name to a name they use¹⁵

true. And ' $\sim p \supset (\sim p \vee q)$ ' can be transformed into ' $\sim p \supset (p \supset q)$ ', and thus can be used to justify row IV (and of course row II again) in the same way.

¹⁵ John M. Anderson and Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., *Natural Deduction: The Logical Basis of Axiom Systems* (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1962), 17–42.

1	$\sim p$	
2	$\sim p \vee q$	1, $\vee I$ (Addition)
3	$\sim p \vee \sim q$	1, $\vee I$ (Addition)
4	$(\sim p \vee q) \cdot (\sim p \vee \sim q)$	2, 3 $\&I$ (Conjunction)
5	$\sim p \vee (q \cdot \sim q)$	4, Distribution
6	$p \supset (q \cdot \sim q)$	5, Impl (Df in PM)
7	$\sim p$	6, $\sim I$ (RA)
8	$\sim p \supset \sim p$	1-7 $\supset I$ (CP)

Once again the spirit of contradiction hovered over us, although finally we exorcised it in step 7. Its presence is not surprising if we remember that (11) can be transformed into ' $(\sim p \cdot p) \supset q$ '. We may use this dubious aspect of the extensional conditional to reinforce the point made earlier, namely, that the definite role ' q ' seems to play in (11) is delusive: the descriptive and extensionally closed force of the consequent of that formula is entirely confined to ' $\sim p$ ', as for prescriptive force, the consequent has none whatever. Behind the seductive plausibility of ' $\sim p \supset (\sim p \vee q)$ ', behind the menace of its transform ' $\sim p \supset (p \supset q)$ ', there lies nothing more useful and nothing more threatening than ' $\sim p \supset \sim p$ '.

VI

In this section I summarize a decision procedure for the intensional protocol calculus. The objective of the procedure, which is an adaptation of the well-known short-cut (*reductio ad absurdum*) truth-table method from extensional logic, is to show either that the formula to be examined can be decisively falsified or else that it cannot be falsified without an inconsistent assignment of truth values to the variables. First, (a) the prior value F is assigned to the main connective of the formula; (b) as a consequence of this move, the value T must then be assigned to the whole of the formula's antecedent and the value F to the whole of its consequent; (c) such truth values as are consistent with these prior assignments are then assigned to the variables of the formula. If consistency with those prior assignments (as defined by the intensional table) can only be attained by inconsistency in the values assigned to the variables, it is impossible to falsify the formula.

In another version of the intensional method sketched here, step (c) is replaced with these two steps: write out a full intensional table

for the variables, determine whether any of the rows are consistent with the assignments made in steps (a) and (b)

It is a wonder that the success in *extensional* systems of the short-cut method, which in such systems also begins with the prior (assumed) value of the complex formula that is to be examined and only then moves towards the values of the variables, did not provoke logicians to take a fresh look at the status of the usual extensional truth tables. In any event, the success of the method in extensional systems lends intuitive support to my claim that when ' $p \supset q$ ' and its transforms are assumed to be true in extensional systems they have a prescriptive and extensionally open force, for the method clearly inverts, as does the intensional truth table, the usual meaning of the extensional table.

One restriction must be placed on the application to *intensional* formulas of the method I have just sketched: it cannot be used to falsify formulas that are intensional analogues of the extensional principle of addition (and its transforms). The difficulty is best seen in that instance of the principle of addition which yields the transform ' $(p \cdot \sim p) \supset q$ '. The analogue of that formula in the intensional protocalculus would be ' $(p \cdot \sim p) \text{ LI} > q$ ', and we cannot assign the prior value *T* to the antecedent of that formula, as step (b) requires. On the other hand, we have eliminated such formulas from the protocalculus by the summary device of noting that to assume that a purported instance of logical implication is true is also to assume that it is possible, in principle, for its antecedent to be true.

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NATURAL KINDS DIRECT REFERENCE, REALISM,
AND THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF NECESSARY
A POSTERIORI TRUTH*

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SCIENTISTS HAVE DISCOVERED that water is H_2O . "Water is H_2O " is true. But is it a necessary truth? In other words, is it true in all possible worlds? Some people think it is. For example Hilary Putnam, in his well-known Twin Earth argument, concludes that "water is H_2O " is necessarily true; thus a liquid which phenomenally resembles H_2O and fits the description of water in almost all aspects, but has the chemical formula XYZ, cannot be water.¹ Saul Kripke has made a similar claim about the necessary identity between water and H_2O . Because this type of truth is based on empirical discoveries, Kripke calls truths of this sort "necessary a posteriori."² The thesis shared by Putnam and Kripke has two premises: a realist view that natural kinds exist independently of human cognition, and a theory of direct reference of natural kind terms. Opposing the view that natural kind terms pick out objects through descriptions, Putnam and Kripke hold that natural kind terms pick out natural kinds in the world in a direct way. Based on these two premises, they argue that, if two natural kind terms, *A* and *B*, designate the same thing in the world, "*A* = *B*" expresses a necessary identity.

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¹ Hilary Putnam, "Meaning and Reference," *Journal of Philosophy* 70, no. 19 (November 8, 1973) 699–711.

² Saul Kripke, *Naming and Necessity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980). Kripke and Putnam each independently developed a view of direct reference of natural kind terms. While their views have differences, they are the same in spirit. In this paper I discuss them mostly together, and separately only when needed.

Objections to the Putnam-Kripke thesis have been numerous³ My argument against this thesis takes a different route from that taken by most of their critics I will grant Kripke and Putnam as many assumptions of their theory as possible, but show a different logical conclusion In particular, I grant that Kripke and Putnam are right in their theory of how natural kinds are named; I also grant that they are right in their realist view of natural kinds I will show that, contrary to their belief, even with these assumptions, their conclusion about the necessary *a posteriori* truth of natural-kind identity is flawed Specifically, I argue that, if Kripke and Putnam are right, then in naming a natural kind, there is always a certain vagueness as to at what taxonomic level the term is posited, hence a vagueness as to the exact scope of that natural kind, and consequently, an inevitable indeterminacy as to what is named. This feature of natural-kind naming determines that true identity statements of natural kinds can never express necessary truth.

I

Indeterminacy of Natural Kind Terms. I will begin with a difference between a kind and an individual and the implications of this difference for naming. Unlike an individual object a kind could, in principle, have an inexhaustible number of instances This results in an important difference between naming a natural kind and naming an individual In naming an individual, we can have the individual right in front of us and name it by ostensive definition. In naming a natural kind, we cannot have the *kind* right in front of us. Even if we could collect all instances of a kind which currently exist, we nevertheless would not have the kind at hand, because a kind is supposed to include instances which have existed in the past and instances that

³ To name a few, the list includes Eddy Zemach, John Duprè, Mark Wilson, Hector-Neri Castañeda, and Avrum Stroll See Eddy Zemach, "Putnam's Theory on the Reference of Substance Terms," *Journal of Philosophy* 73, no. 5 (March 11, 1976) 116–127, John Duprè, "Natural Kinds and Biological Taxa," *Philosophical Review* 90, no. 1 (January 1981) 66–90, Mark Wilson, "Predicate Meets Property," *Philosophical Review* 91, no. 4 (October 1982) 549–89, Hector-Neri Castañeda, "Semantic Holism Without Semantic Socialism Twin Earths, Thinking, Language, Bodies, and the World," *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 14 (1989) 101–26, and Avrum Stroll, "What Water Is or Back to Thales," *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 14 (1989) 258–74

will come into existence in the future. That is to say, in naming we do not have direct access to a kind as we do to an individual. This characteristic of naming natural kinds, as I shall show, has direct consequences for determining what is named.

According to Kripke and Putnam, a natural kind can be named by ostension through paradigmatic instances of a kind.⁴ For example, we point to a glass of water and say, "Let's call this (liquid) 'water' ". In doing so, we have directly named a kind of thing, namely, water. We might be wrong about the properties of the kind being named; water might turn out not to be colorless and tasteless even though we think it is. Should that happen, we would not think we had named something that does not exist, but rather that we had been wrong about the kind of thing we had named. This is so because, according to Kripke and Putnam, in naming we fix the reference directly to what is named, and what we have named is not dependent on the properties we have thought it to possess. In other words, in naming a kind, we directly name "*that kind of thing*"⁵

But what *kind* of thing? A natural response to this question would be, "The kind of which the instances that have been used in naming are paradigmatic ". By answering in this way, however, one has assumed that a group of instances can be paradigmatic of only one definite kind. This is by no means a simple matter. On the issue of the relation between an object and its kind(s) there are at least three views. First, one may think that an object can be in only one kind. For example, one may think that since an object has only one essence it has to belong to only one species which is determined by its essence and that only biological-species terms are natural-kind terms. Holding this view, however, will drastically reduce the scope of the direct reference theory and leave most natural-kind terms (for instance, genus terms and subspecies terms) unaccounted for. The theory of direct reference has been proposed as a theory for naming in general. It should have explanatory power for all direct reference terms of the same mechanism. If a genus term is introduced into the language through the same mechanism as a species term, it should have the same direct-reference character as a species term does. Thus this path would lead to very odd consequences for the direct-reference

⁴ Kripke, *Naming and Necessity*, 122, 136, Putnam, "Meaning and Reference," 702

⁵ Kripke, *Naming and Necessity*, 122

theory. As a matter of fact, neither Kripke nor Putnam seems to have taken this path. Putnam has listed "acid" as a natural kind term, which stands for several compound substances that have different chemical formulas.⁶ Kripke thinks "common names" is an expression "quite appropriate" for natural kind terms, and uses "cow," which stands for the mature female of the genus *Bos*, as an example.⁷ Unless they were to change their views in a drastic way and consequently greatly reduce the power of their theory Kripke and Putnam, I assume, would not accept the view that objects can be in only one kind. They would like their account to apply to all natural kind terms, including species and genus terms.⁸

The second view is represented by writers such as Bruce Goldberg, W. V. O. Quine, John Duprè, and Philip Kitcher.⁹ They have argued that one item may have membership in overlapping natural kinds or classes at the same taxonomic level. For instance, Quine writes, "kinds can . . . overlap, the red things can comprise one kind, the round another."¹⁰ Whether this is true of natural kinds has been a matter of dispute. In biology, for example, Willi Hennig in his celebrated book *Phylogenetic Systematics* maintains that only one taxonomic system can be regarded as privileged, and accordingly that one organism cannot properly belong equally well to two overlapping

⁶ Hilary Putnam, "Is Semantics Possible?" in *Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds*, ed. Stephen P. Schwartz (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 102–32.

⁷ Kripke, *Naming and Necessity*, 127.

⁸ In a recent article, T. E. Wilkerson proposes the view that neither species nor genera are natural kinds, see T. E. Wilkerson, "Species, Essence and the Names of Natural Kinds," *Philosophical Quarterly* 43, no. 170 (January 1993) 1–19. Wilkerson holds that there are many more natural kinds than species and that many natural kinds perhaps only have one member. He even goes so far as to "leave open the very definite possibility that there will be as many kinds as individuals" (p. 16). I leave this view aside for at least two reasons. First, it is a view that neither Kripke nor Putnam is likely to endorse. Second, by reducing kinds to individuals one may be able to avoid many criticisms of the realist view of natural kinds, but at the same time one also rejects the entire concept of a natural kind.

⁹ Bruce Goldberg, "The Linguistic Expression of Feeling," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 8, no. 1 (January 1971) 86–92; W. V. O. Quine, "Natural Kinds," in *Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds*, ed. Stephen P. Schwartz (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 155–75; John Duprè, "Natural Kinds and Biological Taxa", Philip Kitcher, "Species," *Philosophy of Science* 51, no. 2 (June 1984) 308–33.

¹⁰ Quine, "Natural Kinds," 159.

kinds at the same taxonomic level.¹¹ Putnam and Kripke would agree with Hennig in rejecting the second view. There is a third option. It is the view that there is one correct taxonomic theory and one object or instance belongs to only one species and one genus, but not to two or more overlapping kinds at the same taxonomic level. Holders of this view usually rely on the idea of scientific taxonomy, the idea that it is up to the scientists to find out the taxonomic structure of natural kinds. This view is favorable to the Putnam-Kripke theory of direct reference. On the one hand it allows, as Putnam and Kripke intend, a broad application of their direct reference theory to both genus and species terms; on the other hand, it avoids some difficulties that are raised by the Quinean view. For the sake of argument, I will assume the third view is the only correct one.¹²

The third view, however, does not imply that an object can be in only one natural kind, because both species and genera are natural kinds.¹³ Acid is a natural kind (*per* Putnam), but I have every reason to say that H₂SO₄ (sulphuric acid) is also a natural kind. Likewise, cow (the mature female of the genus *Bos*) is a natural kind (*per* Kripke), but I have every reason to say that a species of the genus *Bos* is also a natural kind. Similarly, we can say that apple as well as Red

¹¹ Willi Hennig, *Phylogenetic Systematics*, trans. D. Dwight Davis and Rainer Zangerl (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1979), 9.

¹² This distinguishes my argument from that of many of the above-mentioned philosophers. Mark Wilson's argument, for example, relies heavily on examples of artificial kinds and contends that to distinguish sharply between natural kinds and artificial kinds and to limit the Putnam-Kripke account to natural kinds is "incoherent." Since there are many philosophers who believe that there is, or at least should be, a distinction between natural kinds and artificial kinds, an argument that does not rely on the rejection of this distinction is needed. My argument is also different from the argument presented by Hartry Field, who is primarily concerned with scientific terms such as "mass" and draws his motivating examples entirely from Kuhnian "scientific revolutions." See Mark Wilson, "Predicate Meets Property," *Philosophical Review* 91, no. 4 (October 1982): 549–89, and Hartry Field, "Theory Change and the Indeterminacy of Reference," *Journal of Philosophy* 70, no. 14 (August 16, 1973): 462–81.

¹³ For the sake of simplicity, I use "taxonomy" in a very broad sense. What I say about species and genera applies to biological species and genera as well as to element and chemical compound kinds. Also "species" and "genus" are used in the way that they are in logic, that is, "genus" means a relatively larger kind and "species" a relatively smaller kind or subkind of the genus. Thus, when "species" is used along with "genus," they are intended to stand for, in addition to biological concepts, concepts of two adjacent levels within the taxonomical hierarchy in general.

Delicious are natural kinds. This view poses a difficulty for Putnam and Kripke. A Red Delicious can be an instance of the kind Red Delicious and it can also be an instance of the kind apple. In other words, natural kinds are nested in a taxonomic framework, and within this framework instead of a one-one relation there is a one-many relation between an individual and its kinds. When we point to some Red Deliciouses and name "that kind of thing" the question now is, What kind of thing has been named?

To illustrate this point, let us imagine a possible world *W* (or, for those who do not like possible world semantics, an isolated island people with their own language) in which there are no fruits and consequently no such natural-kind terms as "apple" in the *W* people's language. Let us now throw a number of Red Deliciouses into that world. Suppose the *W* people point to the Red Deliciouses and name that kind of thing "ABC." Let's further suppose the *W* people endorse the Putnam-Kripke theory of direct reference and believe that ABCs do exist even though they might have been mistaken about the properties of these objects, such as roundness, sweetness, and so forth. The problem, however, is that there is a taxonomic hierarchy (for instance, Red Delicious/Delicious/Apple/ . . .) in which kind terms such as "ABC" have to be nested. What "ABC" means depends on at what taxonomic level the term is posited, and its level cannot be clearly determined through paradigmatic instances alone. In the case of ABC, what kind of thing has been named? Red Delicious? Delicious? Apple? Or something even broader in the taxonomic system? At this stage there is no way to tell. If we asked the *W* people what "ABC" meant, they would probably say a natural kind represented by those Red Deliciouses. But if we pressed further and asked whether by "ABC" they meant Red Delicious, Delicious, apple, or something broader than apple in the taxonomic system, they would look at us, puzzled, and probably ask us, What is the difference? Of course, there is a difference. We know there is a big difference. If ABC is Red Delicious, a Macintosh is not an ABC. If ABC is something broader than apple, not only a Macintosh but also a pear might be an ABC. The point is that the *W* people have not recognized the difference.

One may contend that whether the *W* people realize anything or not is irrelevant, and what ABCs are is something they need to discover in the world, not something to be decided by them. In other words, the issue is ontological, not epistemological. This objection confuses the issue. I do not suggest that the way we name objects can change

objects in the world. Even if we assume the realist claim about the independent existence of the world is correct, the above problem for the theory of direct reference remains. While the existence of species is objectively independent of our mind, the existence of genera and subspecies is also objectively independent of our mind. An object is an instance both of a species and of a genus, which are both natural kinds. The issue here is how names are connected to natural kinds in the world, and in particular, how a name is connected to a species instead of a genus or vice versa. It is a matter of naming. We cannot expect a natural kind term to have reference even before the term has been adopted into language. Nor can we discover what ABCs are before we understand what it takes for there to be ABCs. Assuming the Putnam-Kripke realist view of natural kinds is correct, ostension through paradigmatic instances alone does not determine what natural kind has been named.

Taking place in a certain context, an ostensive definition does exclude objects from the kind. For example, perhaps no one in *W*, unless extremely mistaken, would wonder whether a table is an ABC. In our case, however, nothing in the *W* people's minds could definitively determine whether Macintoshes are also ABCs. In naming, the namers usually do not specify features of the kind in great detail as the criteria of the kind they name. Also, as Kripke points out, they may be wrong about these features. Because the contrast between Red Deliciouses and Macintoshes does not occur in the *W* people's minds at the time of naming, the issue of whether ABC includes Macintoshes simply does not arise until after the name has been put into use. After the name has been put into use, it does not bear enough import to determine whether a Macintosh is also an ABC. The problem with the *W* people is thus. On the one hand, Macintoshes share sufficient similarities with Red Deliciouses to be one kind; on the other hand, they also bear sufficient dissimilarities with Red Deliciouses to be a different kind. Therefore, the *W* people have to make a decision as to whether a Macintosh is an ABC, and this decision cannot be dictated by what they had in their minds at the time of naming.

Putnam and Kripke would like to say that it is up to the scientists to find this out. Scientists in *W*, however, can do no better than *decide* whether a Macintosh is also an ABC. Shifting the burden to scientists does not change the nature of the issue. The naming of a natural kind cannot be accomplished once and for all by using paradigmatic instances. The only way to find out more about what kind of thing has

been named "ABC" is to show the *W* people some fruits other than Red Deliciouses and ask them whether these fruits are also ABCs. If we show them some Macintoshes and they call them "ABCs," then probably "ABC" does not mean "Red Delicious." If in addition to Red Deliciouses the *W* people call pears "ABCs," then "ABC" cannot merely mean apple. It is not the case here, however, that the *W* people make a judgment according to a fixed standard, because there is no such established standard. In further focusing on what is named, they need to *decide* whether a Macintosh is also an ABC.

This kind of decision is also a decision about what nature or sameness relation is involved and what kind of thing ABCs are. Putnam maintains that the kind is determined by a certain sameness relation among its instances¹⁴. But what sameness relation? A Red Delicious bears a certain sameness relation to other Red Deliciouses insofar as they are Red Deliciouses. It also bears a certain sameness relation to Macintoshes insofar as both Red Deliciouses and Macintoshes are apples. The *W* people need to make the further decision because the initial ostensive definition does not bear enough import regarding whether, for instance, a Macintosh, which bears a sameness relation with Red Deliciouses at the taxonomic level of apple, is an ABC.

We should note also that the decision is not merely a matter of whether we *call* some objects "ABCs." It has been decided to call both a financial bank and a river bank "bank," yet this does not make them the same kind. To decide to call both Red Deliciouses and Macintoshes "apples," however, is to recognize a certain sameness relation between Red Deliciouses and Macintoshes, and this decision does indicate that they are in a sense the same kind of fruit, namely, apple. That is, to decide whether Macintoshes and Red Deliciouses both are ABCs is to decide what kind of sameness relation is required for something to be an instance of ABC. The decision has to do with what ABC is or what nature ABC has.

One may think that since the *W* people use Red Deliciouses as paradigmatic instances, an ABC must be a Red Delicious. In making this assumption one has hastily ruled out the possibility that, if we later showed the *W* people a Golden Delicious or a Macintosh, they might accept it as an instance of ABC—a possibility that I do not think entirely unlikely. The history of biology shows a history of discoveries of new species and subspecies that belong to some kinds that

¹⁴ Putnam, "Meaning and Reference," 702

have been named. To see why it is not entirely unlikely for the *W* people to accept Macintoshes as ABCs, let us look at another natural kind term, "elephant." The term "elephant" applies to animals of two different species, the Asian elephant and the African elephant. The Chinese counterpart of "elephant" is *xiang*. The term must have been first used to designate the Asian elephant, because it was the only elephant the Chinese could have known when they started using the term. Today *xiang* designates both the Asian elephant and the African elephant. It is reasonable to think the Chinese first used the Asian elephant in fixing the reference and later included the African elephant under the kind name *xiang*. In the same way, it is possible that the *W* people should also take Macintoshes as ABCs.

In deciding what to call an "ABC" there is no necessity compelling the *W* people to call or not to call a Macintosh an "ABC." Were there such a necessity, there would be an exact cross-cultural correspondence between natural-kind terms in two cultures that have the same natural kinds. Obviously, however, we do not have such a uniformity. For example, in Chinese, *Lao-shu* stands both for mouse and for rat, while *Yan* and *Er* stand for wild goose (one that flies) and domestic goose (one that does not fly) respectively. It is possible that, with the same paradigmatic instances, the Chinese have made decisions different from those of English-speakers in introducing these natural-kind terms. The Chinese think mice and rats bear a certain sameness relation in both being *Lao-shu*, while the English think *Yan* and *Er* bear a certain sameness relation in both being geese. Science may prove that they are both right while one way focuses on the species, the other focuses on the genus. The difference indicates the possibility of going either to the species or to the genus from the same paradigmatic instances.

One should not confuse the case outlined above with that of reference changes of natural kind terms. Sometimes terms do change their references. Our case, however, is different. When the Chinese decided that *xiang* also referred to the African elephant, it was not the case that the reference of the kind term *changed* from a narrower taxonomic kind to a broader one. This would have been the case only if the status of the kind term had been already determined. Before the decision was made, however, the taxonomic status of the term was far from having been determined. An ostensive definition alone does not complete the process of naming a natural kind if by naming we mean fixing the reference rigidly to a specified scope which draws a

clear line between what is and what is not of the kind. Decisions following an ostensive definition to further specify the kind are also part of the process of naming. The *W* people would not need to make a decision until they encountered things different from Red Deliciouses but similar enough to them (Macintoshes, for instance) for the *W* people to wonder seriously whether these new things were also ABCs, and they might not encounter such objects in a million years or ever at all. Even after they encountered some objects of this sort, further decisions would still be needed. Generally speaking, when we come across a new object *O* that makes us seriously wonder whether it belongs to a kind (which we have already named in the past without further focusing to determine whether objects like *O* are or are not instances of the kind), we need to *decide* whether it is of the kind.

Therefore, the ultimate reference (or the scope) of a natural kind term is pending and hence indeterminate as long as the entire process of naming is not finalized. The process can never be finalized. Of five hundred million species of animal and plant life estimated to have existed on Earth, 99.75 percent are extinct. There are at least five hundred species of fleas and one hundred species of mosquitoes.¹⁵ There are always new species emerging. Furthermore, we can always imagine an instance (Putnam's XYZ is a good example) that makes us seriously wonder whether it belongs to a kind which has been named, but for which no effort has been made to determine whether that instance is one of the named kind. The ongoing dispute over the identity of water itself shows that the taxonomic status of the natural kind term "water" needs further focusing. The very fact that we are debating over the issue whether XYZ is water proves that the taxonomic status of the term "water" has not been finally determined.

II

Term Indeterminacy and the Impossibility of Necessary Truth. Together with the thesis of the necessary identity of natural kinds is found the following doctrine: If there is a natural kind *K* which has

¹⁵ Ronald C. Pine, *Science and the Human Prospect* (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1989), 18, 74.

been correctly identified as a kind *I* (with the characteristic *i*), and if we imagine a kind *O*, which resembles *I* in almost all aspects, but is not *I*, then, since "*K*" rigidly designates the kind *K*, necessarily *O* cannot be *K*. For example, water has been correctly identified as H_2O , a liquid *X* resembles but is not H_2O , necessarily *X* is not water. Both Kripke and Putnam embrace this doctrine. I believe their conclusion is unwarranted.

There are two ways for a natural kind *K* to be identified as *I*, by definition or by empirical discoveries. *K* is identified as *I* by definition when we name a natural kind *K* that is characterized as *I*. For example, we point to an object and announce "let's call this kind of thing with the feature *i*, '*K*'". By doing so, we identify *K* as a kind with the feature *i*. This does not mean, however, that *K* could not have been otherwise. As Kripke has noted, we might be wrong in our identification. We might later find that there are some instances of *K* without *i*. Therefore, even though we have defined (or, to use Kripke's term, fixed the reference of) *K* as possessing *i*, something that lacks *i* might also be *K*. It is not necessary, therefore, that all *K*s possess *i*. The other way in which a natural kind *K* is identified as *I* is by empirical discoveries. This is the way, according to Kripke, to reach necessary a posteriori truth. As has been noted, a kind may have an inexhaustible number of instances. No empirical examinations can exhaust all instances of a kind. Thus empirical discovery can by no means guarantee necessary identity between *K* and *I*. Even if all instances of *K* we have discovered are *I*s, the taxonomic status of *K* may still need to be determined. Given the nature of natural-kind naming, there is always the possibility of a genus-species (or kind-subkind) relation between *K* and *I*, and thus *K* and *I* are not necessarily identical. In other words, for *K* and *I* to be necessarily identical, "*K*" and "*I*" must both rigidly designate the same kind. Because of the indeterminacy of the ultimate reference of these terms, such rigidity does not obtain, therefore, the necessity of their identity is not warranted.

Putnam's water argument may be put as this: on Twin Earth there is a liquid the chemical formula of which is XYZ. XYZ is indistinguishable from the H_2O of our Earth at normal temperatures and pressures. On Twin Earth XYZ fills up oceans and lakes, people drink XYZ and use it to relieve drought for their crops, and so forth. Is XYZ water? Putnam argues that, since water is H_2O and

XYZ does not bear the sameness relation to H_2O , it cannot be water¹⁶

I contend that, because of the indeterminacy of the ultimate reference of the term "water," there is no necessity that XYZ not be water. As we have said earlier in discussing the ABC case, the *W* people do not know more about what sameness relation has been included in being ABC until it becomes an issue whether fruits other than Red Deliciouses are ABCs, and they need to decide whether, for example, Macintoshes are ABCs. Whether Red Deliciouses and Macintoshes bear the sameness relation to each other at the level of being ABC depends on whether ABC is defined as apple, Red Delicious, or something else, this cannot be decided until an object such as a Macintosh (or at least the description of it) is presented to the namer. In the same way, whether XYZ is water depends on whether it has a sameness relation to H_2O sufficient for being water, and whether XYZ bears a sameness relation to H_2O sufficient for being water depends on the level at which "water" is posited. We cannot say whether the sameness relation would allow XYZ to be water until the decision is made, and this decision is not made until whether XYZ is water becomes a real issue. Given that Red Deliciouses and Macintoshes bear a certain sameness relation in being apples, and that H_2SO_4 (sulphuric acid) and HCl (hydrochloric acid) bear a certain sameness relation in being acid, there are also reasons to think that XYZ and H_2O might bear a certain sameness relation sufficient for both being water.

It may be a fact that we originally used instances of H_2O as paradigmatic instances in fixing the reference of "water" and that so far all instances of water that have been found are H_2O . Does that mean that necessarily XYZ cannot be water? It does not. The Chinese used Asian elephants for the initial ostensive definition of *xiang*, yet the scope of *xiang* was not monopolized by the Asian elephant. It is fallacious to say that, because Asian elephants were used as paradigmatic instances of the kind *xiang*, necessarily the African elephant cannot be a *xiang*. Similarly as *xiang* is a generic (or family) term posited between "mammal" and "Asian/African elephant," "water"

¹⁶ Helen Steward argues that the "is" of this type is "simply predicative," and not the "is" of identity. For the sake of argument, I assume Putnam and Kripke's interpretation is correct. See Helen Steward, "Identity Statements and the Necessary *A Posteriori*," *Journal of Philosophy* 87, no. 8 (August 1990): 385–98.

might be a genus term posited between "H₂O/XYZ" and a taxonomically higher kind.

One may object that for H₂O and XYZ to be two species of the same genus they must have the essential sameness relation, Putnam's point is that, even if XYZ has the same phenomenal properties as H₂O, because it does not have the essential sameness relation XYZ cannot be water. What sameness relation is essential, however, depends on whether it is essential to the species or genus. For example, presumably even though H₂SO₄ does not have the essential sameness relation for being HCl and vice versa, they both have the essential sameness relation of being acid. Even though different species of cows do not have the essential sameness relation for being the same species, they nevertheless have the essential sameness relation for belonging to the same genus. Therefore, even though XYZ does not have the essential sameness relation for being H₂O and H₂O does not have the essential sameness relation for being XYZ either, they nevertheless may have the essential sameness relation for being the same genus. Therefore, it is still possible for them both to be water. Unless Putnam and Kripke choose to hold that only species are natural kinds and have essential properties—and hence to drastically reduce the explanatory power of their theory—they have to face the possibility of the two alternatives illustrated here and hence the possibility of XYZ being water.

Like Putnam, Kripke does not argue on a priori grounds that nothing other than H₂O can be water. In fact, he would probably allow the epistemic possibility that water might turn out to be XYZ, since it is an empirical discovery that water is H₂O and we might have been mistaken about this. Kripke argues that natural-kind terms are rigid designators,¹⁷ and since we use a natural-kind term *T* to designate the kind, nothing which is not the kind can be *T*. For example, he writes, "we use the term 'tiger' to designate a species, and . . . anything not of this species, even though it looks like a tiger, is not in fact a tiger."¹⁸ I do not think this argument really adds anything in Kripke's favor. First, speaking of a kind, we all agree that, if *T* designates a kind, anything not of this kind cannot be an instance of *T*. But the question

¹⁷ For some problems with Kripke's concept of rigid designation see Chenyang Li, "Kripke's Two Definitions of Rigid Designation," *Iyyun. The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly* 41, no. 1 (January 1992) 63–71.

¹⁸ Kripke, *Naming and Necessity*, 121.

is precisely whether something is of this kind. Second, even though the term "tiger" is currently used as a species term, it is not necessary that tiger be one species. Assuming that we are right in believing that all tigers in the world are in fact one species (that is, *Felis tigris*), we nevertheless cannot rule out the possibility that there might be another species of tiger. Suppose we now find another species which has genes different from *Felis tigris*, but resembles *Felis tigris* enough (as the African elephant resembles the Asian elephant). Is it tiger? To say we must call it "tiger" may be an overstatement, but given what has happened to *xiang* ("elephant") it seems at least that we cannot say that necessarily the species is not one of tiger. As a matter of fact, even Kripke himself does not rule out the possibility that there might be "two kinds of tigers"¹⁹. If there were another kind of tiger, a tiger of that kind would not have to be a *Felis tigris*. Therefore, "tiger = *Felis tigris*" is not necessarily true.

In the case of water, the disagreement is precisely about whether XYZ is water (the kind). We can all agree that if XYZ does not belong to the natural kind water, then it is not water (a tautology). But the dispute is really about whether water is a taxonomically broader kind which contains H₂O and XYZ as subkinds. Just as there might turn out to be two kinds of tigers, there is no reason to assert that since H₂O is water, XYZ cannot be water: there might be two kinds of water and both H₂O and XYZ might thus both be water. Just as there are two kinds of elephants but the term "elephant" is still a natural kind term designating the family *Elephantidae*, if there are two kinds of water, the term "water" can still be a natural kind term designating the genus water. Therefore, "water = H₂O" is not a necessary truth.

Perhaps at this point one may want to say that, if there might be two species of tigers or XYZ might be water, this only shows that identity statements like "tiger = *Felis tigris*" and "water = H₂O" are untrue, and such an eventuality would do no harm to Kripke's thesis because he only says that *if* such a statement is true it is necessarily true. What, however, is the truth condition for such a statement? We have shown that the ultimate reference of a natural kind term is indeterminate. If by saying that a statement like "tiger = *Felis tigris*" or "water = H₂O" is true we mean the two involved terms have the same ultimate reference, we can never be in a position to say that such a statement is true. We simply do not know whether the two terms

¹⁹ Kripke, *Naming and Necessity*, 121

have the same ultimate reference. In that case, Kripke's thesis that "if such a statement is true it is necessarily true" would mean little, if not nothing, because the antecedent is never warranted. It seems unlikely that Kripke would be content with this agnostic view. If he refuses this view and takes the position (as most people would) that we can know whether such statements are true, he has to accept that a statement such as "tiger = *Felis tigris*" is true if and only if every instance of tiger is also an instance of *Felis tigris* and vice versa. This has to be so in *this* world or Kripke's thesis would be a cheap tautology. His thesis would not amount to much if it were to say that if every instance of tiger is an instance of *Felis tigris* and vice versa *in all possible worlds*, then "tiger = *Felis tigris*" is a necessary truth; because that is the way we define necessary truth. If the proposition, "tiger = *Felis tigris*," is meant to be meaningful, and if there is any reasonable way for us to discover this proposition to be true or false, it has to allow us to discover this in this world. It has to allow us to rely on empirical scientific evidence we can gather in this world. Science has provided sufficient evidence—if anything counts as sufficient evidence—that every instance of tiger is an instance of *Felis tigris* and every instance of *Felis tigris* is an instance of tiger in this world. Therefore, "tiger = *Felis tigris*" is true in this world. But it is by no means a necessary truth.

Let me emphasize that my argument is not that in a possible world the word "tiger" or "water" might be used in a different way; for instance, that people might call a chair "tiger." That is something about which everyone would agree. My argument is that in this world the ultimate reference of such terms is indeterminate, and therefore, statements such as "tiger = *Felis tigris*" do not express necessary truths. If "tiger" turns out to be a term designating a broader scope than "*Felis tigris*," is it the same term as the term "tiger" we have been using so far? The answer has to be affirmative. Just as *xiang* has remained the same term while now being used to designate the African elephant in addition to the Asian elephant (it remains the same entry in the dictionary), "tiger," if its use were expanded beyond *Felis tigris*, would still be the same term in the same sense as *xiang* is. As Kripke would agree, in that case we would say not that "tiger" had changed its meaning but that we had discovered a new species of tiger. The same holds true for "water." Because of the indeterminacy of the ultimate reference of natural-kind terms and the need for further focusing of these terms, the discovery of a new species is only a step forward in the process of the term's being further focused.

III

A Brief Summary. I have argued that, because we have no direct access to a natural kind as we do to an individual object, when we name a natural kind exactly what the kind is cannot be determined without further focusing. The process of further focusing can never come to an end. What happens when we later find some instances which are so similar to the paradigmatic instances that we have used in naming that we ask whether these newly discovered instances belong to the same kind? This situation calls for us to decide whether the new instances are the same kind as the paradigmatic instances and, which is the same thing, what the kind is. Therefore, when we have two natural kind terms, *A* and *B*, and " $A = B$ " is true, there is the possibility that they are related as genus and species (or better, as kind and subkind), even though the genus may have only one species (but it could have more). My argument has direct consequences for the Putnam-Kripke thesis of the necessary a posteriori truth of identity statements of natural kinds. I have shown that either Putnam and Kripke have to say that it can never be found out whether such statements are true, or they have to accept a truth condition which does not guarantee necessary truth. Either way, the Putnam-Kripke thesis of necessary identity is flawed.²⁰

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²⁰ This paper was developed from a part of my Ph D dissertation, "Toward A Contextual Approach To The Question Of Being," written at the University of Connecticut. I would like to take this opportunity to thank Joel J. Kupperman, my major adviser, and Samuel C. Wheeler III and Garry M. Brodsky, my associate advisers, for their guidance and assistance. Under the title, "Identity, Necessity, and Natural Kind Terms," an early version of this paper was presented at the Ninetieth Annual Meeting of the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association in Louisville, Kentucky, on April 23–26, 1992. I would like to thank Tomis Kapitan for commenting on the paper. My gratitude also goes to Eddy M. Zemach, Ruth B. Marcus, Ruth G. Millikan, Donald L. Baxter, Crawford L. Elder, and John G. Troyer for their valuable comments and suggestions. The revision of this paper was partly supported by office facilities provided by the Department of Philosophy of the University of Connecticut in the summer of 1993.

POSTMODERNITY OR LATE MODERNITY? AMBIGUITIES IN RICHARD RORTY'S THOUGHT

LOUIS DUPRÉ

IS POSTMODERNISM A NEW, perhaps decisive stage that completes the unfinished project of modernity, as Jürgen Habermas and, in some respects, Jean-François Lyotard claim? Or does it intend to break with that project altogether, as Derrida and Rorty maintain? The latter, more radical thesis tends to go hand in hand with the assumption of an essential continuity between modern and premodern thinking. Among those who defend the latter thesis we find Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida, and Rorty. Rorty's position has become somewhat questionable, however, since in the Introduction to his recent *Essays on Heidegger and Others* he distances himself from the very term "postmodern." "The term," he writes, "has been so over-used that it is causing more trouble than it is worth. . . . It seems best to think of Heidegger and Derrida simply as post-Nietzschean philosophers—to assign them places in a conversational sequence which runs from Descartes through Kant and Hegel to Nietzsche and beyond rather than to view them as initiating or manifesting a radical departure."¹ This way of contextualizing the so-called postmoderns with the moderns differs from the radical discontinuity Derrida proposes and that Rorty himself formerly appeared to advocate. Western philosophy would then follow a single course from its Greek beginnings to the present with some distinct swerves, of which the so-called postmodern is one, but with no radical interruptions. According to the recent view the ontotheological principles that guided Greek and medieval thought continue to operate in the rationalist and, indirectly, in the empiricist philosophies of the modern age. This essay will argue that there is discontinuity between modern and premodern and continuity between modern and postmodern.

¹ Richard Rorty, *Essays on Heidegger and Others*, vol. 2 of *Philosophical Papers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 1–2.

More and more interpreters agree that the basic critique of modern culture began with Hegel, the first philosopher to reflect systematically on modernity and the first to proclaim that philosophy is nothing else than the thought of its age² He was also modernity's first radical critic. Yet Hegel limits his critique: he continues to accept the principle of subjectivity, both in its Cartesian epistemic and in its Lutheran religious formulations, as the great discovery of modern thought. "That substance is essentially subject, is expressed in the idea which represents the Absolute as Spirit—the grandest conception of all, and one which is due to modern times and its religion."³ In this statement and in the entire *Phenomenology of Spirit* which it prefaces it appears that modern philosophy holds the key to solving whatever problems it has created. The Enlightenment, in Hegel's judgment, had unduly narrowed and thereby perverted the modern principle of subjectivity. That perversion alone is responsible for the alienation of the modern mind. Hegel's wayward followers Marx and Kierkegaard dispensed a similar mixture of praise and blame on modernity. Marx's critique of the capitalist economy extends to the earliest beginnings of the modern epoch. It derives entirely, however, from the Enlightenment principle of self-validating freedom. Marx so strongly emphasized that principle as to eclipse the idea of the individual subject that had given rise to it. The philosophy of the subject is a romantic illusion; the subject is itself the outcome of social-economic *praxis*. Thus Marx brought the modern idea of freedom to its extreme conclusion while reducing what had been its basis to one of its consequences. Clearly, Hegel and his followers were as much sons of the Enlightenment as they were its enemies.

I

The Postmodern and the Premodern With Nietzsche the scene changes altogether. He questioned the foundations of modern thought and traced them back to Greek and Christian sources. The

² See Arnold Ruge's comments in *Deutsche Jahrbucher*, 1841–594, quoted in Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, trans. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), 51.

³ G. W. F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, trans. J. B. Baillie (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), 85–6.

primacy of the *logos*, sustained since Socrates and defied in the doctrine of the Incarnation, implied for him a denial of the deeper impulses of life, a denial that exploded in the nihilism of late modern culture. Heidegger and his postmodern interpreters have followed Nietzsche's indictment of the Platonic assumptions of all Western philosophy and, with it, of the need for a rational founding of thought. As Rorty points out, the preoccupation with an absolute foundation determines the entire early critique of modernity. "The typical German story of the self-consciousness of the modern age (the one which runs from Hegel through Marx, Weber, and Nietzsche) focuses on figures who were preoccupied with the world we lost when we lost the religion of our ancestors."⁴

The issue now has widened from an original critique of modernity to a critique of the basic principles that underlie Western thinking. The comprehensiveness of Nietzsche's and Heidegger's critique is well known. Derrida and Rorty likewise assume an essential continuity between the principles of modernity and those that set Western thought on its course. Others detect a fundamental *caesura* between modern and premodern thinking. No less critical of the subject-object opposition and of the primacy of the subject as interpretive principles of the real, these thinkers nevertheless deny that the roots of those positions are to be found in either Greek *theoria* or Christian theology, although they recognize that both undeniably created the conditions for their possibility. Conservatives like Leo Strauss, Eric Voegelin, and Alasdair MacIntyre agree on this position with such liberal advocates of modern culture as Habermas and Hans Blumenberg.

Rorty's attacks on epistemology place him in the "continuity" camp. In essential matters modernity remains entirely in line with the premodern tradition. Descartes merely made into a methodological principle what Plato and all his successors had consistently done, namely, to validate thinking by appeal to allegedly evident rules of rationality. Already in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* Rorty considers it the special merit of Sellars's and Quine's refutation of the dualist scheme of the given and its conceptual framing that they completely refuse to present yet another epistemology after having overthrown the existing one. Rationality, then, no longer consists in

⁴ Richard Rorty, "Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodernity," in Richard Rorty, *Essays on Heidegger and Others*, vol. 2 of *Philosophical Papers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 171.

conforming to standards inside or outside the idea but in a behavioral attitude of constant self-correction. What counts as reliable knowledge is decided by the rules of the community, not by some divine rules of truth⁵ Cognitive justification becomes a matter of raising "behaviorist questions."⁶ Neither the empiricist principles of Anglo-American analysts nor the idealist principles of so-called Continental philosophers legitimate rational discourse. Only the *praxis* of communication does so. Such a position obviously goes far beyond a critique of Cartesian dualism in opposing any kind of epistemology. To attack the representational theory of modern philosophies is one thing, to attack the rational justification of knowledge is quite another. The fundamental point of Rorty's critique of Descartes' project applies to all earlier theories of knowledge. Beyond the short-range target of modern representation he aims at the more remote classical and medieval theories of knowledge.

I believe that this position at least partly predetermines the answer to the original question, Does postmodernity consist in the fully conscious concluding part of modern thought or does it break with it? Jean-François Lyotard characterizes modern thought by its belief that our epistemic and emancipatory achievements—the two great triumphs of science and social progress—remain divorced from one another. To legitimate these triumphs and to overcome their divorce philosophy has attempted to unite them in a metanarrative. Metanarratives, however, are both superfluous and ineffective. "[Narratives] define what has the right to be said and done in the culture in question, and since they are themselves a part of that culture, they are legitimated by the simple fact that they do what they do."⁷ Postmodernism therefore abandons the futile search for legitimation beyond the narratives. Surprisingly Lyotard does not consider this abandonment necessarily to result in a break between modern and postmodern. In *The Postmodern Explained Correspondence, 1982–1985*,⁸ he asserts that "the postmodern is undoubtedly part of the modern

⁵ Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 187.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 173.

⁷ Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 12.

⁸ Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Explained: Correspondence, 1982–1985* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).

. . . [and is] not modernism at its end, but in a nascent state and this state is recurrent." In the same collection he suggests that in post-modernism modernity works itself through its own problems.⁹

It is indeed a fact that philosophy has not always had second-level justifications. Plato's philosophy began with open, nonfoundational conversations. The early, so-called Socratic dialogues assume no metanarrative rules. The discussion remains wide open to all viewpoints, as long as the speaker does not contradict himself. To be sure, the dialectic follows some kind of inductive *method*—the very term originates in the dialogues. No conversation, however, can make sense without remaining consistent and without obeying some internal teleology. Such consistency cannot count as a "foundation" in the later sense.¹⁰ In the late dialogues Plato did assume certain principles as absolute. The good, the true, and the beautiful serve as nonnegotiable constants in an otherwise still flexible discussion—these dominant ideas, however, would soon be deconstructed by Aristotle.

Does not the equation of truth and language, however, decisively separate the entire tradition (including the humanist tradition) from postmodernism? The very term *logos*, meaning both "reason" and "word," has defined the course of the entire tradition. Precisely this "logocentrism" is, according to Derrida, what postmodern thought attempts to exorcize. But has it succeeded? In his essay, "Two Meanings of Logocentrism,"¹¹ Rorty rightly attacks Derrida's project as utopian. Conversing meaningfully leaves us no choice but to be "logocentric." We may dispense with the kind of logocentric metaphysics that pursues intuitive insight, total evidence, and incontrovertible truth, but we cannot dispense with the basic rationality of speech.

Interestingly enough, even Rorty's qualified rejection of "logocentrism" has precedents. In fact, this rejection marks the very

⁹ *Ibid.*, 80

¹⁰ "The Platonic dialogues were not self-grounding at all. They indeed had a foundation, but one with a false bottom, for the foundation harbored fateful assumptions about reality, and what founded such a foundation? (Who guards the guardians?)" Gary Percesepe, "The Unbearable Lightness of Being Postmodern," (lecture presented at Barry College, Florida, on April 7, 1990)

¹¹ Richard Rorty, "Two Meanings of Logocentrism," in Richard Rorty, *Essays on Heidegger and Others*, vol. 2 of *Philosophical Papers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 107–18

beginning of modern thought I am, of course, referring to the nominalist theory of language. Its advent had been prepared by an earlier de-ontologization of language. Originally the Christian tradition had considered all human words as in some way partaking of God's divine Word and hence directly disclosing the nature of the real, but at some point in the twelfth century the relation between speech and the real underwent a basic transformation. Knowledge ceased to be thought of as interiorizing the known reality in an "internal word," the *verbum internum*, that was subsequently externalized in spoken or written language. The new theory separates the *verbum* (both internal and external) from the *res*. The difference appears clearly in Abelard, who writes, "Words primarily establish understanding of things, not of themselves, through the intermediary signs we use, words direct the mind of the listener to the likeness or image of a thing so that in the likeness it may contemplate not the likeness itself but the thing for which it stands."¹² The medieval dialectician here declares words to be *about* things, rather than directly expressing their internalized reality. They point beyond themselves toward a reality which remains forever distant from them. That distinction found its way into later Scholasticism, beginning with Aquinas.

Nevertheless the link between word and reality remained solid. In language humans actualize the full intelligibility which the forms of all things possessed before their origin in time. The word and the real coincide in an eternal divine Word that is both expressive and creative. Derrida has pointed out how a systematic and historical link exists between the theology of the Logos and the intrinsic meaningfulness of language. Only because human words partake in that divine Word in which the essential intelligibility of creation rests can we safely assume that they intrinsically correspond to the very nature of the real. "The intelligible face of the sign remains turned toward the word and the face of God. . . . The sign and divinity have the same place and time of birth."¹³ This theological interpretation goes to the heart of medieval realism. The separation of sign from signified, however, did not occur as a result of the secularism of the Enlightenment, as Derrida claims. Already the nominalist crisis had severed the bond between

¹² Peter Abelard, *Logica ingredientibus*, in *Philosophische Schriften*, ed. Bernhard Geyer (Münster: Aschendorff, 1919–1933), 1:313. I owe this reference to an unpublished paper by Edward Cranz.

¹³ Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 13–14.

human words and the divine Logos. If we can no longer take for granted that God's decrees follow an intelligible pattern, then we also cease to trust that the eternal Logos secures the basic veracity of human speech. Henceforth words are to be used at man's own risk and discretion and without the traditional guarantee that, if properly used, they touch the real as it is in itself.

This dissolution of the medieval bond with reality essentially changed the nature of language. By detaching words from things it provided an indispensable condition, albeit a negative one, for language to develop freely beyond its function of naming the real. Language, of course, had never been purely referential, otherwise poetry could not have existed; yet a full awareness of the independence of the *verbum* with respect to the *res* hardly existed before nominalist philosophy. Unintentionally this awareness created a wider space for metaphorical creativity. Nominalism consistently harbored a suspicion of the verbal screen hung between the mind and the direct observation through which alone we have access to reality. The empirically-minded nominalists tended to attack those who granted final authority to any word other than Scripture. Their contempt for "verbal knowledge" survives in Francis Bacon's critique of the four "idols," all of them created by linguistic deception, that block the road to scientific knowledge.

This early modern nominalism reappears with surprising clarity in Derrida. "From the moment there is meaning," he writes, "there are nothing but signs. We think only in signs. . . . One could call *play* the absence of the transcendental signified as limitlessness of play, that is to say as the destruction of ontotheology and the metaphysics of presence."¹⁴ The verbal sign forever defers the presence which it signifies: "Language is entirely intertextual—words refer to one another in wholly contingent manners without touching any translinguistic reality."¹⁵ Rorty quotes this text but considers it an inadequate expression of the postmodern distance between word and reality. He writes, "The right idea, according to us nominalists, is that 'recognition of meaning' is simply ability to substitute sensible signs (*i.e.*, marks and noises) for other signs, and still other signs for the

¹⁴ Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, 50

¹⁵ *Ibid*

latter, and so on indefinitely."¹⁶ The regress of linguistic interpretation cannot be halted by any self-validating intuition. Such is indeed the only consistent conclusion to be drawn from nominalist premises. Language is that permanent absence which persistently signifies a presence. The reference to a negative theology that forever seeks the God who never shows his face is particularly appropriate, because it was a theology of this sort that initiated this kind of thinking. Postmodernism here finds itself at the very gateway to modern thought: it draws conclusions never drawn before. Perhaps Habermas is right in regarding postmodernism as a completion of the modern project.

The de-ontologization of language alone, however, does not exhaust a program that includes far more than the dismantling of rationalism. Postmodernity also exposes the power structures hiding under allegedly rational rules. For Foucault those structures, while presenting themselves as determinations of reason, express in fact a will to power.¹⁷ Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, and Heidegger already had shown how the impulse behind the process of knowing is that of a willful choice. For these thinkers, traditional scientific knowledge was constituted "by a 'will' whose power inexorably established itself in the hard and fast 'ordering' of the form of life, in the 'legitimation' of the types of discourse, and especially in the insistence upon 'truth'."¹⁸ Here also one need not look far to find early modern precedents. Rorty himself approvingly refers to Bacon's refreshingly open pragmatism. The ex-Lord Chancellor saw through the value-free pretenses of knowledge when he equated it with power. We must suspend judgment on this favorable evaluation until we have attempted to understand the significance of Rorty's own pragmatism. There is no doubt, however, that a thoroughgoing voluntarism entered Western thought at the dawn of the modern epoch. Once again it arrived in the wake of nominalist theology. When William of Ockham, in an attempt to overcome the Greek idea of an intrinsically necessary world, defined creation as wholly contingent and dependent on a Creator whose main attribute was unconditioned power, he set up a different, all-encompassing model for human freedom. Instead of consisting in rational determination freedom became identified with

¹⁶ Rorty, "Two Meanings of Logocentrism," 115

¹⁷ See, for instance, Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Harper and Row, 1976).

¹⁸ Klaus Hedwig, "The Philosophical Presuppositions of Modernity," *Communio* 18, no. 2 (Summer 1990): 174-5

self-choice. This innovation transformed the very meaning of political authority and law. It even affected the concept of intellectual activity. Truth did not simply coincide with grasping the equation of idea and reality. The determining movement was the assent of the will. Knowing meant assuming full responsibility for one's affirmation. To be sure, no direct road leads from that early modern voluntarism to Foucault's genealogies of power structures. The trend, however, had been well established and was never interrupted. It was the moving power behind Montaigne's skepticism and Descartes' epistemology.

II

The Postmodern and the Late Modern When we come to the late modern sources of postmodern ideas continuity is even more obvious, though harder to evaluate. How much does Rorty's pragmatism owe to Dewey's? Only a careful interpretation of Dewey's work will enable us to decide whether it is an essential source or merely serves as a projective model for Rorty's own work. The most obvious link is with hermeneutic philosophy. Begun in the early nineteenth century by Friedrich Schleiermacher and developed into a separate class of science by Wilhelm Dilthey, the rise of hermeneutics undoubtedly exercised a determining influence on postmodern thought. Explicating undeveloped themes in Heidegger's thought, Gadamer insists that so-called founding principles be replaced and understood in their complete cultural context. All past theoretical, aesthetic, and moral arguments reach us out of an integral tradition. The critic must define the significance of the single work within the total context of that tradition. We cannot decide the meaning of aesthetic or moral judgments in the light of our prevailing ideas. This is particularly important in ethics where the dominance of Kantian ethical theory has made us well-nigh blind to such past determinants as custom, habit, affection, and moral feeling. Postmodern ethics pits these ancient factors discussed by Aristotle, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume against the determining elements of the late modern tradition.¹⁹

In their polemics with late modern trends and anti-trends postmodern writers are divided on the point where modernity became

¹⁹ See F. De Wachter, "Ethiek modern en postmodern," *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie* 52, no. 2 (1990): 207-29.

problematic and what, if anything, of modernity they should reincorporate into their own thinking. For Habermas, who considers the modern project valid but diverted from its original course, this is, of course, a critical question. He locates the diversion in Hegel's response to the Enlightenment. To reunite the three spheres of mental life that Kant had separated without being able to synthesize them in his transcendental subject Hegel set up a synthesis beyond that subject. The Absolute Spirit would do once again what religion had done in the past: it would reunite the *dissecta membra*. According to Habermas, however, precisely in the theory of the Absolute Spirit Hegel's philosophy completely derailed. Instead of a genuine synthesis it became a pseudoreligious superstructure. In it the basic summons toward human emancipation, clearly enunciated in the Enlightenment, got lost altogether. Instead of liberating the Enlightenment's rationality from the narrow confines of reason grounded in subjectivity Hegel puffed subjectivity itself up into an absolute. He thus brought to a head a problem that had remained latent in the Enlightenment, namely, that this reason denounces all unconcealed forms of oppression "only to set up in their place the unassailable domination of rationality," thereby fashioning for itself an uncanny immunity in the form of a thoroughly concealed domination.²⁰

The Left Hegelians, especially Moses Hess and the young Marx, rid philosophy of the false assurance of its subject-centered reason by replacing that reason with *praxis*. As Habermas recognizes, however, the link that connected the concept of *praxis* to a narrow production paradigm, and the absence or inadequate justification of the normative foundation of *praxis* as critical principle, made that concept itself into a tool of instrumental reason. Once shorn of all metaphysical and religious content reason tends to regress to a "rationality in the service of self-preservation gone wild"²¹—reason becomes an instrument of raw power. Nevertheless Habermas remains optimistic that the concept of rational *praxis* in the form of total, unenforced communication may still offer a viable alternative to the "diverted" project of modernity. In the process of proving this thesis he manages to incorporate all postmodern writers from Heidegger to Derrida into his list of failed attempts in the search for such an alternative. All postmodern thinkers have tried to overcome the problems of late modernity by a

²⁰ Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, 56

²¹ *Ibid.*, 112

simplistic and wholly abstract negation of the self-referential subject. Foucault simply declares that the late invention of "man" has now come to an end altogether. Such a critique of modernity contains an undialectical rejection of the principle of subjectivity. It exacts a high price for its opposition to modern thought in that it condemns not merely the objectifying relation to the self but all the promises of the principle of subjectivity as well. What is needed is a socialization of the principle. Thus, Habermas claims, can be achieved through a new paradigm of mutual understanding focused on "the performative attitude of participants in interaction who coordinate their plans for action by coming to an understanding about something in the world."²² Henceforth there will be no more "transcendental doubling," no more transcendental ego, in fact no more philosophy, but only social sciences to render explicit "the pretheoretical grasp of rules on the part of competently speaking, acting, and knowing subjects." The social sciences no longer aim at a transempirical intelligibility but rather "at the actually exercised rule of knowledge."²³

As I understand it, Habermas's idea of unenforced rational communication is a broadened version of the young Marx's *praxis*. He presents it as an alternative to the late modern diversion of the Enlightenment project that will set that project back on its original course. Against the value-free equivalence of Foucault's multiple power structures Habermas upholds the Enlightenment norm of emancipation from all forms of repression. Contrary to the narrow concept of rationality that inspired the original idea of emancipation, however, rationality for Habermas is not an ideal superstructure: it emerges from *praxis* and is attained in and through communicative action. Rationality remains normative, yet reason must be "desublimated" and brought down to the level of open-ended *praxis*. But to dismiss the norm of rationality, as postmodern writers do, undermines the very possibility of social critique. Habermas's position, then, may be considered postmodern only with respect to late modernity (the period of the diverted Enlightenment), not with respect to modern thought as a whole or even to the Enlightenment. Even the desublimation of reason remains an essentially modern, Left Hegelian concept. Indeed, the Marxist concept of *praxis* brings to a conclusion a development that began when the intrinsic rationality of the world order came to

²² Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, 296

²³ *Ibid.*, 298

be replaced by a subjective one of human making. In the modern response to the nominalist separation of intelligibility and reality the role of reason became transformed from normative to functional. In the end reason came to be viewed as emerging from the productive act only to further that act as its instrument.²⁴ A functional rationality, however, becomes reduced to the practical rule of methodic effective action. Where no norms exist beyond the developing process itself, the distinction between a "right" and a "wrong" course of action becomes ultimately unsupportable. Once theoretical reason becomes a subordinate moment of *praxis*, it must forfeit the authority to raise questions of ultimate legitimacy. To remedy this problem it does not suffice to widen the idea of *praxis* beyond its original meaning of social production. All communication requires structures of authority if it is not to degenerate into pure anarchy. But such structures can operate only when they repress certain kinds of behavior. Which structures ultimately favor an open communication and at what point do they become repressive? The act itself provides no answer to those questions. Power contains no basis for criticizing its exercise. Such a critique, however, is essential to Habermas's theory of communicative action. Ultimately he justifies it on the basis of what Lyotard calls a metanarrative, namely an ideal of emancipation that functions as a universal norm. Rorty has taken Habermas to task for inconsistently hanging on to a universalistic philosophy, with all its problems, in order to support liberal politics.²⁵

III

Rorty and the Past. Compared to other postmodern writers Rorty appears remarkably consistent in his attempt to abandon the basic assumptions of modern philosophy. We should not forget, of course, what Rorty himself has recently written about the conversational sequence of "post-Nietzschean" writers with Hegel, Kant, and Descartes. The discontinuity occurs within a continuous context.

²⁴ Max Horkheimer, *The Eclipse of Reason* (New York: Seabury Press, 1974), 3.

²⁵ Rorty, "Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodernity," 164–76.

Nevertheless Rorty spells out the implications of the new turn in philosophy more sharply than others. He foregoes Habermas's meta-narrative of emancipation as well as Lyotard's utopian ideal of anarchism. Against Derrida he relativizes the significance of philosophical argument itself. Philosophy is not "utterly pervasive," as Derrida and his followers claim. It appears so only to those who have made a profession of it. Philosophical writings, especially postmodern ones, merely look "absurd and little worth reading to many other people."²⁶ As one who—like others inside the profession—finds himself increasingly drawn to poetry, narrative prose, and spiritual writings so as to acquire what philosophy initially promised most and today delivers least—namely, meaning in those aspects of life that truly matter—I find it hard to disagree with this assessment. Certainly late modern philosophy, whether of the analytic or of the deconstructionist variety, badly suffers from that formalist "dryness" with which Rorty (after Iris Murdoch) has charged it. Contrary to its unpalatable prose Rorty's own writing is lively, witty, and responsive to common sense. It revives some of the stylistic qualities of the Enlightenment, a time when composing philosophical treatises was the occasional occupation of gentlemen of leisure and taste, elegant in expression and moderate of opinion. Yet the Enlightenment may well be the last ghost Rorty wants to reawaken. The radically antiphilosophical intent behind the civilized expression reaches beyond the moderns all the way to Plato and Aristotle. It is not that Rorty does not "like" good philosophy, modern no less than ancient. In fact, the depth of his acquaintance with the history of philosophy makes it questionable whether he has time left to like anything else. He feels, however, that philosophy, and especially modern philosophy, fails to respond to the practical questions and interests of our contemporaries.

Has Rorty as fully bidden farewell to philosophy (and particularly modern philosophy) as the multiple volumes of his *Philosophical Papers* claim? Or, is he selecting some modern philosophers for approval while rejecting others? Above all, is he interpreting the chosen ones within their own context, or is he using them as forerunners for his project, however far removed that project may be from their original intentions? In the essay on Habermas and Lyotard from which I have quoted there appears an intriguing statement "Suppose, as I suggested above, one sees the wrong turn as having been taken with Kant,

²⁶ Rorty, "Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodernity," 108

or better yet with Descartes. Then one might see the canonical sequence of philosophers from Descartes to Nietzsche as a distraction from the history of concrete social engineering which made the contemporary North Atlantic culture what it is now with all its glories and all its dangers."²⁷ In support of the availability of such an engineering theory even within the course of modern philosophy's actual history he places the name of Bacon at the head and that of Dewey at the tail end of his alternative sequence. As I understand Bacon and Dewey, however, both men were very much philosophers in the modern tradition. No doubt their pragmatic attitude sets them apart from the common fold. The whole question, however, turns precisely around the nature of that pragmatism. What did pragmatism mean for Bacon and even for Dewey before Rorty enlisted them in his own program? Were they as antiphilosophical as he presents them to us?

The case of Bacon appears rather straightforward. He wanted to steer philosophy away from a purely theoretical course toward more fruitful goals than the mere satisfaction of intellectual curiosity. He continued, however, to attribute the practical power of philosophy to the theoretical light it generates independently of those material benefits. In *The New Organon* Bacon describes his intention as instituting a metaphysical investigation of "forms which are . . . eternal and immutable."²⁸ These forms, to be sure, are not Platonic ideas. He defines them as fixed laws, established by divine decree, or as "axioms" to be "educed" from experience (2.17; 2.10). Bacon's "forms," by his own account, "for the most part" escape the senses (2.6), since they usually appear in clusters. But he *postulates* their existence on the basis of observations that he interprets to be their effects. His "metaphysics" aims at approximating as closely as possible to the indivisibly simple—which at one point (2.8) he equates with mathematical simplicity. It is true that he considers the ultimate aim of philosophy to be the conquest of nature. But was that not also the aim of the much maligned Descartes who considered the branches of the tree of knowledge abundant in practical fruits of morality and medicine? More importantly, is not Bacon's concern with power the most straightforward expression of that voluntarism in which, more than in rationality,

²⁷ Ibid., 174

²⁸ Francis Bacon, *The New Organon*, trans. R. L. Ellis in *The Works*, ed. James Spelling, R. L. Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath (London, 1858–74), vol. 8, bk. 2, aphorism 9. Future references in the text will be to book and aphorism numbers.

consists the characteristic feature that distinguishes the modern from the premodern period? It is through the will and in the exercise of power that the subject-centered culture of modernity defines its identity, for Descartes as well as for Bacon.

John Dewey's pragmatism presents a more complicated case, not only because he belongs to late modernity (strongly influenced by Hegel), but also because he aimed at a kind of cultural integration akin to the one Rorty himself appears to pursue. There can be no doubt about Dewey's practical orientation. But the fundamental question nevertheless remains, Was he a forerunner of postmodernism? Or did he, despite his philosophical uniqueness, continue to accept the modern assumptions?

In his central essay on "Pragmatism, Relativism and Irrationalism"²⁹ Rorty introduces James and Dewey as breaking with the Kantian epistemological tradition altogether. "As long as we see James or Dewey as having 'theories of truth' or 'theories of knowledge' or 'theories of morality' we shall get them wrong." In one way this is undeniable. The pragmatists debunked the ideal of a value-less theory for the reason mentioned by Rorty, namely, that it fails to enlighten us as to why it is good to believe a certain truth. Yet the question why it is good to believe requires itself a decided turn to theory—a turn neither James nor Dewey were reluctant to take. That they emphasized *phronesis* by no means implies that they dismissed *theoria*. One cannot survive without the other. Nor would James have been satisfied with an ethical position that requires nothing more than conformity to social norms. He does indeed speak of success as the test of a theory. But *what* we consider successful depends on theoretical norms.

How is success to be absolutely measured when there are so many environments and so many ways of looking at the [social] adaptation? It cannot be measured absolutely, the verdict will vary according to the point of view adopted. From the biological point of view Saint Paul was a failure, because he was beheaded. Yet he was magnificently adapted to the larger environment of history.³⁰

²⁹ Richard Rorty, "Pragmatism, Relativism and Irrationalism," in Richard Rorty, *The Consequences of Pragmatism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 166–75.

³⁰ William James, *Varieties of Religious Experience* (New York: Collier Books, 1961), 296.

How are we to evaluate the various measures of success and failure against one another if not in some theoretical frame? How little James considered the theoretical investigation of truth a trivial enterprise became increasingly clear when in his later years he considered this investigation indispensable for founding his "radical empiricism" and wrote *The Meaning of Truth*. James felt indeed that to the traditional equation of idea and object we must add the personal stake we have in the idea. Truth must "make a difference." This addition, however, neither invalidated the ancient definition nor weakened his theoretical interest in it. Indeed, in pointing out the significance of personal interest James was not out of touch with earlier discussions of metaphysical issues. John Smith has compared James's interest factor with that of the opposing parties in Kant's discussion of the antinomies of pure reason. Even for the great rationalist, metaphysical issues are not exclusively a matter of theoretical knowledge or ignorance.³¹

Dewey's concern with philosophical theory seems even stronger. He does indeed discard all questions about Being or ultimate causes as meaningless. Nevertheless he grants metaphysics a legitimate place in his thought. He defines it as the study of the "generic traits" that all subjects of knowledge share.³² Rather than being objects of a special science, these generic traits must be considered after other sciences have exhausted their specific nature. Not to do so results in a reductionist interpretation of the real.³³ Nor did Dewey avoid purely theoretical problems of epistemology. Rorty is, of course, right in denying that Dewey's *Experience and Nature* contains "a metaphysics of experience" in any traditional sense of that term. His assumption that the "generic traits" of experience can serve as substitutes for Aristotle's "ultimate causes" rests on the antimetaphysical notion that physiology and history coincide in some point. "Nothing is to be gained from an understanding of human knowledge by running together the vocabularies in which we describe the causal antecedents of knowledge with those in which we offer justifications of our claims of knowledge."³⁴

³¹ John E. Smith, *Purpose and Thought: The Meaning of Pragmatism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), 122–3.

³² John Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, 2d ed. (La Salle: Open Court, 1929), 46.

³³ Smith, *Purpose and Thought*, 143–4.

³⁴ Richard Rorty, "Dewey's Metaphysics," in Richard Rorty, *The Consequences of Pragmatism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 81.

Dewey's "interactions," in which mind and matter partake, form a poor substitute for Kant's synthesis of intuitions and concepts. All of this criticism is amply deserved.

Nevertheless the very clumsiness of Dewey's attempt to justify his strange mixture of Hegelianism and naturalism shows all the more his intention not to abandon the modern search for foundations. Nor can we regard his pragmatist emphasis on interest a denial of the objectivity of knowledge. The context of theoretical knowing has nothing to do with personal preference, nor does it imply a subordination of all knowledge to nontheoretical purposes. What does distinguish James's and Dewey's approach from the traditional one is that they considered the concrete method whereby we acquire knowledge an essential part of epistemological inquiry itself. In John Smith's words, with James and Dewey the manner of testing knowledge entered into the very definition of it.³⁵ In the light of these self-conscious philosophical concerns, it is hard to understand Rorty's assessment that Dewey saw no interesting future for a distinct discipline called philosophy.³⁶ That this interest did not run along the lines of classical metaphysics is true enough. It conformed all the more, however, to a typically modern concern with epistemology. For these and other reasons I doubt whether James's and Dewey's pragmatism can be compared with Nietzsche's radically antiphilosophical project, as Rorty claims in the Introduction to *Essays on Heidegger and Others*. There certainly is more here than blueprints for social engineering.

Social engineering itself, however, as we have historically known it has never been far from philosophical theory. Would Marxism ever have become the powerful social ideology it did in fact become if it had remained an economic theory or a plan for social reform? Marx knew better. Its real force even in the later writings is derived from a highly conceptual rethinking of Hegel's dialectic. Even National Socialism, for all its crude anti-intellectualism, owed much of its strength to bits and parcels of undigested Hegelian and Nietzschean philosophy. Few "social engineers" have been able to avoid philosophical theory altogether. Machiavelli was one who did. Lest one think that these links of philosophy with the bogey bears of history merely prove the detrimental impact of philosophy upon the good life

³⁵ Cf. John E. Smith, *America's Philosophical Vision* (University of Chicago Press, 1992), Introduction and chap. 2.

³⁶ Rorty, "Dewey's Metaphysics," 52.

in society, we may remember that also the most successful social and political experiments—resulting in such landmarks as the Declaration of Independence, the American Constitution, and the French Declaration of Human Rights—are imbued with the philosophies of the Enlightenment right down to their wording

Rorty argues against “dryness” in philosophical discourse. The most stultifying language in American social theory, however, is not that of the Puritans or of the enthusiasts of Enlightenment philosophy—Jonathan Edwards, Thomas Jefferson, and John Adams remain eminently readable—but that of the social Darwinists who, since Andrew Jackson, have combined sociological dryness with ideological vulgarity in the political conversation. It would be hard to find support for this approach in Dewey, who rather than abolishing philosophical ideals attempts to reconstrue them into a more powerful unity

IV

Conclusion. Continuity and Discontinuity. How wide a gap separates the modern from the postmodern? The gap is unbridgeable if we define modern thought by those factors that stand central in the controversy, namely, as a system that originates in the subject and that subordinates direct experience to a second order of epistemological foundations. The more fundamental presuppositions of postmodernity, however, must be traced to earlier, modern sources. In this paper I have drawn attention to two of them: the nominalist, self-referential meaning of language (Derrida’s persistent “absence” of the real) with its consequent openness to unrestricted interpretation, and the deep-seated voluntarism that supports logocentric structures. Both are embedded in modernity. As Nietzsche, the real father of the postmodern movement, understood, they have resulted in an awareness of radical contingency that throws the human condition back upon itself without granting it any ulterior foundation.³⁷

The origin of this sense of radical contingency lies in the breakup of that ontotheological synthesis which had given classical, medieval, and early humanist culture its remarkable coherence as well as its

³⁷ Cf. Kenneth Schmitz, “Postmodern or Modern-plus?” *Communio* 17, no. 2 (Summer 1970) 152–66

confidence in knowing itself integrated with all reality. When this synthesis began to unravel in the fifteenth century, language and reality, power and dependence, immanence and transcendence separated into oppositional poles. Metaphysics, the traditional reflection upon this unity, came to be replaced by an epistemological search for "foundations" of each of these fragments. When thinkers in our century at last realized the full extent of the revolutionary transformation, they did so more in the wake of the self-destruction of European culture in the two wars than as a result of new intellectual insights. The drive to take stock of our situation has led from one philosophical movement to another. Logical positivism, existentialism, structuralism, and deconstructionism are not so much antimetaphysical trends as attempts to articulate a consistent postmetaphysical position. The polemical character of the discourse reveals the continuing malaise the Western mind experiences in accepting its cultural fragmentation. Postmodernism—if we may still use the inaccurate term—the latest but probably not the last stage in this process of self-clarification, has clearly exposed how much the traditional principles of metaphysics have come to conflict with the modern mind. Yet its persisting preoccupation with those principles reminds us of the first thinker clearly to announce this conflict and to illustrate it in the irreducible division of the major areas of consciousness in his work. I mean, of course, Immanuel Kant and his memorable statement of the continuing drive to metaphysics: "Dieser Damon lässt sich ja niemals beschwören" ("This demon can never be exorcized")³⁸

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³⁸ The nucleus of this essay consists of a lecture presented at the Symposium *Rorty on Ethics and Politics* at the Free University of Brussels in May 1993.

PHILOSOPHY AS PERFORMED IN PLATO'S *THEAETETUS*

EUGENIO BENITEZ AND LIVIA GUIMARAES

κατὰ σμικρὸν γὰρ προϊόντες λελήθαμεν ἀμφοτέρων εἰς τὸ μέσον
πεπτωκότες

Theaetetus 180e5–6

I

PHILOSOPHY BEGINS IN WONDER—so says Socrates in the *Theaetetus*—but where does it end? The *Theaetetus* itself ends in such a puzzling way as to be the cause of apparently interminable dispute. Although its theme is the nature of knowledge, neither Socrates nor his interlocutors ever present a definition that gains unanimous approval. The definitions of knowledge as perception (αἴσθησις), as true opinion (ἀληθὴς δόξα) and as true opinion with an account (λόγος) are all rejected. This fact has understandably inclined most interpreters to maintain that the dialogue fails to reach its explicit goal.¹ Nevertheless, Socrates' attitude about the apparent failure of his conversation with Theaetetus is markedly distinct from his express attitude (ironic or not) in those early dialogues with which the *Theaetetus* is often compared. Whereas early dialogues conclude with self-deprecation²

¹ The roll of authors who fall into this camp may be found in Rosemary Desjardins, *The Rational Enterprise* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 203 n. 23. For the most recent additions see David Bostock, *Plato's Theaetetus* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), v, 274, and Seth Benardete, *Plato's Theaetetus Part I of The Being of the Beautiful* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), ix. Benardete calls the *Theaetetus* "by far the most skeptical of Platonic dialogues." A list of various ways in which the dialogue is sometimes supposed to fail is supplied by Miles Burnyeat, *The Theaetetus of Plato* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1990), 235.

² See *Charmides* 175a–176a, *Lysis* 223b3–4, *Hippias Minor* 376c, *Hippias Major* 304e2–3. Unless otherwise indicated, all citations of Plato refer to John Burnet, *Platonis Opera* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1900–07). All translations, unless otherwise indicated, are by Eugenio Benitez.

and exhortation to continue the quest,³ the *Theaetetus* concludes in satisfaction, indifferent to the possibility of further study (210b11–c4).⁴ As midwife Socrates has successfully delivered Theaetetus of his phantom offspring, beyond that he can do no more (210c4–5). Thus the apparently negative conclusions of the dialogue are at least not negatively intoned, and readers can barely avoid the suspicion of having missed something. One response is to argue that an authorized definition of knowledge can be found by a careful reexamination of the very arguments Socrates rejects.⁵ But the fact that our suspicion is aroused by a dramatic consideration (Socrates' attitude of satisfaction) commends a search for resolution through the drama, however that might happen to bear on the problem of knowledge.

This paper examines the *Theaetetus* in the light of its juxtaposition of philosophical, mathematical and sophistical approaches to knowledge, which we show to be a prominent feature of the drama. These are obviously not the only grounds for understanding the conclusion of the *Theaetetus*, but the examination based on them has a persuasive result. Although it suggests that clarifying the nature of philosophy supersedes the question of knowledge as the main ambition of the *Theaetetus*, it hardly obviates Socrates' discussions of perception, opinion, and λόγος. In fact, the characterization of philosophy presented in the *Theaetetus* is intrinsically related to the question about knowledge. Just prior to the beginning of his epistemological investigation Socrates affirms (and his interlocutors accept) that knowledge and wisdom are the same (ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἐπιστήμη καὶ σοφία, 145e6),⁶

³ See *Laches* 200e–201b, *Euthyphro* 15c11, *Protagoras* 361c.

⁴ Notice the equipollence of the two conditionals that begin Socrates' last speech, Ἐὰν [b11] εἰάντε [c1]. Moreover, even though Socrates enjoins Theodorus and Theaetetus to meet with him the next day, he no longer explicitly seeks a definition of knowledge. To be sure, Socrates remains deeply concerned about knowledge, since he asks the Eleatic Stranger to say what a philosopher is, but our point is just that this cannot be construed as a narrowly epistemological concern.

⁵ For a forceful defense of this view see Desjardins, *The Rational Enterprise*. Compare also Ellen S. Haring, "The *Theaetetus* Ends Well," *Review of Metaphysics* 35 (1982) 509–28, and Samuel Wheeler, "The Conclusion of the *Theaetetus*," *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 1 (1984) 355–77.

⁶ Hackforth's influential note on this passage maintains that σοφία should be translated "skill" or "expertise" and not "wisdom", see R. Hackforth, "Notes on Plato's *Theaetetus*," *Mnemosyne* 10 (1957) 128. Hackforth might have supported this view by appeal to the immediate context, which concerns such τέχναι as geometry, astronomy, music and arithmetic (145c7–d2), perhaps that was his intention in stressing the faithfulness of the dialogue.

an identification of which we are persistently reminded⁷ Thus, the question about "knowledge itself" (146e9–10) cannot altogether be separated from the question of knowledge insofar as it is related to wisdom. The link between knowledge and wisdom provides transit to the digression on philosophy (172b–177c), in which connection it is worth recalling that in Plato the term *φιλοσοφός*, variably used to name or describe, is never far removed from its original sense, loving wisdom or knowledge⁸ Consequently, we treat the *Theaetetus* as a work whose explicit question about knowledge is directly linked with the deeper issue of what philosophy is⁹

In what follows we argue that the *Theaetetus* ends well not because it discretely supplies a definition of knowledge, but because it clarifies a vision of philosophy in which the failure to arrive at an unobjectionable definition of knowledge—a failure which may always be expected (cf 146a1)—is outweighed by the intellectual and moral gains of the search.¹⁰ The evidence for this thesis comes in three stages First, we examine the dramatic organization of the *Theaetetus*, specifically the disposition of the characters toward each other and toward the general question about knowledge. This examination helps to underscore the importance of a conspicuous part of the dialogue's plot, namely the confrontation between philosophy, mathematics, and sophistry. Second, we discuss how this confrontation reveals the divergent aims and expectations (as Plato depicts them)

"to the practice of Socrates, as arising naturally out of the experience and interests of Socrates' interlocutor" By the same token we must recognize how faithful to practice it is of Socrates to foist upon his interlocutors an identification or definition with several levels of meaning, the more philosophically interesting of which they are usually unaware

⁷ See for example 161a–162e, 166d–167d, 171c–172b See especially 170a6–b1, where the person who is *σοφώτερον* differs from others in nothing else than knowledge (*τὸ εἰδέναι*)

⁸ See Liddel, Scott, and Jones, *A Greek-English Lexicon* (Oxford Oxford University Press), s.v. *φιλοσοφός*, as adjective or substantive For *φιλοσοφός* as a description in Plato see *Lysis* 212d7, as a name see *Republic* 5, 480a.

⁹ Thus, it seems to us, is the only conceivable ground for the lively speculation that the *Theaetetus* may be the so-called missing dialogue, the *Philosopher*, which completes, by a kind of hyperbaton, the trilogy begun with the *Sophist* and the *Statesman*, (see *Sophist* 217a, *Statesman* 257a) On the speculation, see Benardete, *Plato's Theaetetus*, ix

¹⁰ Coincidentally, our argument supports Burnyeat's "final suggestion" that the *Theaetetus* shows how "epistemology becomes superficial when the securing of an objection-free definition of knowledge is made an end in itself", Burnyeat, *The Theaetetus of Plato*, 241

of mathematics, philosophy, and sophistry. Finally, we argue that the conception of philosophy performed in the *Theaetetus* shows that Plato accepts the mathematician's aim of objective certainty, but rejects the view that philosophy must provide demonstrations. Thus, from the mathematician's point of view, philosophy comes to resemble sophistry. Plato explicitly acknowledges this in the *Sophist*, where the task of understanding the resemblance between philosopher and sophist requires him to make clear the difference between image and reality.

II

The Characters and Dramatic Organization of the Theaetetus

Characters in Platonic dialogues often function as paradigms,¹¹ or in other words, as personifications of types. In general, it would be a mistake to emphasize the personal significance of a Platonic character over his or her significance as a type. For example, the acute irony of Plato's dialogue about temperance—that its main character, Charmides, was to become one of the Thirty Tyrants—should not eclipse Charmides' role within the dialogue itself as a (putative) exemplar for temperance (157d6). Likewise, the fact that Aristophanes is responsible, in part, for the charges ultimately brought against Socrates is less significant for his role in the *Symposium* than the more general fact that he is a comic poet. Even more to the point, when Socrates speaks to a general in a dialogue about courage, or to a professional divine in a dialogue about holiness, the crucial thing is the type of interlocutor he speaks to and not so much that it is Laches or Euthyphro. In short, it seems reasonable to suppose that Plato's choice of characters for a dialogue is dictated primarily by a consideration of types, which types are then instantiated (often in stark or extreme

¹¹ On the idea of persons as "living exemplars" see Antonio S. Cua, *Dimensions of Moral Creativity* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1978), chap. 3. Cua considers paradigmatic individuals insofar as they are a "source of actual conduct for moral agents," and follows Jaspers in including Socrates among this group. See Karl Jaspers, *Socrates, Buddha, Confucius and Jesus: The Four Paradigmatic Individuals*, trans. Ralph Manheim (New York: Harvest Books, 1957). We extend the notion of paradigmatic individuals to include exemplars of viewpoint or intellectual disposition.

fashion) by specific persons. Think of Lysis in this capacity. his unparalleled beauty marks him figuratively as *πρώτον φίλον* (219d1), the nature of which it is the main task of the *Lysis* to discern. Consider how Philebus in the dialogue named for him is the paradigmatic hedonist: by speech and act he demonstrates his unflinching commitment to pleasure (12a7–8, 15c7–9). This speculation about Platonic characters provides a useful way of approaching the dramatic structure of the *Theaetetus*.

There are really four main characters in the *Theaetetus*. Theaetetus himself, Theodorus, Socrates, and Protagoras.¹² Let us first consider the type represented by each of these characters, along with the most relevant features of their particularizations. In regard to these personal notes we attend here primarily to Theaetetus and Theodorus, since, in our opinion, their characters best reveal the organization of the dialogue. We reserve discussion of some pertinent characterizations of Socrates and Protagoras for sections III and IV, where philosophy is contrasted first with mathematics and then with sophistry. After our discussion of the characters as types we can elucidate their significance for the discussion of knowledge.

(1) *Theaetetus*. The key mark of Theaetetus's character is his youthfulness, which is to say his potential, and this potential has two foci. the determinate set of possibilities which may be realized in him (his prospect) and the mere ability to be formed in one direction or another (his pliancy). The magnitude of Theaetetus's prospect is staggering. There are first of all the remarks in the prologue about his bravery and general nobility, followed by Theodorus's incomparable praise (143e–144b). Then there is the passage in which Theaetetus describes how he defined powers (incommensurable lengths),¹³ which anticipates the work of *Elements* 10 attributed to him. Nevertheless, in the *Theaetetus* he is still too young for that accomplishment. Though he shows signs of one day surpassing Theodorus, his subordinate position is explicitly acknowledged. For example, Socrates

¹² Protagoras, of course, is not actually present, but such speeches spring from Socrates in his name that one has difficulty keeping this in mind (see 162d5–e7, 166a3–168c2). Notice also how Socrates keeps up the pretense of Protagoras's presence, twice addressing him by name (170a5, 170c2).

¹³ For the interpretation of *δύναμις* as "incommensurable length" see Miles Burnyeat, "The Philosophical Sense of Theaetetus's Mathematics," *Isis* 69 (1978), 489–513.

compares Theodorus's praise of Theaetetus to praise of a budding runner who, despite his prospect, cannot yet compete at the highest level (148b–c). When Theodorus tries to avoid taking part in discussion by claiming that Theaetetus can perform better than his wizened seniors, Socrates silences him with the response, "But not better than you, Theodorus" (168e). Thus the dialogue emphasizes Theaetetus's prospect as such, and not merely his prospect as a geometer, but also his general intellectual and moral prospect¹⁴

The other side of Theaetetus's potential is pliancy, a feature suggested by his zeal and amazement with respect to intellectual matters (145d3, 155c8–10). As an enthusiastic auditor Theaetetus is easily persuaded (162d34, cf. *Sophist* 236d). Perhaps the best evidence of this can be found in the inconsistent way that Theaetetus, as the dialogue begins, has already been molded under the influence of Theodorus, Protagoras, and Socrates. Consider first the influence of Socrates and Protagoras. Theaetetus says he cannot stop worrying about the sort of questions Socrates asks (148e), but it should be easy to stop worrying if he understands and accepts the Protagorean *homo mensura*, with which he claims to be thoroughly familiar (152a). As a measure of all things himself, he should be aware that whatever answer he gives to a Socratic question is true (for him). The joint influence of Theodorus and Protagoras on Theaetetus is even more paradoxical. How is it possible for a budding geometer to accept that "knowledge is *nothing else than* perception" (151e2–3; emphasis added)? Theaetetus presents his definition with the formal neatness of a mathematician, but apparently fails to recognize that as he and Socrates construe it the definition is inimical to abstract geometry.¹⁵ Third, the influence Theodorus has on Theaetetus, though not incompatible with the influence Socrates hopes to have, still falls short of it

¹⁴ It is somewhat difficult to tell how Plato stands as regards the realization of Theaetetus's intellectual prospect. The prologue emphasizes his moral character, and the dialogue looks forward to his work in geometry. There is no indication, however, of any achievement in philosophy by Theaetetus.

¹⁵ It is possible that in Theaetetus's statement of the definition, *αἴσθησις* means something like "apprehension," but Socrates quickly restricts it, with Theaetetus's agreement, to "sense-perception." Thus is at least an indication of how easily Theaetetus's views can be molded. For a careful examination of how the meaning of *αἴσθησις* is narrowed throughout the *Theaetetus* see Michael Frede, *Essays in Ancient Philosophy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 3–8.

Theaetetus's mathematical training enables him quickly to grasp the sort of question Socrates is asking, but it also apparently disposes him to assimilate all knowledge to a mathematical model. At least this is what we observe in his comparison of philosophical definition to mathematical definition of incommensurable lengths. Socrates of course encourages this comparison, but it is worth considering that his reason for doing so is to reveal a limitation of the mathematical model. In view of the fact—for it is a fact—that Theaetetus fails to answer the philosophical question about knowledge in the same way as he did the mathematical question about incommensurable lengths, we must consider that Socrates' inducement—"Come then, as you so beautifully pointed the way just now, try and imitate the answer about lengths" (148d4–5)—is ironic.¹⁶ It is certain, at any rate, that the very example by which Socrates induces Theaetetus to make a comparison with mathematics—the analytic-minded definition that clay is earth mixed with water—is susceptible to objections later brought to bear against defining a whole in terms of its parts. Plato writes with these objections already in mind, and consequently we must read Socrates' encouragement as a stage in the elenchus, not as satisfaction with the mathematical model of definition.

When one combines the two aspects of Theaetetus's youthfulness—prospect and pliancy—it becomes obvious how much is at stake in his development. Theaetetus's development, after all, is what Socrates is most concerned about at the start of the dialogue (143d). Theaetetus is not a fully formed or deformed person. He needs to discern where he would be led if he consistently adopted the point of view of Theodorus, Protagoras, or Socrates about what knowledge is. Theaetetus is already adept at geometry, but he is not exclusively a mathematician. He has read the doctrines of Protagoras, but he is not a dogmatic proponent of Protagoreanism. He is about to have a discussion with Socrates, but he does not understand much of philosophy. He is just a pupil, not yet committed to any doctrine, and still open to influence and discovery. This is what we mean when referring to Theaetetus as representing the type, "youth."

(2) *Theodorus* In Theodorus we find an acknowledged expert in several mathematical sciences. What is most remarkable about

¹⁶ Socrates uses the same language at *Symposium* 199c—clearly ironically in this case—as a rhetorical tactic to draw Agathon into discussion.

Theodorus, however, is that he has limited himself exclusively to mathematics. The only activity he is depicted as engaging in outside of the discussion about knowledge is geometrical proof.¹⁷ He was at one time a friend of Protagoras, as we are persistently reminded,¹⁸ but he abandoned “mere speeches”¹⁹ at an early age in deference to geometry. Theodorus is a serious man (145c) who finds conversation disagreeable, saying that he is not used to it and that he is beyond the age to get used to it (146b). In fact, he does everything he can to avoid becoming a party to the discussion (162a–b; 165b). He says, however, that conversation befits the young and improves them. How are we to take his point about the relation between philosophical discussion and youth?

Theodorus’s point about improvement seems at first to indicate a favorable attitude towards philosophy, but his favor extends only so far. We can observe this in the curious episode in which Socrates, speaking with Protagoras’s voice, criticizes himself on behalf of Theodorus, since Theodorus will not come to the aid of his friend (164e). Two criticisms are relevant to Theodorus’s disposition toward philosophy: (1) Socrates’ philosophical arguments rely on plausibility (*πιθανολογία*) rather than proof (*ἀπόδειξις*), which from the point of view of geometry makes them worthless (162e), and (2) Socratic discussion is playful instead of serious (167e), which is certainly “not Theodorus’s way” (145c2). The rhetorical structure of this episode forces us to suppose that these are criticisms Theodorus harbors against Socrates but which he decides not to voice. In Socrates’ view, then, Theodorus conceals a mature disdain for philosophy, which he understands as a game for youngsters. In this respect his attitude comes close to that of Calicles in the *Gorgias*, who maintains that philosophy is harmless and even an aid to education if practiced moderately in youth, but that “whenever a man who is already older still practices philosophy, the matter becomes ridiculous” (485a4–7). Indeed, Socrates manages to engage Theodorus in discussion only by appeal to his seriousness (168d, cf. 169c).

¹⁷ See 147d, 162e, 169a. On the meaning of *ἐγγραφει* (147d3) we follow Burnyeat, see Burnyeat, “Philosophical Sense,” 505 n. 57.

¹⁸ See 161b, 162a, 164e, 168c, 171c.

¹⁹ See *ψίλοι λόγοι*, 165a2. The phrase is not uncommon in Plato, he uses it, for example, at *Symposium* 215c7 where it means “mere words” and at *Phaedrus* 262c, where it means something like “abstract discussion.” Theodorus’s meaning must be closer to “mere words,” since as a geometer he can hardly have turned away from the abstract.

Theodorus's disregard for conversation appears to stem from a conflation of philosophy and sophistry. He readily accepts the distinction between *πιθανολογία* and *ἀπόδειξις*, and while he stands with geometry on the side of proof, both philosophy and sophistry, which employ "mere speeches," stand on the side of persuasion. It is worth noting that the similes and metaphors Theodorus chooses to describe Socratic conversation immediately suggest that Socrates is a sophist. Theodorus speaks of getting "tripped up" (165b1), compares Socrates to Sciron and Antaeus, and imagines himself being forced to wrestle in arguments (169a–b). At one point Socrates even chides Theodorus for thinking of him as a "sack of speeches" (161a8).²⁰ Thus although Theodorus represents the type "mathematician," he is an extreme version of that type, since he will only recognize as known what can be demonstrated. All else is a matter of persuasion.

(3) *Protagoras*. In Protagoras we meet the sophist *par excellence*, and Plato spares him none of the standard epithets and clichés of sophistry.²¹ He is "omniscient" (152c8), "clever" (154d8), "renowned" (155d10), "subtle" (156a3), and "disdainful" (161c7); he is skilled in the art of verbal battle (154e), aims at mere verbal consistency (164c; cf. 154d), charges large fees, and plays to the crowd (161e). The distinctive mark of Protagorean epistemology, however, is subjectivism.²² That Plato treats subjectivism as a unifying feature of sophists, where "sophist" is taken in the most general sense, is clear from his awkward and mostly unsatisfactory attempt to force the views of Homer, Epicharmus, Heraclitus, and certain subtle contemporaries of Socrates to amount to the Protagorean thesis (152e; 160d). Protagoras's subjectivism emerges as the polar opposite of Theodorus's objectivism as a mathematician. Although Protagoras requests that any refutation of his view come in the form of a demonstration,

²⁰ Λόγων θύλακον. The translation here is Benardete's.

²¹ Not all of the descriptions which follow are applied directly to Protagoras, but they are applied indirectly to him insofar as they apply to sophists generally.

²² Burnyeat argues that Protagoras in the *Theaetetus* is a relativist, not a subjectivist, see Myles Burnyeat, "Protagoras and Self-Refutation in Plato's *Theaetetus*," *Philosophical Review* 85 (1976) 172–5. The repeated gloss on Protagoras's *homo mensura* as "how things appear to each is how things are for each" (152a, 154a, 158a, 162c, 166c–167e), however, shows that Plato thought Protagoras to be a subjectivist.

his subjectivist thesis, taken in the extreme form agreed to by Socrates and Theaetetus, makes demonstration vain and unnecessary.²³ For the sophist, persuasion is everything, and wisdom amounts to the power to change appearances (166d). Thus, Protagoras represents the type, "sophist" (read: "subjectivist")

(4) *Socrates* If there is any sense to the view that Socrates speaks for Plato, then it follows that Socrates represents the philosopher. But even if, as seems reasonable, we reject the outright identification of the two, it is difficult to suppose that the character Socrates is not depicted as a philosopher in the *Theaetetus*. This is brought out rather comically, however, for the philosopher described in the digression from 172 through 177 is a caricature of Socrates, in some ways resembling him closely and in other ways singling him out by contrast.²⁴ First we will note the contrasts. The philosopher, says Socrates, is at leisure (172d4), does not know the way to the Agora (173c8–d1), has no clue or concern about the genealogy or inheritance of his fellow citizens (173d6–8), does not know that he doesn't know (173e1), studies the heavens and the earth (173e5–6), never "condescends" to what is nearby (174a2), and does not know his neighbor (174b2) or even whether he is a human being (174b3). Socrates in the *Theaetetus* is certainly not at leisure, since he must meet Meletus's indictment against him that very day (210d1–4), and he can hardly be unaware of directions to the Agora, his favorite haunt. He is concerned to ask after Theaetetus's family line (as it turned out, he knows Theaetetus's father and something about the inheritance), and he knows some divine genealogy as well (155d). Moreover in the *Theaetetus* Socrates reaffirms his usual claim to ignorance (150c; cf. 187c; 210c). If we can appeal to the autobiographical sketch of the *Phaedo*, Socrates has by the year 399 B.C. already abandoned his youthful study of heaven and earth. He condescends enough to talk about mud (147a). Of all people Socrates claims to be most concerned about his fellow citizens.²⁵ The direct opposition on these points between

²³ For a thorough defense of this view see Edward N. Lee, " 'Hoist with his own Petard' Irony and Comic Elements in Plato's Critique of Protagoras," in *Exegesis and Argument*, ed. Edward N. Lee, Alexander P. D. Mourelatos, and Richard M. Rorty (Assen: Van Gorcum and Company, 1973), 226–39.

²⁴ For discussion of the dramatic elements of the digression and their significance with respect to Socrates see Scott R. Hemmenway, "Philosophical Apology in the *Theaetetus*," *Interpretation* 17 (1990) 323–46.

²⁵ See *Apology* 36c, *Gorgias* 521d.

Socrates and the philosopher of the digression is too striking and extensive to be coincidental. We cannot deny, however, either that Socrates always aspires to be a philosopher or that he has no intention ever of becoming the abstract and aloof philosopher of his own description. The description, then, must be a parody, and the fact that it calls attention to Socrates shows that he is the standard on which the parody is based.

There are, however, positive similarities between Socrates and the philosopher. The philosopher is concerned with "what is" (172d). The sort of questions he asks are general and metaphysical, such as, "What is man?" (174b). He abandons questions of particular acts of justice or injustice in favor of an inquiry into justice and injustice themselves (175c). He seeks a proper method by which happiness can be obtained and misery avoided (175c). It is not shameful to him to appear worthless when it comes to making flattering speeches (175e). In short it is his aim to become as much like God as possible (176b). In the case of these descriptions Socrates seems once again to be the model. It is not just that we know from other dialogues that Socrates is incessantly inquiring into what is and asking questions like "What is man?" and "What is justice itself?" but also that we have Aristotle's testimony (cf. *Metaphysics* 1078b18–30) that Socrates was the first to do so. In the *Protagoras* one finds Socrates searching for a method by which happiness can be obtained and misery avoided, and in the *Apology* (17b–c) he seems unabashed about his inability to make flowery speeches as long as he tells the truth (see also *Symposium* 199a–b). The other philosophers of Socrates' day did not ask the same sort of questions as he, nor did they concern themselves with ethical matters in the way described here. The model for Socrates' description of the philosopher once again appears to be himself, this time more directly.

Since the philosopher of the digression looks like an equivocal mixture of Socratic and anti-Socratic elements, it may seem that we cannot take Socrates as representing the type "philosopher," but that that would only result if we were to deny that the anti-Socratic elements are parodical. Such a denial puts an interpreter in the embarrassing position of assuming that Plato has both ceased to think of Socrates as a philosopher and perversely used the nonphilosopher Socrates as a mouthpiece to make the point. We prefer to suppose that the irony in the digression is Socratic rather than Platonic, and we shall have more to say about Socrates' reasons for irony presently. Our point here is only that the digression gives us good reason to

suppose that Socrates is being posed to the reader (though not to Theodorus) as the model of a philosopher.

We are now in a position to survey the dramatic organization of the *Theaetetus*. As types the last three characters just discussed—mathematician, philosopher, sophist—are ideally suited for the inquiry about knowledge. In view of their direct concern with reasoning (λόγος) they have the strongest claim to understand what it means to know. In their particular manifestations all three are especially involved with the education of the young,²⁶ the type instantiated by Theaetetus. When it comes to education the cast of the *Theaetetus* is especially striking: it consists of a precocious orphan and three potential “trustees” (ἐπίτροποι) of his intellectual development. This orphan-trustee metaphor is crucial to the structure of argument in the *Theaetetus*, for it establishes an overarching “custody battle” between mathematics, philosophy and sophistry, and in so doing indicates that the epistemological outlook of each is to be considered mainly in opposition to the other two.

The image of orphan and trustee is established at the outset when Socrates notes that Theaetetus’s father, Euphronius of Sunium, was a man of great substance (οὐσία; 144c7) and Theodorus adds that the trustees have squandered his estate. Socrates later uses this same image metaphorically to describe Protagoras’s orphaned doctrine of perception (which Theaetetus maintains) and to imply that Theodorus is its custodian (164e). Thus in keeping with the dialogue’s sustained analogy between physical and psychic progeny we are led to reconsider Socrates’ initial remark about Theaetetus’s inheritance. What Socrates means by οὐσία at 144c is not certain. On the surface he is talking about Euphronius’s wealth, which is how Theodorus understands him,²⁷ but that may not be all. Socrates is talking about what Euphronius bestowed to Theaetetus, but he makes his point immediately after noting that Euphronius had exactly those moral and intellectual gifts which Theodorus described Theaetetus as having.

²⁶ The demand for Theodorus as teacher is explicit from the beginning (143d8–e1, cf. 145d1–5), as is Socrates’ interest in the development of Athenian youth (143d4–6). The demand for Protagoras, because it is obvious (cf. *Protagoras* 310c–e), neither receives nor needs mention (though the fact that he had students is made explicit, 152c10).

²⁷ Compare *Republic* 1, 329e. That Theodorus takes οὐσία to mean wealth is obvious from his use of the word χρήμα, 144d3.

Perhaps, then, Socrates is most interested in Theaetetus's psychic inheritance, and his concern is whether it may be squandered as well. Socrates comes on the scene as Theaetetus's deliverer (151c–d)

If the dialogue establishes a competition between Theodorus, Socrates, and Protagoras, then Theaetetus, who admits he does not know what knowledge is, may have to make an uninformed choice between three quite different epistemological perspectives. Accordingly, Socrates depicts Protagoras's views as sweet food for thought (157c2–3)—a depiction reminiscent of *Protagoras* 313a–314c, where the point is *caveat emptor*.²⁸ In the *Protagoras* judgments about which intellectual foodstuffs are beneficial and which are harmful require not only a “doctor of the soul” (313e2)—in which capacity Socrates there functions—but the advice of “father, brother and friends” (313a9–b1, cf. 314b4–5). Theaetetus lacks the opportunity of his father's advice, however, and Socrates' preeminence as intellectual guardian, so clear in the *Protagoras*, is uncertain in the *Theaetetus*. In the *Protagoras* young and able-minded Hippocrates is already a friend of Socrates and has approached him for help (though not of course the help he actually receives). Theaetetus, on the other hand, has never met Socrates and so must treat him with the same caution that he might treat any purveyor of wisdom. Readers of the *Theaetetus*, we suggest, stand in much the same position. The dialogue asks us to suspend our epistemological patrimony as well as any prior allegiance to philosophy, and only then to judge between the tempting views offered by Protagoras, Theodorus, and Socrates. In this respect Plato is being scrupulously honest.

The foregoing analysis of the characters suggests a structure of the dialogue in which the central issue remains the question of knowledge, but in which the point of that question stretches beyond the attempted definitions. Theaetetus is the instrument through which a confrontation is established between Socrates, Protagoras, and Theodorus. Each of these characters represents a certain approach to epistemology. Their meeting establishes a set of oppositions which Plato will use to clarify the issue of knowledge: mathematics-sophistry, mathematics-philosophy, and philosophy-sophistry. The first of these oppositions is enshrined in the distinction between ἀπόδειξις and πιθανολογία. That distinction is overly restrictive, it neglects the possibility of philosophy as something different from either proof or

²⁸ Compare also *Gorgias* 464b–465a, *Sophist* 223e.

persuasion. The next two sections of this paper consider Plato's attempt to show this.²⁹

III

Mathematics and Philosophy Theaetetus is sharp and quick witted; has a keen memory, and is brave, gentle, and good (144a–b). These characteristics, which are not merely intellectual, are useful to mathematician and philosopher alike³⁰ Theaetetus is also a good student of geometry. The difficulty he faces when dealing with philosophical problems, however, proves that there is a gap he is not yet able to bridge: the pure mathematician lacks something which pertains to the philosopher. It would be tempting to draw inferences about the size and nature of this gap from the simile of the divided line in *Republic* 6 (especially 510b–511c), where philosophy and geometry are associated with separate forms of cognition (*νοῦς* and *διάνοια*) according to the way each employs hypotheses³¹ Such inferences,

²⁹ The issues involved in determining Plato's view of the relation of philosophy to mathematics extend well beyond the *Theaetetus*. Consider the case of the *Timaeus*, in which a mathematician tells the story about the origin of the cosmos. The model Timaeus adopts results in the end in a reduction of natural kinds to composites of regular figures and solids. His obscure theory explains phenomena in terms of combination of geometrical forms, grounding accounts of natural structure in geometry (see, for instance, 35a–36c, 57c). This radical view has to be taken into account and contrasted to the other dialogues if something like the Platonic position regarding mathematics and philosophy (or in this case, cosmology) is to be sought. Supposing that Timaeus speaks for Plato, all that we could argue concerning the *Theaetetus* is that (1) cosmology and philosophy are not the same and (2) here in the *Theaetetus* Plato's concern is the Socratic approach to philosophy. This would be to take a moderate position, according to which mathematics is not by itself determinant of philosophical inquiry.

³⁰ Such characteristics are at least useful in geometrical studies (144a–b). That they are in fact required for philosophy is evident from the aretaic foundations of Socratic dialectic, see Eugenio Benitez, "Argument, Rhetoric and Philosophic Method: Plato's *Protagoras*," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 25 (1992): 222–52. Benitez stresses that Socratic dialectic will always be unsuccessful without interlocutors of sound (or potentially sound) moral character.

³¹ It may be that the *Republic* also distinguishes between *νοῦς* and *διάνοια* in terms of the objects with which each is concerned, but this point is quite controversial. See Gail Fine, "Knowledge and Belief in *Republic* V–VII," in *Companions to Ancient Thought, Volume 1: Epistemology*, ed. Stephen Everson (Cambridge University Press, 1990), 105 n. 35.

however, though they may be sustained by the *Theaetetus*, cannot be safe to draw from the start. The aim of the present section is to determine only what the *Theaetetus* tells us about the limitations of mathematics relative to philosophical inquiry. On that count there are two main sources of evidence: first, passages concerning the application of mathematical rules or procedures in a philosophical context, and second, passages that describe philosophy in mathematical terms. Let us consider each set of passages in turn.

(1) *Applications of Mathematics to Philosophy* The passage which is usually considered of first importance in the application of mathematics to philosophy begins at 147d, where Theaetetus describes the procedure according to which he was able to construct a definition of incommensurable lengths. There are other mathematical passages, however, whose philosophical significance is more obvious, and it will help to begin with them. Let us first consider some cases in which a mathematical rule is applied in a philosophical argument.

At 155a, in the course of an attempt to clarify the Protagorean view of things, Socrates introduces two mathematical axioms into the discussion. The first is, "Nothing can become greater or less, either in bulk or in number as long as it remains equal to itself" (155a3–5), and the second is, "That to which nothing is added or subtracted is neither increased nor diminished, but always remains the same" (155a7–9).³² These axioms are introduced on Protagoras's behalf (154b) as evidence that statements like "Six dice are more [than four] and less [than twelve]" are patently absurd. The rhetorical cleverness of this move has ordinarily been missed.³³ Protagoras's argument is supposed to vindicate the *homo mensura* by showing that the only way of accounting for six dice appearing both more and less is to adopt the view that a different and incomparable six dice appear in each case.³⁴ His tactic is the same as we described in section II above: he

³² These are clearly *mathematical* axioms, as the use of terminology shows (for example *μείζον, ἑλαττον, ὅγκος, ἀριθμός, ἴσον, προστίθῃμι, ἀφαιρέω*). Obviously, the point of their introduction is to suggest that they may have a more general application.

³³ For example both Bluck and Wasserstein ignore the rhetorical context of this passage, see R. S. Bluck, "The Puzzles of Size and Number in Plato's *Theaetetus*," *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society*, n s , 7 (1961) 7–9, A. Wasserstein, "Theaetetus and the History of the Theory of Numbers," *Classical Quarterly*, n s , 8, (1958) 165–79.

³⁴ This conclusion follows from the argument about sameness and difference at 159a–160c.

plays on the predilections of mathematically minded interlocutors by vainly requiring that the standards of their particular field hold for an unrestricted domain. We know from the arguments which follow, however, that the Protagorean view itself is absurd (cf. 169d–171d). The introduction of mathematical axioms into the discussion, then, is a piece of casuistry, and we must conclude that Plato is urging caution rather than unhesitating assent. Indeed, if we follow the usual advice Plato offers in cases like these, the point is to reflect on the terms of the axioms themselves: “greater,” “less,” “equal,” and so on.³⁵ Such reflection is a response to acute puzzlement over contradictory appearances; it is the spring of philosophy. That is precisely Theaetetus’s response, and Socrates praises it as genuinely philosophical, but it requires stepping out of mathematical boundaries.

Much the same point is made in 204b–205a where Socrates virtually forces Theaetetus to apply mathematical considerations of whole and part to the argument about knowable and unknowable things. While it may be true that as a quantity the whole number six is nothing else than the sum of six units (204c), the rule about whole and part is not completely unrestricted. Socrates knows perfectly well that a syllable is not just its component letters (otherwise *νυκ*- and *κνυ*- are the same syllable), that a wagon is not just “a hundred planks” (207a3–4), and that *ψυχῇ* is not just a collection of senses (184d). In these cases arrangement, organization, and form (*ἰδέα*) make a difference to the whole. The argument founded on the mathematical conception that “the whole is [nothing more than] the sum of its parts” is a *reductio ad absurdum*, and it is not difficult to tell which premise in the argument is suspect. What is difficult—what is the task of philosophy—is to arrive at a comprehensive understanding of “part” and “whole.”³⁶

The passages just considered show that there is a limit to the application of mathematical axioms and rules, no matter how evident they appear. Both passages point out the need to reconsider basic

³⁵ See, for example, *Republic* 523a–525e.

³⁶ For more on this see Theodore Scaltsas, “Is a Whole Identical to its Parts?” *Mind* 99 (1990) 583–98. Scaltsas considers the views of Plato, Aristotle, and David Armstrong on the subject of nonmereological composition. Unfortunately Scaltsas does not notice the dialectical utility of Socrates’ statements about whole and part—he takes those statements directly as Plato’s views—but his own discussion proceeds in the manner we say Plato intended.

concepts of mathematics. We next turn to two passages that suggest limitations of adopting a mathematical *procedure* as a philosophical method. The first passage runs from 162d through 165e, and in it Socrates accedes to Protagoras's demand that philosophy follow the lead of geometry in offering proofs rather than persuasive arguments. Socrates' proof once again takes the form of a *reductio*; its basic structure is as follows.³⁷

Thesis: A person knows something if and only if he perceives it.

Argument.

1. Whoever remembers something he once perceived, knows that thing.
2. One can remember something once perceived (and hence, by [1], know it) and at the same time no longer perceive it (hence, *ex hypothesi*, not know it).
3. But it is impossible to know something and not know it at the same time.
4. Therefore, the thesis must be false

When Socrates summarizes this argument at 164d it is quite clear that he considers it to satisfy the conditions of a proof.³⁸ And why not? The argument is valid, and its premises are unobjectionable (their negations are "preposterous"; 163d6, 163e13). Socrates explicitly states, however, that in adopting the method of proof he has become disputatious (*ἀντιλογικῶς*; 164c7) and has turned away from philosophy. The reason he gives is that the conclusion is based on "the agreement of terms" (164c7–8), and this tells us something about Plato's view of the difference between mathematics and philosophy. Mathematical proofs rely on terms being strictly univocal, to that end definitions are stipulated at the outset and rigorously maintained. Even if Socrates assumes that there is a unity of meaning grounding every correct use of the same term, however, as a philosopher he can neither rely on

³⁷ For ease of presentation we have schematized and abbreviated the argument. In addition, we substitute "perceives" for "sees." This substitution is warranted by the fact that the argument makes no appeal to any special properties of sight.

³⁸ See *ἀποδείξαμεν*, 164d7, and cf. 165c9–d1 ΣΩ—λογίζου τί σοι συμβαίνει, THEAI—ἀλλὰ λογίζομαι ὅτι πάναντία οἷς ὑπέθεμην. The use of mathematical expressions clearly indicates that we are supposed to read the arguments of this passage as (attempts at) proof.

that meaning being apparent to everyone nor can he stipulate it without begging questions. He can only employ the procedure of mathematical proof after his definitional quest is satisfactorily concluded³⁹ Thus for Socrates proof is not viable as a philosophic method (and it is certainly not the method he uses).

A second passage that concerns the application of a mathematical procedure to philosophical inquiry begins at 179e, it is a highly comical scene in which Theodorus, always the pedant, complains bitterly about the followers of Heraclitus. He claims that talking to the Ephesians is like "having a dialogue with gadflies" (*διαλεχθῆναι . . . τοῖς οἰστρώσιν*; 179e5–6), that "they take care to allow nothing to be settled in speech" (180a8–b1), and that "none of them thinks that another knows anything" (180c2–3). One cannot help but mark how readily the same descriptions apply to Socrates. In Theodorus's view, moreover, the only chance of making sense of a Heraclitean aphorism is to treat it as a "problem" (*πρόβλημα*; 180c5). He appears to mean a problem in logistics, of the sort presented in riddling or epigrammatical form, as in, "Croesus the king dedicated six bowls, weighing six minae, each one drachma heavier than the other."⁴⁰ Such problems can be reduced to algebraic equations in one or more variables. Socrates' response to Theodorus's ridiculous suggestion is characteristically ironic. "*καὶ μετρίως γε λέγεις*" (180c7).⁴¹ Although he pretends to adopt Theodorus's advice, he clearly does not use the mathematical art of logistics to determine what the Heracliteans mean. Indeed the context suggests that Socrates has a rather favorable view of the Ephesians, for he says that unlike the sophist Protagoras they are not friends of Theodorus, and adds that they probably explained their views to their students at leisure—that is, philosophically. The whole passage, then, presents through the character of Theodorus a vivid warning of the danger of turning philosophy into mathematics.

³⁹ Of course there is nothing to prevent him from using all sorts of arguments, whether valid or fallacious, as part of a *dialectical* inquiry.

⁴⁰ Epigram 12 in W. Paton's *Greek Anthology*, reported in Morris R. Cohen and I. E. Drabkin, *A Source Book in Greek Science* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948), 25. Such problems, Cohen and Drabkin suggest, were common from a truly ancient period and were almost certainly known to Plato. We should add here that Theodorus is explicitly identified as an expert in logistics at 145a7.

⁴¹ Virtually all English translations miss the mathematical nuance of *μετρίως* (usually rendered as "reasonable" or "moderate") and hence also miss the sarcasm in Socrates' reply.

The four passages considered above point to a general pattern in the *Theaetetus*'s treatment of mathematics and philosophy. While mathematical rules and procedures may be useful starting points, they play a limited role in a philosophical inquiry. If philosophy is constrained to remain within mathematical boundaries, and therefore to make use of assumptions which it has not thoroughly investigated, it becomes just another form of sophistry. This is the context within which we must interpret the significance of Theaetetus's definition of incommensurable lengths (147d–e). To a certain extent the disparity between philosophy and mathematics in these passages supports our suggestion in section II that Socrates is ironic when he asks Theaetetus to tackle the problem of knowledge in precisely the same way as he solved the problem of incommensurable lengths. Socrates' praise of Theaetetus, however, is not all irony. There are some aspects of Theaetetus's procedure that have an affinity for philosophical investigation, and it is time we turned our attention to them.

First, it will be a good idea to clarify what Theaetetus did. He observed Theodorus's several proofs that the sides of squares with areas of three square feet, five square feet, and so on, are not commensurable in length with the side of the one-foot square. He further observed that there was no limit to the number of such instances of incommensurability and made an inductive inference that, there being no difference in kind between the incommensurability in each case, a comprehensive designation of "incommensurable length" could be offered. But what need did he have of a definition? In some sense, surely, he already understood and was familiar with the notion of incommensurability. This points to an interesting feature of his project: he did not attempt to show what incommensurability consists in. If that were the case, his definition, "incommensurable length = *df* a length that forms the side of a square equal in area to an oblong number," is not particularly helpful. What Theaetetus did was provide a rule for sorting out commensurable from incommensurable lengths; that is for *identifying* the incommensurable lengths (in which case his definition is quite useful). In terms familiar from Socratic requests for definition, Theaetetus stated a *πάθος* of incommensurability and not its *οὐσία*,⁴² and that already reveals something of the philosophical significance of Theaetetus's definition.

⁴² Compare *Euthyphro* 11a. In view of the dramatic anticipation at the end of the *Theaetetus* of the discussion that takes place in the *Euthyphro*, it is tempting to speculate about the significance of the *οὐσία-πάθος* distinction here, but the mere reference to the *Euthyphro* will not bear such weight.

There two more points deserving of attention here. The first concerns the role of definitions in geometry and philosophy. Theaetetus's formulation of a general rule, in contrast to Theodorus's mere listing of examples, shows that he grasps the sort of unity of definition Socrates habitually requests. When he speaks of "gathering [the incommensurables] together into one" (συλλαβεῖν εἰς ἓν; 147d8) he uses language characteristic of Socrates' attempts at definition. In this regard his inductive inference is quite striking, for he noticed that the incommensurables were "unlimited in number" (ἄπειροι τὸ πλῆθος; 147d7), and hence that no account could be given of them severally.⁴³ In turning away from particular instances and towards the universal Theaetetus takes a step in the direction of philosophy, but it must be stressed that geometry also lies in that direction.⁴⁴ The two destinations only diverge when one considers the role of definitions. In both mathematical and philosophical inquiry definitions give impetus and direction to the investigation, but in Socratic conversations the definitions must be subjected to a thorough test.⁴⁵ The reason for this testing is that the philosopher has as a goal understanding the nature of what is to be defined.⁴⁶ In geometry, however, definitions serve as starting points for demonstrations, along with postulates and common notions. The definiens must provide necessary and sufficient conditions for identifying the definiendum (Theaetetus's definition must embrace all and only the incommensurable lengths) but that is all one needs. Once a geometrical definition is established, one does not look back. We can thus see how Theaetetus's definition earns Socrates' praise without quite standing as a model for philosophic definition.

⁴³ Theaetetus's language in this passage suggests a connection with the philosophical method Socrates describes in the passage at *Philebus* 16c.

⁴⁴ As William and Martha Kneale point out, geometry is concerned with general propositions and not with individuals, and among these general propositions definitions play a prominent role, see William Kneale and Martha Kneale, *The Development of Logic* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), 5–6. The authors add that in many ways Plato's dialectic is indebted both to Socrates and to the geometric tradition. Dialectic is sometimes conceived as an "examination of propositions called 'hypotheses', by drawing consequences from them" (p. 7), and sometimes as a "method of argumentation involving refutation but leading eventually to positive results of high generality" (p. 9). In all cases, it involves a search for definitions (p. 10).

⁴⁵ For more on this comparison see Burnyeat, "Philosophical Sense," 511–12.

⁴⁶ See 145e9, 146e9–10.

The second aspect of Theaetetus's procedure that we wish to address is decidedly more philosophical. In order to arrive at his definition Theaetetus first left the confines of geometry and turned to arithmetic. He divided all numbers into two kinds: those that are the product of some number multiplied by itself and those that are not. After having done so he could return to geometry and liken the first group of numbers to square figures and the second group to oblongs. Only then was he able to bring all the incommensurables under a single description. In a sense Theaetetus succeeded by behaving shamelessly, by ignoring the normal rules or boundaries of geometry. That is precisely the way Socrates repeatedly makes progress in the *Theaetetus*, by "looking in every direction" (190e8), by "turning on every argument and torturing it" (191c2–3), and by "dragging arguments up and down" (195c2–3). Though he calls his own behavior "childish" (ἀδολέσχης; 195b10; 195c2) and "shameless" (ἀναιδές, 196d10), he does not disapprove of it, "being the man I am" (197a1–2). Thus Theaetetus shows in his early work in geometry a tendency to think after the fashion of a philosopher. It may be that this is what Socrates commends when he asks Theaetetus to approach the question of knowledge in the same way.

As we have seen, most of the passages in the *Theaetetus* that deal with the application of mathematics to philosophy are cautionary. The passage concerning Theaetetus's exercise shows that, even in cases where the two disciplines share an affinity for such operations as induction and definition, considerable differences between philosophy and mathematics emerge. Theaetetus, in fact, is most philosophical precisely when least mathematical, that is, when he oversteps the normal boundaries of geometry. We can now complete this part of our investigation by considering some cases in which philosophy is described in mathematical terms.

(2) *Mathematical Descriptions of Philosophy* Philosophers are not indifferent to mathematics. Socrates' speeches abound in mathematical references and examples.⁴⁷ The frequency of such references suggests that mathematics can at least serve to illustrate philosophical points. There are two instances, however, in which Socrates uses mathematical terminology that is especially provocative: the

⁴⁷ There are too many to cite all of them here, but see 190b6–3, 195e1–4

first at 173e6, where he uses the verb γεωμετρέω ("to measure") to describe philosophical thinking,⁴⁸ and the second at 186c2–3, where he uses the mathematical term ἀναλογισμός ("calculation") to describe the basic activity of the mind in judging things.⁴⁹ In each of these cases Socrates' terminology suggests a basic or core similarity between mathematics and philosophy.

The first of our descriptions occurs in the digression about philosophy. Socrates quotes Pindar to portray the philosopher's thought as flying "under the earth and above heaven" (173e5–6), and he likens such mental activity to geometry. There are, as we mentioned, elements of caricature in the digression, but this description is not one of them. Poetry it may be, but not irony (cf. *Phaedo* 79d; *Phaedrus* 247b–c, *Meno* 81b–c). In what does the asserted similarity between geometry and philosophy lie? The main themes associated with the philosopher in the digression are leisure, freedom, and moral perfection, but they are part of Socrates' contrast of the philosopher with lawyers and orators. The comparison with geometry occupies a rather more limited section whose theme is the apathetic detachment of the philosopher. There is one obvious sense in which both philosophy and mathematics are detached. Insofar as they are concerned with what is universal, both may be dubbed otherworldly, hence the quotation from Pindar. Just as the geometer is concerned with abstract figures—none of which is ever perceived by the senses—so philosophy is concerned with universal natures, such as "human being," "justice itself and injustice," and "human happiness and misery in general" (175c), all of which are likewise invisible.

Here the similarity ends, however. The mathematician is within his rights to disdain visible squares and circles, but the digression shows—and here it does use caricature—how disastrous it would be for a philosopher to neglect particular human beings to the extent that he knew not whether his neighbor was "a man or some other creature" (175b3). One could support this point by appeal to other dialogues

⁴⁸ The thinking which Socrates here calls geometric is διάνοια, which suggests that perhaps Plato is writing in terms of the *Republic*. On the relation of the digression to the middle books of the *Republic* see John McDowell, *Plato Theaetetus* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 173–9.

⁴⁹ Socrates steals the term from Theaetetus (cf. 186a10), so we need not think he means calculation in the strict sense. He certainly does *not* mean the mathematical art of calculation (λογιστική) which Theodorus urged be applied to Heracleitean epigrams.

from all periods of Plato's writing career. The philosopher-king, for example, must return to the cave and discern the obscure things there (*Republic* 520c), and the philosopher of the *Philebus*, who knows justice itself, as well as "the divine circle and sphere themselves," must know their sensible counterparts (false as they are) if he is ever to find his way home (62a–b). There is no need to leave the *Theaetetus* to find support, however. Socrates describes the philosopher as treating the public man in a rough and retributive way—he will "drag" the other upward to a "dizzying" height where he can think about justice and injustice themselves—but this is treatment incompatible with ignoring one's neighbor, indeed incompatible with ignoring one's enemy. Though he considers such people to be ignorant and inattentive, Socrates never leaves off trying to convince them (176b, 177b) to learn the truth about human happiness and misery so that they might "acquire the one and escape the other" (175c6–8).

The other description is Socrates' analogy between mathematical thinking and judgment at 186c2–3. This analogy reveals the way in which a systematic philosophical inquiry coincides with inquiry in mathematics. The power to sever things, to examine what is common to them, to acknowledge sameness and otherness, and to reason is exemplified in Theaetetus's mathematical definition: he divides the numbers into two classes, seeks what is common to incommensurable lengths, compares arithmetic and geometry, and on this basis reasons to a definition. In *Theaetetus* 185c–e Socrates names these abilities and sets them in a much more general context. Thus the mathematical steps taken by Theaetetus and the abilities they require are affirmed to apply to any problem whatsoever and to pertain to the most fundamental activity of the mind. To this extent mathematics and philosophy are related. Notice, moreover, how throughout the dialogue Socrates exemplifies the same abilities: he severs the identification of knowledge with perception into the theories of Theaetetus, Protagoras and Heraclitus, examines what is common to them, what is the same and different; and then subjects the whole question to analysis with the rigor and thoroughness of a mathematician. This is the nonmetaphorical meaning of his art of midwifery.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ See 160e–161a, which describes the activity of calculation in the terms of midwifery. Theaetetus's newborn (thought) is, "knowledge is perception." Socrates' first accomplishment is its delivery (making it explicit), his second task (in Cornford's admirable translation) is to follow up the birth "by

We cannot, however, ignore differences in the way the calculative ability is put to use in mathematics and in Socratic midwifery. Midwifery is appropriate to a unique kind of problem—that which originates in feelings of wonder and perplexity (155c–d, cf. 148e)—and far from relieving that state of mind midwifery augments and transforms it. Perplexity and wonder occur when someone's beliefs are suddenly shaken, when things long taken for granted are exposed to criticism, and in Socrates' view this experience is characteristic of philosophy. As philosopher Socrates not only experiences wonder but induces it in others (149a). Twice he suggests that ending the inquiry in wonder may be better than beginning it in presumptuous ignorance, the second time conceding, "that is all my art is capable of, so much and no more" (210c4–5). Thus when it comes to the definition of knowledge, although the philosopher can hope for it, an ultimate answer is not to be expected from philosophy. Purification⁵¹ is expected from philosophy, and that is what Socrates shows Theaetetus. Theaetetus had been holding mistaken ideas about knowledge and philosophy of which he was not even fully aware. Although philosophy proceeds methodically and on a general level it does not produce knowledge, understood as the result of demonstrations. Socrates does not have any thesis to prove. He is "sterile of wisdom" (150c4), and he insists (quite to the contrary of what most interlocutors and interpreters of the dialogues assume) that "none of the speeches come from me but from those who converse with me" (161b2–3; cf. 157c). At play here is an incomparable feature of Socratic philosophy: it purposefully draws out and displays the confusion hidden in an interlocutor's thoughts. It aims at clarity and awareness about what lies embedded in one's presuppositions. For example, it exposes deep misconceptions in Theodorus's and

the ceremony of carrying it round the hearth, we must look at our offspring from every angle to make sure we are not taken in by a lifeless phantom not worth the rearing" (that is, we must thoroughly examine and evaluate it), Francis M. Cornford, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1935).

⁵¹ See *Sophist* 230b–d, where the Stranger describes purification in a way that accurately resembles Socrates' examination of Theaetetus. That Theaetetus learned and accepted the Socratic view of philosophy is suggested by his remark that believing one knows only what one knows and no more is "best and wisest" (230d). The purification which is the aim of philosophy involves a gain in understanding without omniscience (233a), but central to it also is an effect on character—it makes a person modest and gentle toward others (230c, cf. *Theaetetus* 210b–c).

Theaetetus's assumptions about mathematics, philosophy, and their relation to knowledge. The two characters react differently to this exposure: Theaetetus is filled with wonder, but Theodorus returns the next day with a "philosopher" who might be capable of showing Socrates up⁵²

The fact that throughout the dialogue the two geometers are checked and defeated warns the reader about the impossibility of reducing philosophy to mathematics. Indeed, the pretext for Socrates' formulation of the question about knowledge is the repudiation of Theodorus's authority, as expert mathematician, to judge his own subject matter. Socrates certainly counts geometry, astronomy, music and so on as branches of knowledge, and says he is eager to learn these sciences from Theodorus or "anyone else who I think might understand them"⁵³ He also claims, however, that "whoever doesn't know what knowledge is doesn't understand cobblery or any other science" (147b7–8). Thus despite frequent appeals in the text to mathematical rules, procedures, and analogies, we must conclude that the answer to the question about knowledge cannot be obtained from mathematics. For some, like Theodorus, the resistance of philosophical questions to thoroughly mathematical treatment is reason enough for abandoning them. Perplexed by philosophy, Theodorus does not understand the significance of his perplexity, and so he discredits philosophy and identifies it with sophistry. He gives up the high goals of philosophy, thinking they are not attainable just because they are not susceptible to mathematical treatment. None of this deters Plato. In contrast to Theodorus a sophist like Protagoras sees in philosophy the opportunity to use perplexity as a weapon for personal gain, and at the same time eyes a weakness in Socrates' professed inability to offer philosophical proofs. This is a matter of great concern to Plato both in the *Theaetetus* and beyond.

IV

Philosophy and Sophistry. The relation between philosophy and sophistry is a central concern for Plato throughout the dialogues. In

⁵² See *Sophist* 216a–b

⁵³ See 145d4–5. The verb translated "understand" here is *ἐπαίειν*, which could just as easily mean "profess." The nuance is important given the context. Theodorus appears to be a typical interlocutor with a pretense to greater wisdom than he actually possesses.

the *Theaetetus* Plato's examination of this relation is restricted. The dialogue has mathematicians as Socrates' interlocutors, and therefore it considers philosophy mainly in contrast to mathematics and mathematical expertise. As an outcome of the examination it appears difficult to distinguish philosophy from sophistry, especially in regard to concerns about argumentation and virtue. Nevertheless, the *Theaetetus* indicates only how philosophy differs from sophistry in these regards; a defense of the dialogue's conclusions is not supplied until the *Sophist*. Dramatically, the subordinate role arrogated to the theme of sophistry in the *Theaetetus* is made evident by the device of Protagoras's death: the sophist can only speak through intermediaries, and his theories are subject to unfriendly evaluation. It would take a sophist, perhaps, to speak for himself.⁵⁴ With this qualification in mind, let us consider what the *Theaetetus* has to say about the relation between philosophy and sophistry, beginning with the issue of speech and argument.

If we begin with the observed ethos of the speaker, then the *Theaetetus* hardly admits of a distinction between sophist and philosopher. Indeed, Socrates seems to encourage the comparison. A few examples suffice to make the point. Socrates twice describes himself as having an insatiable lust for argument and conversation (146a, 169c, cf. 161a–b); he calls himself “garrulous” (ἀδολεσχία; 195c2), and describes some of his own arguments as “clap-trap” (δημηγορία; 162d3 [Cornford]). These descriptions must immediately suggest the activity of sophists. He also employs the device, familiar from the *Hippias Major*, of putting his own criticisms in the mouth of an unnamed alter ego, in this case a “mercenary” (μισθοφόρος, 165d6) in speeches, a “dauntless” (ἀνέπληκτος; 165b9) and “repudiating” (ἐλεγκτικός, 200a12) critic. In all of these contexts the anonymous questioner is disputatious. As midwife Socrates utilizes speeches as drugs and incantations, the standard weapons of the sophist's arsenal.⁵⁵ He foists the sophistical dilemma about false belief on his audience in much the same way that Dionysidorus does in the *Euthydemus*. The comparisons go on. The point here is just that a speaker's apparent standards

⁵⁴ See *Theaetetus* 166b, and compare *Sophist* 216a–d together with Stanley Rosen's illuminating discussion of the ambiguity of the Eleatic Stranger in his *Plato's Sophist: The Drama of Original and Image* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), Act I “Gods and Philosophers.”

⁵⁵ See Gorgias, *Encomium on Helen*, fragment 82B11 Diels-Kranz. See also *Meno* 80a–b, *Sophist* 235a, *Statesman* 291c.

of conduct provide insufficient ground for distinguishing philosopher from sophist

Will the content of sophistical and philosophical λόγοι allow for a reliable distinction to be drawn? It seems not. In the *Protagoras* Hippocrates stated that the sophist is expert at making clever speeches, but he could not say what these speeches were about. In the *Theaetetus* Theodorus gives the reason for Hippocrates' earlier failure: sophistical speeches have no significant content; they are "mere speeches" (ψίλοι λόγοι). Socrates clearly vouches that reproach. One of his sharpest jabs at Protagoras and the sophistic tradition is that, no matter how subtle one gets, all attempts to clarify the *homo mensura* fail.⁵⁶ As the dialogue progresses he mounts evidence to show that speech becomes meaningless on the Protagorean view. Protagoras's view has to abandon memory and personal identity (166b), it is arbitrary and self-undermining (171a), and it ultimately is incapable of being stated at all (183b). Thus on Socrates' view sophistical speech is an intrinsically barren medium. Apparently the same results obtain for philosophical speech, however, though perhaps for different reasons. At the beginning of the dialogue Theaetetus states that, as far as he knows, no one has ever produced a satisfactory answer to the sort of questions Socrates asks (148e). At that point the discussion is in danger of collapse, and so in order to postpone the end Socrates resorts to the elaborate disguise⁵⁷ of a midwife. Theaetetus is pregnant with some sort of answer, *maybe* even the correct one; just let Socrates ply his trade and see what emerges. Of course, from the point of view of mere content, all Socrates intends is postponement: the discussion does finally collapse. He thus appears to be less a midwife than a murderer of ideas, he can make them die slow painful deaths or apply an executioner's blow, but no positive content survives the examination of knowledge in the *Theaetetus*.

⁵⁶ See 152c, 156a, 158a, 166e.

⁵⁷ Even as he describes the art of midwifery Socrates has to introduce a *deus ex machina* to account for his having such an art. For although "human nature is too weak to grasp an art concerning matters of which it has no experience" (149c1–2), Socrates is "barren of wisdom" (150c4) and has never given birth to any discovery (150d1–2). Obviously he should not possess the midwife's art at all, but as the result of divine dispensation he does (150c7–8, 151a2–5, 151d1–5). The whole passage smacks of pretense, but this is a necessary pretense if Socrates is to bring about the desired state of ἀπορία in Theaetetus. The question is, What difference is there between the sorts of ἀπορία produced by Socrates and the sophists?

If there is a difference to be found in philosophical and sophistical λόγοι, it will have to be sought in terms of the effects produced in their auditors. We must note how strongly Plato emphasizes this point. Both Socrates and Protagoras lay claim to an expertise that consists entirely in producing a change for the better in their clients. Socrates for his part claims that all who have associated with him have made the most marvellous progress, God permitting (150d). At the end of the dialogue he appears satisfied that the change brought about in Theaetetus has made him a better person. Similarly Protagoras claims that wisdom consists in the ability to “change any one of us to whom things appear and are wretched and make things appear and be good for him” (166d7–8). The key difference in the kind of change induced by Socrates and Protagoras has to do with their relation to the truth, to what is.⁵⁸ The most distinctive feature of Socrates’ midwifery is that he is able to distinguish the true from the false (150a); he is not permitted to abandon the truth and let the false go unrejected (151d). In the digression he sums up the whole concern of philosophy as “lighting upon what is” (172d9). On the other hand, Protagoras explicitly denies that he can make someone who previously had false beliefs exchange them for true ones, “for it is not possible to believe things that are not” (167a7–8).⁵⁹ What Protagoras claims to do is to replace worthless or miserable beliefs with better ones, but better does not in any way imply more true. He appears to mean something like this. Some people believe they are in a miserable condition, and therefore they are, since all beliefs are true; but if only they were to change their view, and believe they were in a better condition, they would be.

⁵⁸ One should keep in mind throughout the whole of the *Theaetetus* what Charles Kahn calls the veridical nuance of the verb “to be”, namely, “to be (true)”, see Charles Kahn, “Some Philosophical Uses of the Verb ‘To Be’ in Plato,” *Phronesis* 26 (1981) 105–134. Kahn, in fact, cites the statement of Protagoras’s *homo mensura* in the *Theaetetus* as a passage exemplifying the veridical nuance. We share Kahn’s suspicion that Plato’s use of “to be” is often overdetermined, for example, it may be used in an existential sense along with the veridical nuance. This may be puzzling, but it is not surprising given the ontological significance Plato customarily attaches to the notion of truth. On this point see Cynthia Hampton, *Pleasure, Knowledge, and Being: An Analysis of Plato’s Philebus* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), chap. 2.

⁵⁹ Οὐτε γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δυνατόν δοξάζσαι, cf. Parmenides, B2.7 οὔτε γὰρ ἂν γνοίης τό γε μὴ εἶναι. The ground is laid here for the claims that the sophist “takes refuge” in the Eleatic view that what is not cannot be (*Sophist* 236d), and that Parmenides presents an obstacle that must be removed if the sophist is to be shown up as a kind of deceiver.

This may involve the rationalization of guilt or shame—for example, changing a person so that they no longer see their behavior as corrupt or evil but rather as good and right. Such a change may be difficult to bring about given habitual ways of thinking, but Protagoras is capable of doing so.

The relation of the philosopher and the sophist to truth, to what is, provides the basis for a more extensive distinction between them. On the one hand, the truth Socrates knows concerns his own ignorance; as a lover of wisdom he is personally committed to honesty about the scope and character of that ignorance and publicly committed to exhibiting it in speech. His art of midwifery, it turns out, amounts to producing in his interlocutors an understanding of the same ignorance and perplexity he feels. That is why the philosopher must examine an argument from all directions. He must be willing to abandon any conceptions that prevent him from appreciating how much he does not know. He cannot maintain a position just because it is his (161a). He must not even presuppose that his ignorance is necessary rather than contingent: the question about knowledge, “Can we say what it is?” (146a1) is a live question. For Socrates the consequences of maieutic discourse do not show up as dogma or doctrine or even as well-structured theory; they show up first and foremost in a transformation of attitude toward what is. On the other hand, the “truth” to which Protagoras clings—that each person is the measure of all things—amounts to the annihilation of truth, insofar as it denies that anything is objectively true. The *Theaetetus* suggests that this denial involves him in an ineradicable dishonesty. Protagoras cannot honestly be committed to his truth as something that is, because he does not accept that *anything* is (152c–d). If he abandons the *homo mensura*, however, then he must be prepared to either demonstrate his knowledge of what *really* is—something which, despite all his insistence on proof over persuasion, he is hardly prepared to do—or admit his own ignorance—something which, as σοφιστής, he cannot do. Thus however much his tongue may be irrefutable, his mind is not (154d). The sophist willfully ignores the ignorance that lies at the origin of philosophy, the ignorance whose recognition is the spring of wonder. Instead of being opposed to the philosopher as the false is to the true, he is opposed as the absurd is to the meaningful.

Commitment to truth is the ground on which Plato raises the question of the moral worth of sophistical and philosophical argumentation. To abandon one's false beliefs is seen as a moral improvement

by Plato and Socrates, for whom truth and right are equivalent. This is clear enough in a dialogue like the *Meno*, where no distinction is drawn between true (ἀληθής) and morally right (ὀρθή) belief.⁶⁰ The same sentiment, however, is clearly carried over to the *Theaetetus* in the remark that “true belief is certainly without fault (ἀναμάρτητον) and its consequences are always beautiful and good” (200e6). The identification of truth and right allows us to see more clearly the significance of the digression with regard to the distinction between philosopher and sophist. There Socrates says, “God is without taint of unrighteousness (ἄδικος) . . . and nothing is more similar to him than any one of us who becomes as righteous as possible. It is in regard to this that a man becomes truly clever (ἀληθῶς δεινότης) or worthless and cowardly. For knowledge of this is true wisdom and virtue” (176b8–c4). Socrates’ use of the phrase ἀληθῶς δεινότης must be meant to recall the sophist. Insofar as the sophist maintains a fundamentally dishonest (unrighteous) relation to what is he cannot be truly clever, wise, or virtuous, cannot really teach virtue, and cannot, except in an incidental way, make people better. Although the *Theaetetus* highlights the question of knowledge, the background theme of virtue gives the debate purpose and direction, and the philosopher’s commitment to truth is the link between the two.

There is one other significant point in which the *Theaetetus* distinguishes philosophy from sophistry. The philosopher is said to be at leisure and the sophist not. How does this difference compare to the differences in speech and virtue just discussed? First, we should note that the term “leisure” abbreviates a constellation of epithets attached to the philosopher. It embraces “freedom” (172d1), “peace” (172d5), “growth,” and “straightness” (173a4); in contrast to the “slavery” (172d1), “tense shrewdness” (173a1), and “injustice” (173a8) of the sophist. Thus, σχολή is not a morally neutral term. Here again we may discern a role for truth at the foundation for Plato’s approval of leisure. At leisure no personal concerns are at stake; one can conduct a conversation in the spirit of friendship and goodwill. Accordingly Socrates raises his question about knowledge as if it were a game, in order that those gathered may become friends to each other (146a1–7). On the other hand, those who fail to understand that “no god is ill-disposed toward men” (151d1) feel threatened by Socrates, since their cherished beliefs are at stake. This sense of fear and danger attached

⁶⁰ See *Meno* 97a–98c

to personal concerns, Socrates says, is hard to bear "with truth and honesty" (173a7 [Cornford]), and he should know even as he discusses the question of knowledge he is under indictment for a capital offense. Thus the most difficult part of a philosopher's commitment to truth is detachment from personal concerns: one must value truth over life. That is the extent to which Socrates is committed to the "victory of the victorious argument" as opposed to the victory of his own argument.⁶¹

It is worth noting how far the sophist is shown to lie from this benchmark of philosophy. Protagoras begs Socrates not to be playful (167e) and complains that Socrates has impoverished the analysis of his thoughts by reducing it to a mere dispute (167d), asking for proof instead of persuasive argument. He deceptively portrays himself as committed to truth and thus hopes to convince his audience that the *homo mensura* possesses a validity comparable to that of a mathematical axiom when he says that "you must tolerate being a measure whether you like it or not" (167d3). But Protagoras knows that his view depends on persuasion—what other way could his art of exchanging true but miserable beliefs for better but not truer ones come about? Thus, Protagoras (not Socrates) is the one who reduces conversation to a personal battle, for if all beliefs are true it must come to that.

The *Theaetetus* shows that disappointment with attempts at turning philosophy into a demonstrative science does not have to end in the sophistic denial of all meaningful speech.⁶² In showing this Plato harmonizes the performance and thematization of philosophy throughout the dialogue. Theaetetus learns from Socrates of an *euporia* for philosophy that lies between mathematics and sophistry. By engaging in the conversation Theaetetus is liberated from several confusions,

⁶¹ See Alexander Nehamas, "Plato's Demarcation of Philosophy from Sophistry," *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, 7 (1990) 10. Nehamas claims that this feature marks the central difference between Socrates and the sophists. We would add, however, that Socrates is not concerned with the merely logically victorious argument—where logic is divorced from virtue—but the morally victorious argument.

⁶² Although the *Theaetetus* makes a reasonable reply to sophistry, it must be borne in mind that the nature of philosophy is not fully worked out in the *Theaetetus* or anywhere in the Platonic corpus. The *Theaetetus*, we suggest, stands at the beginning of discussion about philosophy, in which case Aristotle's division of sciences, which allows that some parts of philosophy are demonstrative (such as natural science) while others (such as ethics) are not, might best be seen as an original development on the lines of thought initiated by Plato in the *Theaetetus* and not as a view which simply opposes Plato's

but it can hardly be said that one of these was the view that knowledge is sense perception—the refutation of that thesis was a means to the end of showing Theaetetus something much more general about his epistemological presuppositions. Theaetetus began, as a naive mathematician might, by believing that philosophy should provide ultimate definitions which serve as foundations for demonstration. From his association with Socrates he learns to expect something different from philosophy. Theaetetus discovers, of course, that Socratic conversation is a sort of delivery from false or confused beliefs. Philosophy is not, however, a merely refutational activity. In fact, the course of the conversation always tends toward the view that knowledge is something real and objective. By turning Theaetetus's thoughts consistently in this direction Socrates allows him to get to know better what knowledge is. That is why we can conclude our reading of the dialogue sharing Socrates' satisfaction with the "negative" results of the intercourse. He has effectively succeeded in conveying an understanding of the activity, concerns, and results of philosophy. Because his task in this case involves mathematical and philosophical views about knowledge, he focuses on the mistakes a mathematician is liable to make when first confronted with philosophy, mistakes which suggest that philosophy and sophistry are the same. He has been able to introduce the young Theaetetus, the pivot of the whole plot, to genuine philosophy, not by means of prelections on the subject but by means of an activity in which they both engage⁶³

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⁶³ This study was conducted while Livia Guimaraes was recipient of a fellowship from Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (Brazil)

AL-KINDI'S ETHICS

THÉRÈSE-ANNE DRUART

MEDIEVAL ARABIC PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS is a much neglected field. Not many texts have survived. Some of them are rather popular and belie the assumption that Medieval Arabic philosophy is essentially Aristotelian. For instance, al-Kindi, Abu Bakr al-Razi, Avicenna, and Miskawayh all wrote about treating sadness. Were philosophers at the time subject to acute bouts of depression? or did they have some serious philosophical reasons to deal with this topic? How can one conciliate the popular and highly successful genre of the "Spiritual Medicine," which considers passions as diseases of the soul that are badly in need of eradication, with the need for a rigorous normative ethics? As Islam and its *Shari'a* provide detailed ethical prescriptions and prohibitions, as well as guidance for any situation in the life of pious Muslims, how can philosophy vindicate the autonomy and importance of philosophical ethics? Can it be done on Aristotelian grounds? Why do serious philosophers devote such efforts to "Spiritual Medicine," a very un-Aristotelian enterprise? Such questions are puzzling. To even begin answering them, we need to study carefully the works of each philosopher in order to understand on their own terms what place and what role they assign to ethics, and then to analyze their ethical works to determine their purpose, audience, and philosophic worth.

Al-Kindi, who is known as "The Philosopher of the Arabs" and who died in about 870 A.D.,¹ is the first Arabic philosopher to have

¹ The best introduction to al-Kindi remains George N. Atiyeh, *Al-Kindi: The Philosopher of the Arabs* (Rawalpindi: Islamic Research Institute, 1966). Atiyeh discusses the date of al-Kindi's death on p. 8 and in n. 9 on pp. 15–16. Bibliographical updates can be found in Emilio Tornero Poveda, *Al-Kindi: La transformación de un pensamiento religioso en un pensamiento racional* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1992), particularly pp. 107–18, 333–50. M. Abu Rida edited most of al-Kindi's philosophical texts in *Rasā'il al-Kindi al-falsafiyat*, vol. 1, (hereafter, "RKF") (Cairo: Dār Al-Fikr Al-'Arabi, 1950). Translations of al-Kindi's works are generally scat-

written extensively.² His influence was enormous. A careful examination of his works may well offer clues to dealing with a whole tradition. Besides, *The Art of Dispelling Sorrows* provides some solace for our loss of his other ethical works. For centuries it incited other thinkers to write on the same subject or to paraphrase it. It is a prime example of "Spiritual Medicine" at its best. Understanding it allows one to make sense of this tradition.

Before carefully analyzing *The Art of Dispelling Sorrows* we will trace back this text to its theoretical framework. We will first delineate al-Kindi's conception of ethics, then determine the underlying principle of his ethics, and finally examine his understanding of freedom. Once these three themes have determined the theoretical framework we will study how they are put into practice in *The Art of Dispelling Sorrows*. This will clearly show that al-Kindi's ethics, though rather innocent of Aristotelianism, is not without interest.

I

Al-Kindi's Conception of Ethics. The role and place of ethics in al-Kindi's classification of the sciences is difficult to determine, since his treatises on this issue are lost.³ An examination of incidental statements in various works and in his *On the Number of Aristotle's Books*,⁴

tered, but one volume which contains Spanish translations of most of his philosophical texts is *Obras filosóficas de al-Kindi*, ed and trans Rafael Ramón Guerrero and Emilio Torno Poveda (Madrid: Editorial Coloquio, 1986). Other translations, particularly into English, will be indicated when they are available.

² Not many of al-Kindi's works have reached us, and most of those are rather brief or even—in the case of *On First Philosophy*—truncated. Their chronology is generally obscure. All this makes their interpretation difficult and tentative to such a point that recently Herbert A. Davidson claimed that "the character of [al-Kindi's] writings should dissuade us from the temptation to harmonize the divergent positions that he embraced on different occasions", Herbert A. Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect, and Theories of Human Intellect* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 34. Though Davidson may well be right in what concerns al-Kindi's views on the intellect, we should resist the temptation not to attempt to look for some continuous threads on other themes even if details may differ.

³ For instance, *On the Nature of Science and its Parts*, and *The Parts of Human Science*. See Atiyeh, *Al-Kindi*, 154. See also A. Cortabarría Beria, "La clasificación des sciences chez al-Kindi," *MIDEO* 11 (1972): 49–76.

⁴ *RKF*, 363–84. See also the edition by M. Gudi and R. Walzer with an introduction and Italian translation as "Uno scritto introduttivo allo studio di

however, may help us fill the gap. Al-Kindi follows the Alexandrian tradition in distinguishing the practice of ethics as prerequisite to the study of philosophy from theoretical ethics grounded in metaphysics or first philosophy.⁵ That al-Kindi embodies the Alexandrian tradition in considering logic and mathematics—including astronomy, music and some natural sciences—as prerequisite for the study of philosophy proper is well known. Al-Kindi even offers a particular twist in giving the lion's share to mathematics. It therefore comes as no surprise that he uses so many mathematical arguments in his metaphysical treatises. For instance, *On the Proximate Efficient Cause of Generation and Corruption* ends with the statement that "all that we have said is obvious to anyone well schooled in astronomy and natural science, but anyone who falls short from this will also fall short in his understanding of what we explained, precisely because of his falling short of serious knowledge of astronomy and natural things."⁶ Does al-Kindi also claim that the practice of ethics is prerequisite for the study of philosophy? Yes, because reason or intellect can work properly only if it dominates the passions, which are represented mainly by anger (the irascible part of the soul) and sensual desires (the concupiscible part of the soul), but which also include sorrow⁷ and other such passions.

Control, if not extirpation, of the passions precedes sound intellectual understanding. For instance, the Introduction to *God's Oneness and the Finiteness of the Body of the Universe* tells us that this issue would require long explanation and much research, except for someone "who has reached your degree of theoretical thought (*naẓar*), . . . is helped by an understanding (*fahm*) such as yours, and is prevented from inclination to passion by means of a determination

Aristotele," in *Atti della Reale Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei* 334, Memorie della Classe di Scienze Morali, Storiche e Filologiche, serie 6, 15 (1937), vol. 6 (Roma, 1937), 375–419.

⁵ See Dumitri Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition: Introduction to Reading Avicenna's Philosophical Works* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988), 152, and Dumitri Gutas, "The Starting Point of Philosophical Studies in Alexandrian and Arabic Aristotelianism," *Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities* 2 (1985) 115–23.

⁶ *RKF*, 237. Except when otherwise stated all translations are my own.

⁷ Though to my knowledge al-Kindi never explores the relation between sorrow and the two parts of the soul, he seems to conceive of sorrow as an affect of both these parts.

like yours (*ʿazm*).⁸ Not only must control of passion precede sound intellectual understanding, but it also should accompany it even after some theoretical thought has been acquired. The first chapter of *On First Philosophy* attacks contemporary scholars famous for their theoretical thought (*naẓar*) but in fact strangers to the truth, not only because of their lack of real knowledge but also because of the envy (*ḥasad*) that controls their animal soul.⁹ Al-Kindi does not hesitate to claim that these religious scholars “traffic in religion, though they are devoid of religion.”¹⁰ This highlights the dependence of truth-recognition on control of passion.

The theme of conflicts between intellect and passion—be it anger or sensual desire—is at the heart of the argument for the tripartition of the soul in *The Discourse on the Soul*.¹¹ For al-Kindi the three parts of the soul are the intellective, the irascible, and the concupiscible. *On the Proximate Efficient Cause of Generation and Corruption* completes the picture by laying down the following dictum: “The acts of the soul follow the mix of bodily humors which itself follows variations in the positions of the celestial bodies” (*RKF*, 224–5). Obviously al-Kindi sees a close relation between character and climate. People living below the equator are strongly affected by the heat emanating from the celestial bodies and, therefore, are

⁸ *RKF*, 201. There is a French translation in Al-Kindi, *Cinq Épîtres*, trans. by a CNRS team (Paris: Editions du CNRS, 1976), 93. Al-Kindi defines *ʿazm* as “persistence of opinion in action” in *The Definitions and Descriptions of Things*, *RKF*, 171. There is another edition and a French translation with notes by D. Gimaret in al-Kindi, *Cinq Épîtres*, 21, 34 n. 56. This includes its second version edited by Felix Klein-Franke in Felix Klein-Franke, “Al-Kindi’s ‘On Definitions and Descriptions of Things,’” *Le Muséon* 95 (1982): 213 n. 60. In *The Art of Dispelling Sorrows* al-Kindi states that all that is needed for curing illnesses of the soul is *ʿazm*, see p. 35. An edition of *The Art of Dispelling Sorrows* (hereafter, “*ADS*”) by H. Ritter and R. Walzer is contained in their “Uno scritto morale inedito di al-Kindi,” in *Atti della Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei* 335 *Memorie della Classe di Scienze Morali, Storiche e Filologiche*, serie 6, 16 (1938). (Roma, 1938), 5–63.

⁹ *RKF*, 103–4. There is an English translation of this text with introduction and commentary by Alfred L. Ivry, see *Al-Kindi’s Metaphysics: A Translation of Yaʿqūb ibn Ishāq al-Kindi’s Treatise “On First Philosophy” (fī al-Falsafah al-ʾUlā)*, trans. Alfred L. Ivry (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1974).

¹⁰ *RKF*, 104, *Al-Kindi’s Metaphysics*, 59 (Ivry’s translation).

¹¹ *RKF*, 273–4. There is a French paraphrase by ʿAbdurrahman Badawī in his *Histoire de la Philosophie en Islam*, vol. 2, *Les Philosophes purs* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1972), 427–31.

dominated by anger and sensual desires which cloud their deliberative power. As for those who inhabit better climes, that is, zones closer to the North pole, they are often interested in theoretical thought (*naẓar*) and research because their character traits are justly proportioned (*RKF*, 225–6).

Proper character building, understood as the domination exercised by the intellect over the passions, is thus not only requisite for the fruitful study of philosophy and the quest for truth but must also accompany each of its steps. One may wonder whether such ethical preparation coincides with common moral or religious education or requires a more technical or scientific approach—as mathematics and logic obviously do. If this is the case, philosophers need to provide some kind of “intermediate” or prephilosophical ethics which would shake some of the common views and incite people to the pursuit of philosophical studies. Our analysis of *The Art of Dispelling Sorrows* will show that to shake common views and to incite people to philosophy are the two aims of this text.

Philosophical ethics proper, on the other hand, has its place at the end of the curriculum. In *On the Number of Aristotle's Books* al-Kindi, who claims that the study of Aristotle's books on ethics is of utmost utility for philosophy, states that these books can be fully understood only after the study of what does not need bodies in any way. Ethics is the “fruit of this science,” namely, metaphysics, though “in some way ethical books pertain to the discourse on the soul.”¹² This is not surprising, since al-Kindi has just indicated that although the soul in this life is in a body, it does not need this body for its existence and subsistence.¹³ A study of the incorporeal soul, however, is not enough to ground ethics, since its full understanding requires metaphysics. Does this mean that any approach to ethics

¹² *RKF*, 369, Guidi and Walzer, “Scritto introduttivo,” sec 3, p 393. On ethics in *On the Number of Aristotle's Books* see Charles E. Butterworth, “Al-Kindi and the Beginnings of Islamic Political Philosophy,” in *The Political Aspects of Islamic Philosophy: Essays in Honor of Muḥsin S. Mahdi*, ed. Charles E. Butterworth (Cambridge Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Harvard University, 1992), 14–32.

¹³ Al-Kindi does not really place psychology in physics in the way the Aristotelian tradition does, but he gives it a special status. Complete understanding of psychology requires metaphysics. See Guidi and Walzer, “Scritto introduttivo,” 378–80. Al-Kindi argues for the incorporeality of the soul in *On the Existence of Incorporeal Substances*, see *RKF*, 265–9. There is a French translation in Al-Kindi, *Cinq Épîtres*, 87–91.

that rests simply on a psychology, and on a tripartition of the soul in particular—as does Miskawayh's, for instance—is not yet sophisticated philosophy but some intermediary level? Whatever the case, al-Kindi takes ethics to lead “to full human excellence [*faḍīlah*] which is the aim of the naturally upright human being both in this life and in the hereafter”¹⁴

The end of *On the Number of Aristotle's Books* recaps the whole curriculum and claims that anyone who wants to study philosophy must begin with mathematics and logic, and then move to physics, metaphysics, and finally ethics. *On First Philosophy* makes the dependence of ethics on metaphysics a particular application of a much broader principle. Since “knowledge of the first cause has truthfully been called ‘First Philosophy’, [and] since the rest of philosophy is contained in its knowledge,”¹⁵ theoretical ethics, as well as other philosophical disciplines, requires a knowledge of the first cause, that is, a knowledge of God.

It is unfortunate that al-Kindi does not tell us much about what exactly constitutes philosophical ethics. In fact, what he says about Aristotle's ethical and political texts is rather vague. This raises the suspicion that al-Kindi, at least at the time he wrote this text if not during his whole career, had little access to these texts, and to the *Nicomachean Ethics* in particular, even though he refers to the latter by name.¹⁶ He even attributes to Aristotle the view that “happiness is excellence at each instant, excellence in soul and body and also in what is external to both body and soul.”¹⁷ The parallel between the excellence of soul and body is more reflective of the tradition of spiritual medicine than of Aristotle's own views. The near absence of Aristotelian influence is also clear in the two main texts relevant for a study of al-Kindi's ethics, *The Discourse on the Soul* and *The Art of*

¹⁴ RKF, 369

¹⁵ RKF, 101, *Al-Kindi's Metaphysics*, 56. (Ivry's translation.)

¹⁶ Guidi and Walzer believe that al-Kindi had rather scant knowledge of Aristotle's psychology and ethics, see Guidi and Walzer, “Scritto introduttivo,” 382–4

¹⁷ RKF, 384. It is noteworthy that al-Kindi, as we shall see, indirectly argues against such a conception of happiness in *The Art of Dispelling Sorrows*. There true happiness focuses on the soul—or more precisely, the intellect alone—and there is a clear denial of the importance of external things and possessions.

Dispelling Sorrows. This fact explains why Majid Fakhry characterizes al-Kindi's ethical thought as Socratic¹⁸ and Stoic because of its insistence on suppressing passion¹⁹

Before moving to al-Kindi's basic ethical principle it is useful to turn to al-Kindi's definition of philosophy in *On First Philosophy*, his most detailed metaphysical work. It defines philosophy as "knowledge of the true nature of things, insofar as it is possible for the human being"²⁰ "The aim of the philosopher is, as regards his knowledge, to attain the truth, and as regards his action, to act in conformity with truth."²¹ This again indicates an intimate connection between knowledge and action. Not only is there an intrinsic dependence of proper action on proper knowledge, but it seems too that knowledge which does not lead to appropriate action is not true knowledge. There is clear evidence for the former claim, as we saw, but the latter is merely implied. Later on, al-Kindi somewhat unfolds the meaning of knowledge of the true nature of things

[It] includes knowledge of Divinity, oneness [*al-wahdāniyyah*]²², and excellence [*fadilah*], and a complete knowledge of everything useful, and of the way to it, and a distance from anything harmful, with precautions against it. It is the acquisition of all this which the true messengers

¹⁸ Following a late Hellenistic tradition al-Kindi collected Socratic sayings in a way that rolled Diogenes the Cynic and Socrates into one. The late Hellenistic tradition had already made of Socrates a kind of traditional archetype, the hero of the philosophical epos.

¹⁹ Majid Fakhry, *Ethical Theories in Islam* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991), 67. On the knowledge of Socrates in Medieval Arabic literature, see Ilai Alon, *Socrates in Mediaeval Arabic Literature* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1990). On al-Kindi's collection of Socratic sayings, see M. Fakhry, "Al-Kindi and Socrates," *Al-Abhath* 16 (1963): 23–34 (in Arabic). The influence of the Socratic sayings is also clear in *The Sayings of al-Kindi*, edited and translated into English by Atiyeh in his *Al-Kindi*, 216–57. Butterworth examines al-Kindi's Socratic perspective in his "Al-Kindi," 52–8. On the Stoic influence see Fehmi Jadaane, *L'influence du Stoicisme sur la pensée musulmane* (Beirut: Dar El-Machreq, 1967).

²⁰ RKF, 97, *Al-Kindi's Metaphysics*, 55 (Ivry's translation, with modifications). See also the sixth definition of philosophy in *The Definitions*, RKF, 173. An English translation of *The Definitions* by A. Altmann and S. M. Stern is available in their *Isaac Israeli: A Neoplatonic Philosopher of the Early Tenth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), 28. The French translation is in *Al-Kindi, Cinq Épîtres*, 23, 35, 56–60.

²¹ RKF, 97, *Al-Kindi's Metaphysics*, 55 (Ivry's translation, with modifications).

²² This term has clear religious connotations relating it to the basic Islamic profession of faith that "there is no god but God." It is not simply an allusion to the Neoplatonic One.

brought from God For the true messengers brought but an
affirmation of the Divinity of God alone, and an adherence to excellences, which are pleasing to Him, and relinquishment of vices, which are contrary to excellences both in themselves and in their effects ²³

Philosophy and true religion both conjoin knowledge of God—be it through metaphysics or revelation—and ethics

If indeed true ethics is grounded not only in knowledge of the soul but ultimately in knowledge of God, then we can understand why philosophical ethics at its most sophisticated requires metaphysics. Such an understanding of ethics reflects the old definition of philosophy as imitation of God as far as it is possible for a human being. In fact the move from understanding the soul to reflecting on God or the first cause in order to ground ethics is exemplified in *The Discourse on the Soul*, which begins with a definition of the soul as simple and noble, and connects this nobility to the imitation of God

II

Al-Kindi's Fundamental Ethical Principle Obviously, the ethical implications of conceiving philosophy as imitation of God will depend on al-Kindi's conception of God, since imitation presupposes at least some knowledge of that one imitates. This plunges us at once into a difficulty since, on the one hand, al-Kindi speaks of the imitation of God—that is, the attempt to make oneself similar to God (*tashabuh*, fifth form of *shabaha*)—but on the other hand, he also denies that God would be in any way similar to his creation. Once this difficulty is solved we will see that the suppression of passion is one aspect of this imitation of God. The other implication will concern the heavenly bodies or celestial spheres

Philosophy as the Imitation of God. The definition of philosophy as imitation of God, of course, has its origin in Plato's *Theaetetus*, which speaks of "homoiōsis theōi" (176b). Later on, this definition was picked up by the Alexandrian tradition and became popular in

²³ RKF, 104, *Al-Kindi's Metaphysics*, 59 (Ivry's translation, with modifications)

Arabic philosophical circles.²⁴ Al-Kindi is fully aware of this definition. It is one of the six definitions of philosophy listed in *On the Definitions and Descriptions of Things* and is used rather extensively in *The Discourse on the Soul*. In *On the Definitions* the Kindian formulation gives this definition an interesting twist.²⁵ First, it is presented as a definition of philosophy given by the Ancients from its effect (*fi'l*), that is, its result. Second, it is an imitation of God's actions (*'af'āl*). Third, al-Kindi interprets it as meaning that "the human being should have perfect excellence [*faḍīlah*]."

That this definition focuses on the effect of philosophy reinforces the connection between knowledge and deeds. In fact two of the definitions al-Kindi gives are taken from philosophy's effect. The first one defines philosophy as the imitation of God's actions. It is immediately followed by the second, "Being mindful of death," for "in [the] view [of the Ancients] death is twofold: natural, that is, the soul ceasing to make use of the body, and secondly, the killing of sensual desires; it is the second which they meant here, because the killing of sensual desires is the way to excellence."²⁶ This, of course, leads us back to the theme of suppression of passion and suggests that the imitation of God implies suppression of the passions.

As for the qualification that the imitation of God focuses on God's actions, Gimaret rightly points out that this new formulation avoids claiming one could really make oneself similar to God himself.²⁷ The imitation concerns itself with God's actions and not with God's essence. This is a first hint that al-Kindi will be careful to maintain God's transcendence and to eschew any implication of "shared divinity" (*shirk*), an implication which would be unacceptable both philosophically and religiously.

Finally, al-Kindi's surmising that by means of this formulation the Ancients meant that a human being should have perfect excellence is

²⁴ See Dimitri Gutas, *Greek Wisdom Literature in Arabic Translation: A Study of the Greco-Arabic Gnomologia* (New Haven: American Oriental Society, 1975), 116–17. See also Altmann and Stern, *Isaac Israeli*, 197–202.

²⁵ *RKF*, p. 172, def. 2, Al-Kindi, *Cinq Epîtres*, 22, 35 n. 70b, 60, Altmann and Stern, *Isaac Israeli*, 28–30.

²⁶ *On the Definitions*, in Altmann and Stern, *Isaac Israeli*, 28. (Altmann and Stern's translation, with modifications.)

²⁷ Al-Kindi, *Cinq Epîtres*, 58.

interesting too. In his *Explanation on the Prostration of the Outermost Sphere and its Obedience to God*, a commentary on *Koran* 55:5, al-Kindi attributes excellences to God.²⁸ Human excellence thus not only reflects God's but takes its origin from God's excellence.

The Discourse on the Soul, which purports to be abridged from what al-Kindi calls the book of Aristotle, from Plato, and from some other philosophers, refers extensively to the imitation of God. This is not surprising since contrary to what one might infer from its title, the book makes little use of Aristotle but rather borrows heavily from Neoplatonic sources.²⁹ The text begins with a statement on the soul, attributed to no one, but which gives the tone for the whole work by moving immediately from the soul to God. "The soul is simple, has nobility, perfection, and great dignity. Its substance proceeds from the substance of the Creator just as sunlight proceeds from the sun."³⁰ Then, having carefully distinguished the sun or Creator from its light or creation, the text goes on to add that the spiritual and "divine" character of its substance "arises from the nobility of its nature and its opposition to what pertains to the body, such as sensual desires and anger" (RKF, 273). This immediately links the incorporeality and simplicity of the human soul to its opposition to the body and to the theme of the suppression of passion.

²⁸ "These [the motions of the celestial bodies bringing potencies to actuality] are those by means of which you may become aware of the greatness of God's power, the breadth of his generosity, and the emanation of his excellences [*jayd fadā' ilāhī*]", RKF, 259–60.

²⁹ RKF, 272–80, French paraphrase by A. Badawi, *Histoire de la Philosophie en Islam*, 2:427–33, Spanish translation with interesting introduction by Rafael Ramón Guerrero, "La tradición griega en la filosofía árabe: el tema del alma en al-Kindi," *Al-Qanṭara* 3 (1982): 1–26. For the Neoplatonic influence see also Atiyeh, *Al-Kindi*, 99–100. The imitation of God is central to the anonymous Neoplatonic ethical treatise surviving in Arabic and edited by 'Abdurrahman Badawi in his *Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea* (Kuwait: Kuwait University Press, 1979), 389–445. For a brief study of this text see M. C. Lyons, "A Greek Ethical Treatise," *Oriens* 13–14 (1960–61): 35–57. For a study of other Greek sources, see Charles Généquand, "Platonism and Hermetism in al-Kindi's *Fi al-nafs*," *Zeitschrift für Geschichte der arabisch-islamischen Wissenschaften* 4 (1987–88): 1–18.

³⁰ RKF, 273. The soul that al-Kindi calls simple must be the intellectual soul only, since this soul is contrasted to the irascible and concupiscible. In *The Explanation of the Prostration* (RKF, 255) al-Kindi states most clearly that the soul has three faculties. Al-Kindi's interest in the simplicity of the soul led to his writing a treatise on this subject, see Atiyeh, *Al-Kindi*, 193 n. 193.

Moving then to Plato's views, some of which he explicitly endorses, al-Kindi gives us what he takes to be Plato's conclusion.

The intellectual souls of those whose goal in this world is the enjoyment of various kinds of food and drink, which become transformed into putrescent matter and whose aim is the pleasure of copulation, are incapable of attaining the knowledge of these noble things [i.e., the incorporeal beings] and cannot achieve the imitation of the Creator (RKF, 274)

Still supposedly paraphrasing Plato, al-Kindi indicates that a human being dominated by sensual desires is like a pig—a very impure animal in an Islamic context—and one dominated by the irascible is like a dog, but a human being dominated by the intellective soul is like an angel. Not only does such a one know “the true natures of things” but he is also “an excellent person *close* to resembling the Creator [notice the carefulness of this formulation] for the things which belong to the Creator are wisdom, power, justice, goodness, beauty, and truth. Human beings likewise may sometimes³¹ govern their souls insofar as it is possible for a human being, and so become wise, just, generous, good, and prefer the true and the beautiful.”³² In this way the human being is able to participate to a small degree in some of God's excellences, which are presented as positive attributes. The soul's proximity to God's power endows it with a power resembling God's. Things get even better after death, when the soul liberated from the body comes to know all else—as the Creator does—or to a somewhat lesser degree because it receives this knowledge from the Creator's light. At that stage the soul's status in the realm of intellect becomes “higher than the realm of the celestial sphere,” probably because celestial spheres will remain bound to a body (RKF, 275–6).

Introducing then another philosopher, probably Pythagoras, al-Kindi again states the necessity of abandoning sensual desires and undergoing purification. He uses the famous Neoplatonic comparison of the soul to a mirror in need of serious polishing. Pythagoras—if indeed it is he—claims that after death, thanks to God's light and mercy, we will be close to the Creator's light and mercy (RKF, 276–7). The incorporeal soul's proximity to God increases with its distance from the body and its two lower faculties. Reverting to Plato, al-Kindi

³¹ With an emendation to “qad yumkinu l-'insāna”, RKF, p. 275, l. 3.

³² RKF, 274–5. One can find a summary of this passage in one of al-Kindi's sayings, see Attyeh, *Al-Kindi*, 218–19, 240 n. 5.

even asserts that purification is the only way for the soul to reach nobility in this life and in the hereafter. Then, al-Kindi says once again, the soul's power is close to resembling God's power (*RKF*, 278). Al-Kindi finishes with an illustrative story attributed to Aristotle and some moral exhortations. The only good reason for sorrow is neglect of the truly important thing, "to purify one's soul insofar as is possible."³³

Clearly the text is not of the greatest sophistication: it does not argue for its positions, relies on authorities, employs a story, and ends with an exhortation to moral purification and the intellectual life. Many of the terms used for God are Koranic and all are positive attributes describing God's actions. Strikingly the exhortation to take care of one's soul derives all human excellences not from human efforts (except from purification) but from God's gift and mercy. The various philosophers who are quoted are united in inciting the reader to suppress anger and sensual desires in order to purify his soul and pursue the intellectual life, particularly the consideration of metaphysical themes. This may well be an instance of prephilosophical ethics.

In more technical texts al-Kindi reflects on the terms applied to God in order to highlight God's transcendence. Terms applied to both God and his creation are not used in any of the usual ways. They are neither synonymous nor homonymous, therefore, they are not purely equivocal or even equivocal in relation to a prime analogate as all medical things are related to medicine.³⁴ What are left are terms that are either purely negative or purely positive, such as "Oneness" and "Agent," which apply essentially and primarily to God—the universal cause—and are applied metaphorically and accidentally to his creation. Al-Kindi's *The Agent in the Proper Sense*³⁵ argues that God alone is truly an agent, since He alone produces existence out of nothing. Strictly speaking the term agent (*fā'il*) should be restricted to God. Any other kind of action (*fi'l*) coming after the first is an "influence"

³³ *RKF*, 379. On this only true reason for sorrow, see also the end of *The Art of Dispelling Sorrows*.

³⁴ That they are neither synonymous nor homonymous, see *On First Philosophy*, *RKF*, 155–6, *Al-Kindi's Metaphysics*, 107. That they are not related to a prime analogate, see *On First Philosophy*, *RKF*, 159, *Al-Kindi's Metaphysics*, 111. Note that al-Kindi's example of medicine comes from Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 2.2.

³⁵ *RKF*, 182–4. For an English translation see Altmann and Stern, *Isaac Israel*, 68–9.

(*mu'aththir*), for it is no immediate cause of existence out of nothing and derives its causality from the Agent. The true Agent can also be said to influence, but He alone does it without being influenced in any way.

The work called *On First Philosophy* focuses on oneness³⁶ and argues that only the first cause is truly and essentially one, since all other forms of oneness are derivative, mixed with multiplicity, and accidental. From this it follows that the first cause has no genus whatsoever and is neither in time nor in motion, since both time and motion involve multiplicity. Additionally, since the first cause and its creation are not in the same genus, and similarity or likeness occurs only in the same genus, the first cause has no similarity or likeness to its creation.³⁷ This picks up the stern affirmation in *God's Oneness* that God does not resemble his creation because he is "far beyond the attributes given to him by the unbelievers."³⁸ By the unbelievers al-Kindi seems to mean people who take the anthropomorphic Koranic attributes literally. *On First Philosophy* ends on the same note and adds that metaphorical oneness derives from the generosity of the One.³⁹ It seems logical to conclude that all of God's positive attributes pertain primarily and essentially to God and are applied only metaphorically and accidentally to his creation, because whatever pertains to creatures is purely derivative from God's power and so necessarily imperfect.

Certainly al-Kindi believes that some terms such as "similar" apply to two things by a relation of "annexation," that is, that they are extrinsically related (*'idāfah*)⁴⁰ Such relation implies (1) that the two things are in the same genus; (2) that the relation is accidental (similar and dissimilar belong to the category of quality⁴¹); and (3) that, therefore, the "producer" or "influencer" qua "producer" and the thing which is "affected" qua "affected" in that particular manner are

³⁶ RKF, 143, *Al-Kindi's Metaphysics*, 95–6. On al-Kindi's views on oneness see Michael E. Marmura and John M. Rist, "Al-Kindi's Discussion of Divine Existence and Oneness," *Mediaeval Studies* 25 (1963): 338–54.

³⁷ RKF, 142–3, *Al-Kindi's Metaphysics*, 94–5.

³⁸ RKF, 207, *Al-Kindi, Cinq Épîtres*, 98.

³⁹ RKF, 162, *Al-Kindi's Metaphysics*, 114.

⁴⁰ What exactly al-Kindi means by *'idāfah* is not clear to me, but al-Kindi certainly boldly denies such a relation can exist between God and his creation.

⁴¹ RKF, 130, *Al-Kindi's Metaphysics*, 82.

simultaneous. Strictly speaking, of course, such relational terms cannot be applied to God. What applies to God is a relation of cause to effect in which the cause in essence precedes and completely causes the effect.⁴² In this case the cause is more elevated and more noble than its effect, and is in no way associated to it. Imitation of God's actions therefore derives from God's generosity, and remains a mere imitation that never leads to true likeness to God because such likeness is strictly impossible.

Al-Kindi's affirmation of God's oneness and, therefore, his rejection of motion and multiplicity in God have an interesting corollary: God is neither soul nor intellect. God is not intellect because to be an intellect would involve a multiplicity of cognitions.⁴³ He is not soul either not only because of the multiplicity of cognitions in the intellectual soul but also because of the presence of motion in the soul. The soul thinks some forms and then moves to others. It is also subject to various character traits or dispositions (*'akhlāq*) and pains (*'ālam*) which accompany it, such as anger, fear, joy, sorrow (*ḥuẓn*), and the like.⁴⁴ This makes it clear that if we want to imitate God's actions we must suppress not only our sensual desires and anger but also various emotions or passions, because emotions and passions involve motion. We can therefore now see why imitation of God requires the suppressing of passion, and in particular the dispelling of sorrows.

The Celestial Bodies' Imitation of God. A closer look at al-Kindi's views on the celestial spheres or bodies in the *Explanation on the Prostration of the Outermost Sphere and its Obedience to God*⁴⁵ (a commentary on *Koran* 55.5–6, "the stars and trees prostrate themselves") reveals some of their interesting features. The celestial bodies are rational beings also but are more perfect than we—at least as long as we have not yet reached the hereafter—since they, *qua* causes of our bodies, are our proximate efficient causes. An examination of their perfection sheds further light on human excellence.

Al-Kindi interprets the outermost sphere's prostration before God not as a physical prostration similar to the ritual prostration of

⁴² RKF, 142, *Al-Kindi's Metaphysics*, 94

⁴³ RKF, 154–5, *Al-Kindi's Metaphysics*, 106–7.

⁴⁴ RKF, 154, *Al-Kindi's Metaphysics*, 105–6

⁴⁵ The text begins with an examination of the outermost sphere but later on shifts to views on the celestial bodies. Al-Kindi's unheralded switch from singular to plural justifies ours.

the canonical Islamic prayer but as an obedience. As obedience implies choice, the celestial spheres must be both animate and rational (*RKF*, 246–7). At first using a fairly Aristotelian division of the soul, al-Kindi argues that since the spheres have incorruptible bodies—they have no contrary—they can neither grow nor decrease and do not need nutrition. In other words, they do not have a vegetative soul. They also necessarily lack any of the senses essentially related to nutrition, namely, taste, smell, and touch (*RKF*, 253). They must have senses, however, since they are animate. They therefore have only the two noble senses of hearing and sight,⁴⁶ which “lead to true sciences and the acquisition of excellences.” Thanks to these two senses one reaches “the complete science of philosophy which grants all excellence” (*RKF*, 254). There is a clear assumption that celestial spheres philosophize, since philosophy—including metaphysics—is the way to all excellence. The message is not difficult to decipher: “Follow the celestial spheres’ good example and become a philosopher.”

Then, switching without further ado to the Platonic tripartition of the soul, al-Kindi goes on to state that the celestial spheres do not have an irascible or concupiscible faculty.⁴⁷ Their degree of perfection grants them by nature what we have to strive so hard to attain in this life. They are never burdened by the irascible and concupiscible soul and its passions, while we have to learn how to dominate the two lower faculties of our soul in order to extirpate the passions. We even have to wait for death to bring the ultimate liberation.

What exactly does al-Kindi mean when he says that the celestial sphere is a proximate efficient cause?⁴⁸ Al-Kindi first explains that it is the cause of anything subject to generation and corruption and of life in particular (*RKF*, 248). His argumentation rests essentially on physics and a conception of the soul as the principle of life. Then,

⁴⁶ In Islam the common list of God’s essential attributes includes hearing and seeing, and therefore sight and hearing are aspects of the imitation of God. Of course some theologians, to avoid any form of anthropomorphism, identify God’s sight and hearing with his knowledge, but others think they are senses.

⁴⁷ *RKF*, 255. Al-Kindi does not seem to be aware of any incompatibility between Aristotle’s and Plato’s divisions of the soul.

⁴⁸ Al-Kindi had already dealt with some aspects of this issue in *On the Proximate Efficient Cause of Generation and Corruption*, which is later than *On First Philosophy* (*RKF*, 215, 219) but earlier than *On the Prostration*, which refers to it (*RKF*, 255).

referring to *On First Philosophy*, al-Kindi defends the same view by means of a metaphysical argument (*RKF*, 251)

Later, having introduced God's creation and design, al-Kindi states that true causation consists in bringing from potency to act *all* that is not impossible.⁴⁹ The implication is clear. Just as God brings about actuality out of pure nothingness, so the celestial spheres in their own derivative way move as many preexisting potencies as possible to actuality. This is the manner of their imitation of God's own generosity to and governance of other beings while the celestial spheres strive to reach their own excellence through philosophical sciences. Only a metaphysics of act and potency and creation out of nothing allows one to understand what is involved in the imitation or emulation of God's generosity as far as possible for the celestial bodies and human beings. *The Discourse on the Soul* had already stated that imitation of God requires the human being to imitate His generosity, but had left rather unspecified what exactly this emulation could entail. The *Discourse* did not provide the metaphysical apparatus necessary to understand God's generosity

III

Human Freedom, Astrology, and the Humoral Mix. Al-Kindi clearly believes in at least some degree of freedom of the will, although he neither explicitly addresses the issue nor has a specific term for free will. He seems to undermine his own conviction, however, in highlighting astral influences and astrological computations and in accepting the dictum that "the acts of the soul follow the mix of bodily humors" (*RKF*, 224–6). Therefore, we need to look more carefully at these issues.

(1) *The Affirmation of Human Freedom.* Al-Kindi often speaks of human choice and will. He even claims, as we saw, that the celestial bodies' obedience requires them to have choice. Choice, however, does not by itself necessarily entail that choice be free and that the

⁴⁹ *RKF*, 259. That is, true causation consists in bringing from potency to act everything that is in fact possible. This is similar to al-Ghazali's position. On this matter see Richard M. Frank, *Creation and the Cosmic System: Al-Ghazali and Avicenna* (Heidelberg: Carl Winter-Universitätsverlag, 1992), 52–77.

will not be subjected to some forces that would predetermine the choice

The Art of Dispelling Sorrows provides us with a clear statement that, at least in some circumstances, the human being is free to act or not to act. This very freedom grounds the attempt to rationally dispel some sorrows based on the fact that some of them arise from our own action and we ought not to do what saddens us

If we do what saddens us, though refraining from it is up to us [*'ilaynā*], for our doing it or refraining from it is up to us [*'ilaynā*], then we are doing either what we will or what we do not will. If we are doing what we will but in fact do not will to be saddened, then we end up willing what we do not will. Such conduct is typical of irrational people.⁵⁰

In fact this ability to pursue or to refrain from a certain course of action gives us a handle on sorrow, since sorrow is by convention and not by nature (*ADS*, 35). As Simone Van Riet puts it, "Sadness is not inescapable. One chooses it. It is voluntary."⁵¹ One may regret that al-Kindi does not explore the theme of human freedom further. Are all our actions and our refraining from them up to us? Are they completely up to us? and at all times? What exactly does it mean to say that they are up to us? Such questions are not answered or even raised.

(2) *Human Freedom and Astrology* Although al-Kindi does not hesitate to use astrological computations to predict the date of the end of Arab domination,⁵² in a lesser known treatise he presents astrological computations as essentially means for making rational choices. In *The Determination by Astrological Means of the Moment at which to Expect an Answer to One's Request and Supplication to God*,⁵³ al-Kindi first explains that although the stars may determine what is below them—that is, the sublunary world—since they are the proximate

⁵⁰ Ritter and Walzer, "Scritto morale," 35. The Arabic expression *ilaynā* is a literal translation of the Stoic *eph' hēmīn* (ἐφ' ἡμῖν), "in our power." See, for example, Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.1.7–9, in *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, ed. and trans. by A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). The Greek text is in vol. 2, p. 388, the English translation and comments is in vol. 1, pp. 391–4.

⁵¹ Simone Van Riet, "Joie et bonheur dans le traité d'al-Kindi sur l'art de combattre la tristesse," *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 61 (1963): 15.

⁵² Atiyeh, *Al-Kindi*, 190. For Atiyeh's discussion of al-Kindi's views on astrology and what Atiyeh takes to be al-Kindi's determinism see pp. 79–82.

⁵³ *The Determination by Astrological Means of the Moment at which to Expect an Answer to One's Request and Supplication to God* (hereafter,

causes of generation and corruption, they certainly do not in any way determine what is above them—that is, God, who is their own cause. Astral conjunctions, therefore, are simply signs of God's actions for those who know how to read them, since stars are intermediaries between God and us (*DAM*, 65–6). As stars are caused by God, they manifest something of their creator's will. Such signs allow us to select the propitious time to ask for something (*DAM*, 65). As foolish people would apply such knowledge for requesting and obtaining things harmful—such as riches or dainty food—instead of useful things, al-Kindi wants to restrict this lore to the learned and wise. Presumably the philosophically inclined would employ it to ask only for useful things, such as mathematical knowledge and understanding of metaphysics. To prevent the misuse and abuse of astral computations knowledge gained in this way should be hidden under symbols (*DAM*, 68). Al-Kindi's views on the extent of the astrological influence remain unclear, as do his views on the extent of the limitations it may put on human freedom. Astrological computations, however, allow us to time intelligently and therefore to choose rationally the moment at which to make a specific petition.

(3) *Human Freedom and the Humoral Mix* As we saw earlier, al-Kindi accepts the dictum that the soul's actions follow the mix of bodily humors, which itself is determined by astral influences. This dictum may be true of actions arising from innate character traits and inclinations, but it does not follow from this that such traits or inclinations cannot be suppressed, or at least curbed or modified, by acquiring proper habits. A natural inclination to sorrow—the objects of which are conventional and not natural—can, therefore, be controlled by proper habits.⁵⁴ This allows al-Kindi to speak of choosing character traits. Proper moral training may bring some change in the natural inclinations, or more exactly, to their focus. If those naturally inclined to sorrow discover that objects of sorrows are in fact few and

"*DAM*", edited with an Introduction by Muhsin Mahdi in his "Unedited Texts of al-Kindi and al-Farabi," (in Arabic), in *Nusus falsafiyat* given to Ibrahim Madkour and edited by Uthman Amin (Cairo: Egyptian Association of the Book, 1976), 53–68. The text edition runs from p. 65 to p. 68. The same treatise had previously been edited by Mubahat Turker Kuyel in *Araştırma* 10 (1972): 9–14. We will refer to Mahdi's edition.

⁵⁴ *The Discourse on the Soul* speaks of those whose nature it is to cry for things causing sorrow (*RKF*, 279) but *The Art of Dispelling Sorrows* shows how such a disposition can be altered by acquiring proper habits (*ADS*, 33–4). See also Van Riet, "Joie et bonheur," 16.

far between they will, it is hoped, sorrow much less. Opinion about what is really worth sorrowing about may be changed. In addition, medicine too may help in modifying the humoral mix thanks to better habits.⁵⁵ Thus may enhance human freedom

Clearly al-Kindi's views on astrology and the influence of the humoral mix are not as detrimental to human freedom as one might think, although we have no hint that al-Kindi himself was bothered about their compatibility. Moving from theory to practice, let us examine how al-Kindi deals with the malady of sorrowing

IV

*The Art of Dispelling Sorrows*⁵⁶ Too often *The Art of Dispelling Sorrows* is deemed not worth philosophical examination. Abu Ridah takes this view so far that he does not bother editing it.⁵⁷ Walzer and Van Riet dub it "popular" philosophy.⁵⁸ More recently Butterworth, taking it more seriously, analyzes it at some length but at the end confesses disappointment. For him, this work "provides strategies for coping, personal coping, and accepts the milieu in which we live as a fixed variable—that is, something not worth trying to alter. We learn to put up with it, even to come to terms with it in such a way

⁵⁵ See Felix Klein-Franke, "The Arabic Version of Galen's 'Peri Ethôn' (περὶ ἠθῶν)," *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam* 1 (1979) 125–50. About the role of humors in a mental disease see, for instance, Hans Hinrich Biesterfeldt and Dimitri Gutas's article, "The Malady of Love," which presents a pathology of love that associates it with an excess of black bile and explains why this malady is medically incurable, Hans Hinrich Biesterfeldt and Dimitri Gutas, "The Malady of Love," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 104 (1984) 21–55. Where medicine fails philosophy takes over, and al-Razi dedicates the fifth chapter of his *Spiritual Medicine* to the treatment of this disease. Al-Kindi too had some interest in this issue, since he wrote the *Agreement of the Philosophers about the Allegories of Love*, which must have contained a paraphrase of Plato's *Symposium*, see Dimitri Gutas, "Plato's *Symposium* in the Arabic Tradition," *Oriens* 31 (1988) 37–47.

⁵⁶ In addition to the Ritter and Walzer edition to which we are referring, there is an edition by 'Abdurrahman Badawi in his *Trattés philosophiques par al-Kindi, al-Farabi, Ibn Bajjah et Ibn 'Ady*, 3d ed. (Beirut Dār Al-Andaloss, 1983), 6–32. Badawi provides also a close French paraphrase of this text in his *Histoire de la Philosophie en Islam*, 2 456–69.

⁵⁷ For Abu Ridah's justification see *RKF*, viii, where he states that this text is not philosophical.

⁵⁸ Ritter and Walzer, "Scritto morale," 7, 13, Van Riet, "Joie et bonheur," 13, 23.

that we improve our own life." According to Butterworth, however, *The Art of Dispelling Sorrows* does not deal with any serious philosophical issue—such as the nature of happiness—and does not even question its own hidden assumptions.⁵⁹

Rafael Ramón Guerrero and Emilio Tornero Poveda's translation under the title "The Art of Consolation," relates this work to Epictetus's *Manual* and to Neoplatonic texts.⁶⁰ The notion of philosophy as consolation evokes Boethius's famous *Consolation of Philosophy*, which far more than al-Kindi's own had an enormous literary, artistic, and philosophical influence.⁶¹ Al-Kindi is more indebted to a Hellenistic and late Roman tradition of "therapeutic arguments" than is Boethius. According to Martha Nussbaum this tradition covered the spectrum from Aristotelians to Stoics and Epicureans. This kind of tradition, which conceives of philosophy as something that must necessarily affect the manner of our living in all its aspects, links the therapeutic arguments needed to heal the soul from its diseases to literary artistry.⁶² No one would deny that Boethius's masterpiece is

⁵⁹ Butterworth, "Al-Kindi," 32–52, see p. 52 in particular.

⁶⁰ *Obras filosóficas de Al-Kindi*, 156–71. There is an Introduction on pp. 154–5. Badawi calls it a "consolation par la philosophie", Badawi, *Histoire de la philosophie en Islam*, 2:456. For the Greek sources see Ritter and Walzer, "Scritto Morale," 9–30, although Walzer's view that it is clearly modeled after a lost treatise of Themistius should not be accepted. See also Jadaane, *L'influence du Stoïcisme*, 88–90, 195–214, and Badawi's discussion in his *Histoire de la philosophie en Islam*, 2:456–7, 469–73.

⁶¹ On the great influence of *The Art of Dispelling Sorrows* see Ritter and Walzer, "Scritto Morale," 7–9, and Badawi, *Histoire de la Philosophie en Islam*, 2:473–7. Miskawayh quotes from *The Art of Dispelling Sorrows* at length in his *Refinement of Character*. The Arabic edition of this work is *Tahdhib al-Akhlaq*, ed. Constantine K. Zurayk (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1966), 219–21. There is also an English translation *The Refinement of Character*, trans. Constantine K. Zurayk (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1968), 194–6. There are some similarities between *The Consolation of Philosophy* and *The Art of Dispelling Sorrows*, which show their dependence on the same tradition of late antiquity. For instance, Lady Philosophy acts as a physician to cure Boethius's soul and first applies an easy or light remedy (as does al-Kindi), and both texts argue that what was thought to be misfortune is in fact good fortune.

⁶² "This idea of philosophy as a compassionate art through which confused and suffering people may be brought from their current misery to a greater measure of flourishing—this is a deeply rooted idea in the major traditions of Hellenistic ethical thought, both Greek and Roman. Frequently it is expressed through an analogy between philosophy and the art of medicine: as medicine is to the body, so philosophy is to the soul", Martha C. Nussbaum, Introduction to *The Poetics of Therapy: Hellenistic Ethics in its*

a prime example of one of those rare happy marriages between artistry and philosophy. Anyone who has taught this work knows how it still captivates and charms contemporary undergraduates. As for al-Kindi's *Art of Dispelling Sorrows*, it too exhibits literary and artistic ambitions sadly absent from the rest of his work.⁶³

Nussbaum's paper, "The Stoics on the Extirpation of the Passions,"⁶⁴ is most helpful for locating al-Kindi's own therapy. She asserts that "in order to see the power of the Stoic conception of therapy we need to focus on their account of the emotions or passions. . . . We shall go on to investigate the notorious thesis of Chrysippus that the passions are forms of false belief or judgment. This thesis has, as I think we shall see, considerably more philosophical and intuitive power than might at first be evident."⁶⁵ If, indeed, passions and emotions are tied to false beliefs we can understand why a philosopher such as al-Kindi, who values truth so highly, would like to eradicate them.

(1) *Introduction (p. 31)*⁶⁶ *The Art of Dispelling Sorrows* makes its own the common literary device of presenting philosophy, be it at its most sophisticated or popular, in the form of a letter answering a personal request of a friend. This of course allows for the reader's easy identification with the friend. Presumably someone who asks for a tract to help him in dispelling sorrows must be afflicted in some way, but the text does not offer further clues. Al-Kindi's answer will thus fit anyone suffering from sadness. In a *captatio benevolentiae* al-Kindi states at the outset that noble souls, such as his friend's, do not want to become prey to vice and try to avoid its pain and tyranny. The implications are clear: sorrow is a vice and painful disease for which we should seek a remedy.

As only knowledge of the cause of a pain can lead to its cure, al-Kindi without further ado gives an essential definition of sorrow: "It is

Rhetorical and Literary Context, ed. Martha C. Nussbaum, *Apeiron* 23, no. 4 (1990): 1–6.

⁶³ See *Obras filosóficas de Al-Kindi*, 154, Jadaane, *L'Influence du Stoïcisme*, 209–10.

⁶⁴ Martha C. Nussbaum, "The Stoics on the Extirpation of the Passions," *Apeiron* 20 (1987): 129–77. Nussbaum shows how some of the relevant Stoic views were known to Galen. Galen's influence on Arabic philosophy—which is much more important than usually stated—explains how they reached al-Kindi, even if he was unaware of their true origin.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 130–1.

⁶⁶ Page references in these headings are to *ADS*.

a pain of the soul occurring from the loss of things loved or from having things sought for elude us."⁶⁷ No justification is provided. This is a view commonly held. Nearly the whole treatise follows from this presupposition, although at the end al-Kindi will claim that the definition leads to inconsistency and so hint that it is false. The treatise uses various literary devices to make its points. Although al-Kindi, to my knowledge, never states that emotions or passions are false beliefs or inherently connected to them, he nevertheless spends his time gently correcting and even refuting the common beliefs about the causes of sorrow.

The arguments, of which there are many,⁶⁸ do not rest in any way on revelation and often not even on defined philosophical positions. On the surface they are fairly ordinary common-sense arguments made palatable by tales, illustrations, and even a long allegory. The work is pleasant if somewhat pedestrian. I believe, however, that it is designed to make careful and thoughtful readers question their commonly accepted false beliefs which are at the root of their complaint and to incite them to seek what is really necessary, that is, to engage in the pursuit of philosophy. Only philosophy provides secure foundations for the assumptions of the therapeutic arguments, the curative power of which the readers will have experienced. The slow pace, repetitions, apparent digressions, stories, and so on, have no other purpose than to upset the readers' familiar beliefs and give them time to assimilate fully the consequences of the refutation of their old beliefs and of the acceptance of more philosophical ones.

(2) *Causes of sorrow are such by convention and not by nature* (pp. 31–35). From the very beginning of this work, its readers must confront the implications of a truth they do not fully acknowledge. Our world is a world of generation and corruption, and this fact necessarily leads to sorrow if the possessions we love and the things we seek are corruptible and sensible objects. By definition such objects are not only elusive and transitory but also such that others can snatch them away from us. To avoid sorrow, therefore, we should rather love and seek things of the intellect, since these things alone are stable and eternal. Besides, no one can despoil us of them. True understanding of nature, of physics, would bring home to us that the love

⁶⁷ Butterworth, "Al-Kindi," 40. (Butterworth's translation of *The Art of Dispelling Sorrows*, with modifications.)

⁶⁸ That is, in contradistinction to the other "ethical" treatise, *The Discourse on the Soul*.

and pursuit of sensible and corruptible objects is self-defeating. As we are not yet able to give up our attachment to the sensible world al-Kindi, leaving aside the claims of the world of intellect, invites us simply to imitate illustrious kings, who do not cry over the past or rush for what may or may not come but rather pay full attention to the present. Somehow the field of things that cause sorrow has been narrowed down to current things or events, and the self-esteem of the readers is boosted by telling them that their past attitude is common and that they can imitate the glorious behavior of illustrious kings.

Sorrow is not grounded in its object—the nature of which, in fact, is not under our control—but rather in our own attitude towards the object. Why? Because what brings sorrow does not do so by nature but simply by convention—by the way we choose to look at it. Human experience shows that such is the case, since different people value different things and assume that what they value is the only thing worth valuing. The hedonist, who takes his pleasure in drink, food, sex, and elegant clothes, thinks everybody else is a sad case. The gambler, though wasting time and money, thinks that everybody else is missing his life. Even the highway robber—who risks amputation and crucifixion—assumes that everyone else is a loser. Most pathetic of all, the effeminate⁶⁹ and cross dresser—for whom everyone feels aversion—assumes everyone else lets life pass him by. Notice how al-Kindi suggests that at least the practitioners of the last three types of conduct are victims of false belief. Now he can draw the conclusion: what people value is not valuable by nature but rather by habit and familiarity. Therefore, he says, let us change our own attitude to things and no longer accuse the sensible objects of being the cause of our sorrows.

Al-Kindi kindly provides two incentives for doing so. First, as the soul—presumably only the intellective soul—is incorruptible, it is much more important than the body, which is merely its instrument. Second, spiritual medicine is less painful and much less expensive than bodily medicine. All that it requires is a “determination,”⁷⁰ which,

⁶⁹ The context indicates that for al-Kindi the effeminate is also a cross dresser. About the effeminate (*mukhannath*) see Everett K. Rowson, “The Effeminates of Early Medina,” *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 111 (1991) 671–93. According to al-Razi even spiritual medicine cannot cure the “effeminate” of the malady of love, *Rasāʾil Falsafīyyah*, ed. P. Kraus (Cairo: Imprimerie Paul Barbey, 1939), 45.

⁷⁰ That is, *ʿazm*, see note 8 above.

starting from small matters, will gradually take up greater ones. Again, wary that the reader may be frightened by the immortality of the soul—a weighty philosophical issue dealt with at the end of physics and in connection with metaphysics—al-Kindi focuses on the immediate emotional appeal of the ease and inexpensiveness of the spiritual medicine.

(3) *The easy remedies* (pp. 35–39) Classifying the kinds of sorrows allows the reader to see that many of them can be prevented. Some arise from our own actions. Since we can refrain from these actions, as we saw earlier, we can dispel these sorrows by not performing such actions. Other kinds of sorrow arise from other agencies, not all of these, however, are unavoidable, for we can prevent some of them from occurring. Thus only unavoidable sorrows are left, but we should not worry about them beforehand because they may not even happen. Anxiety about their possible occurrence is simply a useless, self-inflicted torment. Assuming that harming one's body is irrational, al-Kindi goes on to conclude that harming one's soul is the peak of ignorance and injustice. Instead of worrying about evils which may not even occur, he says, let us rather deal with actual inevitable sorrows. The originally enormous burden of all past and possible sorrows has now become much smaller and lighter, thanks to a change in our own attitude.

Al-Kindi then works on decreasing the remaining time during which the burden must be borne. Various simple psychological devices are given. Experience tells us that previous sorrows abated, and so will current griefs. Misery loves company and particularly glamorous company. Al-Kindi therefore tells the story of Alexander, a very educational philosopher king, who from his deathbed provides his mother with consolation. She must build a city and then give a great feast there to celebrate her son's death. Many people are to be invited, on the condition they have no sorrow whatsoever. So she does, but no one comes to the banquet. As she expresses her surprise a courtier kindly points out the obvious. Nobody came because no one is fully exempt from sorrow. Notice that the wise Alexander knows that it will take some time for his august mother to get the message. *A fortiori* al-Kindi should give time to the naive reader. As sorrow is by convention and not by nature,⁷¹ it is a senseless self-inflicted torment and therefore irrational. It thus places its victim at

⁷¹ ADS, 37. Notice the repetition of this same point made earlier.

the level of the brutes Drily al-Kindi adds that brutes—being so by nature—behave with constancy and order, whereas irrational human beings—who follow their whims—do not even have method to their madness.

Giving some more instances of the irrationality of common behavior, al-Kindi shows that to wish to avoid all misfortune is to wish for the impossible, and that wishing to keep as one's own what is in fact common property—that is, sensible and corruptible things which can be snatched away from us—is also self-defeating. Then, leaving aside these tantalizing philosophical arguments, he turns once again to the emotional appeal and argues that the wish to keep common property as one's own is a form of envy, the most shameful vice.⁷²

Finally, al-Kindi explains why he thinks all sensible things are common property. Echoing a passage of the *Phaedo* dear to the Stoics—in which Socrates argues that suicide is immoral because, being properties of the gods, we need their permission to leave this life⁷³—al-Kindi claims that external things are common because they belong to God who created them and lends them to us. We should, therefore, understand that God can take external things away whenever and by whatever means he wishes, even at the hands of our own enemy. We should also be most grateful that God never reclaims what is essential, that is, our own soul. Although the immortality of the soul and God's creation ground the argument, al-Kindi once again chooses to focus on the emotional appeal of the ugliness of ingratitude.

(4) *The difficult remedies (pp 39-end)*. The time has now come to show that the original definition of sorrow is self-contradictory if the objects of acquisition and desire are sensible and corruptible. Al-Kindi has a real passion for using and even abusing the principle of noncontradiction. If the cause of sorrow is the loss of such external possessions or our not obtaining them, then to avoid sorrow we should eschew the acquisition of external possessions. Since failing to acquire them is the other cause of sorrow, however, it follows that whether or not we come to acquire external possessions we shall inevitably be plunged into sorrow.

⁷² Let us remember that for al-Kindi envy leads even some learned people to give up the pursuit of truth (see note 9 above). Al-Razi dedicates the seventh chapter of his *Spiritual Medicine* to envy.

⁷³ *Phaedo* 61c–62e. On the curious influence of this text on the Stoics see John M. Rist, "Suicide," in John M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 233–55.

The solution to this conundrum is simple let us not even desire external possessions. We are moving from treatment to prevention. Having now abandoned the implied conception that joy is the acquisition and retention of external things, we are also ready to abandon kings as role models and to move to emulate philosophers, who eschew external things. To someone who notices that he has never been sad Socrates replies that such is the case because he possesses nothing. In contrast Nero, "king" of the Romans, is duly warned by an anonymous philosopher not to get attached to a fragile crystal canopy given to him but is foolish enough to take it with him on a ship. A shipwreck conveniently destroys the canopy but spares Nero's life, so that he can survive to grieve about the loss of his canopy. Adding another allegedly Socratic saying for good measure, al-Kindi highlights the practical superiority of the philosopher who, in contrast, would not even grieve about the loss of his only shelter, a tub.

Indeed, al-Kindi asks, Why should we worry about externals? since the Creator, presumably because of his generosity, provides every creature with what it needs. Only human beings burden themselves with useless worries about external things—worries which not only plague their earthly life but even endanger their eternal destiny.

Building a near mosque on the few lines of section 7 of Epictetus' *Manual*, al-Kindi compares in great detail human life to a sea voyage towards the homeland. At a necessary stop for restocking, the closer people remain to the ship and the less they pay attention to the beauties of the scenery, the sooner they return aboard to find a first class choice seat with plenty of leg room for the rest of the journey—seats apparently are assigned on a first come, first serve basis. People who return unburdened with souvenirs but, distracted by the sights, have lingered somewhat behind get only business class seats. As for those who have wasted time collecting ungainly souvenirs, they go in tourist class and struggle to put their newly acquired possessions under narrow seats and over their heads. The later they join, the more cramped their space and the more voluminous their possessions. After a time some of their possessions will spoil, causing their owner further embarrassment and discomfort. Some people will even die on the way, smothered by their possessions. Others, fully engrossed in their hunt for souvenirs, will not notice the captain's last call and will be left on land to die horrible deaths.

Al-Kindi refrains from spoiling the charm of his allegory by explaining it in detail. Butterworth therefore rightly points out that little

is said about the final destination of the journey except that it is the world of truth.⁷⁴ Thoughtful readers, however, wondering and pondering, will pay attention to the faint but unmistakable call to serious philosophical studies. There a close examination of nature, the soul, and God—that is, issues of physics, psychology, and metaphysics explored by al-Kindi in other works—will provide serious answers to their questions.

Having been led to abandon the common but false belief that external things lead to happiness, and having been given a glimpse of tantalizing metaphysical truths, al-Kindi's readers, desiring once and for all to escape self-inflicted sorrows, will focus on the imperishable and inalienable realities of the world of the intellect that al-Kindi has spoken of at the very beginning. We have come back, full circle. The only thing really worth sorrowing about is our allowing ourselves to be deflected from reaching our homeland, where things are eternal and immutable, where everything is real, and where one does not desire what should not be desired.

Finally, al-Kindi's readers can face up to the greatest counterintuitive argument about what causes sorrow. Even death, assumed to be the greatest evil, is no evil at all. It is inherent in the human condition.⁷⁵ An immortal human being would be a self-contradictory thing. Our considering death an evil is rooted in ignorance, for death opens for us the world of the stable objects we crave. If death is no evil then, *a fortiori*, simple loss of or inability to gain sensible things will be no evil either. What is evil is fear of these supposed evils, that is, our own attitude toward them.

The ultimate step in the shedding of false beliefs has come. What readers had assumed to be misfortunes turn out to be good fortune or grace, since they remove false causes of sorrow. Only the one who possesses no external things is really master of the things that enslave kings, namely, anger and sensual desires, which are causes of vices and pains. True freemen are not—as common people falsely believe—kings, for kings are slaves to their own lower soul. Rather, true freemen are people who are fully rational and give true weight to intellectual objects. The implication is clear: these are the philosophers. The text ends by asking God to place the reader among those

⁷⁴ Butterworth, "Al-Kindi," 48–9

⁷⁵ In *On the Definitions* too al-Kindi defines the human being as animal, rational and mortal, *RKF*, 179

who enjoy the fruit of the intellect and shun ignorance. There is perfect rest. Even God gives his blessing to philosophers!

The audience of The Art of Dispelling Sorrows. Although al-Kindi often uses arguments based on common views and emotional appeal, he nevertheless refers to metaphysical positions he holds. The stock and trade Stoic arguments open up for the reader the realm of serious argumentation, but they need to be supplemented by Neoplatonic metaphysics.

Boethius's *Consolation of Philosophy* presents a trained philosopher suddenly confronted with misfortunes so great that he forgets himself; that is, he forgets that he is a philosopher. Lady Philosophy gradually cures him of his illness and returns him to himself. She can then proceed without further ado to metaphysical intricacies, although it is first necessary for her to spend half her time on therapeutic arguments and to sustain Boethius's efforts with doses of poetry which become less and less frequent as the work progresses.

Al-Kindi, on the other hand, is addressing a beginner. He sees his therapeutic arguments as a necessary precondition to the study of philosophy and as arguments which therefore can only adumbrate the philosophical truths which should replace the common false beliefs of which the reader needs to be cured. There is the patience and emotional appeal needed to coax a reader easily distracted by the immediate need to cope with some undetermined sorrows. When finally the reader admits that what looks like misfortune is in fact good fortune he can move to philosophy proper and its rigorous methods. *The Art of Dispelling Sorrows* is an instance of prephilosophical ethics leading to the liberation of the mind from passions and for philosophy. Many readers may remain at its surface level. So be it. Promising readers will not. They will register for philosophical studies.

A last remark. As Van Riet has pointed out, the text often incites us to joy, another emotion.⁷⁶ Are we not then confronted with an inconsistency in al-Kindi's views? Perhaps the quest for joy is part of the immediate emotional appeal and, in more sophisticated contexts, al-Kindi would explain that joy is only a temporary aim. Alternatively, the link between joy and rest—the contrary of motion—may indicate that there is a contentment of the mind which is not a passion because it is a stable condition.

⁷⁶ Van Riet, "Joie et bonheur," 15–23

V

Conclusion. Let us now recapitulate some trends in al-Kindi's ethics while avoiding the temptation to harmonize details. True philosophical ethics follows from psychology and metaphysics. The former provides knowledge of the immortality of the intellective soul, of the soul's simplicity, and that the body is a mere instrument. The latter establishes God's oneness and His true agency. God's oneness in turn excludes motion and therefore passion. The notion of ethics as the imitation of God follows nicely from this. The suppression of passion in this life for the sake of the development of the intellectual life and as a prelude to the soul's liberation and greater closeness to God in the hereafter is thus included in ethics. Philosophy is the core of human science, which is discursive by its nature. Revelation or "divine" science may grant to some, already in this life, a glimpse of the eternal participation in God's light and truth.⁷⁷

As for prephilosophical ethics, *The Discourse on the Soul* shows that it too can accommodate the theme of imitation of God in its focusing on the philosophical implications of common religious beliefs. *The Art of Dispelling Sorrows* illustrates how therapeutic arguments may not only extirpate some specific painful passion but, in so doing, may incite the reader to the pursuit of philosophy.⁷⁸

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⁷⁷ On human versus divine science, see *On the Number of Aristotle's Books*; RKF, 372–6.

⁷⁸ I would like to thank Richard M. Frank for his most helpful remarks on an early version of this paper. This paper owes much to him but, needless to say, all its defects are my responsibility alone.

BOOKS RECEIVED

SUMMARIES AND COMMENTS*

IAN BELL AND STAFF

BELLAMY, Richard *Liberalism and Modern Society* University Park The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992 x + 310 pp Cloth, \$40 00, paper, \$16 95—In this book of exemplary scholarship Bellamy traces the conflict within modern liberalism between its ethical strand and the social-economic order that supported that strand The rise of modern industrial society, and the social and political changes concomitant with it, transformed ethical liberalism into economic liberalism, with the result that the philosophical underpinnings to liberalism were weakened to the point of near collapse

Bellamy examines this transformation as it occurred in Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries He uses paradigmatic liberal theorists in England (John Stuart Mill and T H Green), France (Emile Durkheim), Italy (Vilfredo Pareto and Benedetto Croce), and Germany (Max Weber) to show that ethical liberalism was unable to handle the growing pluralism, social differentiation, and competitive market relations of modern society The advances of capitalist economies “undermined the social environment that lent ethical liberalism its coherence” (p 252) This section of the book, spanning three-quarters of the book, is superb Finely written and deeply researched, these chapters not only capture the essence and shortcomings of these liberal theories but also demonstrate the social and historical character of liberalism

In the final section of the book Bellamy turns to contemporary liberal theory Here he discusses Nozick, Hayek, Rawls, Dworkin, Walzer, and Raz The last two are, on Bellamy’s account, communitarian liberals who argue for a social foundation to liberalism, the only way—again, according to Bellamy—that liberalism can be saved While it seems odd to consider Raz as a communitarian liberal, any more than, say, the Dworkin of *Law’s Empire* or the Rawls of “Justice as Fairness Political not Metaphysical,” and while it might be useful in a book on liberalism to distinguish Nozick’s libertarianism from contemporary liberal theories, Bellamy’s discussion is careful and rewarding Yet his own conclusions rest on what might be an overly tendentious reading of liberal theory He argues that his own idea of “democratic liberalism” (pp 254ff) is to be contrasted with “liberal democracy,” which seeks to

* Books received are acknowledged in this section by a brief resume, report, or criticism Such acknowledgement does not preclude a more detailed examination in a subsequent Critical Study From time to time, technical books dealing with such fields as mathematics, physics, anthropology, and the social sciences will be reviewed in this section, if it is thought that they might be of special interest to philosophers

ground politics in a set of universal ethical principles while maintaining neutrality "Whereas liberal democracy assumes (or seeks to create) a moral consensus which provides a framework for political deliberation, democratic liberalism gives central place to fair procedures that favor the expression and temporary conciliation of a plurality of ideals" (p 254)

Yet how different is democratic liberalism from liberal democracy? Is not Rawls, for example, also arguing for liberal and constitutional principles and arrangements that can serve as a *modus vivendi*? Moreover, it appears that the rights that liberals argue for, *pace* Bellamy, and that we can agree on, are precisely those that establish the conditions for participation in fair democratic procedures. Rights clash, then, where different notions of human flourishing conflict—say, over abortion. But there can be no political settlement of this clash, or even any political deliberation about it, without the first set of rights. As Bellamy says, "For all but the smallest groups, therefore, some formal framework establishing the norms of conduct and the conditions for entering into agreements is unavoidable" (p 257). Contemporary liberal theorists, thanks in part to communitarian critics, as Bellamy points out, appreciate this. It would be helpful, therefore, to hear more about the differences between liberal democracy and democratic liberalism. Perhaps in an essentially historical argument, and a detailed one such as this, it is too much to ask that an author devote equal time in the work to the development of his own conclusions —Jack Crittenden, *Arizona State University*

BOKHOVE, Niels Willem *Phänomenologie Ursprung und Entwicklung des Terminus im 18. Jahrhundert*. Aalen Scientia Verlag, 1991. vi + 439 pp. DM 120—This is a doctoral dissertation submitted in Utrecht in 1991. The four main parts of the text are preceded by a substantial introduction, and followed by a very important bibliography (pp 357–421). In spite of classifying his work as belonging in the type of research called *Begriffsgeschichte* (history of concepts), the author tells us that he has done a history of the term "phenomenology" rather than of the concept of phenomenology. To justify this, Bokhove quotes Rothacker: "Terms and problems have a history. Not properly the concept as such" (pp 9–10).

We learn that the term "phenomenology" has not only a history but even a complex historiography. For almost all of the historiography after 1900, Husserl and his phenomenology have been the criterion for classifying the uses of the term "phenomenology." Thus, for instance, in the first (1960) and second (1965) editions of his *The Phenomenological Movement*, H. Spiegelberg introduces a distinction between "true" (Husserlian) and "pseudo-phenomenologies," which he dropped in the third (1982) edition in favor of a new division between "Husserlian phenomenology" and "unrelated [to Husserl] phenomenologies." The latter

are divided into "philosophical phenomenologies" and "extraphilosophical phenomenologies." Opposing this trend, the author has dismissed Husserl from the center of the history of phenomenology, and has preferred to undertake, vis-à-vis the variety of uses of this term, a "phenomenology of phenomenologies" (pp. 7–8).

In this connection, I fail to understand the author's decision to regard—a priori, it seems—all phenomenologies as in some sense philosophical (pp. 7–8). The author points out that with respect to the eighteenth century this policy offers no problems, but difficulties arise in connection with the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when phenomenology was introduced into quite a few other disciplines (psychology, medicine, physics, botany, theory of religion).

Moreover, the main question now arises: What is the unity of the resulting collection? The reader used to the Husserlian-centered understanding of phenomenology will be surprised by more than one meaning of the word. For instance, in one case we learn that "out of respect toward the creation of the world by God the new [phenomenological] method restricts itself to the 'surface' of reality and gives up thereby the use of optical tools such as microscope and telescope" (p. 178). Again, in the chapter devoted to Lambert one finds that phenomenology should detect false appearances, and provide the means to avoid them in order to reach the truth (p. 203).

A gift waits for the reader on page 148: a facsimile of the earliest known handwritten occurrence of the word *phenomenologia*, which has as its author Friedrich Oetinger (1702–82). That the term "phenomenology" was first used by Oetinger was pointed out in the 1940s by Max Wundt, but remained largely ignored; the general opinion in the past one hundred fifty years rather credited Lambert with the invention of the term.

Bokhove's goal was to "follow the development of the concept of phenomenology in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries" (p. 8), that is, from Oetinger on, but soon a division of the project into two parts became unavoidable. The present volume in fact covers only the eighteenth century, that is, the first part (an outline of the subsequent development is found in section 4).

In the course of his research, the author discovered how many "adventures" have been experienced by the term "phenomenology" through its history "as a consequence of its difficult typographic and phonetic form" (p. 9). This kind of consideration, plus some etymology and study of related words ("phenomenogony," and so forth) is the subject of the relatively short Part 1.

Bokhove points out that, of course, the term "phenomenology" did not arise *ex nihilo*. Thus, he planned to examine the development of the concept of phenomenon from antiquity until the eighteenth century. Thus (pp. 37–117), together with an overview of the various phenomenologists *avant la lettre* or "protophenomenologists" (who did not use the term) (pp. 119–24), and a short chapter on philosophical terminology (pp. 125–31) makes up Part 2.

Part 3, by far the longest and in fact the central section of Bokhove's work, presents the "development of the term 'phenomenology' in the eighteenth century" through the detailed study of four authors: Oetinger,

Lambert, Kant, and John Robison, in addition, there is a chapter on "the minor Lambertians"—Ignacio Angelelli, *The University of Texas at Austin*

BOTTURI, Francesco *La Sapienza della storia Giambattista Vico e la filosofia pratica* Milan Vita e Pensiero, 1991 512 pp 66000 Lire— Francesco Botturi, professor of the philosophy of history at The Catholic University of Milan, is the author of several essays on Vico, in this book he takes a larger look at Vico's entire work through the guiding thread of the concept of wisdom (*sapientia*) The idea of wisdom is the "foundation of Vico's practical philosophy" (p 13), a kind of wisdom whose locus is between poetic wisdom and reflected wisdom, between imagination and concept From a genetic point of view, poetic wisdom upholds a primacy, but philosophical wisdom retains the structural primacy (p 480) According to Botturi, Vico, who wants to maintain the unity of these forms of wisdom, tries to keep them together by placing them in temporal succession Both forms of wisdom are "complementary and irreducible paths of Vico's metaphysical transcendentalism" (p 480), and both constitute wisdom synchronically Botturi articulates Vico's thought in four chapters on the concept of wisdom chapter 1, "The Ideal of Wisdom and Epistemology of the True", chapter 2, "Poetic Wisdom", chapter 3, "Wisdom as Justice", and chapter 4, "Communication of Wisdom"

The primacy of the poetic over the theoretical aspect is an original and fundamental primacy *Homo nascitur poeta* It is the reversal of the traditional position which, since Plato and Aristotle, had subordinated poetry to philosophy "Vico does not dismiss or neglect either the theoretical or the affective aspects of poetry, on the contrary, he sets them in a new and original synthesis" (p 130) Vico denies the primacy of the universal over the particular the primordial and most basic form of thinking is metaphoric thinking, concepts are secondary and derivative (p 193) Botturi discusses this position of Vico at length in the first chapter, together with the doctrine of metaphor and analogy which gives a foundation to it, and he analyzes the problems and the objections to it The kernel of this epistemological problem lies in "the paradox of poetic gender" that "consists in the universal value which a single image assumes without abandoning its own individuality" (p 138) Botturi sees an unresolved ambiguity in Vico's epistemology, however (p 201)

Vico criticizes Aristotle's distinction between history and poetry on the same line as his criticisms of the distinction between proper and improper, true and verisimilar the Aristotelian distinction cannot be an original one Prior to the distinction, there is a deep unity which must be seen poetry and history are deeply connected, and poetry (that is, language), which generates history, grounds the historical facts *Rerum-publicarum prima conditores poetae*—Poets are the founding fathers

of the republics (pp 169–71) Botturi then, along the line of the reflections of Apel, examines the functions of language as the first and most fundamental of human institutions, an institution which is the condition of the possibility for all other institutions (pp 172ff).

The second part of Botturi's book deals with Vico's practical philosophy as political philosophy. Law is for Vico the communication of the mind with the atemporal beyond the physical world (*ordo rerum aeternus*), it is a metaphysics *in actu exercito*. In this way, the practicality of Roman law identifies itself as a temporal and concrete expression of the Platonic idea of justice. Thus Vico criticizes two traditions of thought on law in society, the rationalist tradition, whose expressions are found in the writings of Grotius and Pufendorf, and the empiricist-utilitarian one, whose radical expression is found in Hobbes. These traditions, beyond a superficial diversity, are actually quite similar in their presuppositions and results (p 317). Both traditions are incapable of explaining the origins of society and law, which consist neither in abstract rationality nor in mere acts of force and violence. Their exclusion of religion renders unintelligible the passage from the law of force to the force of law, a passage that in Vico corresponds to the stage of the "pious giants."

Especially insightful is the analysis that Botturi gives of the concept of *pudor* (shame) as Vico treats it in *De Constantia*. Shame is that form of fear which is at the root of religious experience and moral conscience. "Once the original 'pietas' is lost, the memory of God generates 'religion', which is a fear of the Numen, for shame reminds us we have offended the Numen" (p 333). He treats not only this original metaphysical shame (the consequence of an "original sin") in which religion is rooted, but also the shame which arises from the look and the judgment of others, and produces what we call common sense, that is, fear of a negative judgment and care for one's own reputation. The outcome of the original metaphysical shame, this fundamental sense of guilt, however, is larger than these two aspects. It also produces sexual shame, in which order and law in sexual behavior find their origin and first justification. But even curiosity and industry have their roots in this original shame because of an inadequacy of the theoretical (curiosity) and the ethical (industry), an inadequacy which has to be "covered" or overcome. This anthropology of shame, which in the *New Science* Vico says is in agreement with the Scriptures, (and, we may add, throws light on non-Western ethical doctrines, as, for instance, the Chinese ones) is the interior force through which man enters into ethical and juridical existence. The original shame, which is the root of law, cannot be derived from a horizontal human relation "if we [did] not stop at the shame of a divinity, from the kind of men described by Hobbes, Grotius and Pufendorf, humanity would have never been able to arise" (p 335).

Shame is the principle of humanity also because it is the immediate force that renders us able to channel unordered passions. This happens through a first stage of the latency of the passions induced by shame, and then by their subordination to a "conatus," which is the initial concrete expression of human freedom and of a rational dominion of passions. "Shame and religion indeed correspond to the experience according to which 'the true' becomes the rule of 'the certain', and

utilitarian instincts receive the possibility of a moderation according to justice" (p. 342). This complex ordination of the concepts of fear, religion, and society is also an explicit antithesis to Hobbesian thought and to Hobbes's analysis of the relation between passions and reason in society. Like Hobbes, Vico has the foundation of human sociability as his main theoretical concern, but for him neither is religion a mask of worldly power nor is society uniquely based upon individual interest and fear of violence. Religion (a form of fear) is the way in which human beings discover their humanity and their sociability, and in this sense it is true that "the beginning of wisdom is the fear of the Lord" (*initium sapientiae timor Domini*). While according to Hobbes societies have their beginnings "in reciprocal fear, not in reciprocal benevolence" (*De cive*) of nonsocial individuals, fear and religion in Vico, even the fear of the "artificial" gods of the poets, lead to the discovery and the historic development of a common human nature and of a social conscience, which has its general expression in the three pillars of common sense: the existence of providence (that is, religious cult), public marriage, and public burial — Paolo Guetti, *University of Dallas*

COPENHAVER, Brian P. and SCHMITT, Charles B. *Renaissance Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992. 450 pp. Cloth, \$65.00, paper, \$18.95.—This introductory book on the philosophy of the Renaissance constitutes the third volume of a History of Western Philosophy offered by OPUS General Editors. This volume was preceded by similar introductions to Classical Thought (T. Irwin), the Rationalists (J. Cottingham), the Empiricists (R. S. Woolhouse), and Continental Philosophy since 1750 (R. C. Solomon). It will be followed by two more volumes on English-Language Philosophy, the first from 1750 to 1945 (J. Skorupski) and the second from 1945 to the present (B. Stroud).

The conception of the book and about one third of it were left behind by Schmitt after his untimely death in 1986. Copenhagen expanded the original project and provided its final wording. The emphasis on Renaissance Aristotelianism and Skepticism bear the imprint of Schmitt's views, while the pages on logic, language and occultism are clearly more within Copenhagen's expertise.

The first chapter surveys the historical context of Renaissance philosophy. The student and the general reader are reminded of some well-known features of the period (that "Latin remained the functional language of learning throughout the whole period" [p. 11]), but the text also provides the experts with an erudite summary of the transmission of Aristotle and other Greek, Muslim, and Jewish authors to the Latin West, a critical review of Burckhardt's ideas, a history of humanism, and a solid summary on the relation between Renaissance philosophy and Reformation theology. The second and third chapters deal with the major schools of philosophy: Aristotelianism (Bruni, Trebizond, Lefevre d'Étapes, Mair, Pomponazzi, Vitoria, and Zabarella) and Platonism (Ficino, Pico, Cusanus, and Patrizi). The fourth chapter encompasses all the

thinkers who defy clear labels under the generic title of "Stoics, Sceptics, Epicureans, and Other Innovators." There the reader will find in amicable company such odd bedfellows as Vives, Nizolio, Valla, Agricola, Ramus, Sanches, Montaigne, Machiavelli, Erasmus, and Thomas More. The fifth chapter studies the philosophy of nature, with particular emphasis on its antiauthoritarian and anti-Aristotelian character. Giordano Bruno is given the prominent and symbolic position he deserves, but the book also offers solid monographies of Lull, Paracelsus, Telesio and Campanella. The last chapter is slightly idiosyncratic. It begins by reviewing the history of philosophy as a discipline from Polidoro Vergilio to early modern historians (Stanley and Horn) and Renaissance thought on history, but concludes with a lengthy critique of the absence of the Renaissance from recent philosophical inquiry. Somehow Ayer, Moore, Wittgenstein, Russell, and the Kneales share the attention of the authors with some digressions on Vives and Suárez.

In spite of its dual authorship, the text gives the reader a remarkable sense of unity in purpose and execution. This is no minor achievement. The book is addressed to the general reader, but is erudite enough to serve as a reference text even for those who are recognized as Renaissance scholars. The monographic studies that make up most of the book are accurate, although individual experts might have some objections of detail (Vives was most likely born after 1492, Vitoria's first name was the Castilian "Francisco" rather than the Italian "Francesco"). The thematic organization of the book invites some questionable chronological inversions (Valla and Agricola follow Vives, Bruno precedes Lull) and tends to disguise the highly eclectic character of most Renaissance thinkers. As a whole, Renaissance scholasticism does not fare too well in the book (Cajetan is not mentioned as a philosopher while Molina and John of Saint Thomas are not mentioned at all). Still, this volume is, in my judgment, the most complete and authoritative introduction to the topic available in English. The bibliographical apparatus is rich and up to date. — Carlos G. Noreña, *University of California, Santa Cruz*

COUSINEAU, Robert H. *Zarathustra and the Ethical Ideal*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1991. vii + 225 pp. \$76.00.—Believing that the deconstructive turn has arisen out of a dearth of authentic "analogous thinking-action," Cousineau seeks an existential response and a dialogical relation to Nietzsche, the character Zarathustra, and the text of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Adopting the Heidegger-Derrida propensity to philological analysis while prescinding a negative use of deconstruction, Cousineau has given us a curious, insightful, but often uneven study of Nietzschean themes and language. Early on, Wittgenstein's claim that "Ethics and aesthetics are one" is adopted, but Nietzsche's explicit expression of the same idea is missed even though it is evident in the subsequent discussion.

There is, in this humane textual analysis, a tendency to associate Nietzsche and Heidegger in regard to a recognition of the "unsayable."

that refers to our most vital dimension of being. In the author's concluding remarks, however, the "resignation" in Heidegger's later writings is contrasted to Nietzsche's "To value is to create" (p. 200). At the same time, the extremism of Derrida's approach to texts is avoided even though his attention to words, phrases, and their associations and connotations is emulated. Questions abound and there is much in this study that will not be surprising to serious students of Nietzsche. There is a respect for the genuine wisdom of Nietzsche that many who know his writings well ignore. There are shifts in Cousineau's discussions from detailed, fairly insightful analyses of Nietzsche's language to sometimes rather obvious presentations of his prescriptions for a life that is a dialectic of the tragic and the comic, an interplay of courageous endurance and an "unbounded Yes."

Although the focus of this study is *Zarathustra*, the interpretation of it is subject to *déférence*. Themes in *The Gay Science* are touched upon, but not pursued. The critique of science is often misstated. Thus, the exclamation "long live physics" is taken to mean a call back to a Greek sense of nature (p. 52). The "untruth" unveiled by science is underestimated and Nietzsche's relationship to science and its "nihilistic" effects is missed. When *Zarathustra* is finally discussed Cousineau offers us many insights within an uneven structure. He sees the importance of Nietzsche's relation to Buddhist thought (p. 106), and avers that he proposes an "authentic presence" and an openness to the "that" of life, the bodily self, and the concrete (pp. 168–9). Moreover, he wonders if there is not a peculiar kind of *ressentiment* that fuels the obsession with the deconstruction of authentic "presence" (p. 166).

There is much to quarrel with in Cousineau's essay and there is a lack of balanced structure in his text. But there is learning, respect for his subjects, and a personal sense of the core of "spirituality" that lies within and behind the writings of Nietzsche. It is ironic that one of the chief architects of deconstructionism (Nietzsche) has, by virtue of his other perspectives, led in this book, as well as in a few recent studies of Nietzsche as/and literature, to the softening of the metal/mettle of deconstructionism itself —G. J. Stack, *State University of New York at Brockport*

DECK, John N. *Nature, Contemplation and the One*. New York: Larson Publications, 1991. 152 pp. \$14.95. —The author aims at providing a setting in which a modern reader can evaluate the meaning of what Plotinus has to say. It is more important to listen to Plotinus than to investigate the sources of his thought. Deck gives a careful description, even if largely in a negative approach, of the One, and turns next to the main characteristics of *Nous*, which represents an ideal of contemplation but also produces the universe. The difficulties inherent to Plotinus's concept of soul are discussed. The last of the products of contemplation is nature, the lower part of soul. Plotinus's answer to the question whether nature is real is elusive. It is fully real, yet what is real

appears to be the reflection of a form upon matter, which is a mirror reflecting being. But even this presentation must be qualified. The last chapter deals with efficient causality: contemplation is at the same time production. Plotinus seems to consider matter a product of the *Nous* (p. 124).

Deck's genetic description of Plotinus's thought tries to solve its perplexities as it goes. He points to the difficulty of expressing Neoplatonic doctrine in Aristotelian categories. Certain notions such as that of causality do not correspond to those of Aristotle or Aquinas. The book, which is completed by two appendixes, is a very good introduction — Leo J. Elders, *Institut voor Wysbegeerte en Theologie*

D'ORIANO, Pietro. *Parola e appartenenza. L'apriori in Heidegger*. Milan: Editoriale Scientifica, 1990. xiv + 361 pp. \$25.00.—In this groundbreaking work, whose title translates as *Word and Belonging*, D'Oriano investigates the connection between Heidegger's question of being (*Seinsfrage*) and the demand for an a priori or *proteron* as ontological "past." Playing on the temporal sense that he finds in "a priori" and *proteron*, D'Oriano translates both terms as the "before," that is, being (*Sein*) as the prior.

D'Oriano views philosophy's nostalgia for the before as having attained a certain crystallization in transcendental thought, where the speculative unreachableness of the noumenal and the corresponding "indigence" of understanding not only guarantee a delimited degree of intelligibility but also constitute the very substance of the critical-transcendental discourse. But herein lies a paradox. Insofar as it seeks to dictate the conditions of the possibility of its own coming to be, critical thought finds itself subject to the frustration of its own aspirations. On the one hand, the urgency underlying philosophical thinking is the desire for a "past," a "dwelling," a before, which remains the ultimate object of its concern. On the other hand, philosophy's interest in the before announces and structures itself as a failure of this very ambition, and it does so in the postmetaphysical form of a thinking of difference.

The book is focused on the question of Heidegger's ontological difference, and one of its main claims is that owing to the ties that both entities and temporalized being have with the temporality of the *hic et nunc* of language (that is, language as factual, hermeneutical utterance), the ontological difference between them can and must be related to the traditional metaphysical difference between the temporal and the eternal. In the terms of the tradition, D'Oriano says, entities as the subject matter of discourse are taken as present here and now, and the true being of entities is idealized as *to aidion* or *aei on*. Following both Heidegger's critique of Husserl and his retrieval of the unsaid in Aristotle, however, D'Oriano argues that insofar as apophantic discourse, as an intra-temporal event of a speaking "subject," establishes a relationship between transient entities and the before, the before allows itself to be

assimilated into *to ardhon* as much as the *aer* allows itself to be interpreted as intratemporal

In an effort is to escape this ambivalence—or better, to promote it to a higher level—D'Oriano makes a further claim, which, in fact, is the positive outcome of his reflection on the texts of the later Heidegger. He argues that the temporality intrinsic to the ontological difference (the “temporal difference”) foreshadows what he calls in Italian the *dapprima* (I risk translating the word as the “heretofore”), which lies beyond the dichotomy of temporality-eternity and changing-unchanging, and which comports paradoxically the disappearance of the dimension of *das Gewesene* and of the temporal difference itself. He makes his point by interpreting *Dasein's* temporal ekstasis of *Gewesenhert* (the already operative essence or “past” of *Dasein*) as impervious to any possible “here and now” of utterance, precisely to the degree that it is *Dasein's* being-towards-death.

In a particularly rich set of reflections D'Oriano revisits the question of the transcendental imagination and sensibility in Heidegger's *Kantbuch*. He reads these concerns of the early Heidegger against the short, later works of Heidegger, especially *Sprache und Heimat*, which he analyzes as embodying the final development of Heidegger's views on imagination and art. The crux, for D'Oriano, is the “contingency” of the poetic word insofar as its structure is that of belonging (*appartenenza*) to *Ereignis*—which, in turn, comports the cobelonging of *Dasein* and things. In this dimension of belonging-cobelonging there is no place for a “possibilizing thought” linked to being as the a priori or before; rather, there is only the possibility of *Dasein* recognizing and appropriating an “ethical irresponsibility” of dwelling in the clearing.

D'Oriano, who is a leading voice in the new, post-Heideggerian generation of Italian philosophers, exposes these difficult issues with lucidity and elegance. While not a book for beginners, *Parola e appartenenza* is an original and challenging reinterpretation of the issues that constitute the very center of Heidegger's thought.—Thomas Sheehan, *Loyola University of Chicago*

FERRY, LUC *Rights—The New Quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns*. Translated by Franklin Philip. Series in Political Philosophy, Volume 1. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990. 151 pp. \$21.00.—The thesis put forward by Luc Ferry in this book is the following: “If Heidegger's deconstruction of metaphysics and Strauss's critique of historicism are incontrovertible, and if, despite everything, we refuse to conclude that a ‘return to the ancients’ is in order, we must take up the challenge of showing how modernity may criticize itself and thus refrain from yielding to the wiles of metaphysics” (24–5). It is a substantial thesis—not entirely original, but well-argued, with an interesting exegesis of Fichte's theory of rights.

The quarrel between antiquity and modernity is based, as is well known, on whether or not the project of modernity, which is presumed to have failed, necessitates a return to antiquity. Ferry argues for the critique implicit in Heidegger and Strauss's rejection of modernity while at the same time accepting the implicit claims of modernity. The two issues here are metaphysics and historicism. Ferry wants to agree with Heidegger's critique of metaphysics and with Strauss's critique of historicism without returning to antiquity for justification. Further, he argues that the risks of returning to antiquity are irrationalism and amorality. In terms of Heidegger, the radical critique of reason leads to irrationalism or ontotheology, while Strauss's return to the politics of classical antiquity leads to the abolition of democracy. Instead, Ferry argues for a "critical philosophy" which can provide a "criticism of metaphysics," which implies a critique of historicism without "giving up reason, freedom and equality." For Ferry the solution lies with Fichte's critique of metaphysics and historicism.

Although the book really does not offer a complete solution to the problem of critiquing metaphysics without destroying reason and critiquing historicism without destroying subjectivity, it does suggest that the solution to both problems lies in Fichte's reconception of reason and ethics in the realm of political philosophy. In terms of his critique of metaphysics, Fichte saw that the contradiction between idealism and realism could be overcome if the concept of idealization could be retained as a necessary fiction without the dogmatic implications of either idealism or realism. This moment of idealization was in turn developed from his theory of intersubjectivity, which contained both the moment of ego and non-ego, or self and not-self. While idealization is necessary it is not absolute. Hence, it can be said to function as a fiction not unlike Kant's "regulative idea." This concept is political in that it involves self and other and their "dialectical" relationship as fundamental. Hence, Fichte's concept of rights is fundamental both to his critique of metaphysics as well as to his critique of historicism inasmuch as the relation of self and other are basic both to Fichte's method of idealization (one must conceive of the "other" in order to conceive of the self) and his critique of historicism, which retains the precondition of ethics. Since self-awareness requires the conception of the other, Fichte concludes that self-awareness presupposes rights. Self-awareness involves the conception of the ethical awareness of the other. The intersubjective notion of rights then is already assumed in any conception of awareness of self. Ultimately, Fichte begins to lay the groundwork for a political philosophy which is able to overcome the limitations of both metaphysics and historicism without returning to antiquity for justification. The result of this achievement is the retention of the notion of "reason" on the one hand and a democratic politics on the other, both of which would be lost in the retreat to classical antiquity.

Ferry has provided us with an analysis which is both provocative and, if on occasion a bit terse, interesting. In order to make his argument complete he would have to take up the critiques of foundationalism that abound in contemporary philosophical debates. —David M. Rasmussen, *Boston College*

GILL, Jerry H. *Merleau-Ponty and Metaphor*. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International Inc., 1991. xix + 164 pp. \$35.00—Merleau-Ponty's work is replete with metaphors, so much so that one could believe that metaphor is his primary mode of philosophical expression. But he has never said that this is the case, at least not directly, and has in fact written very little specifically about metaphor. Perhaps taking his lead, commentators on Merleau-Ponty's work have also largely ignored metaphor. Jerry Gill has written a brief and careful book to look into this matter and to fill in whatever gap exists.

Gill devotes the first half of the book to an inventory of Merleau-Ponty's use of metaphor. In the opening chapter he examines the imagery in the early philosophy, that is, in *Phenomenology of Perception*. The second chapter describes the imagery used in the middle works, which treat of aesthetics, politics, and culture. The third chapter is devoted to *The Visible and the Invisible*, the final (and posthumously published) work. Typical of the metaphors in *Phenomenology of Perception* is the description of philosophy in its preface: "not the reflection of a pre-existing truth but like an art of bringing truth into being, we take up this unfinished world in order to complete and conceive it" (quoted by Gill, p. 5). In *The Visible and the Invisible*, where he returns to the concerns of his early work, we find *chiasm* or intertwining, to convey the profound implication of self and world in each other evident in the description of philosophy just noted, and the "flesh" which delivers that same implication and which stands as "the centerpiece for the entire arrangement of insights in *The Visible and the Invisible*" (p. 60). In Part 2 Gill turns directly to the theme of embodiment and its impact on Merleau-Ponty's understanding of language. From the outset Merleau-Ponty had argued that speech was essentially gesture, where complex meaning is delivered and received directly—without appeal to any more basic dimension of literalness—and where the meaning so delivered is gathered from the cultural and physical context shared by speaker and hearer. Gill relates Merleau-Ponty's embodiment of language in nature and culture to the discussion of metaphor which has been carried on during the previous two or three decades by such figures as Edwards, Black, Wheelwright, Beardsley, Goodman, and Ricoeur. His view places him as far as one could get from the position (Edwards') that metaphor has a literal equivalent which can be substituted for it. With Ricoeur he holds that metaphor is not reducible to a literal equivalent, and that it aims at a true account. He takes it as the most primitive of linguistic modes.

Merleau-Ponty, as Gill quite correctly says, denies the dichotomy between literal and metaphoric speech. "Indeed, he even goes so far as to ground all speech in the metaphoric mode, granting significance to literal propositions only within the framework provided by context, convention and creative intention" (p. 126). Such a reversal of perspectives is the sort of shift in philosophical values that phenomenologists like Merleau-Ponty were delighted to promote.

Gill has returned to an issue which has concerned readers of Merleau-Ponty's work from the time of *Phenomenology of Perception* though without its being expressed as a problem of metaphor: does not this version of intentionality, that is, intentionality as embodiment, draw self

and world so close together that philosophy becomes impossible for want of that distance which would allow the mind to turn upon itself and upon its situation? As early as 1946, in a discussion of Merleau-Ponty's work which took place before the Société Française de Philosophie, Emile Brehier, then dean of the French historians of philosophy, pressed Merleau-Ponty on this point. The form which the question took at the time assumed that philosophy would ultimately have to be delivered in literal expressions which mirrored reality. It gradually dawned upon those who followed his work and who let its meaning sink in, that there was to be no resolution into objective language but an enduring commitment to the primacy of a richer speech with its own distinctive power to let things be.

Gill understands this well, shapes the question as one of metaphor, and makes an effective case for its primacy in Merleau-Ponty's work. I did miss in these pages an effort to provide at least a working definition of metaphor. In its absence, metaphor seems to be everything that literal language is not, and thus leaves a bit of uneasiness. On the whole, though, this study is very well done and worthy of the attention of whoever is interested in how philosophers think — John F. Bannan, *Loyola University of Chicago*

HEIDEGGER, Martin. *The Principle of Reason*. Translated by Reginald Lilly. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991. xxi + 148 pp. \$27.50— This lecture course dating from 1955–56 is perhaps Heidegger's last truly important work. The book takes Leibniz's famous dictum, *nihil est sine ratione* —nothing is without reason—as the point of departure for a series of ruminations on the fate of modernity, modern philosophy, the atomic age (here, a major concern), science, and the process of *Seins-gesckick* (usually translated as the “destining of Being”; though in this edition, the translator prefers the Germanicism, “the *Gesckick* of being”) which is somehow responsible for our present fate of *Seinsverlassen-heit*—abandonment by Being. Although many of these themes will be familiar to Heidegger readers from related works of the 1940s and 1950s, *The Principle of Reason* is a significant exemplar of the later Heidegger's manner of thinking and philosophical concerns.

For Heidegger the Leibnizian dictum epitomizes some twenty-three hundred years of Western philosophy. Hence, he claims, we have much to learn from analyzing its implications and origins. What emerges is a philosophical lineage and series of equivalences that, when taken as a whole, imply a profound, yet all too simplistic indictment of the totality of Western *Dasein*. With the Greeks (especially Plato) there begins a “forgetting of Being” as a result of which the Presocratic concept of the “truth of Being,” which has to do with its capacity to shine forth and show itself, has been occluded. Heidegger deftly recounts this process, one that culminates in denouncing the perils of Western “representational thinking” (hence, this text is one of the most important for an

understanding of Heidegger's status as a precursor of postmodern criticisms of "representation") Already in Latin, the Greek *logos* (speech and gathering together) has been debased to *ratio*, a term etymologically related to "to calculate" More and more, Being in its primordially is reduced to what it means for a "subject" to grasp (calculate, reckon with) "objects" or "beings" Heidegger illustrates his point persuasively with the example of a seventeenth-century fragment from the German poet Angelus Silesius (a contemporary of Leibniz), which reads "The rose is without why, it blooms because it blooms/It pays no attention to itself, asks not whether it is seen." This is Heidegger's way of raising a theme common to many of his "postphilosophical" writings, namely, that the primordial understanding of Being with which we moderns have lost touch has alone been preserved by poets Thus the verses just cited, their characterization of the blooming of the rose as "without a why," are meant to stand as a living refutation of Leibniz's contrary claim that "nothing is without reason" or "without a why" For Heidegger, the original sin of all Western thought lies embodied in this claim It is at the origin of calculative thinking, and, now that Being has been forgotten, it culminates in our ceaseless technological exploitation of the totality of beings—or, simply, in the "atomic age"

Throughout this book one encounters the characteristic combination of blindness and insight that distinguishes so much of Heidegger's work In the end, the judgments about philosophy, modernity, science, and so forth are too summary and unnuanced In my own book on Heidegger (*The Politics of Being* [New York: Columbia University Press, 1990]), I have spoken of the "leveling gaze" of his later philosophy Thus, despite the incisiveness of many of his insights, for Heidegger, all that is "essentially" worth saving in the West is Presocratic philosophy, a handful of poets, and—in a fully nationalist spirit—the "teleology of Greco-Germanic *Dasein*" There are other poets, philosophers, cultural traditions, and political movements that cannot so readily be written off as foreshadowing the godforsaken (*gottesverlassene*) "nuclear age"—toward which, for Heidegger, the totality of the tradition seemingly points To do justice to Heidegger's brilliance as a thinker, we must save him from his own ideological exaggerations and prejudices — Richard Wolin, *Rice University*

KRAPIEC, Mieczysław Albert *Metaphysics: An Outline of the History of Being* Translated by Theresa Sandok Catholic Thought from Lublin, Vol 2 New York: Peter Lang, 1991. xii + 539 pp —With this work, the second of the Catholic Thought from Lublin series, the Polish Thomist Albert Krapiec has written a veritable classic, a work destined to be ranked with the famous scholastic books of this century And although broadly speaking, this is a work in the worthy tradition of Garrigou-Lagrange and Gredt (inasmuch as it vindicates the *philosophia perennis* and its chief theses), it is distinguished by its lucidity, simplicity, depth, and precision of insight, as also by its obvious assimilation

and analysis of recent controversies and doctrines. The net result is first rate, a full-blooded "existentialist" metaphysics in which the classic Thomistic theses are nicely grounded in a thorough examination of the primordial encounter with being, of the proper object of metaphysics, and of its characteristic procedure.

In this last issue Krapiec is especially interesting, as he shows how metaphysics is deductive neither in the contemporary formalist sense nor in the strict sense of the Aristotelian syllogism, but still provides certain scientific knowledge because of its appeal to the "necessary states of things" and their interpretation in the light of a "designated (not arbitrarily) proper object of Metaphysics" (pp. 45-6)—Being as Being. In all of this Krapiec's inspiration is Thomas's teaching that metaphysics proceeds by the *modus intellectualis*, grasping multiplicity in a unity. Being is that unity and the hermeneutical-ontic context within which its transcendental and specific modes are illustrated, justified, and analyzed. This being is, however, not the abstractionist concept of being. Since being's notion is necessarily tied to a judgementally grasped actual existence, which is the actuality of a "concrete content," the concept of being is always in some way tied to its primordial ontic-epistemic roots, namely, the concretely existing individual thing and the mind's (in part) judgemental encounter with it. There is thus no perfect abstraction of the concept of being either from some common essence *quo* or from the essence in the concrete which is what primarily exists. The deeper reason for this, Krapiec teaches, is the real composition of essence and existence, the codetermination involved therein, and hence the merely relative unity of the concept of being. In very clear language, he then illustrates how the derivation of a transcendental and nontautological formulation of first principles hinges mainly upon which of the two aspects of being is brought to the foreground (for instance, "being" itself obviously brings existence to center stage, "thing" brings essence) and which occupies the subject or predicate position.

Also of special interest in this book is Krapiec's treatment of analogical cognition, wherein he shows a most exacting precision and an illuminating originality. Although a defender of Cajetan's analogy of proper proportionality, he claims that analogies involving nonnecessary categorical relations are really reductively univocal, and that Cajetan's failure to see this is a major omission. In fact, the cardinal comes in for tough (and in my view not entirely merited) criticism not only for this but for "essentialism," for his *terminus purus* theory of suppositality, and for a "magical" theory of ontic composition.

Herein also are defended all the major theses of Thomism, especially the non-self-limiting character of act and the real distinctions between potency and act, essence and existence, and substance and accident. In his treatment of the essence-existence issue, Krapiec generously provides a collection and defense of the various arguments for the real distinction in contingent and finite being, some routes being direct (for instance, the *intellectus essentiae* argument), others indirect (for instance, the pantheist and monist implications of the contrary position), evincing thus the epistemic flexibility of the Thomist approach.

In sum, Krapiec has provided us with a book of breadth, depth, precision, and judicious assimilation. Nothing is cursorily treated, and all

judgments are analyzed and justified. This is philosophic *aggiornamento* with a vengeance, incorporating and developing this century's scholasticism and assessing with fairness transcendental Thomism, phenomenology, and other major schools of philosophy. It is also a fine history of metaphysics, but the use of history involves no abrupt changes of topic, as it is deftly integrated with the developing metaphysical problems and their solutions — Christopher Albrecht, *Washington, D C*

LANGAN, Thomas. *Tradition and Authenticity In the Search for Ecumenic Wisdom*. Columbia, Mo: University of Missouri Press, 1992. 239 pp. \$34.95—This work finds some inspiration in the investigations of the late Eric Voegelin, who insisted that the existence of history and man's existence within history result from man's articulation of his experience as ordered to the whole of being and its source. While Langan's enterprise does not explicitly rest on Voegelin's judgment in his *Order and History* that "God, man, world and society form a primordial community in being," it is within these speculative parameters that he works.

This is the first of a series of studies which will be dedicated to the truth question of this ecumenic epoch. "How and from what standpoint can one adjudicate reasonably, in the light of one's natural faith, between clashing truth claims advanced by disparate traditions with distinctive objects of interest and relevance to them, and how ought we to synthesize truths of different orders of experience into a genuine and authentic ecumenic wisdom?" (p. 6). In this initial volume the concern is with outlining a method to focus upon the diverse major traditions which seek to guide human destiny in our time. Later volumes will explore the epistemological and ontological implications which arise from this reflection.

Four genera of dominant traditions are carefully considered: artistic, revelational, associational, and scientific-philosophical (pp. 68–88). The entire examination of considerations made in this volume takes place within three phases: explicit tradition in the pursuit of authenticity (finding the way, space for authenticity, structure and kinds of explicit tradition, truth and faithfulness of traditions, bad and good sense of tradition), the place of traditions in the emerging world system (elements of the world system, relevant explicit traditions, single wisdom from various traditions), tradition and authenticity (ultimate structures and the problem of ideology). These are followed by a glossary and appendixes with schemata juxtaposing the essential characteristics of major traditions. As such, the tone of the reflections is not aimed principally at those with any specialization in philosophical discourse. The objective of this volume is the attainment of a true critical distance from and an appropriation of the tradition in which one has been formed, as well as to indicate the means to "develop hermeneutic sensitivity to the way symbols function" in order to initiate a rapprochement of diverse competing traditions (pp. 203–4). The first demands "accurate description of the contemporary interaction of institutions, symbol systems, and

world processes," and the latter demands "incorporating the insights of distinctive traditions in a single ecumenic wisdom" (pp 207–8)

Langan does not retreat from acknowledging that it is appropriate to begin the search for orderly resolution within the occidental tradition it is his own, and equally important, "it makes the most encompassing claims, in relation to which all other ontological claims—so it pretends—should be situated" (p 199) In a word, history is a uniquely Western experience in which man transcends the cycles of nature which form the womb of cosmological civilizations Historicity is joined with the "perennial 'given-ness' of human nature," which precludes any idealistic reductionism when reflecting on the "dialectical relationship between the ontic and the ontologic" (pp 194–5) To elucidate this, however, brings us back to the central issue of the translatability of symbols between diverse traditions, especially when some traditions claim an inclusiveness of articulation that is not present in other traditions, and when the former involve a "maximum differentiation of experience" (pp 178–83) In turn, this demands a sensitivity for the sources and canonical texts of major explicit traditions (pp 51–68)

Langan illustrates his reflections with anecdotes about contemporary discussions concerning symbolization and order in areas as different as Québec and Poland He often echoes notions appropriated from Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, Vogelín, and occasionally von Balthasar The last three are among the quartet of speculators to whom this volume is dedicated Having cleared the ground, one may look with eagerness for the following volumes which will no doubt be more intensely speculative, since they will have to detail the epistemological and metaphysical foundations of the whole endeavor In those contexts, it is likely that the fourth member of the dedicatory group will be heard, even though it will be in a discrete manner when elucidating the principles needed to accomplish the task envisioned that member is Etienne Gilson —Michael Ewbank, *Loras College*

O'ROURKE, Fran *Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas* Leiden: E J Brill, 1992 xvi + 300 pp \$80 00—This valuable work, one of a very restricted number dedicated to the subject, is a revised version of a doctoral dissertation directed by Gerard Verbeke and submitted to the Katholieke Universiteit te Leuven It is meritorious not only for its sensitive appraisal of Dionysius's own doctrines and Aquinas's critical assimilation of them, but also because of the evident effort expended to present a global, yet accurate portrayal of Dionysius's principles and *viae* as developed by Aquinas

The order of considerations proceeds in four main phases knowledge of God, transcendence of being and the good, transcendent causality and existence, and creative diffusion of the good The first major focus ranges over Pseudo-Dionysius's understanding of reason and Revelation, causality, the names of God, and the priority of negative knowledge as contrasted with Aquinas's own doctrines regarding the same, as well as

Aquinas's utilization of the *triplex via* The second phase considers Dionysius's doctrines concerning *Thearchia* in terms of his view of non-being This is compared with Aquinas's doctrines regarding matter and potency as nonbeing, along with St Thomas's refinements concerning the causality of goodness and being and the primacy of the latter

Phase three, perhaps the most controversial, focuses on the unity of divine causation in the light of Exodus 3 14, and on Dionysian elements in Aquinas's notion of being Reflections on *esse commune* are centered on the notion of *virtus essendi*, which is interpreted in terms of Aquinas's utilization of the notion of "virtual quantity" and *esse intensivum* Following this analysis of Aquinas's understanding of the divine identity and perfection, O'Rourke presents Dionysius's portrayal of the cycle of creation and Aquinas's assimilation of this doctrine of emanation and return in terms of efficient and final causation This culminates in the final phase which includes careful analyses of Dionysius's and Aquinas's views of divine creative freedom, their doctrines concerning the presence and transcendence of God, and the manifestation of this presence within hierarchy and order

Acknowledgement is made early on that negation "is of value for Dionysius only because it is interior to the affirmation of a transcendence" (p 17) Having grasped this, Aquinas's adaptations and transformations of the *triplex via* are sensitively portrayed (pp 31-43) Although not immediately pertinent in the focus taken in this presentation, these modulations reflect to a great degree Aquinas's conscientious adherence to Aristotle's canons of demonstrations *quia* and *propter quid*

O'Rourke constantly remarks Aquinas's confirmations of any concordance between the teachings of Dionysius and Aristotle, as well as St Thomas's care to nuance without contradicting, insofar as such is possible, the doctrines of such a venerable author as the Pseudo-Areopagite This latter is excellently described in explaining Aquinas's examination of the distinct focuses on efficient and final causality to confirm the metaphysical priority of goodness over being in terms of final causality This qualifies, without discrediting, Dionysius's confirmation of the supremacy of "The Good" (pp 85-113)

In this work of such high quality, some of the finest reflections concern the principles and conclusions assimilated from Dionysius and utilized by Aquinas to elucidate the hierarchy of creation (pp 225-74) Aquinas's analysis of the creative diffusion centers on the relation of similitude, in which "there is no exact comparison between cause and effect but effects possess according to their capacity the images of the causes" (p 259) Such implies, contrary to Plotinus and Proclus, that the "descending flow of perfection" is not a degradation in which there is a "lessening of God's causality within creatures, since he is immediately and directly actual within all" (p 261) This constitutes foundational order in terms of a radical diversity and inequality according to which *convungit fines primorum principis secundorum* (*De veritate*, q 16, a. 1)

In analyzing Aquinas's understanding of participation and hierarchy O'Rourke relies heavily on the insistence of Van Steenberghen, Solignac, and Fabro that Pseudo-Dionysius is the principal influential source for Aquinas's own understanding of *esse* (pp 131, 133, 180-2)

Accordingly, Gilson's caveat that any consideration of being in terms of varying degrees of intensity is a concession to imagination is dismissed and full interpretive weight is placed on Fabro's notion of *esse intensivum* (pp 168 n 116, 174–85). In turn, this is related to Aquinas's occasional linking of *quantitas virtualis* and *quantitas intensiva* (pp 155–67).

Strictly, however, "intensive" and "quantity" are metaphorical in reference to *esse*, for they denote determinate degrees, and as such pertain to the order of essence, not *esse*. *Esse* as such is simply the being of all which is, and is neither intense nor intensive of itself. Thus, it is misleading to assert that "*esse* determines, as it were, the ontological density of each individual along the great chain of Being" (p 186). Rather, beings as beings are diverse and unequal, but *esse* is not. Such better accords with Aquinas's tactic of tempering the "agnostic character of Dionysius's thought" which is so profoundly addressed in this work (pp 55–6), and which is a central aspect of the former's critical assimilation of the thought of the latter —Michael Ewbank, *Loras College*

PLOCHMANN, George Kimball *Richard McKeon A Study* Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1990 xvi + 260 pp \$29.95—This is the first study of the scholarly legacy of the late Richard McKeon, written by a lifelong friend and former student. The author is very familiar with McKeon's written and oral teachings and refers often to his "extraordinary classroom sessions" (p 198). He devotes only one chapter to the little he came to know of his teacher's personal life but predicts many future biographies from those who have retained McKeon's letters. The good news announced in this book is the "planned republication of all McKeon's papers which first appeared in print in what are so often referred to as 'obscure journals'" (p xiv). In this early presentation of the genius of his former teacher Plochmann does not attempt to give equal consideration to all the writings, of which those on politics make up the greater part. He simply aims to introduce the public to a professor whose teaching career spanned five decades and whose influence extended far beyond the Academy.

During the first period of his professional career, Professor McKeon's writings focused upon Antiquity and the Middle Ages, but after World War II his writings concerned twentieth-century problems. His view of philosophy as practical as well as theoretical made him influential in the formation of UNESCO. The need for unity rather than uniformity in a world of cultural diversity led McKeon to develop a systematic pluralism which emphasized common problems and common values rather than common principles. Within this book twenty-one diagrams are used to show how McKeon categorized the diverse methods of the philosophers as a prologue to the

reorganization of all knowledge and discourse. Accurate communication for the sake of clarity was considered by McKeon absolutely essential for mutual understanding.

It is important to note, however, as the author does, that McKeon goes beyond the classification of previous systems to offer his own original solutions. Indeed, Plochmann maintains that "had McKeon not begun so many of his writings with references to past thinkers, he might be better known at present as an innovator in higher education, an apostle of diplomacy, a prophet of world government, a drill sergeant of philosophic and scientific methods, and more besides" (p. 203). In fact, the works of McKeon can be described as preservative and interpretive or originative. This is in sharp contrast to the best known philosophers of our time who "are relatively untutored in the background of their chosen discipline" (p. 19).

Like Dewey, McKeon considered education most important for democracy, but unlike him, this author points out, McKeon did not think of all philosophy as treating of education (p. 118). He deeply appreciated the necessity of metaphysics as a science of real things, not of words or ideas. "The knower in order to recognize the known, must determine What Is, and this involves as starting points the transcendentals (being, thing, something, one, true, and good)" (p. 83). The task of metaphysics is fully outlined in McKeon's 1960 Presidential Address to the Metaphysical Society of America, "That Which Is, Being and Existence." He viewed metaphysics as able to guide science and investigate problems that the special sciences cannot.

Plochmann attributes to McKeon the basic conviction of the indispensability of philosophy for a proper education of those who attempt to solve social problems and work for world peace. A philosopher can make the distinctions which eliminate those conceptual confusions which foster disagreements. A true philosopher is always making an "unswerving effort to come to grips with inner meaning and truth, to illuminate with philosophy all things in nature and the arts" (p. 13). For McKeon philosophy was "an ordered sequence of ideas aimed at diagnosing and alleviating the world's evils or enhancing its goods" (p. 121). The question arises as to whether McKeon's emphasis on philosophical pluralism entailed any degree of relativism. Quite the contrary, according to Plochmann, who insists that "McKeon never denied the existence of Truth in general and of determinate truth belonging to some given statement" (p. 188).

The author can legitimately conclude from his analysis of the wide-ranging works of McKeon that "although he worked tirelessly on educational administration and reform, the dissemination of knowledge, and the accommodations between different cultures, as well as the theoretic foundations of world peace, these others depended for their formulation and their stimulus upon his conception of philosophy itself" (p. 167).

Plochmann's book is highly recommended to general readers as an introduction to Richard McKeon's thought, to philosophers and those preparing to teach philosophy as promoting insight into methodology, and to all who are concerned with world peace. —Mary T. Clark, *Manhattanville College*

POLS, Edward *Radical Realism Direct Knowing in Science and Philosophy* Ithaca. Cornell University Press, 1992 xi + 221 pp \$28.50—

The main thesis of this book is one which the author acknowledges to be scandalous in the eyes of many contemporary philosophers: our rationality has the capacity to achieve *direct* knowledge of independent reality. This thesis implies a critique of what Pols calls the “linguistic consensus,” according to which all human knowledge is mediated by “language-cum-theory.” More importantly, this thesis subserves Pols’ constructive purpose in this book: to draw attention to our direct rational awareness of independent reality, and to develop some important epistemological and metaphysical implications of such awareness.

Chapter 2 is dedicated to clarifying some preliminary issues surrounding “the scandal of radical realism.” According to Pols, only heightened attention to our rational awareness—and not some new theory or proposition about it—can lead to a justification of its authenticity. Such heightened attention is nothing other than an intensification of the reflexive component which already accompanies our rational awareness of any object. The failure to attend to this rational awareness is one of the deleterious consequences of contemporary philosophy’s overvalorization of the propositional. Such overvalorization, in turn, is bound up with the failure to distinguish clearly between rational awareness itself (by which we achieve direct knowledge of objects) and the formative function of rationality (by which reason creates its own products such as theories and propositions).

In chapter 3 Pols outlines what he calls “seven dogmas of the linguistic consensus,” for example, the dogma that “knowledge consists of a system of propositions” (p. 60). In chapter 4, Pols seeks to show that there can be no satisfactory solution to the contemporary debate between realism and antirealism as long as this debate is conducted within the venue of the linguistic consensus. As Pols forcefully argues, both sides of the debate subscribe simultaneously to a minimal realism and a minimal antirealism. The debate presupposes a minimal realism insofar as both sides admit that science, if it is to remain “empirical,” must have some connection with what is nonlinguistic or nontheoretic. But the debate also presupposes a minimal antirealism insofar as both sides hold that we can have no direct knowledge of independent reality (although they disagree on whether our putatively indirect knowledge can ever be knowledge of what is independently real).

Turning to the positive purpose of his book in chapter 5, Pols distinguishes between primary rational awareness (by which we are directly aware of temporospatial beings) and secondary rational awareness (by which we are directly aware of things that are not temporospatial, such as theories and propositions). Pols’ radical realism does not entail that *all* of our knowledge must be direct. But for Pols, our indirect knowledge (for example, of the structure of the DNA molecule) would be impossible if we could not have direct knowledge of things like models and theories. The contrast between directness and indirectness is not a contrast between the experiential and rational elements of our knowing; it is a contrast between knowing something by virtue of attending to *it*, and knowing something by virtue of attending to something else.

Pols clarifies some of his conclusions in chapter 6, by articulating his "Nine Theses About Science, Common Sense, and First Philosophy." Finally, in chapter 7, Pols argues that the traditional metaphysical issues of causality and primary being (or substance) are really one. The "ontic power" of a primary being causes the being to be a unity and thus causes the beings within that being to be components of it. By virtue of its ontic power, a primary being also possesses "transeunt causality," or the power to act upon beings other than itself. Thus our direct rational awareness of primary beings as beings coincides with our direct rational awareness of their transeunt causality.

The main thesis of this book is apparently simple and straightforward, but a genuine grasp of the author's meaning requires great care and attention. This is because the book's subject matter (rational awareness) is inevitably *sur generis* and self-justifying: no amount of explanation or argumentation can eliminate the need to attend to one's own rational awareness. As Pols repeatedly points out, the contemporary failure of such self-knowledge is ultimately the failure of philosophy itself — Michael Baur, *The Catholic University of America*

POSSENTI, Vittorio. *Le società liberali al buio. Lineamenti di filosofia della società*. Collana di Filosofia, 50. Turin: Marietti, 1991. 424 pp. 60,000 Italian Lire (\$45).—This is the latest book of Vittorio Possenti, professor of history of moral philosophy at the University of Venice and one of the major experts on the thought of Jacques Maritain. Possenti deals here with the situation of liberal Western societies from the point of view of classical political philosophy, understood as the tradition of political thought originating in Aristotle and adopted by Aquinas and modern Thomists such as Jacques Maritain.

The book is divided in three parts, followed by a concluding chapter. The first part deals with the theory of the political form and the problem of a public philosophy. For Possenti there are four coefficients which constitute the political form: right (natural right), common good, people, and authority. These four coefficients or components of the "politico" (*le politique, das Politischen*) are equally necessary; no political society is conceivable without any one of them, though they do not exercise the same function in the political whole. Possenti suggests an analogy, borrowed from the Aristotelian classical distinction of four causes, to explain them: The common good functions as a final cause, the right (or justice) as a formal cause, people or society as a material cause, and authority (and in the democratic regimes the people too, through its representatives) as an efficient cause (p. 39).

The importance of a defense of a theory of a natural right arises out of an idea of justice which always transcends any possible established order. By reference to this idea we are able to judge this order. On this account authority finds its justification in the order of justice, and not in the justice of order. The collapse of natural right and justice provokes the abandonment of the axiom, *iussum quia iustum* for the

reversed axiom, *vultum quia visum* (p 66 and p 159) Possenti discusses the ideas of common good, people, and authority with respect to a broad spectrum of problems, considering ancient authors (Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas) as well as modern (Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel) and contemporary authors (Kelsen, Schmitt, Maritain, Rawls, Luhman, Bobbio, Nozick, Bishurjan, Lippmann, and so forth)

In the second part of the book Possenti deals with the concept of practical reason, with the themes of work and technique, and with the relationship between politics and religion Possenti discusses and criticizes the views of Bobbio and Rawls The third and last part of the book deals with the problem of the foundation of democracies and the relationship between state and society Possenti himself criticizes this part for the lack of a necessary development of the concept and function of the family, which is extremely important in the elaboration of a public philosophy in a democratic system Possenti suggests that in the family there is a recognition that is of primary importance to human society, but this idea of has nothing to do with the Hegelian idea of struggle for recognition it is the recognition which is realized through parenthood (p 33 and pp 373–6) Family is not a private matter but the gateway to public life The exclusion of the theme of family coincides with the persistence of an individualistic perspective in public philosophy

The struggle between totalitarianism and democracy formed the core of this century's history, but now "democracies find themselves facing internal enemies, such as irresponsibility, indifference, lack of civil courage" (p 285) The view that democracy is prior to philosophy misstates the entire idea of democracy, which, being based on principles, needs a theoretical and philosophical foundation (p 293) Such a position ultimately does not need to be contradicted, because it leads to philosophical *aphasia* (p 294)

Two more things should be mentioned about this book First, its main thesis is that for the accomplishment of the uncompleted modernity it is necessary to go to the pre-Kantian and pre-Enlightenment sources, in order to find a foundation for natural right, the common good, and human rights Second, in a thesis reminiscent of another Italian philosopher, Augusto Del Noce, Possenti maintains that the spirit of freedom and the spirit of religion go together, and that democracy must find in religion the moral strength which opens up the space for freedom and tolerance — Paolo Guetti, *University of Dallas*

RAKOWSKI, ERIC *Equal Justice* Oxford Clarendon Press, 1991 xii + 385 pp Cloth, \$49 95, paper, \$21 00 —Rakowski's form of egalitarianism places him squarely within the dominant individualistic liberal tradition developed over the past two or three decades by John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, and others He calls his view "equality of fortune," and states its "central thesis" this way "no one should have less valuable resources and opportunities available to him than anyone else, simply in virtue of

some chance occurrence the risk of which he did not choose to incur" (p 1) Those who suffer from the fallout of the natural lottery have "a right to compensation" from "fortune's favorites" (p 2) Thus, his answer to the question Amartya Sen has popularized (but which Rakowski never asks)—"Equality of what?"—is not, contrary to appearances, equality of *fortune* Rather, it is equality of "resources and opportunities," which alone can rectify the inevitable *inequalities* of fortune

The first and most important half of the book begins with a lengthy discussion of "the presumption of equality" (ch 2) and ends with a defense of the position that one's bodily parts "should be regarded as resources for purposes of determining a person's just entitlements" (p 3) In between Rakowski examines the role of voluntary choice, risk, preference, desert, gifts, and other legitimate transfers that alter the outcome of the spin of fortune's wheel in individual lives

As its affinities with Rawlsian liberalism suggests, Rakowski's doctrine of equality of fortune is not very radical In a passage that would cause utilitarians to choke and libertarians to nod approvingly, we read that "arguments from the disintegrative effects of large disparities in wealth cannot possibly justify strict curbs on differences among people's holdings" (p 16) Nevertheless, he insists that "inequalities must at some point be checked"—presumably by taxation and transfers—but these measures are discussed only in passing Rakowski presents his doctrine as an alternative to Rawls's difference principle (which he explicitly discusses and dismisses [pp 116–19]), just as he defends what Rawls denies, namely, "the reality of distributive desert" (p 117) Whether he also repudiates the priority of the principle of basic equal liberties one cannot tell, since he ignores the issue

The latter half of the book is devoted, first, to a defense of strict liability in the realm of nonmalicious harms (Part 2, "Corrective Justice") and, last, to a somewhat loosely related set of topics concerning the distribution of life-saving resources (Part 3, "Saving and Taking Life")

Rakowski's philosophical method is not altogether clear He insists, "There is no way to bore below the everyday appeals to principles and consequences we make routinely when engaging in moral argument" (p 10) As a result, the arguments of the book have a distinctly intuitionistic and casuistic quality about them The book is not intended to shed much direct light on justice as it governs the basic institutional structure of society, but only on justice as it arises in the circumstances of an individual's life and in the course of everyday transactions of various sorts (exchanges, gifts, coercive extractions) It is an ambitious and demanding book that repays close reading —H A Bedau, *Tufts University*

RASMUSSEN, Douglas B, and DEN UYL, Douglas J *Liberty and Nature An Aristotelian Defense of Liberal Order* La Salle. Open Court, 1991 xvi + 268 pp Cloth, \$49 95, paper \$24 95—This book concludes with the

suggestion that Aristotelian tradition "is perhaps the only remaining unexplored source for providing liberalism with the kind of secure moral footing it desperately needs" (p. 225). The suggestion seems preposterous on the face of it. In this case, however, the suggestion is a summation of all the considerable analysis that has gone before. The entire book consists of a demonstration of the fact that the quintessentially modern and liberal notion of fundamental rights for individuals ultimately requires the quintessentially ancient Aristotelian notion of nature.

This remarkable project is carried out by paying systematic attention to a few paradoxes which have confounded most other thinkers devoted to the ethical writings of Aristotle, including the basic paradox that the virtues and goods of human flourishing only exist actually when they achieve a determinate form resulting from the unique circumstances and choices of the individual—whereas in that determinate form they are not *universally* good (or are only *analogously* so, just as they are instances only analogously). Universal moral goods only exist abstractly. Concrete moral goods, by contrast, exist only through the mediation of individual choices and circumstances. "Goodness is neither an intrinsic feature of things or actions, nor is it simply a subjective phenomenon of consciousness. Rather, *goodness is an aspect of reality in relation to the needs or ends of a living thing*" (p. 57, emphasis added, see also pp. 89, 91, 117).

The authors' fundamental move is to render thematic in all its implications, as Aristotle did not, the fact that moral perfection of the individual cannot be achieved otherwise than by the individual living according to the consequences of personal choices. On this fact rests the irreducible requirement for a sphere of strict autonomy to guarantee the possibility of moral perfection. Hence the first requirement of social political life as a human life form is the preservation of the minimalist sphere of individual autonomy in the absence of which human flourishing as a moral achievement is precluded. The social-political condition that must be fulfilled before, and as the basis of, any other, is the protection of the mature human being's self-directedness.

By facing squarely—and, perhaps, for the first time effectively—the question of the relationship of morality and legality, Rasmussen and Den Uyl are able to resolve the thorny problem of "the common good" as the basis upon which their synthesis of tradition and modernity, "Lockean and Aristotelian conceptions," in the sphere of political theory rests (p. 142).

The common good, at its core, is a procedural notion and not a substantive one where self-directedness is not protected, the condition for the possibility of human flourishing as a moral achievement is at risk. Thus individual rights provide moral guidance for society's creation of a morally legitimate constitutional and legal order, not for the conduct of individuals. Instead of seeing the partial divergence of legality and morality as a regrettable deficiency in the wisdom or virtue (or both) of legislators, Rasmussen and Den Uyl show that the relationship between law and ethics is, as a necessary consequence of what the protection of self-directedness requires, neither direct nor isomorphic.

Thus, the requirements of morality are inherently richer than, and may conflict with, the requirements of legality (see for example pp 146–9) Only what is moral can be legislated, but much that is moral cannot be, precisely because legislation is required before all to protect the liberty upon which morality ultimately depends *Abusus non tollit usum* not all abuses of liberty are subject to legal correction, nor, in the nature of the case, can they be

The “set of compossible moral territories,” the protection of which is the primary purpose of the legal system, implies as a necessary consequence a partial divergence between the legal and the ethical or moral, and has the further consequence of ensuring that pluralism is an essential part of the common good, for a differential weighting or valuing of goods by free individuals is as certain as their differences Rasmussen’s and Den Uyl’s procedural notion of the common good as entailing pluralism enables them to introduce a procedural notion of the social contract which makes sense of the basic foundation of government in the “consent of the governed”—something that has generally eluded Aristotelian thinkers such as Adler, Veatch, and Simon, to mention a few both recent and prominent

Justice itself is affected by the establishment of a morally legitimate constitutional order What is just or unjust in human affairs is only partially “given in advance” of the determinate social order Certain aspects of justice will only come into play after historical rights have been defined I would suggest, for example, that Rawls’ celebrated *Theory of Justice* needs to be thoroughly rewritten in the light of Rasmussen’s and Den Uyl’s work They provide a seminal treatment, indicating the direction in which the future of sound social and political philosophy must surely lie —John Deely, *Loras College*

REIMAN, Jeffrey *Justice and Modern Moral Philosophy* New Haven Yale University Press, 1990 xiv + 322 pp. Cloth, \$35 00, paper, \$16 00—Reiman’s project is to turn Rawls’s *A Theory of Justice* into the theory of justice, by remedying a defect in Rawls’s theory—a defect which has left the theory open to serious objections The book, at heart, is an attempt to provide a moral grounding for Rawls’s assumptions concerning the justice of the social contract Reiman wants to provide the rational defense of Rawls that Rawls himself failed to produce, Rawls’s tendency to rely on “intuition” in defending his principles of justice leaves him short of the rational justification Reiman seeks to furnish (pp 269, 271–2, 290, but see p 164, where there is some reliance on intuition) The path to this end is a fulsome one, demanding the development of theories of natural and social justice

The issue at the heart of Reiman’s book is how one accounts for and defends authoritative claims of moral requirements once one has entered the “natural context” The “natural context” for morality is the ethical equivalent of the political state of nature, or the condition of Cartesian

doubt, but the doubt now is directed at moral requirements. Reiman's solution to this difficulty is to examine the tenets of the social contract, and discover what conditions enable one to exit the "state of nature." Imagining a moral state of nature or "original position" (p. 12), Reiman seeks a defense of requirements on reasonable grounds, reason must be able to provide a defense for morality, or the requirement appears simply as a form of subjugation.

This argument is taken up in the first two chapters, where Reiman provides, first, reason's "weak answer" (pp. 81–2) to subjugation, which is that justice excludes subjugation, it is "weak," though, for it does not yet demand that one embrace justice. In chapter 2, Reiman provides the "strong answer" to subjugation (pp. 141–53) by showing that there are certain legitimate moral claims that can be made, and defended, on the basis of human reason. These claims must somehow overcome the Cartesian suspicion that they are not requirements of reason.

The suspicion of subjugation must be removed so that we are allowed to pursue our "sovereign interest," our "real self-interest," which consists in our "interest in being the self with whom [our] very being is identified" (p. 50). Thus sovereign interest flows from the Heideggerian realization of being and self, and from the knowledge of mortality, which "challenges me to live a life with worth that compensates for the eternal absence ahead" (p. 44). Subjugation is the "natural test of morality," and the attempt to justify moral authority is "the most pressing concern of moral philosophy" (p. 41).

In the second part Reiman takes up the principles of natural justice and of social justice, outlining the moral requirements of natural justice in chapter 3. Chapter 4 constitutes the transition from natural to social justice, emphasizing the subtle ways in which authority can operate in the social context. Chapter 5 addresses the fundamental issue of the role of social justice within social contract theory, including an extensive examination of labor theory. Here Reiman arrives at the defense of the demands of justice within the social contract and concludes by refining Rawls's "difference principle" to exclude the "gambler problem."

The attempt to provide a wholly rational account of the social contract theory leads Reiman to neglect the role of passion and faith in human experience. This seeming anomaly in a work on moral philosophy is addressed in his Conclusion, however, where he suggests that there is ultimately little distinction between faith and reason—at least insofar as the nontheological requirements of the Ten Commandments are rationally defensible.

Given the intricate design of the book, there is a remarkable degree of consistency throughout, with great care taken in the use of language and expression. Some notable exceptions remain, though, for instance, left incomplete is an explanation of a peculiar remark addressing the necessity of providing incentives for labor: "This necessity is rooted in human nature, but it could change in history" (p. 285). Reiman sees the struggle of the future as one between the claims of socialism and capitalism, for "stateless communism" does not appear to be a "realistic agenda" at present (p. 304). The critique of capitalism and liberty in chapter 5 would perhaps be more robust if it extended beyond an analysis of Nozick.

Reiman does not shy away from addressing difficult issues in the course of this provocative book. His defense of abortion (p. 166) and infanticide (p. 169), drug use and prostitution (p. 306) may not be convincing, but it is certainly not for the squeamish. At times it does appear as if Reiman may be too concerned about anticipating critiques of the work, and this results in a number of extended tangential discussions. The book would be strengthened by further attention to the situations in which one is allowed to exert force over another, force which does not amount to subjugation (pp. 11, 37–8). Finally, Reiman recognizes the importance of free will and human reason (pp. 57, 70–1, 126), but then undermines that, and much else, with a critical remark that “human beings do not seem to have essential purposes or functions” (p. 102) — Richard J. Dougherty, *University of Dallas*

ROSEN, Stanley *The Question of Being: A Reversal of Heidegger*. New York: Yale University Press, 1993. xxiii + 344 pp. Cloth, \$35.00— Unlike most recent studies of Martin Heidegger—for instance, by the Chilean Marxist Victor Farias and by the American philosopher Thomas Sheehan—Stanley Rosen’s *The Question of Being* avoids making political statements. In fact Rosen is remarkably silent about Heidegger’s engagement as a Nazi in the 1930s, and has no interest in discrediting his subject for sympathetic speeches about Hitler while rector of Freiburg in 1933 and 1934. Recognizing a worn-out field for what it is, Rosen deals instead with Heidegger’s ontology, respectfully but also critically. He exhibits none of the obvious distaste for Heidegger that marked his earlier book *Nihilism*, nor do I find much evidence of the Straussian scaffolding apparent in Rosen’s first work, on Plato’s *Symposium*.

Throughout this study Rosen keeps coming back to an appropriate question. Even granting Heidegger’s intuitive brilliance and contributions toward reviving ontological inquiry, was he justified in his dismissive treatment of Plato, Aristotle, and Hegel? It is all too easy to interpret Heidegger’s dismissal of Western philosophy from Plato onward (with exceptions being made for German romantic poets, Schelling, Nietzsche, and perhaps the nominalists) as a heuristic or even rhetorical gesture. Rosen, who takes this dismissal for something more, analyzes the reasons that Heidegger went as far as he did in rejecting the great philosophical system builders. He also insists that Heidegger was wrong to do so. The existential and increasingly mystical approach to the *Seinsfrage* present in Heidegger’s lectures of the forties and fifties betray a distrust of Western rationality that Rosen demonstrates was based on an excessively limited view of what philosophic reasoning is. Neither Plato nor Aristotle believed that he had encapsulated Being entirely through a conceptual system, and the categories Aristotle set up to understand predicates was never considered as definitive or as embracing all conceivable existence. Classical philosophy recognized the epistemic limits of discursive or of dianoetic knowledge. Thus the Heideggerian idea that philosophy was about those aspects of Being which

revealed themselves to our attention, and did not remain hidden—that is, *to lèthen*—would not have been alien to Plato and Aristotle. Rosen stresses that Heidegger sets up a straw man, which he then attacked as Western rationality. Heidegger also exaggerates the links between that rationality and various forms of scientific positivism.

Rosen is particularly effective in demonstrating the abstractness of much of Heidegger's discussion of Being. Unlike classical philosophy, which assumes an eidetic substratum being attached to both the percipient and the object of perception, Heidegger's outlook requires that each subject try to identify Being through an endless assortment of unmarked, anonymous objects. Heidegger's "difficulty lies in the fact that he is not talking about anything at all, as he himself insists. Otherwise put, he is attempting to talk about the beingness of beings, without referring to the being of being, and so without referring to anything that is a this or a that, a something or another. But this is like trying to talk about the fishermen of fish without referring to fish" (p. 119).

Perhaps my one quibble with Rosen's study is the implicit importance that he assigns to Heidegger as a deeply influential philosopher. Whence his reference, already in the subtitle, to the need among members of his profession to effect a "reversal" of Heidegger's alleged cultural and academic dominance. As Ernest Nolte shows (perhaps unwittingly) in his biography of Heidegger published in 1992, the great philosopher, already tainted by his brief association with the Nazis, cultivated contacts in the postwar period with the anti-American, antitechnological and ecological Left. Heidegger's *Kehre*, or turning toward an anti-Western mysticism, may have been influenced by professional and social considerations, that is, by an attempt to tap into fashionable currents that arose at least partly independently of his work. This one critical observation aside, I would recommend *The Question of Being* as the most intelligent study of Heidegger written in English. In fact there are few studies in other languages that seem as good.—Paul Gottfried, *Elizabethtown College*

SCHEFFLER, Samuel. *Human Morality*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. 150 pp. \$26.00.—The author's objective is to defend what he regards as a moderate or middle position on the relationship between the moral point of view and the point of view of the individual. Unlike those who hold that the two must always collide and those who hold that they must ultimately coincide, the author holds that there is a potential for congruence between them. His pursuit of this issue leads to a review of "morality's content, authority, scope, and deliberative role" (p. 5). The rather complex argumentative structure of the work reflects in part the rich combinatorial possibilities of these factors, taken separately and together.

On the question of the limits of morality, the author holds that in principle any combination of "stringency," "pervasiveness," and "overridingness" is possible. Morality could be said to be pervasive "in the

sense that no voluntary human action is in principle resistant to moral assessment (although of course one or another of the familiar excusing conditions may apply)" (p 25) It could be overriding "where that is understood as meaning that it can never be rational knowingly to do what morality forbids" (p 25) It could have stringency, "the property of being very demanding within whatever domain it applies " The author surveys four positions which, respectively, either (1) give up stringency, on the ground that if a moral theory is too demanding we should seek a less demanding one, or (2) give up pervasiveness, on the ground that areas should be acknowledged in which we are not subject to the demands of morality, or (3) give up overridingness, on the ground that in some areas it may be rational to ignore the demands of morality, or, instead of giving up any of these, one might (4) insist on the demands of morality and the difficulty of living up to these demands The issue here is whether considerations dealing with morality's effects on the individual should be regarded as limiting morality, and whether the limits, if any, are on the scope or the content of morality

On the question of the deliberative role of morality, the author distinguishes five different ways in which moral considerations (broadly or narrowly defined) might enter, they range from a process involving explicit reflection on general moral principles to the counterfactual possibility that moral considerations might have come to the agent's attention and altered the conduct While insisting that moral considerations do not normally rise to the level of explicit moral theory, the author nevertheless thinks that moral theory has a point and that it can be defended against some standard objections

On the question of the authoritativeness of morality, the author distinguishes the "prudential concept of reason," which says that the rational action is the one that most effectively promotes the agent's interests, the "instrumental concept," which says rational action consists in maximizing the satisfaction of the agent's existing desires, and four versions of "the claim of overridingness" or "the claim that it can never be rational knowingly to do what morality forbids" (p 52) The usual objections to the last claim are held to be inconclusive or to rest on a dubious picture of human motivation The author also suggests that in reality less turns on the issue of overridingness than might initially appear, and for two reasons even if morality were overriding it might not have the authority some would like, and even if it is not overriding it might have more authority than some have feared The author appeals to psychoanalysis to show the possibility in principle of a kind of naturalistic account in which we distinguish between motivation by a sense of duty and motivation by desires or sentiments The upshot of the analysis is supposed to show that morality can have authority even if the claim of overridingness is rejected

On the question of the stringency and demandingness of morality, the author distinguishes an array of possibilities, but concentrates on the choice between an "ideal of purity" and his own preferred "ideal of humanity" He attempts to rebut efforts to find some "uncontroversial property of moral claims," such as impartiality or universality, from which stringency could be deduced His own moderate view is offered

to us not through a proof but as a proposal, "a proposal that we think of morality this way rather than that, not because there is no precedent for the other way of conceiving it, or no argument for so doing, but rather because this way of conceiving it coheres with more that matters to us" (p 114) The central evidence for his own "moderate" position is held to be our "commonsense convictions," such as, for example, "a basic tenet of our commonsense moral outlook that we are justified in devoting some disproportionate degree of attention to our own basic interests" (p 122) The book concludes with a brief but interesting discussion of the social and political context within which a morality may operate

The book is intended to make, and does make, a contribution to ongoing debates between contemporary academic moral theorists What the author takes to be our "commonsense convictions" is a consensus within that community of theorists, but not outside it Here is a single example most people in most communities have adjusted their views about the properties of morality to views about what their god or gods desire Like the Democratic platform, this work on human morality contains no reference to any god —Richard Smyth, *University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill*

SHANKS, Andrew *Hegel's Political Theology* New York Cambridge University Press, 1991 xiii + 234 pp \$49 50—This book is a critique of the impact that systematic ideological distortions have on social life This critique is developed through a study of the "relationship between philosophical thought and religious dogma in general" (p 16), since religious dogma is an obvious instance of authoritarian ideology Moreover, Shanks is especially concerned with the recovery of the Christian tradition, which he argues has been "superficially deformed by such ideology" (p 3)

This also is a book on Hegel, whom Shanks characterizes in the following way "No other thinker seems to me to come so close to the heart of the matter" (p 4) in diagnosing the nature and impact of ideological distortions Hegel, he argues, is the first thinker to move significantly beyond Anselm's *Cur Deus Homo* in providing a "nonreductive philosophical Christology" (p 17) Such a Christology, for Shanks, is the "attempt to demonstrate the character of the Incarnation as a rationally *necessary* precondition for the full reconciliation of God with humanity" (p 17)

The book's argument is that a philosophy of religion that is based on an adequate conceptualization of the relationship between rational reflection and religious dogma can serve as a paradigm for identifying and critiquing the authoritarian ideologies that distort political life A philosophy of religion, therefore, should also be a rational political theology, or—at very least—political theology should be seen as an essential component of a philosophy of religion Hegel's reflection on the symbols

of Christian faith models such a philosophy of religion for us in a case in which, for Shanks, authoritarian ideology has not essentially deformed a living tradition

Shanks uses Milan Kundera's conception of "kitsch" as a literary schema that presents the possibilities for distortion that authoritarian ideologies possess. In Kundera's usage, kitsch's meaning is extended beyond its nineteenth-century usage of mass-produced trivial art. Rather it signifies a mindset easily recognized in the late grim Marxist regimes of Eastern Europe, but also present as a set of distorting possibilities in the West. Kitsch is the collective harmony that is bought at the price of an abandonment of free, critical thought (p. 3). It is a largely self-censored perception of reality, governed by indulgence in a communal narcissism, by the desire to feel good about that of which one is a part. Kitsch is the raw material of any form of propaganda (p. 2), the means by which the thought control of the collective is dressed up, internalized, and rendered seductive (p. 3).

The central concern of what Shanks calls Hegel's political theology is a systematic attempt to expose and oppose the distorting capacity of such a repressive ideology. Its focus is on an "inclusivist" interpretation of Christology, in which the emphasis is on the universal, albeit historically emerging, truths about man, God, and their relationship. The message which emerges is that of the "infinite value of the individual as such" (p. 4) as the reversal of an authoritarian ideology's proclamation of the "absolute worthlessness" of those whom it places in the role of the other. Such an ideology's response to its perceived opponents is threefold: "moral condemnation, an appeal for loyalty to the wider group, and threats" (p. 10).

Shanks locates Hegel's central contribution to an inclusive Christology that can serve as the paradigm for political theology in his treatment of religion in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. That is, Hegel inserts the problem of the question of political theology into the general philosophical problem of "how we learn about things" (p. 18), of what counts as experience in a philosophically meaningful sense. Experience, for Hegel, cannot be equated with perceptual evidence. Shanks focuses on Hegel's phenomenology of the "Unhappy Consciousness," which he takes to be an adequate philosophical reflection on the distorting nature of kitsch, of authoritarian ideologies. He is at pains to argue that it is incorrect to maintain, as important commentators have, that the "Unhappy Consciousness" is intrinsically connected with medieval Catholic Christianity. Rather, it should be seen as a schema for any authoritarian ideology. Shanks contrasts the reconciliation and forgiveness with which chapter 6 of the *Phenomenology* concludes, and which serves as the transition to an adequate philosophical reflection on religion, to the kitsch of the Unhappy Consciousness. The contrast shows that reason's developing self-understanding, and its liberation from repressive ideologies, are one and the same movement.

The book includes an engagement with contemporary political theology in the work of J. B. Metz, and with Hannah Arendt's political philosophy — John Donovan, *Mount Saint Mary's College, Md*

VANDERVEKEN, Daniel *Meaning and Speech Acts, Volume I Principles of Language Use* Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1990 ix + 244 pp \$49.50—Two rather distinct and competing trends can be discerned in twentieth-century philosophy of language (1) the logical trend, found in the work of Frege, Russell and Tarski, with its focus on language-world connections and truth, (2) the language-use trend, found in the work of Wittgenstein, Austin, and Searle, with its focus on language as employed by speakers in ordinary conversational contexts (speech acts) Vanderveken's aim here is to bring together both the logistic and language-use traditions by folding the analysis of language-world relations and the formal semantics of truth *into* the theory of speech acts This gives rise to a "general semantics" of language-use and language-understanding Vanderveken claims that such a general semantics of speech acts will provide a transcendental analysis of the a priori forms of possible thought and experience of human speakers (pp 4–5) It would therefore be a great mistake to treat this book (and its companion-volume, not reviewed here) as just another contribution to the now slightly dated "speech act industry" It is, in effect, an attempt to raise speech act theory to the level of philosophical grammar, or what seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers would have called *grammaire générale et raisonnée*

The crucial link for forging a union between logistic and language-use semantics is Vanderveken's thesis that the primary unit of meaning is the "illocutionary act" An illocutionary act is what is performed by any speaker who uses a sentence with the intention of communicating a thought in a context of utterance, and takes the form $F(P)$, where F is an illocutionary force (such as assertion, command, or wish) and P is a proposition Now sentences are the basic "bearers" of meaning in that words have meaning only in the context of sentences, but in turn, sentences have meaning only in the context of illocutionary acts, or intentional uses of sentences So illocutionary acts are the most fundamental units of meaning According to Vanderveken, in literal speech the illocutionary act (understood to be an act-type, not an act-token) just is the semantic value of the sentence used in that context of utterance Hence the meaning of a sentence in an interpretation is a function which maps from contexts of utterance onto illocutionary acts (p 40)

A distinction crucial to Vanderveken's project of a formal semantics of illocutionary force is that between success-conditions and satisfaction-conditions success-conditions are the rules governing the occurrence of acts, and satisfaction-conditions are the rules governing the correspondence or "fit" between acts and the world On Vanderveken's picture, truth is merely a subspecies of satisfaction (with the "words-to-world direction of fit"), yet the conditions of satisfaction of illocutionary acts are dependent on the truth-conditions of their propositional contents What Vanderveken wants to do is to construct a semantics which precisely specifies both the success-conditions and the satisfaction-conditions of literal sentence-utterances This semantics will be able to comprehend a broad range of intensional notions, including not only truth-conditional analyticity, consistency, and entailment, but also illocutionary analyticity, consistency, and entailment (pp 49–53)

Because every illocutionary act contains a proposition as part of its semantic structure, the analysis of propositions is central to Vanderveken's general semantics. On his view, propositions are compositional sense-complexes which designate possible states of affairs, and are made true by the actual existence of those states of affairs. Propositions not only contain their truth-conditions essentially but also contain in their content a representation of those very truth-conditions (pp 85–95). This allows Vanderveken to individuate propositions in a moderately fine-grained way that is more intensionally sensitive than Carnap's "intensional isomorphism" criterion, without going all the way to the extremely fine-grained criterion of intensional identity favored recently by George Bealer and others—which would require, for example, that "Stan hits Ollie" and "Ollie is hit by Stan" express distinct propositions.

Speech act theory in its trajectory from Austin through Searle to Vanderveken has acquired a distinctly architectonic quality. According to Vanderveken, there are five basic uses of language (assertive, commissive, directive, declarative, and expressive), and a transcendental argument shows us that this set of basic uses of language is unique and complete (pp 105–6). There are six essential components of every illocutionary force (illocutionary point, mode of achievement of an illocutionary point, propositional content, preparatory conditions, sincerity conditions, and degree of strength), and the set of all possible illocutionary forces can be recursively defined (pp 125–9). Moreover, one can supply formal definitions of success and satisfaction and a law of identity for illocutionary acts (pp 129–36). It is possible to describe sets of laws for illocutionary points and sentential types, for illocutionary forces, and for entailment and analyticity (pp 137–65). This ramified theoretical framework not only provides foundations for speech act theory, but also allows for the precise analysis of language-specific devices such as performative verbs in English (pp 166–219).

It should be obvious that this book is dense with interesting ideas and detailed analysis. As with all philosophically rich books, one could easily take issue with it on various points. For example, it seems to me a disadvantage of Vanderveken's account that it so strongly favors an orthodox Fregean semantics and cannot therefore accommodate singular propositions, or the other phenomena of "direct reference" (pp 96–8). Oddly, Vanderveken himself admits in passing that there are certain illocutionary acts taking objects themselves (and not senses) as contents (pp 23–4). But surely this is tantamount to admitting the existence of directly referring terms!

Nevertheless, rather than nit-picking, I want instead to focus critically for a moment on the exciting claim that the results of speech act analysis are transcendental. That claim in turn rests on the thesis that all possible human thoughts, concepts, and objects of experience are constrained a priori by the universal illocutionary potentials of natural languages (see pp 56–60). Since every illocutionary act either employs words or embeds a propositional content, Vanderveken's thesis requires that human beings cannot cognize or get at reality except through language or propositions. But that is implausible. Clearly, prelinguistic infants have various ways of effectively representing the objects they care about in their local environments, and I don't need words or

propositions—but instead only what Kant calls “spatial intuition” and what Gareth Evans calls a “cognitive map”—to be able to know just where my coffee cup is right now (that is, over there, within easy reach) Direct, nonlinguistic, nonpropositional awareness of real objects is therefore perfectly possible, and it follows that the implications of speech act semantics for transcendental philosophy are much narrower than Vanderveken believes —Robert Hanna, *The University of Colorado at Boulder*

VERENE, Donald Phillip *The New Art of Autobiography An Essay on the Life of Giambattista Vico Written by Himself* Oxford Clarendon Press, 1991 xvi + 263 pp \$59 00—Having previously given us a close study of Vico's *New Science* (*Vico's Science of Imagination*, 1981), Verene turns his attention in his most recent book not to Vico's “new science” but to his “new art,” arguing that as Vico was the founder of the philosophy of history in the *New Science*, so he may be seen equally to be the founder of the modern art of autobiography in his *Life*. This should not be taken to mean, however, that Verene has nothing to do with the *New Science* in his account of the Vichian act of autobiography, on the contrary, his argument is that in the *Life* Vico contemplates, comprehends, and narrates his own life history according to the same principles, mythic design, and structural schemata as he contemplates, comprehends, and narrates the history of all humanity in the *New Science*. Thus, “the *New Science* is the autobiography of humanity,” Verene tells us (p 78), and

he who tells its story is not so much humanity's biographer as its autobiographer because he simply speaks for humanity, since its general story can only be realized in a particular text. The Vichian philosopher is a kind of biographer-autobiographer, since he is both apart from and the subject of the causes he relates. There remains his own particular story, which exists within that of humanity and which includes the discovery of the principles of humanity's life and is itself recountable as a philosophical history by applying these principles to it (pp 72–3)

With this as his thesis and with his thorough knowledge of both the Vichian literature and the literature that has in recent years grown up around the act of autobiography, Verene has produced a splendid book that will speak with equal force to students of Vico and to students of autobiography.

After a first chapter in which he sifts with painstaking care through the details of Vico's life and his *Life*, demonstrating that there are frequent shippages of a significant and revealing nature between the one and the other, Verene proceeds to a chapter entitled “The Idea of Autobiography.” This chapter gives both a history and a philosophical analysis to thought about autobiography from Vico's time to our own,

with emphasis on what has been said by literary *cum* philosophical critics of the past thirty years or so about the writing of one's own life. In certain ways this is the center of Verene's study, establishing the grounds on which he can argue that the *New Science* is a macrocosmic vision of human history corresponding to and depending upon the microcosmic unfolding of his own history in the *Life*. Vico, according to the "idea of autobiography" set forth in this chapter, necessarily reads his own history as he reads all of human history, in mythic and fabular terms.

In the following chapter Verene considers Vico's two principal predecessors in philosophic self-examination, Augustine and Descartes. He proceeds in chapter 4 to a compressed study of the body of Vico's philosophic writings that culminated in the *New Science*, this to be balanced against and taken up into his autobiographical account of how the philosophical writings came to be as they were and as they had to be. Chapter 5 then delineates "Vico's Fable of Himself," returning to what I have described as slippages between the life and the *Life*, but now shown not to be slippages so much as they are more or less deliberate maneuvers designed to shape the life of Giambattista Vico to the contours of the Life of Humanity. Whether or not it is true "that all autobiographies are myths of the author, metaphors of the self," Verene writes, "it is certainly true of Vico's autobiography." The fable is the substructure of Vico's life of himself as it is the substructure of the life of the nation" (p. 163). This is his new art, corresponding to his new science, and as Verene demonstrates, the first paragraph of the *Life*, like the entire book, "has the organization of a Vichian cycle—there is Vico the natural child, Vico the fallen child who heroically survives, and Vico the reborn child with the nature of the adult philosopher" (p. 174). It is a myth of cycles within cycles within cycles, each being a structural repetition of the cycles of human history established in the *New Science*. Verene concludes with "Vico's Art," a chapter that traces what was made of Vico's science and his art by subsequent philosophers, autobiographers, and literary artists. "The one great 'commentary' on Vico's autobiography," Verene says in conclusion, "is James Joyce's *Finnegans Wake*" (p. 226), a book that in effect combines the *New Science* with the *Life of Giambattista Vico Written by Himself* to produce the mythic *Autobiography of Humanity*. When asked whether he believed in the *scienza nuova*, Joyce, as reported by Verene, responded, "I don't believe in any science, but my imagination grows when I read Vico as it doesn't when I read Freud or Jung" (p. 227). Leaving aside the slight to Freud and Jung, one might say that one's imagination grows not only in reading Vico but also in reading Donald Verene on the new art of autobiography that was founded by the great Neapolitan thinker who so excited Joyce's imagination—James Olney, *Louisiana State University*.

WESTPHAL, Merold. *Kierkegaard's Critique of Reason and Society*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991. xii + 129 pp. n.p. —This volume, originally published in 1987 (Mercer University

Press), is a collection of seven previously published essays, here slightly modified. Six of these were previously published in various journals over the years 1971–1984 and one was presented at a Kierkegaard conference at St. Olaf college in 1985.

In the Preface Westphal lays out, as precisely as one could hope for, his Kierkegaardian agenda. "While I have written more on Hegel, to whom my intellectual debts are enormous, it is Kierkegaard who has influenced my own thinking more than any other writer" (p. vii). Further, the essays reflect Westphal's discovery that the ideology and sociology of knowledge are to be found in Kierkegaard no less than in Marx (though refracted through a different terminology), and that Kierkegaard's own hermeneutics of suspicion and critique of ideology dethrones, to some degree, the atheistic monopoly of Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud. In addition to the recovery of Kierkegaard's prophetic character, the essays elaborate, more specifically, Westphal's twofold thesis that "the 'individualist' interpretation [is] as fundamentally misleading as the 'irrationalist' interpretation, reflecting more of an a priori 'existentialist' stereotype than a careful reading of the text" (p. viii). He does not claim originality for these discoveries, though he does claim that they are often neglected points of Kierkegaardian scholarship.

While remaining true to the course, the essays cover a broad field of Kierkegaardian concerns. After an introductory piece on the prophetic nature of philosophy of religion, essays follow on Kierkegaard as a prophetic philosopher, Kierkegaard's politics, Kierkegaard's sociology, Abraham and Isaac, Abraham and Hegel, Kierkegaard and the logic of insanity, and ideology critique in the *Fragments* and the *Postscript*. There is something for everyone who has an interest in Kierkegaard.

For myself it was Westphal's discussion of the "contradiction" involved in faith that was especially useful (pp. 99ff). He rightly argues that this contradiction is not a formal one and brings to bear some forceful observations. Even so, I do not find here a clear delineation between the sort of faith (Socratic) that is related to an objective uncertainty and the kind (Christian) related to an objective absurdity. This distinction, axial in the *Postscript*, is completely obscured by a claim such as, "In the *Postscript* paradoxical religiousness is that which must be believed clearly against the understanding" (p. 100). The truth is, Socratic faith is clearly represented in the *Postscript* as paradoxical but propelled by the nonrational (objective uncertainty), in contrast to Christian faith which is even more paradoxical by virtue of the irrational (objective absurdity). In relation to the latter, though Westphal is right with respect to the kind of contradiction lying at the heart of Christian faith, a contradiction it remains—an "offense to reason"—and all the twisting and turning in the world cannot dislodge the fact that at some level and in some important sense Kierkegaard (or at least Climacus) is an irrationalist.

On the back cover it is reported that a reviewer called the earlier edition "a pivotal event in the history of Kierkegaardian scholarship." This is an overstatement. But a provocative and useful collection of essays it is —Ed. L. Miller, *University of Colorado at Boulder*

WETZEL, James *Augustine and the Limits of Virtue* Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1992 xv + 246 pp \$54.95—Wetzel tells us that “limits” in the title of this volume intends to connote two things (p 16) Negatively, it refers to Augustine’s dissatisfaction with pagan accounts of virtue, especially their blindness toward the psychology of inner conflict Positively, it refers to the saint’s reformulated understanding of virtue within a theistic context in which he stresses the motivational integrity of graced willing

It is a common view of scholars that, inasmuch as he later abandoned Platonism, Augustine owes only a transitory debt to the Platonists Further, for many interpreters, a sharp line exists between the more philosophical young writer of a work like *De libero arbitrio* and the older opponent of Pelagianism Wetzel, in contrast, says that Augustine had a profounder lifelong debt to Platonism (p. 4) and that there is continuity between the young convert from Neoplatonism and the elderly doctor of grace (p 11)

Both Neoplatonism and the Stoicism that figured in Augustine’s appropriation of it stressed the role of knowledge and self-determination in the acquisition of virtue As Wetzel sees it, the Stoic convergence of virtue, self-determination, and happiness supplied Augustine with a philosophical ideal which survived his theological critique of pagan wisdom (p 55) The saint’s dissatisfaction was directed towards “the Stoic ideal of invulnerability in ethics, buttressed with the resources of Platonic metaphysics and epistemology” (p 119) At the same time, “the ideal of invulnerability in ethics remains the lodestone of Augustine’s philosophical interests What he comes to deny is that virtue reflects resources of power that we alone generate to maintain our integrity—our sense of self—in the world around us, where time and change seem to promise us only entropy and dissolution” (pp 124–5)

From experience, Augustine knew that the motivating power of knowledge was limited He saw the need for a more profound psychology to account for inner conflict and moral failure Pagan philosophers had given reason extraordinary power over passion because they “failed to see how passion carries reason’s past into its future, often in disruptive fashion Because our lives extend over time our willing bears the impress of what we have been” (pp 109–10) In his own life, Augustine knew what he should do, but his past judgments and actions, existing now as the legacy of habit, blocked him from acting on his knowledge Habit’s power derived from “discredited knowledge, the lingering hold of all those reasons for acting once thought to be viable” (p 128)

In Augustine’s mature theology God anticipates human willing in matters of salvation and human freedom itself becomes “the effect of grace, not its precondition” (p 197) “Love of God, first received under grace, lays the foundation for the virtues It renovates the springs of human motivation, replacing fear of punishment with love of justice” (p 183)

On the issue of the compatibility of grace and freedom, Augustine thinks that freedom is unintelligible apart from grace As Wetzel interprets him,

our acts are genuinely ours if our motives fully account for our having committed them Our motives have their source in what we perceive

to be good [Augustine] characterizes free will as our being moved to act wholly in accordance with the good. This adds to the basic condition of attribution the stipulation that our perceptions of the good suffer from no sinful distortion (i.e. distortion caused by our having measured the good on some standard other than God's). When we represent the good intelligibly, we are moved by God. Hence freedom coextends with grace. (p. 216)

"Grace gives the saints greater liberty than either Pelagius or Plato could have supplied them with, for grace reaches over time to fortify them with perseverance" (p. 218). Yet "even the graced life, in having to reclaim the past from sin, remains vulnerable to time" (p. 218). Inasmuch as it is "held mortgage to its past" (p. 202), that is, as the legacy of habit endures, our will in this life can resist God's grace.

Wetzel's book is thoughtful and scholarly. He has read the primary sources and quotes liberally from the best Latin texts available. He is aware of most recent secondary sources in English and French. Although on occasion he mentions Gilson and Portalié, nevertheless, long-time Augustinian scholars will miss the names of people like Bourke, Boyer, Hessen, and others. At times, Wetzel's concern for contemporary issues has led him into needlessly abstruse discussions which wander from both Augustine's text and his own central theme. The volume has a fair bibliography and a comprehensive index, but it could have included a *Textregister*. I would recommend it to scholars and to graduate students, both in philosophy and theology.—John P. Doyle, *St. Louis University*

WHITE, Stephen A. *Sovereign Virtue: Aristotle on the Relation Between Happiness and Prosperity*. Stanford Series in Philosophy, vol. 8. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992. xiv + 337 pp. \$35.00.—This work upholds the leading role of virtue in the happy life against competition from goods of fortune, such as health, beauty, wealth, and honor. "Sovereign" in the title—a translation of *kuriōs*—may mean two things: complete (sovereign virtue is complete virtue in contrast with natural virtue or any merely partial virtue) and dominant (a ruler dominates what is ruled). White holds that complete virtue, and more especially the activity in accordance with it, is dominant in Aristotle's version of the happy life.

The first half of the work develops the general position. Happiness, on White's understanding, cannot be any single thing, but it is a way of life that integrates a set of many good things (p. 11). Several of these good things may themselves be ends desirable in themselves, unless something is good in itself, our lives could not be satisfying since our choices would not be for any definite ends (pp. 18–21). All good things, including those that are ends, contribute to the ultimate end, happiness. Happiness alone is an end sought solely for itself, in terms of which all else is ranked and selected (pp. 12–13). Now among the goods that

may be ends, one sort is essential to happiness, and that is virtuous activity. Other goods are needed as well because virtuous activity requires some instruments for its use (for example, money or a friend) and because this activity often serves further ends (for example, to aid a friend [p. 127]). White holds, however, that virtuous activity is sovereign in the sense that it is essential and indispensable for happiness, yet it is not by itself sufficient since happiness also requires other goods.

Since virtuous activity is sovereign rather than sufficient, happy people are vulnerable to fortune. To the extent other goods enter into their happiness, they may need good fortune to secure them and are always at risk of losing them to bad fortune. White's general argument thus recognizes that for Aristotle even happy persons may succumb to bad fortune and cease at least for a time to be happy.

White also wishes, however, to make the strongest case for virtuous activity. He suggests that for the virtuous and happy person no other good things count as much as virtuous activity (pp. 126–9). This limits vulnerability. As long as the virtuous person, no matter how bad circumstances become, can continue to act as virtuously as possible and be confident that such virtuous activity is what really matters, then the person is happy. If a person is acting virtuously, and thus satisfying the "objective condition" for happiness, then happiness can endure misfortune so long as the person also satisfies the "subjective condition" of being satisfied with that activity (pp. 124–5). White states,

Aristotle's account provides no algorithm for measuring happiness, but it does specify the criteria for settling the question: the sovereign factor is virtuous activity, but the virtuous have some additional need for prosperity. On the other hand, since different people seek different particular ends, the final standard for happiness rests with the virtuous themselves: only they can say whether their activities are impeded and incomplete, and only they can say whether they are happy (pp. 134–5).

It may be wondered whether White does not have Aristotle too enamored of Socrates and whether he treads a bit close to the debater's thesis that the good man is happy on the rack.

The second half of the book considers some of the main goods of fortune in connection with particular moral virtues. He treats health along with temperance, wealth with liberality, power with courage, honor with great-souledness (dignity), and life itself with courage, dignity, and friendship. In each case he shows that virtuous activity outweighs the other good. In this interesting approach, White does not intend a complete account of the virtues.

White offers frequent and extended discussions of the literary background to Aristotle's ethical reflections, as well as current scholarship. White compares and contrasts Aristotle's methodology in ethics with Socratic elenchus as analyzed by Gregory Vlastos. He finds them similar, but Aristotle makes better use of the various propositions and so gets more positive results. White thinks that the evolution of Aristotle's thought, whether or not it emerges elsewhere, is not very apparent in

the ethical treatises. He therefore deals with all of them together, preferring the *Nicomachean Ethics* because of its fullness. In juxtaposing passages from different parts of Aristotle's treatises, White is perhaps not always sufficiently sensitive to the original contexts. Generally, this is a helpful work — Ronald Polansky, *Duquesne University*

WODEHAM, Adam of *Lectura secunda in librum primum Sententiarum*; vol 1 *Prologus et distinctio prima*, vol 2 *Distinctiones II–VII*, vol 3 *Distinctiones VIII–XXVI*. Edited by Rega Wood and Gedeon Gal. Franciscan Institute Publications. St Bonaventure: St Bonaventure University Press, 1990. Vol 1 49 + 354 pp, vol 2 374 pp, vol 3 491 pp. \$120.—In his monumental *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, Etienne Gilson devotes only one paragraph in his chapter on fourteenth-century nominalism to Adam of Wodeham. He admits that this is partly due to the fact that little is known of Adam's philosophical views except that he is generally considered an Ockhamist. Gilson's treatment reflects the once widely held view that Adam's contributions to the history of philosophy were limited to expositions of William of Ockham. Adam was William's student at Oxford and later served as his teacher's secretary. He was perhaps best known as the author of an introduction to William's *Summa logicae*. More recent scholarship, however, has established Adam as an original philosopher in his own right and, in this regard, this critical edition of the *Lectura secunda* is an important contribution.

Adam gave three series of lectures on the *Sententia* of Peter Lombard: The *Lectura prima* were given in London sometime before 1329. Little is known of the content of these lectures, as the *reportatio* has been lost. Better known are the *Lectura tertia*, available in the printed edition of 1512. This third set of lectures was given at Oxford in 1332. The *Lectura secunda* were delivered at the Franciscan school in Norwich about 1330. While Adam probably lectured on all four books of the *Sententia* at Norwich, the only extant *reportatio* covers the first book alone. This survives in a single manuscript, Cambridge, Gonville and Caius 281/674, on which this edition is based.

The text contains discussions of a number of philosophically interesting topics and provides ample evidence of Adam's independence as a thinker. While he clearly was influenced by his teacher, he does not hesitate to distance himself from William's views. In his *Prologus*, for example, Adam claims that a single undivided soul alone is enough to explain all of our cognitive acts. In the course of his discussion he has occasion to reject William's real distinction between the sensitive and intellectual souls (Prol, Q 1, §2 [19–10]). Adam insists that sensitive and intellectual cognitions cannot be received by distinct faculties. He argues that sensations are simple forms and, as such, could not be received by a complex faculty (Prol, Q 1, §3 [112]). To this he adds another interesting argument based on experience. Positing a separate

intellective act in explanation of sensory knowledge is superfluous because that act would then contain the cognitive judgment about the existence of the sensible object. Such a judgment, however, could only be grounded on sensation and not on any intellective act. Therefore, the intellective act of judgment must be part of the same cognitive faculty as the sensitive act (Prol, Q 1, §4 [1 13–14])

Another instance where Adam departs from a well-known position of his teacher is in his treatment of scientific knowledge. He introduces this discussion as a gloss on the Augustinian maxim "Omnis doctrina vel rerum est vel signorum." He departs from the Ockhamist view that the immediate object of scientific knowledge is not the extramental reality but the mental act which constitutes the conclusion of a demonstrative syllogism. Rather, Adam argues, scientific knowledge concerns what such a conclusion is meant to signify. This is not simply something outside the mind, but it is something which can be signified only in a complex manner (*complexum significabile*) taking together the propositional mental acts constituting the premises and conclusion of a demonstration along with the extramental things to which they refer. It is thus complex as a whole which necessitates assent in the knower (Dist, I, Q 1, §§6–8 [1 189–193])

This fine edition has a number of features which are designed to make the text accessible. The editors have divided the text into clearly numbered sections and have supplied headings for each section as an aid to the reader. The apparatus intelligibly reports variants, doubtful readings, and scribal errors. Also provided are notes on all internal references as well as references to other texts. Especially useful are the well-organized indexes at the end of each volume. The arrangement of these features shows the skill and experience of the editors, who have both been contributors to the critical editions of the *Opera* of William of Ockham. The appearance of the *Lectura secunda* is a welcome addition to the source materials for late medieval philosophy —Michael W. Tkacz, *Gonzaga University*

YOUNG, Julian. *Nietzsche's Philosophy of Art*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. ix + 170 pp. \$44.95.—In this first full treatment of the philosophy of art of Nietzsche in English, Young traces the positions that Nietzsche adopts in regard to the nature of creativity, the purpose of (good) art, and its ideal aesthetic effects in his published writings. With a few exceptions the notes in the *Nachlass* are eschewed and the primary focus is on the conception of art presented in *The Birth of Tragedy*. From the beginning one senses that this commentary on, interpretation of, and critical appraisal of Nietzsche's aesthetics is fresh, sprightly, and more than an account of what Nietzsche said about art. It is bold, insightful, and, in its *dénouement*, irreverent. Young has taken Zarathustra-Nietzsche at his word: he is not a follower, not a disciple.

The main thrust of this vibrant study is that Nietzsche's philosophy of art follows a circular path: he ends where he began, with the aesthetics of *The Birth of Tragedy*. Though some German commentators have hunted at this, none have so convincingly argued for (if not demonstrated) this interpretation. A closely related theme is that Nietzsche, despite his efforts, did not entirely escape the shadow of Schopenhauer. Though it is admitted that in his middle period he did reject both pessimism and Schopenhauer, it is argued that Nietzsche returned to both in his later works. In what is called an intellectual history of Nietzsche's reflections on art and aesthetic experience, his attitudes toward art, its expression, and its desired effects are traced in his major writings up to and including *Ecce Homo*.

Against the background of the pessimism of Silenus (that because of the pain and suffering of existence it is best never to have been born) Nietzsche proposes the Apollonian dream-like transfiguration of actuality and the *Rausch* ("intoxication," "rapture," "ecstasy," "frenzy") of a Dionysian art which serves, like the beautiful veils of illusion of Apollonian art, as a "prophylaxis" against the daunting insight into the terror and horrors of existence. Young avers that the image of Apollonian art corresponds to Schopenhauer's concept of the world as "Idea" (*Vorstellung*), as well as to his notion of the manifestation of Platonic Ideas in artworks. Dionysian art (which unites us with the "primal unity" or Schopenhauer's "primal Will") more or less resembles Schopenhauer's description of the encounter with the sublime. Qualifying these analogies (as he does), Young presents a plausible case. He finds in *The Birth of Tragedy* a "fundamentally religious character." But this should not be surprising since Nietzsche persistently seeks to delineate an affirmative "religion of life," a religion of immanence, a demanding tragic optimism that sanctifies *this* life and does not transfer all value to "the beyond."

Nietzsche's positivistic, anti-art orientation in *Human, All-Too-Human* is accurately identified as a self-criticism of *The Birth of Tragedy*, insofar as it seems to adopt the "Socratism" of the theoretical man that is attacked there. Even in the former work, however, Young discerns what he calls a defense of "signposting art" or the projection in art of a neoclassical future ideal for man (p. 77-8). In a chapter entitled "The Gay Science," it is held that there is a strong pessimistic undercurrent in the celebration of "joyful knowledge" despite Nietzsche's buoyant attempt to disguise it.

Whether we agree with him or not, Young's strengths lie in his defense of provocative insights into Nietzsche's theoretical stances on art, his criticisms of overstatements, and his intriguing (if sometimes harsh) psychology of the man. Rather than simply stating the link between a "Dionysian relationship to existence," *amor fati*, and willing eternal return, he dogs Nietzsche, noting that in *Twilight of the Idols* an affirmation of the life-process is expressed not, as previously, as an affirmation of the eternal recurrence of *his* life. Throughout, counterexamples that are specific and persuasive are offered to some of Nietzsche's more extravagant claims about artworks or types of art.

Saving his most provocative thrusts for last, Young asserts that Nietzsche never truly overcame pessimism (perhaps here treating the

paradox of a "Dionysian pessimism" too lightly) and ended, ostensibly in terms of his own criteria, in a "romantic pessimism." He calls his final aesthetic a redemption from world and self via Apollonian "superficiality" or Dionysian illusion, a romanticism in which refuge from oneself is sought in "intoxication, convulsions, anaesthesia and madness" (thereby turning Nietzsche's words against him).

A brief epilogue turns *ad hominem* and uses the language of manic grandiosity against a man whose incipient illness peeks through what Young elsewhere considers as a pseudo-autobiography, *Ecce Homo*. Young wrestles with Nietzsche and his philosophy of art so personally that there is something "Nietzschean" (in the sense of "overcoming" what one once valued) about the way he clearly sympathizes with his subject's aesthetics, with the idea of the effect of art as "ecstasy," with the Apollonian-Dionysian solutions to what is ugly and painful in actuality, with the concept of the "redemptive power of art." But he then turns against the creator of these. Nevertheless, this is a lively and polemical work that anyone interested in aesthetics or Nietzsche (pro or con) ought to experience — George J. Stack, *State University of New York, College at Brockport*

ZIMMERMAN, Michael E. *Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, Politics, Art*. The Indiana Series in the Philosophy of Technology. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991. xxvii + 306 pp. Cloth, \$39.95, paper, \$18.95.—In this book the author lays bare and illuminates the systematic connections between Heidegger's philosophy (early and late), his accounts of modernity and technology, and his political views. This is by far the best of the more than a dozen books and anthologies washed up by the latest wave of the Heidegger-Nazism controversy.

Zimmerman distinguishes himself from the field in two ways. First, in Division 1, "Heidegger and the Politics of Productionist Metaphysics: The Longing for a New World of Work," Zimmerman casts floods of light on Heidegger's writings on modernity and technology by placing them in their social, political, and intellectual context: the reaction, among intellectuals on the German right, to the traumas and pathologies of a rapidly modernizing society, for example, the fragmentation of small-scale, organic communities, the rise of an alienated, anomic, "rootlessly" cosmopolitan urban-industrial society, the shattering debacle of the Great War and the years of chaos that followed. Zimmerman argues convincingly that Heidegger's thought is an example of what historian Jeffrey Herf calls "reactionary modernism"—reactionary because it rejects the individualism, secularism, rationalism, universalism, and cosmopolitanism of the Enlightenment, modernism because it seeks to reconstitute premodern, organic community on the level of the modern.

nation-state through the appropriation and application of modern science, technology, and institutions. Chief among the reactionary modernists is Ernst Junger, whose heady writings and powerful influence on Heidegger—exerted through a long and complex relationship—are treated brilliantly by Zimmerman in a series of absolutely gripping chapters, which read like a good science fiction—or horror—novel

Second, Zimmerman evidences an extremely thorough and accurate understanding of Heidegger, taking into account the best of recent Heidegger scholarship, particularly the work of Thomas J. Sheehan and John D. Caputo. By contrast, the similarly conceived books by Richard Wolin (*The Politics of Being* [New York: Columbia University Press, 1991]) and Tom Rockmore (*On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992]) are systematically distorted by the hopeless task of fitting the large Heideggerian box into smaller neo-Marxist boxes. In Division 2, "Heidegger's Critique of Productionist Metaphysics," Zimmerman recapitulates in great detail Heidegger's accounts of modernity and technology in the context of his philosophy as a whole. Especially illuminating is his discussion of the relationship of Heidegger's later writings on technology to *Being and Time*. One problem appears in Zimmerman's account of Heidegger's critique of modern subjectivism. Zimmerman seems to hold that Heidegger objected to modern subjectivism because it denies the intrinsic "natures" of things. As a rough first statement, this is illuminating enough. But it strikes me as extremely implausible to ascribe anything like a *classical* idea of nature to Heidegger.

In light of the body of his book, Zimmerman's Conclusion, "Critical Reflections on Heidegger's Concept of Modern Technology," is disappointing and unconvincing, hastily canvassing critiques and appropriations of Heidegger by everyone from Habermas, Derrida, and Rorty to Charles M. Sherover, John D. Caputo, and Joseph Margolis, concluding with a discussion of "eco-feminism." It is left to other authors to follow out the intimations of this richly suggestive text.

As an added bonus, the book is well-constructed and elegantly printed, with a strikingly beautiful cover. This is a distinguished beginning for The Indiana Series in the Philosophy of Technology—Gregory R. Johnson, *Athens, Ga.*

CURRENT PERIODICAL ARTICLES

PHILOSOPHICAL ABSTRACTS*

AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Vol 67, No 1, Winter 1993

Reflections on the Life and Works of Scotus, ALAN B. WOLTER

This is a summary of what is known after half a century of research and a series of international congresses on the life and works of Blessed John Duns Scotus. The article traces the story behind the critical Vatican edition, begun in 1950 and still in progress, that paved the way for the Congregation for the Causes of Saints to recognize officially Scotus's "fame for sanctity and heroic virtues as well as the existence of his cult from time immemorial" on July 6, 1991. After a three day international congress in Rome on the *Via Scoti*, Pope John Paul II conferred liturgical honors on the newly beatified during a solemn vespers services in the Vatican Basilica on March 20, 1993. Since the Vatican edition is only publishing Scotus's major theological works, the Franciscan Institute of St. Bonaventure University began an edition of his philosophical *opera*, the first volumes of which will appear next year.

Scotus on the Divine Origin of Possibility, ALAN B. WOLTER

Henry of Ghent raised a question regarding the origin of possibility and impossibility that was to become the occasion of a criticism on the part of Duns Scotus and two other Franciscan theologians, William of Ockham and Peter Auriol. According to the classic Scotist formula, things are possible formally of themselves but depend *principiative* upon the artistic creativity of the divine intellect which gives them their first *esse obiectivum* or *esse intelligibile*. God does not know creatures because they are intelligible, but they are intelligible because he knows them.

* Abstracts of articles from leading philosophical journals are published as a regular feature of the *Review*. We wish to thank the editors of the journals represented for their cooperation, and the authors of the articles for their willingness to submit abstracts. Where abstracts have not been submitted, the name and author of the article are listed.

John Duns Scotus on Ens Infinitum, FRANCIS J. CATANIA

The usual interpretation of John Duns Scotus's discussion of "Infinite Being" (*ens infinitum*) links that concept with his well-known position on the univocity of being (*ens univocum*). The latter concept is viewed as the basis for continuity between ordinary experience and the transcendent use of a concept. This interpretation of Scotus fosters the image of "parts": one part is shared (*ens*), one part differentiates (*finitum*, *infinitum*). Even though Scotus's language supports this interpretation, I suggest that rather than conceiving of "parts," we look at Scotus's concept of being as ultimate subject from two points of view: now abstractively recognized as limited in a potentially variable way ("divided into the ten genera"), now imaginatively constructed as so intensified as to include in a unitary way the full range of compossible perfections (*ens infinitum*). I use the adverbs "abstractively" and "imaginatively" with deliberation. I will argue that rationalist and conceptualist interpretations of Scotus have not done justice to the place of imagination in constructing the concept of "infinite being." The result may be not a highly abstract concept but a useful schema for structuring names predicated of God.

Duns Scotus on Potency Opposed to Act in Questions on the Metaphysics, IX, ANSGAR SANTOGROSSI

The paper situates Scotus's *Metaphysics* commentary on potency and act within the Christian context of creation out of nothing. It briefly presents the five different meanings he distinguishes for "potency" before examining one of them, potency opposed to act, in detail. Potency opposed to act is incompatible with actuality in the same subject and is based in a nonexistent yet known thing. Scotus's treatment of potency thus leads him into the problems surrounding talk about nonexistent objects. Furthermore, it is the same thing which is first in potency and then in act, but Scotus gives some very subtle nuances to "same" here. Thus a study of Scotus on potency leads to profound considerations about being, identity, and distinction. Following a hint from Scotus, an attempt is made to lay out the conceptual order of priority obtaining between actual being, merely known being, and potential being, and among these as present to intellect.

Transcending the Natural: Duns Scotus on the Two Affections of the Will, JOHN BOLER

Duns Scotus, following Anselm, identifies *affectio commodi* (sometimes *beatitudinis*) and *affectio iustitiae* as basic inclinations of the will. This paper investigates the "inborn freedom" (*libertas ingenita*) Scotus attributes to the presence of *affectio iustitiae* in the will, which allows the rational agent to rise above the range of *affectio commodi* (that is, the "natural" appetite to realize the potential of the agent's intellectual nature). The will, therefore, escapes the scheme where actions are explained in terms of appetite and

proper object. The thesis is that *libertas ingenta* derives from Scotus's beliefs about the character of morality itself rather than its metaphysical or psychological presuppositions concerning freedom of the will. The dual *affectiones*, then, provide a basic structure for the moral situation as Scotus sees it: the tendency to realize the potential of a rational agent's intellectual nature must be transcended by considerations of *justitia*. The implicit criticism of an Aristotelian eudaimonist ethics is discussed.

Scotus and the Moral Order, MARY ELIZABETH INGHAM

This article considers ethical aspects of Scotist thought within the context of a rational will, that is, one capable of selfless love for the highest good. Scotus's discussion of moral living includes the will's natural affection for justice, the basic freedom internal to willing, the will's rationality, the role of virtue, and the primacy of love. Rather than offer new insights into Scotus's ethical thinking, the presentation brings together and integrates significant ethical elements into a comprehensive discussion of the nature of moral living as relational, according to the thirteenth-century Franciscan. By way of a concluding reflection, implications of this moral vision are discussed, particularly as they relate to contemporary issues of interpersonal, social, political, and environmental import.

Duns Scotus's Doctrine on Universals and the Aphrodisian Tradition, MARTIN M. TWEEDALE

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Vol. 30, No. 4, October 1993

Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology, KIHYEON KIM

The distinction between internalism and externalism has been one of the most widely used distinctions in current epistemology, one that has been applied both to accounts of epistemic justification and to accounts of knowledge. The main goal of this paper is to show that there are three components of epistemic justification and that the internalism-externalism distinction can be made on three corresponding dimensions. First, introspectibility is presented as the proper epistemological criterion for the internal. Second, three components of epistemic justification are extracted and the corresponding three different versions of internalism and externalism are presented as the result of applying the introspectibility criterion to the three components. Finally, this discussion shows that most confusions over internalism and externalism arise from conflating the three dimensions.

Is Philosophy of Language Really Important for the Foundation of Scientific Realism? MICHELE MARSONET

In this paper it is argued that some ideas contained in Quine's works play an important role in the antirealist stance currently flourishing in philosophy of science. Quine's views on the language-world relationship are shown to be based on the Fregean paradigm which, identifying existence and logical quantification, offers no solution to ontological problems. The paper argues that the linguistic turn has had a negative effect on philosophy of science, claiming that reality is what we are able to express within our language, many philosophers of science have broken any bridge with practicing scientists. Our language plays a role in the process of scientific enterprise which is not as important as the linguistically oriented philosophers of science believe. Language is in most of the analytic tradition an extremely powerful and a priori factor. We have thus a sort of linguistic idealism which may be overcome by taking into account what practicing scientists actually do.

Forgiveness and the Intrinsic Value of Persons, MARGARET R. HOLMGREN

This article develops a position on forgiveness based on the Kantian claim that all persons are of equal intrinsic worth. It argues that the injured person must often work through a process of responding to the wrongdoing in order to reach a state of genuine forgiveness, that this process is central to her self-respect, and that inappropriate instances of forgiveness may occur if she attempts to forgive her offender before this process is complete. It then argues that once this process is complete, forgiveness is always appropriate and desirable from a moral point of view, regardless of whether the wrongdoer repents and regardless of what she has done or suffered. Genuine forgiveness is always compatible with (and ultimately required by) self-respect, respect for morality, and respect for the wrongdoer as a moral agent. Thus the person who habitually works towards a state of genuine forgiveness exhibits an important virtue.

Varieties of Aesthetic Naturalism, DAVID E. W. FENNER

It is simplistic to describe naturalism—be it epistemological, ethical or aesthetic—as a single position. It follows, therefore, that to attack one camp of naturalism, no matter how successfully, is not fully to attack naturalism as a project or a methodology. This paper attempts to draw some dividing lines between various kinds of aesthetic naturalism. Five kinds are identified: conservativist, nonreductionist, apriorist, modest aposteriorist, and hard naturalist. After some consideration of the five, it is argued that the most tenable sort of aesthetic naturalism is modest aposteriorist. Aposteriorist naturalism avoids any excesses an a priori move might incur, stays true to the empiricist spirit of naturalism, and is in the final analysis more explanatorily economical.

Belief and the Basis of Humor, HUGH LAFOLLETTE and NIAL SHANKS

Humor is a pervasive feature of human life and crosses racial, cultural, sexual, and class divisions. Its nature is elusive, however. This elusiveness should have piqued the philosophical imagination, its pervasiveness should have demonstrated its philosophical importance. Humor, however, has generated relatively little theoretical interest. We find that surprising. We offer an analysis of humor which is true to the phenomenon. Moreover, our account takes humor from the sidelines of philosophy and places it on the playing field with ideas current in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and ethics.

Truth-conditions and Contradiction, DOUGLAS ODEGARD

Applying truth-conditions to sentences about the world seems to generate paradoxes unless the truth-conditions are restricted. Nevertheless, we can avoid contradictions without having to restrict truth-conditions if we refuse to apply logical laws to sentences the truth-values of which cannot possibly be established by applying truth-conditions. The refusal is reasonable, since the point of logic is to help us make justified truth claims. The basis for the refusal allows us to avoid a surprisingly wide spectrum of contradictions, without excluding more than we want.

Supererogation and Doing the Best One Can, MICHAEL J ZIMMERMAN

It is commonly thought that any theory according to which what one ought to do is the best that one can do implies by its very nature that supererogatory acts are impossible. This article shows that this is not so and argues that such a theory is in fact no worse off than any other theory with respect to accounting for supererogation.

Logical Dimensions of Question-begging Argument, DALE JACQUETTE

The formalization of necessary and sufficient conditions for circular or question-begging reasoning cannot be given in conventional propositional logic. The difficulties encountered in the attempt, including the formal deductive validity of circular inference, have convinced some philosophers that circularity is therefore at most an informal or rhetorical fallacy, rather than a logical fallacy. An alternative formal analysis of question-begging argument is proposed in an epistemic-doxastic logic with a relevance propositional substructure. The system formalizes circularity as a genuine logical fallacy, involving an incorrect directionality of inference, as opposed to the correct directionality of noncircular or non-question-begging argument. The analysis answers Sextus Empiricus's and J. S. Mill's objections that all deductively valid inferences are circular by providing a definition of circularity according to

which only some but not all valid inferences are circular. The proposal eliminates the need to distinguish between circular and viciously circular arguments, and formally interprets so-called equivalence models of circularity as special limiting cases of epistemic dependence models.

AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

Vol 71, No 2, June 1993

Resolving Epistemic Dilemmas, DOUGLAS ODEGARD

There are cases in which our evidence for holding a belief changes when the belief is adopted such that, whereas initially we have adequate evidence for holding the belief, we cease to have adequate evidence upon adopting it. According to Richard Foley, we are in an epistemic dilemma: we should neither deny the belief nor adopt it nor withhold judgment on it. The dilemma is best resolved by noting that we have two epistemic goals and that one goal is prior to the other.

Skeptical Hypotheses and "Omniscient" Interpreters, STEVEN L REYNOLDS

Donald Davidson's omniscient interpreter argument is defended against objections by Richard Fumerton and Richard Foley, Colin McGinn, and Bruce Vermazen.

INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

Vol 33, No 2, June 1993

Derrida and Mādhyamika Buddhism. From Linguistic Deconstruction to Criticism of Onto-theologies, CAI ZONG-QI

This paper explores four important parallels in the Derridean and Mādhyamika theories. First, both Derrida and the Mādhyamika thinkers develop deconstructive theories of meaning based on the similar ideas of *différance* and *differentiam*, and seek to nullify the logos and the name of Non-Existence reified by the Western idealists and Buddhist Essentialists. Second, they both apply the same theories of meaning to deconstruct the Matter and Existence reified by the Western materialists and Buddhist Realists. Third, they both conceive of their double negation as an exercise of *neither/nor* logic and set forth their deconstructive formulas in similar terms of *tetrapharmakon* and tetralemma (*catuskoti*). Fourth, they both abolish their

own *tetralpharmakon* and tetralemma and embark on their self-deconstructive course along an aimless "supernumerary" and along a linear "hexalemma." While discussing these four parallels in the following sections, this paper also pinpoints the fundamental differences between the Derridean and the Mādhyamika theories, and considers how these two deconstructive traditions lead to the end of philosophy

INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Vol 33, No 3, September 1993

Hegel, Idealism, and Robert Pippin, KENNETH R. WESTPHAL

In *Hegel's Idealism*, Robert Pippin contends that Hegel develops an improved version of Fichte's idealism. Pippin's key to their idealism is the thesis that there are conditions presupposed by self-conscious judgments about objects. Emphasizing this thesis led later German idealists to dismiss Kant's doctrine that space and time are a priori forms of intuition and to develop views of the autonomy of human reason in terms of thought's self-determination. Five of my main criticisms of Pippin's interpretation are as follows: (1) Only certain kinds of such conditions entail idealism, (2) Hegel's "autonomy of thought" does not primarily concern human thinking, (3) Hegel's unique sense of "idealism" does not contrast with "realism" (as Pippin assumes), (4) Pippin's pivotal interpretation, "Force and Understanding," is not supported by Hegel's own examples; (5) Hegel's frequent use in his *Logics* of contingent empirical categories is central to Hegel's idealism, which is deeply naturalistic and expressly based on empirical science.

Pippin on Hegel's Critique of Kant, SALLY S. SEDGWICK

In the early chapters of his book *Hegel's Idealism*, Robert Pippin supports Hegel's claim that objective idealism is the "completion" or "extension" of an insight first discovered but inadequately developed and appreciated by Kant. Implicit in the very idea of the transcendental unity of apperception as it is presented in the Transcendental Deduction of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Hegel argues, is the key to a form of idealism which resolves the contradictions and dualisms of the Critical philosophy. The author of this paper argues that while Pippin's representation of Hegel's conception of his relation to Kant is accurate, Pippin does not demonstrate that objective idealism is the proper conclusion to draw from Kant's insight about the transcendently apperceptive nature of human consciousness.

Thomas Aquinas' Double Metaphysics of Simplicity and Infinity,
EILEEN C. SWEENEY

The article contends that Aquinas defines and uses simplicity and infinity in two distinct and almost opposite senses, which are drawn from different

metaphysical perspectives, one Aristotelian, the other Neoplatonic. Aquinas retains these two metaphysical perspectives without synthesizing them, the article maintains, in an effort to mirror both the complexity of the reality he is attempting to portray and the inadequacy of the human intellect to grasp it through just one of the perspectives those notions delineate. This results in not a single but a complex and double metaphysics.

Defensible Anarchy? HOWARD H. HARRIOTT

Anarchism is often thought of as an indefensible philosophy of politics. In this article a detailed sketch of a position which can be strongly made on behalf of the anarchist is presented. It is shown that critics of anarchism have simply ignored the strength of the anarchist's moral case against government. Part of this demonstration makes use of recent developments in social choice theory and game theory, analytic tools of the social sciences which have often been thought to provide a convincing demonstration of the democratic state. These very tools are shown to help to provide support for anarchist claims *against* the state. It is then argued that a positive case can be made for the anarchist construal of the possibilities of human nature and for the real possibility of an anarchic community. Part of the argument relies on support provided by recent studies in altruism.

What-Being: Chuang Tzu versus Aristotle, CHENYANG LI

The article attempts to show how Chuang Tzu's metaphysics is a plausible alternative to Aristotelian metaphysics. First, whereas Aristotle maintains that every primary substance is a definite *this-and-such*, Chuang Tzu believes that an object is both a *this* and a *that*. An ox is an ox, but also a pack of flesh and bones. Second, because of this diversity of being, Chuang Tzu does not believe that there is a single objectively correct answer to the question of what an object is primarily. It is correct to say that the object is primarily an ox, it is also correct to say that it is primarily a pack of flesh and bones, depending on the perspective we use. Third, because an object can be both a *this* and a *that*, Chuang Tzu suggests that an object can survive a substance sortal concept change.

Hegel's Original Insight, ROBERT B. PIPPIN

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Quine, Underdetermination, and Scepticism, LARS BERGSTRÖM

The underdetermination thesis says that different theories may be equally supported by all possible evidence. This paper provides an improved

version of the thesis and asks whether or not it is true. It may well be true, but there is not much support for it. W. V. Quine has vacillated between various responses to the thesis. One of these, also endorsed by Donald Davidson, is that equally supported theories should be regarded as true or false together. This claim is disputed. Another response is that one's own theory is true and equally supported theories false or meaningless. This is not quite satisfactory either. It is shown that Quine's underdetermination thesis leads to a kind of skepticism. This might be accepted by many people, but presumably not by Quine. It is shown that the arguments that might be adduced against it, from the point of view of Quine's naturalism, are not convincing.

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 90, No. 8, August 1993

Is It Rational To Be Polite? MARK KINGWELL

This paper assesses the rationality of polite speech by drawing on sociolinguistic accounts of such speech influenced by Erving Goffman and H. P. Grice. These accounts suggest that full-time commitment to a "perfectly rational speech" of bald on-record statements is, in fact, irrational. This conclusion in turn suggests that normative theories based on communicative competence, like Jürgen Habermas's, will have to be revised in light of our rational anticipations of politeness. Such a revision gives rise to something we can call "civil discourse ethics."

Who Can Accept Moral Dilemmas? RAGNAR OHLSSON

The article discusses the presuppositions connected with the acceptance or denial of the possibility of moral dilemmas. The arguments of the debate have not conclusively shown either that moral dilemmas are possible or that they are not possible. Three ideas about moral systems seem to rule moral dilemmas out: the Kantian conception of ethics as descriptive laws of the behavior of rational persons, the modern view of ethical statements as descriptions of ideal worlds, and the conception of ethics as a device for giving advice to agents. Emotivist or prescriptivist metaethical convictions make the idea of moral dilemmas less interesting. The conclusion is that a moral realist would be most prone to accept that there are real moral dilemmas. He cannot, however, take moral statements to be descriptions of the behavior of rational persons or descriptions of ideal worlds, but rather of moral attributes to be discovered in our world.

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
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Cogito Ergo Sum, JIM STONE

This article exploits the idea of an "attitude-constituted" proposition to develop a noninferential reading of the cogito. A proposition *p* is *attitude-constituted* for *S* just in case *S*'s standing in a propositional attitude to any proposition is sufficient to constitute the fact that *p*. For instance, the fact that *S* is thinking now need be nothing more than the fact that *S* is hoping it will rain. "I think" and "I am" are incorrigible and indubitable for *S* because they are attitude-constituted. In the context of Descartes' program of radical doubt, "I am thinking, therefore I am" means "My thinking this very thought constitutes the fact of my existence." As the only facts left to constitute my existence are about my thinking, it follows that I am a thing constituted by the fact of its thinking. "Sum res cogitans" follows directly from the cogito.

An Inquiry Into Religion's Empty World, T. R. MARTLAND

Religion's assertions and actions are to reality as geometry's axioms and postulates are to reality: they contribute tools and techniques that make that reality possible and understandable. The argument proceeds: Religion is cognizant of old world responsibilities and needs, but it acts irresponsibly toward them by contributing tools and techniques that make a new reality possible. Its work is not performed by individuals who are necessarily "holy" according to the old reality, or even according to the new reality they are entering. Rather, they come into that identity as they perform their religious deeds and contribute to that new reality. The article concludes that this "coming into" is religion's one directive: Let go of all content, including this one. This act is the new reality. It is done "thus" day, now, and is worthy of being honored. Why? Because by so doing, emptiness is now.

Higher Goods and the Myth of Tithonus, NOAH M. LEMOS

This essay explicates and defends the view that some goods are "higher" than others. The first section explains what such goods would be and considers some examples that tend to support their existence. The existence of such goods has been accepted by Franz Brentano and W. D. Ross and, perhaps, Aristotle and John Stuart Mill. The second section considers an important objection to the existence of higher goods, one that arises if we reject certain extravagant claims that some of their defenders have made about them. Even if such claims are false, the existence of higher order goods can be defended. The final section argues that if we accept the existence of higher goods, then we should reject some assumptions that some philosophers have made about intrinsic value.

Putnam and the Relativist Menace, RICHARD RORTY

JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
Vol 31, No 3, July 1993

Consciousness and Self-Knowledge in Aquinas's Critique of Averroes's Psychology, DEBORAH L. BLACK

This article examines Aquinas's arguments against Averroes's doctrine of the unicity of the human intellect which are based upon appeals to intellectual self-awareness. It contends that despite the intuitive appeal of Aquinas's criticisms, they are not successful within the Aristotelian psychological framework which Averroes and Aquinas share. Aquinas's appeals to consciousness are inconclusive when understood within the context of his own acceptance of Aristotle's view that consciousness of intellection as such is derivative and indirect. Averroes can account for human consciousness of thinking through his development of the Aristotelian principle that all intellectual activity is dependent upon the concomitant use of the imagination—a principle that Aquinas too upholds. The article concludes with an examination of the differences between Averroes's and Aquinas's views of the imagination, and it suggests that these differences may account for Aquinas's tendency to overlook the repercussions of the doctrines under consideration for his arguments against Averroes.

JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
Vol 31, No 4, October 1993

Animal Souls, Metempsychosis, and Theodicy in Seventeenth-Century English Thought, PETER HARRISON

This paper gives an account of early modern discussions about the nature of animals. A central issue for seventeenth-century thinkers was whether animals had souls, the soul traditionally having been regarded as the source of life, sensation, and thought in animate beings. A variety of seventeenth-century positions with regard to this question are outlined beginning with the influential, if controversial, Cartesian view, according to which animals have no souls, and moving on to the equally novel views of the English Platonists and their circle. A governing principle in all of these discussions was the justice of God, for some account had to be given of why innocent creatures were made such that they were capable of suffering. The concern of early modern thinkers with theodicy thus determined the direction of their speculations about the interior operations of animals, and accounts for their entertainment of notions which appear to contemporary minds to be rather counterintuitive.

Ignoring the Demon? Spinoza's Way With Doubt, RICHARD V. MASON

Spinoza's attitude toward Cartesian doubt has often seemed dogmatic, that is, wholly insensitive to the force of the *First Meditation*. This paper argues that he had access to a workable response. Spinoza was uninterested in doubt about sense perception, except as reinforcement for his scorn toward empiricism. Because such doubt could be put in its place, doubt about rational judgment might become the real issue. (Because rational judgment was safe, doubts about sense-perception did not matter.) Descartes had to resort to an extranatural device—his demon—to make extreme doubt plausible, since it could not be represented coherently within the order of nature. Doubt about rationality was not available for Spinoza—nor, he might argue, should it have been available for Descartes—because the type of possibility within which it could apparently be constructed was not genuine. Worry about only imagined possibilities was without content, pointless.

Some Aspects of the Philosophy of Catherine Trotter, MARTHA BRANDT BOLTON

Catharine Trotter (1679–1749), married name “Cockburn,” has not been entirely overlooked in the history of philosophy, because important figures of the time noted her able defense of John Locke against Thomas Burnet's charges of advocating a moral theory based on theistic voluntarism. She also wrote other treatises which she described as defenses of the moral theory of Samuel Clarke. The fact that she wrote in this genre (defenses of prominent philosophers against opponents now marginal) raises several questions. To what extent did she arrive at the views she defends independently? What is the nature of her own philosophical thought? What purpose did she have in writing against the field of opponents she chose? These questions are addressed mainly by discussing a theme that runs through much of her work: opposition to a succession of theories of motivation that ignore the nature of actions and, in one way or another, base motive on self-interest alone.

Hume, Conjectural History and the Uniformity of Human Nature, SIMON J. EVNINE

Dugald Stewart characterized the method of conjectural history and associated it with the belief in the uniformity of human nature. This article discusses whether Hume believes in the uniformity of human nature. It then goes on to examine two instances of conjectural history in Hume, the argument from the *Natural History of Religion* to establish that polytheism precedes monotheism, and the discussion of the origins of justice and civil society, and attempts to show that Hume presupposes some conception of the development of the human mind. Hume is contrasted with Locke, whose views on these subjects do not imply a historical development of the mind.

The Role of Scepticism in Modern Philosophy Reconsidered,
RICHARD H. POPKIN

MIND
Vol 102, No 406, April 1993

Parsons on Mathematical Intuition, JAMES PAGE

Charles Parsons has argued that we have the ability to apprehend, or "intuit," certain kinds of abstract objects, that among the objects we can intuit are some which form a model for arithmetic, and that our knowledge that the axioms of arithmetic are true in this model involves our intuition of these objects. Although it is reasonable to suppose that we can intuit many objects in the way Parsons describes, there is a problem with his claim that we know this model is infinite through intuition. Unless this problem can be resolved, it is questionable whether our knowledge that the arithmetical axioms are true can reasonably be called intuitive in the way Parsons intends.

Social Relations and the Individuation of Thought, MICHAEL V
ANTONY

Tyler Burge has argued that a necessary condition for an individual's having many of the thoughts he has is that he bear certain social relations to other language users. Burge's conclusion is based on a thought experiment in which an individual's social relations (and only those relations) are imagined, counterfactually, to differ from the way they are actually. The result is that it seems, counterfactually, that one cannot attribute to the individual many of the thoughts he can be attributed actually. In the article, an alternative interpretation of Burge's thought experiment is offered on which the intuitions Burge evokes can be accepted while his conclusion about the social character of thought must be denied. On the alternative account, the same thoughts are attributable to the individual across both actual and counterfactual situations. The alternative interpretation given, it is then argued that it is preferable to Burge's.

Conscious Experience, FRED DRETSKE

A near-orthodox view about conscious mental events is that what makes them conscious is the agent's consciousness of them. If one is not conscious of having an experience, belief, or desire, then the experience, belief, or desire is not conscious. By distinguishing between awareness of objects and events (thing-awareness) on the one hand, and awareness of facts (fact-awareness) on the other, it is argued that there can be conscious states in a person of which that person is not conscious. What makes these states conscious,

therefore, cannot be our consciousness of them. It is concluded that conscious experiences are not states of which the person (in whom they occur) is conscious, but rather, states that make the person in whom they occur conscious of something (else)—typically, in the case of sense perception, external objects or events

On Some Difficulties Concerning Intuition and Intuitive Knowledge, CHARLES PARSONS

The Conceptual Contingency of Mathematical Objects, HARTRY FIELD

THE MONIST

Vol 76, No 1, January 1993

Wise Maxims/Wise Judging, NANCY SHERMAN

One of the reasons often cited for the renewed interest in Aristotelian virtue theory is its alleged sensitivity to the particular case. In place of an emphasis on rules and procedures is attention to the variety of individual cases, and a reminder of the shortfalls of misplaced rigor. The argument of this essay is that a similar concern can be found in Kantian ethics, especially in the case of imperfect duties, or duties of virtue. In these cases there is considerable discretionary room for sensitivity to context and occasion. Even so, Kantian ethics is distinct from Aristotelian ethics in basing moral estimability on motive, independent of actualization in the world. Although there is a retreat inward in the Kantian account of virtue, the motive of duty must itself be seen as informing moral perception and judgment, and influencing the cultivation of character in terms of affect and habit. In this regard, Kantian and Aristotelian virtue both care about the actualized character.

THE MONIST

Vol 76, No 2, April 1993

My Own Death, PIERS BENN

The article is concerned with whether it is possible to conceive of one's own death, and in particular with why this has so often seemed problematic. It exposes a fallacy in Freud's argument that one's own death is inconceivable, but concedes that from a first-person perspective there is a difficulty, which is best understood with reference to Thomas Nagel's treatment of "particular subjectivity." The analogy between Nagel's views on this, and similar issues

to do with time and tense, is investigated. It is suggested that a token-reflexive account of both kinds of problem should be accepted, but that nevertheless the opposite view is not merely confused or insubstantial. Drawing on such thoughts, the existentialist conviction that one's own death is mysterious is sympathetically diagnosed and explained, although not endorsed.

NOUS

Vol 27, No 3, September 1993

Seeing That and Seeing As, IGAL KVART

In this paper an analysis of a variety of perceptual constructions is offered. The seeing-that construction is taken as the basic construction, and is analyzed in terms of visual images and the concepts of knowledge and being a cause. A reduction of the seeing-as construction to the seeing-that construction is then proposed. The analysis is contrasted with Dretske's

Modal Realism and Inductive Skepticism, HOLLY GAIL THOMAS

This paper argues that acceptance of David Lewis's modal realism makes skepticism with respect to induction unavoidable, and that this is grounds for rejecting modal realism. In response to previous attempts to raise such an objection, Lewis has suggested (1) that any argument that the modal realist cannot reasonably trust induction will, when properly understood, turn out to be an argument that *no one* can reasonably trust induction, and (2) that the argument depends on the illicit assumption that all the modal realist's so-called possible worlds are really *actual*. This paper is an attempt to formulate the objection so as to make it clear, first, that the argument that the modal realist cannot reasonably trust induction depends on beliefs that are peculiar to the modal realist, and second, that it does *not* depend on the assumption that all the modal realist's so-called possible worlds are really actual.

Quaka, Awareness, and Sellars, STEPHEN LEEDS

Questionable Objectivity, ARTHUR RIPSTEIN

THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Vol 43, No 173, October 1993

Conditionals of Freedom and Middle Knowledge, RICHARD GASKIN

The doctrine of middle knowledge, developed by the Spanish Jesuits Luis de Molina and Francisco Suarez in the late sixteenth Century, claims that God can know the truth-values of subjunctive conditionals recording what agents would freely do if placed in any hypothetical circumstance ("conditionals of freedom") The article argues that the doctrine can rebut the charges of incoherence levelled at it by a number of recent writers, including Kenny and Hasker These writers argue either that there are no true conditionals of freedom, or that the truth of such conditionals cannot be logically prior to God's decisions in the creation situation The article argues that the objections either misunderstand the way in which possible-worlds semantics apply to the thesis that God has middle knowledge, or rest on an implausible correspondence theory of truth Furthermore, acceptance of the possibility of barely true subjective conditionals of freedom requires us to reject Lewis's proposed semantics for "would" and "might" conditionals Unless we are fatalists, however, those semantics should be rejected anyway Finally, the possibility of God's knowledge of subjunctive conditionals of freedom requires abandonment of the approach to the semantics of subjunctive conditionals in terms of comparative similarity of possible worlds, canvassed by Stalnaker and Lewis

The Logical Grammar of the Transcendentals, D. P. HENRY

Much of scholastic and contemporary exact philosophy constitute two facets of a single conversation Linguistic analysis in many of its details, logical and universal grammar, universals theory (comprising abundant mereology), along with the pervasive and basic notion of functorial incompleteness, were all at times presented most competently Logical varieties of present-day functorial counterparts of *ens*, being (that is "ing" for *ens ut participium*, being taken participially, and "er" for *ens ut nomen*, being taken nominally) are hence precisely relevant, and yield exact reproductions of the distinction between *esse essentiae* (being at the quidditative level) and *esse existentiae* (concrete being) On this basis the various contrasting categorial levels to which Aquinas (for example) assigns *ens*, *unum*, *verum*, and *bonum* in question 21 of his *De veritate* are easily identified and relativized to present-day logical metaphysics

The Possibility of Created Entities in Seventeenth-Century Scotism, JEFFREY S. COOMBS

How does the nonactual first child of the Subtle Doctor, call her Dunsina, differ from the nonactual round-square? The difference between the two is

that one is possible and the other impossible. During the seventeenth century there was much debate about the distinction as philosophers sought to construct ontologies to support it. In this paper I present the views of two Scotists, the Irishman John Punch (1603–72/3), and the Italian Bartholomew Mastrius (1602–73), both Franciscans. John Punch was famous for proposing that there is a type of being called “diminished being” which all possible beings possess independently of any divine creative act and which distinguishes the possibles from the impossibles. Mastrius attacked Punch’s view because it introduced a type of being which was neither God nor created by God. Mastrius proposed instead that possible beings have a “real possibility,” which is generated by God’s thought about creation.

Ontological Priority and John Duns Scotus, MICHAEL M. GORMAN

The two most important ways in which the expression “ontological priority” has been used in recent literature are to indicate a dependence relation and to indicate a degrees-of-being relation. These two uses are in themselves irreconcilable, and there are no good reasons for favoring one over the other. They can both, however, be brought under a higher, more inclusive concept of ontological priority that is based on Duns Scotus’s notion of essential order. The essay attempts to give a precise formulation of such an understanding of ontological priority. The result is membership criteria for the class of “ontological priority relations.”

Leibniz’ Theory of Space. A Reconstruction, EDWARD J. KHAMARA

The article offers an interpretation of Leibniz’s relative theory of space which, while denying the possibility of a spatial world containing no material objects at all, allows for the possibility of unoccupied places and preserves both the continuity of space and its infinite extent. The author concludes that Leibniz’s theory is subtler and more interesting than it is commonly taken to be, and is not open to some of the allegedly serious objections that are currently held against it.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW
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Executions, Motivations, and Accomplishments, DAVID ISRAEL,
JOHN PERRY, and SYUN TUTIYA

The article assumes that some complexes of cognitions motivate acts. This requires that the complexes cause the acts in the appropriate way, and also that they *rationalize* the acts. This article tries to provide a sufficient condition for rationalization. The basic idea is very simple. One of the

cognitions must be a desire that a certain result be accomplished. The content of the beliefs, perceptions and other doxastic cognitions must be (1) such that the type of act performed is a way of accomplishing that outcome, under certain circumstances, and (2) such that those circumstances obtain. (The article does not attempt to say under what conditions a complex of cognitions causes an act in the right way to motivate.) Although the basic idea is simple, the details are complicated and, it is hoped, interesting. In order to state its sufficient condition the argument distinguishes among acts, actions and movements. Actions are divided into executions and accomplishments. The distinction between cognitions and their contents is emphasized.

Persons, Compensation, and Utilitarianism, DIANE JESKE

In *Reasons and Persons* Derek Parfit has argued that we should accept a psychological reductionist, rather than a Cartesian or non-reductionist, criterion of personal identity. He claims that acceptance of psychological reductionism commits us to the view that our identity is not what matters in our survival, and that this implication of psychological reductionism should lead us to find the separateness-of-persons objection to utilitarianism less compelling. Parfit concludes that psychological reductionism lends plausibility to a utilitarian moral theory. Parfit's arguments to show that psychological reductionism lends plausibility to utilitarianism are not successful. Psychological reductionism should lead us to reject the separateness-of-persons objection in its strongest form, but it should not lead us to see all distinctions between persons as morally insignificant. Psychological reductionism, in fact, can be used to support and motivate the commonsense claim that we have special duties and obligations to our intimates.

Content, Kinds, and Individualism in Marr's Theory of Vision,
LAWRENCE SHAPIRO

Content Preservation, TYLER BURGE

PHILOSOPHY

Vol 68, No 266, October 1993

A Curious Plural, T. S. CHAMPLIN

"Who were Eric Blair and George Orwell?—They were the same person." Who or what are the "*they*" here? Not two people, because there was only one person who went under two names, and not two names, because it makes no sense to say that two names were the same person. Eleven answers, including solutions deriving from Frege on sense and meaning, and

from Leibniz's Law, intentional objects, mental representations, and trans-world identities, are examined and rejected. I distinguish between pointing (1) at someone in the flesh, (2) at his name displayed in a list of names of people, and (3) at him in a publicly displayed list of people. Only this third possibility, which permits certain misunderstandings, makes "They were the same person" intelligible as an identity statement. The "they" in the above answer are the two people, Orwell and Blair, at whom we can point in the above question.

A Mind of One's Own, J. R. LUCAS

The necessary uniqueness of personal identity is to be grounded in decision-making, not bodily continuity. It is only contingently the case that bodies do not divide like amoebae. We could envisage someone, Tweedle, dividing into Tweedledum and Tweedledee: the crucial test then would be whether they could quarrel or not. If they could, they would be two individuals, if not, only one, though with two bodies. Since in applying this test we are already considering all possible decisions, there is no further possibility of replication, with two qualitatively identical but numerically distinct individuals apparently being one and the same former person. Either they are a single person, though with two bodies, being of one mind on every possible decision, or there is a difference which could, in principle, determine which of them was the former person.

Stroud's Dream-Argument Critique, JOHN O. NELSON

This article employs two strategies to show that Stroud's tentative conclusion in *The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism* is untenable. Appealing to the technically defined notions of *monologue* and *dialogue*, the first argues that it is incoherent for a philosopher to aver in print that he may, for all he knows, be in bed asleep dreaming (Stroud's reluctant conclusion). The second argues, on the basis of *monologue's* past dependency on *dialogue*, that Stroud's "I may be in bed asleep dreaming" contains *per se* a hidden impossibility. The conclusion to be drawn, then—dialogue being the actual foundation of knowledge—is that the basic feature of human knowledge that Stroud aimed to uncover but failed to is the condition of intersubjectivity.

Science, Nature and Ideology, GUY ROBINSON

Descartes took a central part in the seventeenth century's great secularizing project, namely, the transforming the concept of nature so it would take over the role that Scholasticism had given God. He went to extraordinary lengths to establish nature as a transcendental explanatory principle—denying ordinary notions of continuity and change, picturing ordinary things as continually disappearing *in nihilum* and needing an external cause to be continually "created anew." He was thus helping to prepare the modern conception of nature as standing, like God, over and above and outside the

things and happenings of the world, causing and governing change. This picture is contrasted with Aristotle's conception of *physis* as an *internal* principle of change and persistence. The notion of a disappearance *in nihilum* which Descartes conjures up, requiring a transcendental defense, is shown to be incoherent and in conflict with the conservation principles that were foundational for the new physics.

The Need for Ontology: Some Choices, C. B. MARTIN

The first part of the paper sets out ontologies amongst which some forms of antirealism must select. The argument is that the choice between the varieties of antirealism and realism is *inevitably* a choice between ontologies. The second part (beginning with Part IV) attempts to provide an ontology for realism.

Patience and Courage, EAMONN CALLAN

Ordinary morality and contemporary moral philosophy accord an exalted place to courage among the virtues of self-control. Patience is assigned to the margins of ethics. That comparative assessment of courage and patience is shown to be seriously mistaken. An adequate understanding of the variety of ethical challenges our lives pose shows patience to be as central as courage. Furthermore, contrary to Amélie Rorty's view of courage as a source of moral conflict with other virtues, the roles of courage and patience can be understood in a way that reveals their harmony in the good life.

PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

Vol. 53, No. 3, September 1993

Indeterminism and Free Agency: Three Recent Views, TIMOTHY O'CONNOR

This paper examines three creative recent attempts to provide an indeterministic account of the metaphysics of free agency. The first, by Carl Ginet, is a variety of "simple indeterminism" according to which the initiation of free behavior need not involve any element of causal production. The other two (advanced by Robert Nozick and Robert Kane) are species of "causal indeterminism," the general view that free action is caused, but not necessitated, by reasons. In criticizing these approaches, the author tries to show that they fail for fundamental reasons. The criticisms offered, if sound, provide grounds for supposing that any theory of the two broad types cannot succeed. The author suggests by way of conclusion, that the incompatibilist who believes that human agents *do* sometimes freely act is committed to the successful formulation of the theory of agent causation, the only remaining indeterministic alternative.

Epistemic Desiderata, WILLIAM P. ALSTON

There are seemingly endless disputes over alleged necessary conditions for the justification of belief. Prominent examples concern whether it is necessary that the belief be *based on* adequate evidence, whether justifiers must be accessible just on reflection, and whether what justifies a belief must make it likely to be true. All parties to such disputes recognize the epistemic desirability of these conditions. Perhaps it is a mistake to suppose that there is some common target called "epistemic justification," the necessary conditions for which are being debated. There are various facts best explained by this supposition, such as our inability to give a theoretically neutral indication of the item in question. If we give up the belief in a single objective "epistemic justification," we can reconceive that part of epistemology as a study of various *epistemic desiderata*, their nature, viability, and relative importance for various interests and purposes. This approach is exemplified by a brief discussion of the internalism-externalism contrast.

The Gestalt Controversy: The Development of Objects of Higher Order in Meinong's Ontology, DENNIS SWEET

To show how Alexius Meinong's ontology developed from the stark simplicity of the "Hume Studies" to the rich complexity of his mature thought, I trace the evolution of his ontological analysis of phenomenological complexes in light of his reactions to the views of Ernst Mach, Christian von Ehrenfels, Hans Cornelius, and Kasimur Twardowski. Through the influences of these writers, Meinong was compelled to radically modify his ontology in two ways. First, he was led to develop a unique variety of reism that acknowledged ontological heterogeneity among the objects of experience. Second, he was led to abandon his earlier commitment to structural idealism, and to endorse the view of perceptual realism. With these modifications, Meinong was able to introduce "objects of higher order" into his ontology, the introduction of which opened the door for the development of the other elements in his vast and varied categorial inventory.

Sunburn: Independence Conditions on Causal Relevance, ANTHONY DARDIS

Causally committed properties are properties which require that their instances have a cause (or an effect) of a certain kind. Sunburn, for instance, must be caused by the sun. Causal relevance is a contingent dependency relation between properties of events. The connection between a causally committed property and the property to which it is committed is not contingent. Hence a pair consisting of a causally committed property and the property to which it is committed should not be in the causal relevance relation. I formulate conditions on the causal relevance relation designed to rule out causally committed properties. These conditions entail that being a propositional attitude is not causally relevant to being an action. Nevertheless, reasons can cause actions.

A Coherence Theory of Autonomy, LAURA WADDELL EKSTROM

This paper presents a conception of "the self" in part in terms of a particular notion of preference and develops a coherentist account of when one's preferences are authorized, or sanctioned as one's own. It then proposes a coherence theory of autonomous (or self-determined) action and, analogously, a coherence theory of what it is to have a self-determined will. The basic idea of the paper is that one acts autonomously only when one acts on a preference that coheres with the desires and beliefs that one is able to defend as being true beliefs and good desires. In acting upon a preference that does not cohere with what one takes to be good and true one acts in a way that frustrates, rather than expresses, one's core self. The view presented solves certain problems with hierarchical accounts of freedom such as Frankfurt's.

Arousal and the Ends of Desire, ROCKNEY JACOBSEN

The problem of characterizing a distinctive class of sexual desires arises from the effort to accommodate two troublesome ideas: first, the polymorphous nature of sexual perversion suggests that any activity whatsoever can be the object of a sexual desire; second, any activity which can be sexually desired can also be the object of nonsexual desire. Both ideas can be accommodated only by giving up the widespread assumption that distinctions among kinds of desire must derive from prior type-distinctions among their objects. This assumption is challenged, and an alternative taxonomic strategy for sorting desires is defended. The new strategy is implemented to define sexual desire by way of a distinction between states of sexual arousal and sexual desire.

 PHRONESIS

Vol 38, No 1, 1993

The Virtues of Thrasymachus, T. D. J. CHAPPELL

In Plato's *Republic* 1 the Sophist Thrasymachus's statement of an alternative view about justice sets the challenge which *Republic* 2–10 must answer. If his view of justice is not interesting, plausible, or coherent, it is not clear why moral philosophers should bother with the *Republic* at all. But what *is* Thrasymachus's view? *Inter alia*, he has been seen as a Nietzschean conservative, as a revolutionary, as someone who thinks justice a vice and injustice a virtue, and as just being confused. I argue, against all these interpretations, that Thrasymachus's view is that justice is something which the man of practical wisdom will use to hoodwink others into serving his own ends. Thrasymachus has—interestingly enough—his own coherent view of the good life, and from this there follow views about the structure of practical reasoning and about which characteristics are virtues and which vices. But

for him, the discussion of justice is rather peripheral to all this, since he holds that justice is neither a virtue nor a vice, but merely a device

Aristotelian Rainfall or the Lore of Averages, ROBERT WARDY

This article argues, against exponents of cosmic and anthropocentric readings of Aristotle, that his teleology is limited to individual natural kinds. The notorious rainfall example in *Physics* 2.8 is to be understood as attributing a goal to the rain, but that purpose is water's return to its natural place, not crop growth. *Politics* 1.8 does assert that plants exist for the sake of animals, the other animals for the sake of men, but it has no theoretical import for Aristotle's natural philosophy. *Metaphysics* 12.10 is not evidence for a cosmic reading because it is impossible to transfer Aristotle's model of political order to the cosmos itself. According to Aristotle, although we exploit many features of the natural world, they are not there for exploitation. Finally, even if tenable, anthropocentrism would be unattractive, since it incoherently entails that some species are naturally subject to self-destructive tendencies.

Rationality, Eudaimonia and Kakodaimonia, ROBERT HEINAMAN

The article argues that Aristotle does not believe that all rational action aims at securing *eudaimonia* (happiness) for the agent. Intrinsic goods are worth having independently of their promotion of any further ends, including *eudaimonia*. Aiming for such a good may be rational even when *eudaimonia* is impossible and not the agent's goal. An agent can also act rationally to avoid evil when *eudaimonia* is impossible. The author uses an interesting passage from the *Politics*, which sets out little-noted constraints on the activities that qualify as *eudaimonia*, to argue that perhaps even the happy agent may act rationally without intending the act to promote his *eudaimonia*. The final section argues that, once we appreciate the importance of avoiding evil together with the fact that an immoral agent secures the greatest of evils, an alleged conflict in the *Nicomachean Ethics* between the intellectualist book 10 and the rest of the work disappears.

The Stoic Division of Philosophy, KATERINA IERODIAKONOY

To discuss philosophy under the three headings of "logic," "physics," and "ethics" is customary in every introduction to Stoicism. Nevertheless, a systematic review of the evidence shows that the Stoics' view on the tripartition of philosophy is more complex than it has been presented. The paper focuses on a well-known passage in Diogenes Laertius (7.39–41), which constitutes our main evidence concerning the Stoic account of the parts of philosophy, and deals with four points in this text which are extremely puzzling. First there is Diogenes' claim that according to most Stoic philosophers, it is not philosophy but philosophical discourse which is divided into

three parts. Second, Diogenes reports that different Stoic philosophers used different terms when referring to the three parts. Third there is Diogenes' statement that Stoic philosophers were not unanimous in the order of the three parts, and fourth, Diogenes' presentation of different similes used by the Stoics to describe the interrelation of the three parts must be considered. It is only by close analysis of these issues that we understand in what sense Stoic philosophers divided philosophy and how they perceived the unity of the philosophical disciplines thus divided.

*Alexander's Sea Battle: A Discussion of Alexander of Aphrodisias
De Fato 10*, RICHARD GASKIN

The article argues that in chapter 10 of his treatise, *De Fato*, Alexander presupposes an interpretation of Aristotle's *De Interpretatione* 9 according to which Aristotle restricted the principle of bivalence for statements about future contingencies. This reading of Alexander has been challenged on the grounds that Alexander presupposes determinism in arguing against his Stoic opponents, and that this presupposition prevents us from assessing whether Alexander thought necessity is consequential upon the sheer assumption of future truth. By detailed examination of the text it is shown that the presupposition of determinism does not enter into the specific part of the text where future truth is in question, and that there Alexander does argue for an entailment from future truth to necessity. Hence, he must have supposed that Aristotle restricted the general validity of the principle of bivalence in order to avoid a general necessitarianism.

PHRONESIS

Vol. 38, No. 2, 1993

Aristotle's "Second Man" Argument, THEODORE SCALTSAS

The article is about a subject and its essence. Plato faced the nature-feature problem by not allowing that participation in a Form can determine the nature of the participating subject. Aristotle introduced both natures and features in the *Categories*, and correspondingly, two different relations to the subject. On this account, however, the subject fails to be a *kath' hauto* entity, since it is different from what it is *in virtue of itself*—that is, from its nature. Aristotle advanced the "Second Man" argument in *Metaphysics* 7.6 to show that the subject cannot be different from its nature. The premises of the argument are identified and its logic analysed. It is shown that the infinite regress is vicious, resting on an impossibility to which its premises are committed. Aristotle's conclusion is that there is no nexus of instantiation separating the subject from its nature.

Nonsubstantial Individuals, MICHAEL V. WEDIN

Ackrill's (standard) view that in the *Categories* nonsubstantial individuals (items present-in but not said-of a subject) are nonrecurrent accident particulars must be relinquished in view of Owen's textual argument that general accidents are present-in particular substances (three other Owen arguments are shown to be without effect). But we need not follow Owen in construing these items as determinate species of color and the like, nor need we accept Frede's more sophisticated version of this sort of view. A revised version of the standard view is presented, one that is immune to all of Owen's criticisms and that agrees with much of the spirit of Frede's positive account. A central point involves reinterpreting the force of Aristotle's remark at 1a23–25 that what is present-in a subject cannot exist separately from what it is in. Independent evidence from the *Categories* and *Metaphysics* 7 also argues in favor of the nonrecurrent status of nonsubstantial individuals, as does evidence from certain of the Greek commentators.

The Metaphysical Location of Aristotle's Mathēmatika, MICHAEL J. WHITE

This article focusses on a dilemma developed in *Metaphysics* 13.2–3 *mathēmatika*, the object of mathematicians' attention, cannot exist in sensible things, but they cannot exist apart from sensible things either. Since Aristotle's own conception of *mathēmatika* seems especially vulnerable to the first horn of this dilemma, the article considers the (possible) immunity of Aristotle's conception to his arguments in support of the first horn. It is argued that this immunity is to be located in (1) a form of "property dualism" (as opposed to substance dualism) with respect to mathematical versus sensible and physical characteristics of things, and (2) in the use made by Aristotle of his actuality-potentiality distinction with respect to the existence of *mathēmatika in rebus*. It is concluded, however, that the *potentialiter* existence of *mathēmatika* in the sensible and physical realm largely leaves open questions concerning the degree and manner in which such *potentialiter* mathematical structure constrains the mathematical activity.

The Academic Position of Favorinus of Arelate, A. M. IOPPOLO

Modern historiography on scepticism does not give Favorinus an exact philosophical position, at times he is included among the Academics, at times among the Pyrrhonians. Galen in *De optima doctrina* considered Favorinus's philosophical position similar to that of a group of Academics, which he calls νεώτεροι. His teaching is based on arguing pro and contra, as was that of the παλαιότεροι Academics and, like them, he challenges Stoic epistemological dogmatism, then represented by the philosophy of Epictetus. His position on ἀκαταληψία, however, seems to be an attempt to reconcile rigorous scepticism and epistemological fallibilism, typical of the Fourth Academy, provided that nonassertive language is used. "It seems to me convincing that" Favorinus's interest in the history of the Academy, beginning

from Arcesilaus, is not part of a simply historical or antiquarian interest but is assumed as a doctrine itself and reelaborated in the light of the subsequent developments of Pyrrhonian scepticism. He therefore actually represents a turning point in the historical picture of Platonism of his era.

RATIO

Vol 6, No 1, June 1993

How to Beat a Sceptic without Begging the Question, JOHN GRECO

In the first part of the paper a familiar skeptical argument is explicated and a solution is proposed. The central claim of the solution is that a skeptical possibility is relevant only if the possibility is true in some close possible world. But since there is no reason to believe that one is deceived by an evil demon or that one is a brain in a vat in some close possible world, there is no reason to accept an essential premise of the skeptical argument, that is, that the skeptical scenarios are relevant possibilities. In the remainder of the paper it is argued that, contrary to frequent charges against a relevant possibilities approach, the solution proposed does not embrace idealism, end in a stalemate, or beg the question against the skeptic.

The False Promises of Risk Analysis, SVEN OVE HANSSON

The relatively new discipline of risk analysis promises to provide objective guidance in some of the most controversial issues in modern high-technology societies. Four conditions are discussed that must be satisfied for this promise to be fulfilled. Since none of these conditions is satisfied, risk analysis does not keep its promise. In its attempts to reduce genuinely political issues to technocratic calculations, it neglects many of the factors that should influence decisions on risk acceptance. A list of tentative guidelines is given for numerical decision support that supports democratic decision-making instead of trying to evade it.

Prediction and Predication, JOHN HYMAN

Nelson Goodman's own solution to his new riddle of induction turns on the degree to which predicates are entrenched in our use of language. This solution, however, requires that judgments concerning the degree to which a predicate is entrenched can be made independently of any canon of perceptible similarity. Hyman argues that this requirement cannot be met. Goodman claims that since "green" can be defined positionally in terms of "grue" and "bleen," "grue" and "bleen" are symmetrically related to "green" and "blue," and positionality is therefore "an entirely relative matter." Hyman argues that in order to prove that positionality is an entirely relative matter, we would need to provide a nonpositional definition of "grue," rather than a

positional definition of "green", since such a definition cannot be provided, the riddle does not reveal that "the roots of inductive validity are to be found in our use of language"

Antitheism. A Reflection, CHRISTOPHER NEW

Why is there no sustained tradition of argument concerning the existence of a supreme (omniscient and omnipotent) being who is perfectly evil, as there is of one who is perfectly good? Arguments which are reflections of the ontological, cosmological, and teleological arguments, and arguments based on personal experience or the occurrence of antimiracles (harmful events not explicable by science) could have provided grounds for belief in such a being at least as good as their originals in fact provide for theism. An imaginary encyclopedia entry, in which fictional antitheistic arguments are presented, illustrates this point. The reason for the nonexistence of a tradition of antitheism seems therefore to be that it is merely emotionally, not rationally, less inviting than theism.

The Incompatibility Of the Virtues, A. D. M. WALKER

The article examines an apparently simple argument which seeks to establish incompatibilities between the virtues as traits of character by appealing to the possibility of conflict between the exercise of different virtues in action. Since we can sometimes exercise the virtue of truthfulness only at the expense of not exercising the virtue of tact, it would seem that the degree to which we possess the virtue of truthfulness must, at least in some measure, correlate inversely with the degree to which we possess the virtue of tact—and similarly for many other pairs of virtues. The article focuses on the two cardinal assumptions of this argument, namely, that sometimes the exercise of one virtue can conflict with the exercise of another, and that the degree to which a person possesses a virtue correlates directly with the extent of its exercise. Both assumptions are defended against a variety of objections.

Punishment: A Tale of Two Islands, MARK THOMAS WALKER

An imaginary desert island scenario provides the setting for a story which is designed to expose the shortcomings of deterrence, reform, and restitution theories of punishment, and to emphasize the intuitive appeal of Kant's strong retributivist insistence that there is a positive obligation to punish offenders just qua offenders, and not merely an automatic right to do so (weak retributivism). Nevertheless, it is urged that though the fact that an offence has been committed can in itself suffice to establish that punishment is in some sense required, this requirement at most supports a position that is intermediate between Kantian retributivism and weak retributivism. This latter position, it is suggested towards the end of the article, also illustrates something of more general, theoretical interest concerning the structure of deontic implication.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

The Department of Philosophy at the University of Hawaii announces a call for papers for a seventh East-West Philosophers' Conference, to be held January 9–23, 1995, at the University of Hawaii. The theme will be "Justice and Democracy: A Philosophical Exploration." In addition to fifty invited papers from philosophers from over thirty countries, the conference program will allow the presentation of approximately thirty additional papers. Scholars interested in participating should send an abstract of their paper together with a short *vita* to The Director, Seventh East-West Philosophers' Conference, Department of Philosophy, University of Hawaii, 2530 Dole Street, Honolulu, Hawaii 96822. The deadline for submissions is March 1, 1994.

The Philosophy Department at Washington University announces that it will sponsor the first major conference on ethics and cognitive science, to be held on April 8–10, 1994, at Washington University. Papers will be presented by sixteen philosophers, including Paul Churchland (UC San Diego), Holly Smith (Arizona), and James Sterba (Notre Dame). Advance registration is required. For additional information contact Larry May, Philosophy Department, Washington University, Campus Box 1073, One Brookings Drive, St. Louis, Missouri 63130-4899, telephone 314-935-7349.

The Philosophy Department and Science, Technology, and Society Program at Pennsylvania State University announce a five-week National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Institute on "Rethinking Technology: Philosophical Reflection on Technology since World War II." The program is for college and university teachers of philosophy, applied ethics, and interdisciplinary philosophy and technology studies, and will take place from June 5 to July 9, 1994. Directed by Carl Mitcham and Leonard Waks, faculty include Albert Borgmann, Fred Dretske, Paul T. Durbin, Robert Ginsburg, Don Ihde, Deborah G. Johnson, Joseph Kockelmans, Robert Proctor, Warren Reich, Kristin Schrader-Frechette, and Langdon Winner. Applications are available from NEH Summer Institute, STS Program, Willard 133, Penn State University, University Park, Pennsylvania 16802. The application deadline is March 1, 1994, and notification will take place by April 1, 1994.

The International Philosophical Preprint Exchange announces the beginning of its operations. The Exchange is a new service on Internet designed to provide a means for philosophers to exchange works in progress. To receive instructions on the use of this service, send a piece of electronic mail to the address phil-preprints-service@phil-preprints.lchuba-u.ac.jp. The email must contain exactly the following four lines of text:

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The judges for the 1993 Dissertation Essay Competition sponsored by the Philosophy Education Society, Inc , will be Deal Hudson (Fordham), Hubert Schwyzer (UC-Santa Barbara), and Keith Yandell (Wisconsin-Madison). For additional information about the competition see the September 1993 issue of the *Review of Metaphysics*.

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
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


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
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
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RATIONALITY AND MORALITY

E. M. ADAMS

IT IS OFTEN ASSUMED that being prudent, being moral, and being rational are all distinct and distinguishable. It is widely accepted that being prudent is acting on behalf of, or with a regard for, one's own interests, whatever they may be; that being moral is acting on behalf of, or with regard for, the interests of others; and that being rational is acting completely clearheadedly and with full knowledge about oneself and everything else involved. It follows from these assumptions that one can act either prudently or morally without acting rationally, for one can act either way without being fully knowledgeable and clearheaded about all that is involved. But can an act be both rational and immoral? Can it be rationally prudent and immoral?

I

Rationality. We may begin our inquiry by considering what it is to be rational. We need to distinguish between subjective and objective rationality. Subjective rationality is a matter of acting in accordance with one's perceptions and beliefs about the situation; objective rationality is a matter of acting clearheadedly, with full knowledge of the relevant action situation. That is, objective rationality is a matter of acting in accordance with the reality of the situation on the basis of one's beliefs about it. When we speak of rationality, unless indicated otherwise, we shall mean objective rationality.

The dominant view in our scientific age is that when one is fully knowledgeable about everything involved in an action situation, one's knowledge is of only the contingent facts and causal connections involved such things as one's desires, preferences, feelings, powers,

economic resources, time, and social relationships, similar things about the other people involved, and the other factual conditions of, and causal relationships in, one's environment. Of course one's desires, preferences, and feelings shift with changes in one's comprehension of the factual situation. But being fully knowledgeable about the situation must include being knowledgeable that one's desires, preferences, and feelings are based on a full comprehension of the situation. In addition, we may assume that being clearheaded in making a decision is a matter of making the decision with full awareness of the relevant facts and their causal dependencies and consequences, with none of these matters temporarily forgotten or overlooked.

On these assumptions, it would seem that what one would do if one were fully clearheaded and fully knowledgeable about everything involved would depend not just on one's awareness of one's desires, preferences, and feelings, along with awareness of the other facts of the situation and their causal links, but more importantly on what one's desires, preferences, and feelings are. Thus for some the rational thing to do in any situation might be the narrowly self-serving thing. For others, the rational thing to do might be to act with a regard for the interests of their family and friends or some other group with which they identify, while ignoring the interests of all others except as facts that might affect the success of their action. For still others, the rational thing to do might be to deliberate about their action with a genuine regard for the well-being of all people who would be affected.

For those who happen to be committed to the moral point of view, a rational action in a situation involving others would be a moral action; but it is widely accepted that the commitment to the moral point of view is simply a fact about some people that is based on either an arbitrary choice or social conditioning. Some hold, however, that there are reasons for anyone to adopt the moral point of view and that it is rational to be committed to the moral point of view and irrational not to be.

If the reasons for adopting the moral point of view were prudential, to be moral would be to be prudential in a fully enlightened and clearheaded way. Some contend, however, that clearheaded attention to all the relevant facts motivates some of us, indeed most of us, to adopt the moral point of view, not by virtue of preexisting preferences and desires, but by the direct effect of the comprehension

of the relevant facts. This is either an article of faith or an empirical generalization from observed behavior. Either way leaves open the possibility that there are fully clearheaded and knowledgeable people who do not adopt the moral point of view and have no reason to do so. Such people would not be subject to being rationally appraised as having made any kind of a mistake or as being at fault in any way; the only rational judgment on them would be that comprehension of the facts causally affects them differently than it does most people. Neither would those who were motivated to adopt the moral point of view be subject to rational appraisal for their choices. The so-called choices would simply be the ways in which the parties concerned were causally affected by comprehension of the facts. This position differs from a simple causal theory only in what it takes to be the causal conditions of the commitment.

If the causal condition of a commitment to the moral point of view were the comprehension of the facts rather than a set of blind factual conditions, it is not at all clear that the commitment would be a rational act in any significant sense. It is not subject to rational appraisal as correct or incorrect, as justified or unjustified. If we think of the comprehended facts as reasons for the commitment to the moral point of view, they are only causal reasons, not justifying reasons.

If this were the true story about commitment to the moral point of view, why should we not be tolerant of moral preferences, as some urge that we all be tolerant of an individual's sexual preferences? Those who were moved to adopt the moral point of view but found it inconvenient or impractical might justifiably try to develop a medication that would protect them from moral motivations, or might seek psychological counseling to try to alter their emotive responses and overcome their moral hangups. Those who prefer people to be moral might try to find some way to induce in the unresponsive favorable emotive responses to the moral point of view. This would be manipulation of others, however, not reasoning with them.

If those who share the causal view of emotive responses to comprehended facts were to take the direct motivations to adopt the moral point of view seriously and try to cultivate motivations of this kind rather than try to eradicate them, it would seem that such people would have to do so for reasons other than the comprehended facts. What could those reasons be other than these persons' self-interest as such, or the general utility of the moral point of view for

the total complex of interests of all involved in a way that would be to the advantage of each? Of course, on the second alternative the motive power would be derived from interests people already had. However one's personal interest-complex might be constituted, whether totally self-regarding or extremely altruistic, one's interests would be nothing more than the effects of one's bodily processes, environment, and comprehension of the facts. There would be no room for mistakes or correctness other than in the comprehension of or inferences about the facts. So the only way to argue for the moral point of view, as distinct from manipulating people to accept it, would be by appeal to its utility in terms of the interests of a given individual, or to its general utility as including an advantage for each regardless of his or her interests, preferences, and emotive responses. In other words, commitment to the moral point of view could be shown to be rational in a significant sense only by showing it to be prudent.

II

Rationality Reconsidered The above reasoning seems to be unexceptionable, yet I find it unconvincing. If my intuitions are to be trusted—and I do not think that they are unique to me—the difficulty must be with the presuppositions or assumptions of the argument. First of all, I suggest that we should not define a rational act as the act of an agent who is fully informed and clearheaded about the factual situation. For one thing, an agent may deliberate and form a judgment about what it would be rational for him or her to do in a given situation before acting. Such a judgment does not seem to be of what one would do if one were clearheaded and knew all the relevant facts. Furthermore, there is the troublesome issue about whether there is, or can be, any slippage between a person's informed and clearheaded judgment about what would be the rational thing for one to do in a given situation, and what one actually does. Even if we hold that one who is well informed and thinks the situation through does what he takes to be the rational thing to do under the circumstances, there is another issue here. Some people believe that one can and does act contrary to his or her best clearheaded judgment in some situations; indeed, some think that one may knowingly choose to act irrationally in some situations.

Furthermore, there is a common presumption that reason speaks with one voice, so that a conflict of voices on an issue indicates that the rational view has not been reached. We expect convergence in the approvals and disapprovals of disinterested, knowledgeable, and clearheaded people. This is why we seek advice from disinterested people and submit controversies to unbiased, informed juries and arbitration panels. We try to liberate rationality from the influence of particular desires, preferences, and feelings that might pervert the judgment of those involved. Reason judges an action impartially with a full regard for all the interests involved, if it favors some interests over others, it does so for reasons that any impartial judge should acknowledge and approve.

We determine that an act is rational not by whether it is what a fully informed and clearheaded person would do in the situation, but by whether clearheaded, unbiased, fully informed persons would judge the act to be rational for the agent in the given situation. This, however, does not help us define what it is for an act to be rational. My major objections to most modern discussions of rationality and morality concern assumptions that govern the discussion but are seldom brought under critical review. Most of us share cultural assumptions about the self, knowledge, and reality that were formed without taking into account morality or any area of normative thought. Within the framework of these assumptions, even the intelligibility of scientific thought, with its humanistic presuppositions, is rendered suspect. So it is not at all surprising that the moral enterprise becomes highly problematic in our modern culture, nor is it surprising that philosophers who share the prevailing assumptions about selfhood, knowledge, and reality often distort morality in trying to make sense of it.

It is a thesis of this paper that there is no way to understand philosophically either the rational or the moral enterprise without having a correct philosophical view of the human self, and that such a view of the self is impossible without taking account of the rational and the moral enterprises themselves. So the exploration of the human self should be the beginning point in moral philosophy. This is a big task for a short paper, but I hope that I can give some indication of what a proper account would include.

III

The Human Self The human self is a knower-agent. I use this description to differentiate human beings from purely behavioral agents, who act in response to internal and external stimuli under impulse or instinct. As knower-agents, human beings may act sometimes in response to sensory stimuli under impulse or instinct, but more characteristically they do not accept instinct, impulse, or stimuli at face value. They operate not only with internal restraints on instinct and impulse but with knowledge, principles, plans, and reflective critical judgment.

Being culturally generated and having reflective and critical powers, a somewhat normal and more or less mature human being is a self integrated under a normative self-concept and he or she has a world unified under a descriptive-explanatory conceptual system. These are not just facts about human beings. If a human being is not a self more or less integrated under a normative self-concept and does not have a world more or less unified under a descriptive-explanatory conceptual system, then that human being is either not normal or not mature. This indicates that human beings have an inherent normative structure such that if they do not develop their knowledge-yielding and critical powers, and become a more or less integrated self under a normative self-concept, and have a world more or less unified under a descriptive-explanatory conceptual system, something has gone wrong. They are defective as human beings, they are not able to live a human life.

Furthermore, more or less normal and somewhat mature human beings are, by their inherent normative structure, bound by the imperative that their normative self-concept and their world-view be correct. Any inconsistency or other indication of error in either is disturbing and motivates one to try to correct the matter. We all want not only our experiences, beliefs, and actions to stand justified under critical examination, but also our identities, lives, and general world-view as well. This is no ordinary want; it bears on us as a categorical imperative. No one can sacrifice or seriously compromise it without doing damage to one's identity and self-respect, for such a compromise damages the integrity of one's selfhood and one's life.

IV

The Thinking Self. We do not have to convince people that they ought to be logical. Logical appraisals of our experiences and beliefs tap into the organizing and governing principles of our minds. Everyone with somewhat normal and mature human powers finds oneself already operating under inner logical imperatives, for one is committed to the consistency and correctness of one's perceptions and beliefs in being a thinking self. A thought is one's own not so much by being a member of a set of thoughts occurring in one's mind, but rather by being endorsed or embraced when one's mind (one's total mental complex) is functioning as a whole. As long as one is of two minds on a subject, one has not made up one's mind and is not prepared to put forth a specific thought or belief about the matter in question, for he or she has none. Making a truth-claim or taking something to be the case requires the unity of one's mind, and the unity of one's mind involves logical integrity. Thus the very nature of a mind normatively requires that one be consistent and correct in one's thoughts—that one's truth-claims, perceptual takings, and beliefs stand justified under logical criticism. If one is not already committed to being logical, no one can teach him or her anything.

This is not all. As thinking beings, we require what we take to be the case to make sense, to be intelligible. This is a matter of our being able to fit whatever we take to be real into a context, ultimately this means fitting it into our view of the world order. A unified mind requires a unified world-view. If we take the content of a perception or belief to be real but cannot fit it into a place in the world, the world order as we know it is threatened; and a challenge to our view of the world threatens the integrity of our minds, for it challenges the consistency and correctness of our fundamental assumptions and beliefs. Hence, as thinking beings we are under an inherent imperative to render intelligible whatever we take to be real, that is, the normative structure of our minds requires an explanation for whatever we take to obtain in the world, and it requires a world-view that makes such explanations possible. The human mind cannot be content with things or events that do not make sense.

V

The Moral Self We do not have to convince people that they ought to be moral. This needs more showing. Just as thinking beings are committed to the unity and integrity of their minds and thus to the consistency and correctness of their perceptions and beliefs, to the intelligibility of the real, and to the unity and correctness of their world-view, rational agents are committed to the unity and integrity of their lives and thus to the justification and meaningfulness of their actions, and to the meaningfulness and worthwhileness of their lives as well. We are compelled in this way by inner imperatives grounded in our nature as rational agents.

One's normative self-concept is the organizing and governing principle and driving force of one's life. It is involved in and governs what one counts as options among possible actions. It determines one's feeling insult, embarrassment, shame, guilt, disappointment, failure, self-reproach; and the opposite feelings of ambition, drive, satisfaction, pride, self-respect, self-approval, and the like. In other words, one's normative self-concept defines the boundaries of one's life, charts one's course, and drives, pulls, and steers one along life's way. One's deepest and strongest emotions and motivations are tied to it. The principles and criteria of self-criticism are found in it. Indeed, one's core normative self-concept, one's normative concept of oneself as a human being, governs one's moral feelings and appraisals not only of oneself but of other human beings as well. Moral emotions and appraisals would be too weak to govern one's life unless the moral point of view were anchored in one's normative self-concept and understood as grounded in one's selfhood.

We have to distinguish different levels or dimensions of one's normative self-concept. The most obvious distinction is between one's concept of oneself as a human being and one's concept of oneself as the particular individual one is. My normative concept of myself as the particular individual that I am has been formed by critically assessed experiences and choices in the circumstances of my existence. These circumstances include my own native constitution, social relationships, and cultural context. By a process taking place over a long period of time, I formed and reformed my self-concept. This was a critical process, the idea that emerged had to pass critical scrutiny and was reconstructed or amplified many times. Early in life, my normative self-concept was largely formed by the judgments

and expectations of others—and of course the judgments and expectations of others continue to be taken into account. But with a self-identity formed under strict tutelage, my own critical powers then took over and reconstructed and further developed my normative self-concept until it became the idea of the individual my critical judgment approved and held me responsible for being. It was the idea of the individual I ought to be or ought to become. This idea of the individual that I ought to be, with all of its constraints and restraints, has been a guiding force in my life; it has defined a path and closed off many byways. Furthermore, it has been both a driving and a pulling force. It has been a basis for self-evaluation, self-criticism, and self-improvement. It is, in other words, a normative idea. Every desire, insofar as it obtains my reflective endorsement and full support, and thus becomes authentically mine, has to be congruent with my normative self-concept.

Regardless of one's circumstances, everyone is a human being, and everyone's normative self-concept must include what one ought to be or ought to become as a human being in the circumstances of one's existence. Moral appraisals of the behavior of an individual reflect on him or her as a person in much the same way as medical appraisal of a physician's work reflects on him or her as a physician. In other words, one's moral appraisals of one's own behavior or that of another presuppose one's normative concept of a human being. This is why moral judgments are universalizable. Whatever one judges to be morally wrong or right in oneself one must, as a matter of logic, judge to be morally wrong or right in any other human being in like circumstances. Likewise, whatever one judges to be morally wrong (or right) in another one must, on pain of being inconsistent, judge to be morally wrong (or right) in oneself in like circumstances. This is because such judgments pertain to the suitability of the act in question for a human being under those relevant conditions, including, of course, what is relevant in one's own makeup and relationships.

If we develop our conception of the human self independent of morality—as so many modern philosophers do—we must develop our conception of ethics independent of our conception of the human self. This is what gives rise to the consequentialist theory of ethics. In a consequentialist view there is the matter of how an action affects the agent and how it affects others, and morality becomes identified with judgments that take into account the consequences of an action.

on others as well as on the agent. Once our thinking takes this turn, there is a problem about how the self and ethics are joined. It is what creates the space that makes the question, Why should one be moral? appear to be a real problem

VI

Morality and Selfhood It is a thesis of this paper that the moral point of view is anchored in the very nature of selfhood. According to this view, a normative self-concept is essential to selfhood, and the core of one's normative self-concept is the normative concept of oneself as a human being. Since moral judgments of anyone's behavior concern what he or she ought or ought not to do as a human being, it follows that no immoral act could really be in one's self-interest, for such an act would do injury to oneself as a human being. If a prudential judgment is defined as one based on one's enlightened self-interest, then there should not be a conflict between one's prudential and moral judgments. This is not, however, a reduction of moral reasons to prudential reasons; nor is it a prudential justification for being moral. Rather, it says that one cannot be prudent without being moral. But perhaps it would be better to define a prudential judgment as one that concerns whether an act that was a moral option for one would be in one's best interest. In other words, prudential judgments may best be thought of as judgments based on self-interest that reach beyond the limits of moral concern. But even here we have to be careful: it would never be moral to be imprudent unless one were imprudent by error in judgment.

According to this conception of morality, a judgment of the morality of an act, as already indicated, may or may not concern the effect of the act on others. Indeed, the last human survivor on a deserted island or even on the planet could face a situation in a way that befits a human being or in a manner unworthy of his or her humanity. The person who, with somewhat normal and mature powers, is impulsive or careless about his or her own present or future well-being is morally at fault; such behavior is not appropriate for one as a human being. It is immoral for one in acting to satisfy some desire to ignore his or her more important needs. It is immoral for a human being to ignore the consequences of one's actions for

one's own future needs, much as it is immoral for one to ignore the consequences of one's actions for the welfare of others.

VII

Our Normative Self-Concept A normative self-concept, as already remarked, is essential for one's being an integrated self capable of living a human life. One can no more be a rational agent and live a human life without a normative self-concept than one can be and work as a policeman without the concept of oneself as a policeman. A key question for morality is whether one's normative self-concept or one's normative concept of a human being in general is such that it is correct or incorrect. It is not very popular in our modern cultural climate to think of normative concepts as part of our descriptive language or to talk about the correctness or incorrectness of concepts of any kind. As I have already indicated, however, I subscribe to both theses and have argued for them in other works.¹

Very briefly, I support a realistic interpretation of value language; I contend that ought-judgments constitute the basic kind of value judgment. A predicative value judgment says that something is or is not the way it ought to be. If there is not a way that something ought to be, then however it is factually constituted or related it is neither good nor bad, normal or abnormal, or whatever. In other words, there is, or so I claim, a normative structure in the nature of things and in objective situations.

In spite of all our efforts to eliminate normative and predicative value concepts from the descriptive-explanatory language of modern thought, we seem compelled to recognize that an organism, for example, has a normative structure involved in its internal causal dynamics. We talk about an organism's being well-formed or deformed, mature or immature, healthy or sick, and the like. These value predications presuppose that there is a form the organism

¹ See E. M. Adams, *Ethical Naturalism and the Modern World-View* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1960, reprint, Greenwood Press, 1973), E. M. Adams, *Philosophy and the Modern Mind* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1975, reprint, University Press of America, 1985), and E. M. Adams, *The Metaphysics of Self and World* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991).

ought to have or ought to come to have and that there is a way the organism and its organs ought to function. Furthermore, we seem compelled to acknowledge that the inner causal processes of the organism work for the realization and maintenance of the form the organism ought to have, and to keep the organism functioning the way in which it ought to function. Value realism validates these commonsense conclusions

We seem compelled to think of a knower-agent, as well as an organism, as having an inherent normative structure. As a thinking self, one is, as we previously observed, under an inherent imperative to be consistent and correct in one's perceptual takings and beliefs, and, as a rational agent, one is under an inherent imperative to define and to live a life of one's own that would be meaningful and worthy of one as a human being and as the individual one is. The latter imperative defines the office of personhood; it constitutes one's primary responsibility as a person. It is presupposed in life criticism, just as the fundamental logical imperative is presupposed in logical criticism. Human rights are grounded in this life-defining imperative; they are the freedoms and means one must have if one is to fulfill the responsibility of personhood, much as the rights of the President of the United States are the freedoms and means he must have in order to fulfill the constitutional duties of the office.

As rational agents, we appraise our acts. We appraise them as meaningful or meaningless, rational or irrational, right or wrong, justified or unjustified, and so forth. Acts, like words and sentences, are meaningful only if they are embedded in a context of meaning in which they fit. For example, an act is meaningful if it is integrated into a project; a project is meaningful if it is integrated into some larger project, and the larger project is meaningful if it is integrated into the life one is living. Even the life one is living seems meaningless unless it is integrated into some larger context of meaning. People enhance the meaningfulness of their lives by joining them with others in marriage, in some cooperative enterprise, in a community, and so on. Religions affirm and seek to enhance the meaningfulness of individual lives and even human history by integrating them into a divine plan for all creation. No human being can be happy with meaningless experiences and activities. The normative structure of our being demands meaningful experiences, activities, and lives. Without this we are bored and depressed. Nothing seems to matter.

Our inherent normative structure demands that our acts be rational. We all accept the charge of irrationality as condemnatory, unless we are operating with some distorted concept of rationality. At the extreme, one is irrational if one's emotions, desires, intentions, and actions are unsupported by or unresponsive to reasons. At less extreme levels, one is irrational in action to the extent one fails to take into account relevant and available facts and normative requirements, or fails to give them appropriate consideration. In short, one is rational in action to the extent one's acts are guided and justified by responsible beliefs and value judgments about oneself and the situation one is in. We demand of ourselves that our actions stand justified under rational appraisal—that they be right or at least alright.

The point is that one's normative self-concept of oneself as a human being is correct or incorrect according to whether it embraces the imperatives that are inherent in the subjective normative structure of one's selfhood as a human being with relatively mature and normal powers. If one goes wrong in forming one's normative self-concept as a human being, the error will systematically pervert not only one's moral judgments but one's life as well.

It even makes sense to talk about the correctness or incorrectness of the normative idea one forms of oneself as an individual. One can certainly form a wrong idea of the individual one ought to be, and one can discover the wrongness of such an idea. This does not mean that there is only one correct idea of what an individual ought to be. For example, there may be several equally good vocational options for some, while for others there may be only one right vocation in the circumstances of their existence.

There are not, however, several equally valid, optional normative concepts of oneself as a human being. No normative concept of oneself as a human being is correct unless it includes the basic imperative to stand justified in experience, thought, and action under rational criticism. Moreover, rational criticism presupposes and works toward the ideal of consensus, for real disagreements in rational appraisals indicate that something is wrong somewhere, even though the source of the error may be so deep in the minds or cultures of the participants that the search for that source may be hopeless.

Of course, rational appraisals operate within a culture. We have no chance of reaching a consensus on rational appraisals without reaching a consensus in beliefs and other value judgments about

the relevant situation. Even if this is possible in principle, it is often practically impossible. But the relativistic thesis about rational appraisals claims that a consensus in rational appraisals is impossible in principle. The position is based on either the subjectivity of value judgments or the relativity of basic conceptual systems, or on both. The argument against value subjectivism turns on the semantic and epistemic character of affective and conative experience. The case against the relativity of basic conceptual systems is based on the claim that the basic categories are grounded in the constitutional principles, the inherent normative structure, of the human mind.²

VIII

Conclusion If we grant the argument so far, can we distinguish between the rational act and the morally right act? An answer to this turns on the question whether we can distinguish between rational approval and moral approval—and obviously we can. Not all rational approvals are moral approvals. A mechanic, for example, may repair a car in a way that would not be rationally approved without there being any moral issue involved. If I am right, however, all moral approvals are rational approvals. In other words, moral appraisals are a subclass of rational appraisals.

We may say that the rational thing to do is what the situation normatively requires or allows one to do. In other words, the rational thing to do, objectively speaking, is to act in accordance with reality, or at least in accordance with the best available beliefs about reality. This sounds like the theory we rejected, but the view of reality is different.

According to the typical modern view, there is no objective normative structure in the nature of reality that imposes normative limits and requirements on rational agents. According to my version of value realism, each human being has an inherent normative structure. With somewhat normal, mature human powers, one is under an inner imperative—one grounded both in one's human nature and in one's well-formed normative self-concept—to define and

² See Adams, *Philosophy and the Modern Mind*, and Adams, *The Metaphysics of Self and World*.

to live a life of one's own that would be worthy of one as a human being and as the individual one is. This means that one is under an imperative—an imperative that is a responsibility—to define and to live a life that would pass muster under rational criticism. Correlative to this inherent imperative are certain rights: what one must be free to do and have the means to do if one is to be able to fulfill one's human responsibility. These rights impose normative limits and requirements on other human beings. Other human beings have the same inherent normative structure as oneself, the same defining responsibility and correlative rights. Anyone who defines and lives a life that is not responsive to the normative limits and requirements imposed on one by the normative structure of other human beings or any other aspect of one's environment is living a life unworthy of a human being. His or her life is not a moral life; it will not stand approved by moral appraisal. Furthermore, such a life is not a rational life, it will not pass muster under rational criticism; it is not a life lived in accordance with reality. Here we find that moral appraisals and rational appraisals overlap. Indeed, moral appraisals just are rational appraisals that take into account the moral dimension of the situation. It can never be rational to ignore moral limits and requirements.

We may conclude also that it can never be moral for a capable person to be irrational in thought or action, for thinking and acting in any area that does not, to the best of one's ability, stand up under rational criticism is never worthy of one as a human being. So it is immoral to be imprudent. Any apparent conflict between the ethical and the prudent must be grounded in some confusion or mistake.

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RIGHTS, LAW, AND THE RIGHT

EDWARD G. SPARROW

THERE IS MUCH TALK THESE DAYS OF RIGHTS. civil rights, legal rights, natural rights, human rights, women's rights, reproductive rights, children's rights. A great deal of it—if not all of it—is confused and confusing. Indeed, it is safe to say that no politically relevant concept more needs clarification than this one. Furthermore, because we are lavishly spending our political capital, it will soon happen that neither the incantation of familiar phrases nor the public expression of sentimental pieties will keep us from destroying our community. The conflict between property rights and civil rights, so prominent in the 1960s, is only one example of the sort of tensions which we will undergo in the future. Unless adequate categories through which these conflicts may be resolved are accepted, any one solution can only prefigure larger conflicts whose features are ominous indeed.

Strident talk today about such novelties as “reproductive rights” will lead tomorrow to the discovery of all sorts of other new “rights.” for example, rights to telephone service, to a car, to a warm house, and, possibly, even to a happy life (someone, indeed, has already sued his parents—unsuccessfully thank goodness—because, by bringing him into the world, they had violated his right to a non-miserable existence) and to demands that these be enforced. But when everyone comes to think that they have a right to whatever good thing they want, politics will become defined by the assertion of, provision for, and enforcement of, such so-called rights; this direction cannot but generate and perpetuate deep and lasting divisions within the community.

Hence this article presents—or, rather, except for some outrageous possibilities, re-presents—an older framework within which political issues can be framed and priorities assigned. It first determines the nature of rights in themselves, for example, legal rights,

civil rights, and natural rights. Then it tests its definition by applying it to cases where rights are said to be contrasted with such other things as remedies, privileges, and duties, or where they are said to be in conflict with one another. Reflection on these applications of the definition then leads to an alternative framework for thinking about them. This framework, once explored, yields an understanding of the meaning of human freedom.

Suppose now I am walking peacefully down a sidewalk with an older and wiser friend, and that a stranger tries to bar our way. The stranger is not a policeman, and he's not shielding us from danger, so I tell him we have a perfect right to proceed and he has no right to stop us. I have no sooner spoken these words, however, than I find myself asking out loud what I mean by saying that we have such a right and that he does not have the right to stop us. My friend answers, "What you have, my friend, is the permission of the law to walk down the street unimpeded by the arbitrary action of another, and what he lacks is that same law's permission to stop you."

"What's that?" I reply. "What do you mean 'the law's permission'?"

"Well," he answers, "rules of action which operate publicly and as such within a community and which are ordered to the common good are called laws, and those laws either command, permit, or forbid actions. When the law permits an action, it tells anyone who might want to perform it—usually implicitly, by forbidding others to interfere with it—that it will not use its coercive power either to prevent it or to punish it. This decision is grounded on a prior determination: that this action will either not harm the common good, or that greater harm to that good will come if the act is sought to be prevented than if it is allowed.

"And, by the same token, to say that someone lacks the right to stop us is to say that his interference with our walking lacks the law's permission. Permission is withheld because of a prior determination that such an action as his does harm the common good. The provisions of the law in any situation, in other words, determine the rights and wrongs of it. In our particular case, our permission to proceed—our right to proceed—is merely the other side of the prohibition the law places on his arbitrarily stopping us, his lack of a right to stop us."

"But," I reply, somewhat shocked, "this analysis seems to leave *me* with nothing. When I have someone else's permission, he has everything. All I am left with is the knowledge that as far as he is concerned it is all right for me to do what I want. But he has all the power. I have nothing."

"Yes," my friend replies, "that's true. The 'right' you have is not anything you can call 'my own' the way you can call your body, your power of sight, or your dreams 'my own'. Those things are irreducibly private. But a legal right, being the law's permission to act in view of the common good, presupposes others—fellow citizens—who share that good with you, and hence is irreducibly public. You may talk as if rights were private possessions and say, 'I have a right', or 'You have no right', but your words are misleading if not altogether meaningless. Since the law is a public thing, its permissions are also public and so cannot be anyone's private property."

"Well," I say, "this is strange doctrine indeed. What do I mean, then, when owning something I say I have rights to it? When I sell it, do I not surrender something, namely, those rights? What has this surrendering to do with permissions?"

"What it means to own is a fascinating question. Consider the many ways we use the word—'I own up to what I did', 'I own the boy to be my child', 'He is my own', 'I own him'—besides using it to mean what we usually think we mean when we speak of ownership. If we restrict ourselves to this last case, it seems fair to say that what we mean by the word is a relationship between persons and things whereby the exclusive use of the things by some, who are called owners, is permitted while the same use by others, the non-owners, is forbidden. Those others are then said to have no right to them. The right the owners claim to the things is but the law's permitting them to make such arrangements for their use as they shall, within certain limits, think best. In a sale then, the seller does not sell any rights in the sense of private possessions; he removes himself as a beneficiary of the law's permission to perform certain actions without public interference with respect to the property. Nor does the buyer acquire any such private rights, he merely succeeds to the law's permission and protection that his seller previously enjoyed. In short, in this case, as in that of the man who stopped us, the possession of a right is nothing but the law's permission to perform certain actions without public interference."

I am still somewhat skeptical, however. "This answer still seems to me to fall short of what I mean when I say that I have a right. It grounds something I have on what another is willing to permit. Let me put my objection this way: Why are certain actions permitted and others not? Is it not because one has a right to do them rather than that one has a right to do them because they are permitted?"

My friend answers, "Do you remember that a while ago I said the law commanded, permitted, or forbade actions with respect to the common good, and that, with respect to permitted actions, it said that it was all right to do them? Do you recall that this was because those actions either left alone, or only slightly harmed, that good? What this means is that the law aims at expressing what it is right to do. Your right, as you call it, is derived from, and is wholly dependent on, what is right, that is, on what the law seeks to determine and express. Hence although it is true that the law is grounded in something higher than itself, that something is not your private rights. It is the right in itself."

"Well, I still think you are wrong. You turn my rights into law-given permissions and then make these laws disappear into something you call the right in itself. Are you really prepared to say that when persons say they have rights to this and to that, to do this and to do that, they have nothing at all beyond permission from some law grounded on some vague 'right in itself'?"

"Yes."

"But are there not some actions that a law has to permit or forbid if it is to be a law at all? And are not these the actions that I have a natural right to do? What about the words of the Declaration of Independence: 'We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights' What about the Bill of Rights and the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and its Declaration of Human Rights? What about our political heritage and, increasingly, the whole world's too? Are you going to tell me that all these words mean nothing and that much blood has been shed over nothing at all?"

"No, I am not quite saying that. But since you have moved rapidly from the area of legal or civil rights to that of human or natural rights, perhaps you would tell me a little about them?"

"Certainly. Every person is born into the world with certain inalienable rights. These are his by nature, and no one has to be

granted them by governments or laws. Rather do they flow out of a person's nature and it is up to the law to recognize them and render their exercise possible. Among them are the right to life and physical integrity, to reputation, to liberty, to property, to a livelihood, to marriage, to religious worship, to education, to association, and to freedom of expression. To say that these rights are inalienable is to say that they cannot be given away, sold, or renounced to the state, society, or other persons; and that no agents, in turn, can take the rights away from the person and must protect and foster them. The state, indeed, only exists for the sake of that protection and fostering."

"Very good. It does seem to me I have heard some of this before. But tell me, can these rights ever come into conflict with one another?"

"What do you mean?"

"For example, could one man's right to education conflict with another's right to property? Or could one's right to liberty conflict with another's right to a livelihood? Could one's right to freedom of expression ever clash with another's right to his reputation?"

"Yes, I suppose some such conflicts are possible. But what are you getting at?"

"Only that I am a little surprised that the right could ever be at war with itself."

"But we are not talking about what you so grandly keep calling 'the right'. We are talking about rights."

"And what is their relation?"

"I haven't the foggiest idea because I am not sure what you mean by 'the right'."

"Well, let's go back to your list of rights and try to be a little more precise about them. Precisely what is such a right—for example, your right to liberty? What exactly do you mean by the phrase?"

"The right to liberty? Let me see. . . liberty . . . freedom. Maybe I mean something like legal ability, the ability to do what I want to do whenever I want to do it."

"You mean the power to do it?"

"I don't really know. Somehow power doesn't sound quite right. Might and right seem to me quite different. I guess it must be something indefinable, like the notion of straight."

"Would you say the same about the right to association?"

"No, that seems a little easier. The right to association is the right that persons have to meet together for all sorts of purposes, for example, to petition the government or to have a hunting party "

"Yes, I know what it is to associate But what is the right to it?"

"It's something I have which makes it wrong for the government to prevent me from associating "

"Under all circumstances?"

"Well, not exactly."

"And what sort of thing is the right itself?"

"I am not sure I cannot put it into words, but 'power' occurs to me again and again I guess the right to associate is the power to do so, not the physical power, but the legal power "

"And legal power comes from law?"

"It seems it would have to."

"So we are back with law. Can you do any better with the right to life?"

"The right to life? No, I don't think so "

"Well, let me try to help you It seems to me that every one of your natural and inalienable rights is a legal power that you have and that what it means for this power to be yours is only that another has a natural and inalienable obligation not to interfere with your exercise of it For example, your right to life is but your legal power to defend yourself when attacked, and this power is nothing but the obligation that all unauthorized others have not to take it from you Your right to association is the prohibition of others' preventing you, under most circumstances, from associating Your right to liberty is the others' obligation not to interfere unreasonably with your movement "

"All right, but I don't see how that helps. These obligations and prohibitions are duties and their counterparts are my rights. Rights and duties are like the two sides of a coin. If I have a right, another has a duty to respect it."

"Well, perhaps so. But let's look a little more closely now into the prohibition against interfering with your movement, for this prohibition is, you agree, if not the substance, then certainly the counterpart, of your 'right to liberty' Does the government lack the legal or the physical power—the right or the might—to interfere with your movements?"

"The legal power, obviously, for it is certainly stronger than I am."

"But in order for this incursion by the government to be forbidden must there not be another and higher law and power forbidding it?"

"Yes, I suppose so "

"But since the government is prohibited by this higher law from interfering with certain actions, must not we say that it is by virtue of this very same prohibition that the citizens are permitted to do them, whatever the government may say—just as, in the case of the man who tried to prevent our progress down the street, we could infer from the prohibition on his act the permission granted ours?"

"Yes "

"And did we not agree earlier that a legal permission was granted because the permitted act either did not touch, or only insignificantly harmed, the common good?"

"Yes "

"And did we not also agree that when it permitted an action, the law said that it was "all right" for the agent to do it?"

"Yes "

"Would you object to my calling this higher law by a name it has had for many centuries, namely, the natural law?"

"No "

"Well then, can you now tell me what is the difference between these two expressions: Acts by a citizen that do not touch, or only slightly harm, the common good are by the natural law all right to do, and, The citizen has a natural right to do certain things?"

"No, I cannot see any difference at all between them "

"Well, to me too it seems that they are exactly the same. But notice, we are saying now about natural or human rights just what we said earlier about legal rights, namely, that it is law that constitutes them and that, being but permissions given by the law in view of the good, they not only have no existence independent of law but are also wholly derived from law "

"It looks like that."

Here my friend leaves me to ponder and question over again what he has told me. Legal rights are law-given permissions of actions that are judged not to touch, or to harm only slightly, the common good. These laws, in turn, are based on a judgment concerning the right in itself, that is, concerning what it is right to do

if the common good is to be achieved. A higher law, sometimes called the natural law, determines and expresses what it is right in itself to do. Natural or human rights are also permissions of actions, but the law which permits these directly, and the common good at which it aims, is broader and deeper than that at which human law aims. Lastly, rights are not private but public. That is, the law which permits actions, whether it be human or some other, applies to all in the community, and this one-many relationship precludes thinking of rights as things privately owned which are, as it were, emanations from each individual.

If what my friend took so much trouble to tell me is correct, we should be able to resolve in its terms five of the oppositions in which the notion of rights figures prominently. Each of these oppositions often seems beyond reconciliation. The first involves a distinction, familiar to all law students, between a legal right and a remedy, and this opposition arises when a statute of limitations is invoked. After the period of time specified in the statute has elapsed and the plaintiff has, as a result, become legally precluded from evicting the trespasser on his land, it is asked whether the plaintiff has been deprived of his right to his land or merely of his remedy for its repossession. The discussion can be carried on endlessly as long as one of the premises is that the landowner's legal right to his land is something other than the permission the law gives to his evicting a trespasser. If the right to land is nothing but the legally enforced permission to evict, then evidently to prohibit eviction is to withdraw both remedy and right. the right is nothing but the remedy.

Another alleged dichotomy is that between a right and a privilege. This dichotomy introduces, it is true, a dimension which requires the preservation of some kind of distinction, though not an opposition, between the two, namely the dimension of grace, mercy, or undeservedness. In most cases, however, a right and a privilege are the same thing. Both are permissions of action given by public authority, and hence it is futile to argue whether driving a car on a public highway is a right or a privilege. So long as a law exists which permits drivers with licenses to drive on public roads, it is only a matter of words whether this permission is styled a right or a privilege.

A third instance was touched on in the dialogue: the case of conflicting rights. The alleged conflict between property rights and civil rights was a prominent example in the 1960s and one nowadays

could cite the alleged conflict between the right to choose and the right to life. When the questions are posed in terms of the claims of one right against another, it is impossible to avoid emotional collisions and half-baked intellectual compromises posing as solutions. If it is seen, however, that the demand for the recognition of abortion rights, for example, is but a demand that the law, affirming that the common good requires that women who want to abort their pregnancies should be able to have it done safely and legally, permit doctors to perform abortions; and if it is seen that the demand for the recognition of the right to life is but a demand that the law, recognizing that the common good requires the preservation of human life, protect that life as much as possible, then the question of abortion can be argued at the proper level and in the proper terms. Those terms concern whether the common good does demand that doctors be allowed to perform abortions and, if so, under what circumstances

A fourth question concerns the often-used phrase "deprivation or rights." Our analysis does not so much clarify a problem here as it makes it evident that the phrase is ultimately meaningless. The word "deprivation" suggests the taking away of something private, and as we have tried to show, legal permissions of action are not private. Hence, although legal permissions can be revoked, no one can strictly speaking be deprived of his rights. This is of course not to say that some persons cannot by force prevent others from doing what the law in fact permits them to do

The fifth question involves the so-called dichotomy between rights and duties. Rights and duties are said to be the opposite sides of a coin. If I have a right to walk down the street, you are supposed to have a corresponding duty, that is, the duty not to hinder me. There is a serious difficulty with the analogy of the coin, however. The dichotomy suggests that there is an absolutely sharp dividing line between a right and a duty. In fact, however, such a radical separation is illusory. It becomes perfectly clear, when we think about it, that if I am walking peacefully down the street, you have not only a duty, but you have also a right, not to hinder me. Similarly, a policeman whose duty it is to direct traffic has also a right to direct it. We may say that everything one has a duty to do, one has also a right to do.

How then shall we talk about rights and duties? That there is a distinction between them is clear, but that this distinction is

not illuminated by the coin analogy is also clear. I turn for help to logic, specifically to the logical relation that obtains between two pairs of propositions in the square of opposition.

The relation that will help us is subalternation, and it exists between the universal and particular forms of two propositions which have the same subject and predicate when both are affirmative or both negative. Thus the universal affirmative, "Every man is mortal," and the particular affirmative, "Some man is mortal," are subalternates; so are the universal negative, "No stone is mortal," and the particular negative, "Some stone is not mortal."

Subalternation exists not only in the categorical square of opposition—the one just described—but also in the modal square of opposition, and it is with this latter than we will be concerned. "Every *S* is *P*" and "Some *S* is *P*" are subalternates in the categorical square of opposition. "*S* must be *P*" and "*S* may be *P*" are such in the modal square. Similarly, on the negative side of the categorical square, "No *S* is *P*" and "Some *S* is not *P*" are subalternates, and to these correspond "*S* cannot be *P*" and "*S* may not be *P*" in the modal square.

It is the case with subalternates that if the universal is true, then the particular is true also, for the particular is included in the universal. Similarly, then, in the modal square, if the first proposition is given, the second is also given. If I "have a duty" to do something, I also "have a right" to do it.

The modal square of opposition, however, can do more for us than help us analyze the relation of rights to duties. It can also enable us to relate precisely rights, duties, the law, and the right to one another, for it is literally true to say that whatever I have a duty to do, I must do, and that whatever I have a right to do, I may do or have the permission to do. So the affirmative side of the modal square of opposition may be read directly as the affirmative side of what I might call a square of action (see Appendix 1). Thus whatever I must do, I may do. Since affirmative law—both civil and natural—by its commands and implicit permissions, enunciates and determines what I must do and what I may do, it is related to the affirmative side of the square as well as to duties and rights. The right in itself belongs in the square too, since it is the grand function of affirmative law to declare what it is right to do or not do.

The relations connecting rights, duties, law, and the right that exist in the affirmative side of the square exist also in its negative side. Negative law by its prohibitions determines what I must not do—what I have a duty not to do. By what it condones it determines what I do not have to do—what I have a right not to do, what it is all right not to do.

The modal square can be read as a square of action not only in terms of the affirmative and negative sides separately but also in terms of the relation to one another of the pairs of elements that make up those sides. Just as “*S* must be *P*” is the contradictory of “*S* may not be *P*,” and “*S* cannot be *P*” the contradictory of “*S* may be *P*,” so “I must do *X*,” a duty, is the contradictory of “I do not have to do *X*,” a right; and “I cannot do *X*,” a duty, is the contradictory of “I may do *X*,” a right. Finally, just as “*S* must be *P*” cannot coexist with its contrary, “*S* cannot be *P*,” but “*S* may be *P*” can coexist with its subcontrary, “*S* may not be *P*,” so “I must do *X*” cannot coexist with its contrary, “I cannot do *X*,” but “I may do *X*” can coexist with its subcontrary, “I do not have to do *X*.”

At this point someone might say, “This is all very interesting, if a bit obscure. But is there no more reason than this for dragging us through all this logical jargon?” Yes, there are two very good reasons. In the first place, the assimilation of the modal square to rights, duties, law, and the right sheds considerable light on some of the writings of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke; by clarifying some of the important obscurities contained in those writings, it enables us to say where they are wrong.

By virtue of these writings we have become accustomed to considering government, or state, or society, as entities defined by their distinction from the individual. The individual—and the name means, literally, atom—is conceived by them as a point surrounded by “natural rights,” some of which he “surrenders” when he “enters” society, but others of which he retains because of their inalienable character. The “state of nature,” as the prepolitical life is called, is the home of freedom, liberty, and the full exercise of all natural rights. Because of certain inconveniences in this state, however, it is said that men have established another state, the state of civil society: a state characterized by law, coercion, duty, and obligation. This habitual way of thinking takes from Hobbes the identification of natural right with liberty or freedom: “The right of nature, which Writers commonly call *Jus Naturale*, is the Liberty each man hath

to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own Nature . . . LIBERTY or FREEDOM, signifieth (properly) the absence of opposition."¹ It also takes from Hobbes the opposition of law to right and of obligation to liberty:

. . . because right, consisteth in Liberty to do or to forbear; whereas law, determineth and bindeth to one of them so that Law, and Right, differ as much, as Obligation and Liberty; which in one and the same matter are inconsistent.²

On the other hand, this habitual view takes from Locke the conviction that the prepolitical existence of man is not quite as bad as Hobbes painted it, and that the notion that the public authority can never legitimately do more than further a common good which is defined as the preservation of the lives, liberties, and estates of the citizens

But though men when they enter into society give up the equality, liberty, and executive power they had in the state of nature into the hands of the society, to be so far disposed of by the legislative as the good of the society shall require, yet it being only with an intention in everyone the better to preserve himself, his liberty, and property, for no rational creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse, the power of the society, or legislative constituted by them, can never be supposed to extend farther than the common good, but is obliged to secure everyone's property by providing against those three defects above-mentioned that made the state of nature so unsafe and uneasy.³

An important measure of political progress or regress is in this view the lesser or greater encroachment by the public authority on the private and inalienable rights of the individual citizen. Such an analysis of political life and of law has often enough been criticized, but I think we may now go further and suggest why it is erroneous. At the same time we may find out why it sounds strange to our ears to say that a man has a right to do his duty.

Locke's and Hobbes's view of politics and of man presupposes that the human good is individual and defined by an impulse toward self-preservation, and by the natural right, flowing from that fundamental and necessary impulse, to do anything which promotes it

¹ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1914), 106

² *Ibid.*, 107

³ John Locke, *Second Treatise on Government*, (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1952), 73

and to forbear from doing anything that hinders it. It assumes, therefore, that the human good is to be found in the bottom half of the square of action, for that is the home, as we can see, of "mays" and "don't have to's", that is, of rights to do and of rights not to do, of what it is all right to do and what it is all right not to do.

This realm, furthermore, because it does not present the "must" or "must not" of duty, becomes also the home of individual liberty—or freedom—for liberty is nothing if it is not a lack of constraint. Since constraint and force are opposed to liberty, however, and law imposes duties and obligations by force and constraint, the human good becomes also defined in opposition to law. Thus Locke asks, "If man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said, if he be absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject to nobody, why will he part with his freedom, why will he give up his empire and subject himself to the dominion and control of any other power?"⁴

Because the makers of our political myth have placed the human good in the bottom half of the square, law, society, and government come to be spoken of popularly as encroaching on the freedom of the individual. Law is opposed to liberty and duties are contrasted with rights. To speak of a man's right to do his duty, therefore, seems strange indeed. But that is only because this view of things political is wrong, and this for two reasons. In the first place, the bottom of the square of action—the realm of natural rights and freedom—which, on this account, generates and limits the top half of the square—the realm of human law, duty, and obligation—is, as we saw, itself derived from and wholly dependent on another law, the natural law. It is but the realm of those actions which are, by that natural law, all right to do or all right not to do because they are neither prohibited nor commanded by that law.

In the second place, the realm of human law is itself neither posterior to, nor limited by, the realm of natural rights and liberty. Human law is a particularization and determination of the natural law and derives from it, and the only rights related to it are the legal rights which are derived from it because they are but its implicit permissions put in another way. It is the natural law and the permissions implicitly granted by it (natural rights properly

⁴ Locke, *Second Treatise on Government*, 70

understood) that limit human law (and civil rights), not natural rights understood as independent and self-derived entities.

The second benefit of assimilating the modal square of opposition to rights, duties, law, and the right is that it enables us to articulate some thoughts about the right and the wrong which, though unusual, still merit consideration. It can be argued, a propos of the true and the false, that adding to a statement the assertion that the statement is true does not add anything to its content. That a statement being made is true is asserted simultaneously with the assertion of the statement itself. Similarly, concerning the so-called false, it can be convincingly argued that the false as such—as distinct from true negation—is inconceivable, that it does not exist, that therefore it cannot be meant, and hence that all false statements are ultimately meaningless puffs of air.

I now propose something much more scandalous than that: the right and the wrong stand in exactly the same relation to action that the true and false do to speech. I mean that adding to a command or prohibition the assertion that it is right to do or not do what is commanded or forbidden, or to a permission that it is all right to do or not do what is permitted, does not add anything to either command, prohibition, or permission. Similarly, concerning the wrong, adding to a command that it is wrong not to do it, to a prohibition that it is wrong to do it, and to a condoning that it is not wrong to do what is not forbidden, adds nothing to any of these. Moreover, the wrong as such—except, that is, as the negation of the right—is inconceivable, does not exist, cannot be done; and all wrong actions are, insofar as they are wrong, meaningless.

I can hear the howls of protest and derision right now, but let the argument be made. First and very briefly, the right. If we look at the wording of laws and judicial decisions we shall find, for the most part, that whereas this wording states that something shall or shall not be done, may be done or need not be done, none declares in addition, and in so many words, that it is right that this or that should be done or not done. Such a state of affairs is inexplicable except on the supposition that it would be redundant if not ridiculous for someone speaking in the name of the right to command, forbid, or permit something and then add that it was right to do or not do what had been commanded or prohibited, or that it was all right to do what had been sanctioned or condoned. Just as every statement carries within itself an implied assertion

of its truth, so every command, permission, or prohibition carries within itself an implied declaration that it is right to do or not do what is commanded, permitted, or forbidden. I am not saying that every commanded, permitted, or forbidden act is rightly so designated, but only that everyone who commands, permits, or forbids asserts simultaneously with his words, but perhaps erroneously, that it is right to do what he says.

Now we must show that the wrong does not exist. Let us go back to the square of action and begin with an affirmative precept "You must drive carefully," or rather its double negative equivalent, "You must not drive carelessly." The contradictory of this latter is, "You may drive carelessly." Now two contradictories cannot coexist, so if it is right to drive carefully, then "You may drive carelessly" must be wrong. But to say that "You may drive carelessly" is wrong is to say nothing else than "You must not drive carelessly"; and this is but the double negative restatement of the original "You must drive carefully." In other words, to think "You may drive carelessly" is wrong is to think "You must drive carefully" is right. There is no transition at all between thinking the one statement as wrong and thinking its contradictory as right. Hence it is impossible for a negative precept to be conceived as wrong. No sooner do we try to grasp one, precisely as wrong, than it turns into an affirmative precept, and each of these, as we have already seen, carries within itself an implied affirmation of its own rightness. No sooner is a precept established as right, in other words, than its contradictory, unthinkable as such, goes up into thin air and leaves the field occupied by the double negative, and therefore tautologous, form of the original precept.

Suppose, however, that we now think an affirmative precept as wrong: "You must kill all your prisoners of war." Then its contradictory, "You do not have to kill all your prisoners of war," must be right. But if we ask ourselves what we mean when we say that "You must kill all your prisoners of war" is a wrong precept, we discover that we mean simply that "You do not have to kill all your prisoners of war" is right. In other words, just as the attempt to grasp the wrongness of a wrong negative precept left us holding only a double negative form of a right precept, so the attempt to grasp the wrongness of a wrong affirmative precept leaves us, without any transition whatever, with a single negative form of a right precept.

Hence the wrong, as a predicate of a precept, and therefore as having independent significance, cannot be grasped in thought. No sooner do we try to think such a wrongness than we are led either to a double or to a single negative right. The wrong exists only in the negativity of negative right. But the negativity in a precept of negative right seems unthinkable in itself. For example, how can we think the negativity of *not* having to kill all prisoners of war? We can only think of sparing them, that is, of keeping our trigger fingers at rest, and so forth. I think it right, therefore, to insist that the wrong as something possessing independent significance does not exist. All that exists in the realm of precepts of action is the right.

But does it therefore also follow that only the right can be done? I can again hear the groundswell of protest at the suggestion of such a ludicrous, not to say offensive, possibility. "The wrong unable to be done! Are you mad? Look at the frightful atrocities that men have committed against one another and themselves over the ages! Look within yourself! Can you ignore all that evidence of evil doing and blithely say that the wrong cannot be done?" Yes. If the wrong could be done, it would be possible to mean something by the word "wrong" when it is predicated of an individual action. If the word has meaning when said of an individual action, it must also have one when that individual action is formulated in speech and then universalized. We have shown, however, that it can then have no meaning. Hence it must also not have one when it is said of an individual act. What then? How can we combine our awareness of the horrible actions men perform with straight thinking about them?

We can get at this problem first by way of analogy to the true and the false. The false does not exist except as the negation of the true, and therefore in itself it cannot be meant and is not there to be designated by a significant word. This is to say that all affirmations are true and that a false proposition is, inasmuch as it is false, not a proposition at all but mere sound. By analogy, then, to say that the wrong cannot be done and does not exist, and that one means nothing by the word, is to say that all actions are right and that a wrong action is, as wrong, not an action at all but mere agitation.

Can it then be said that all actions are right? It can on the universal level, where, just as to think a proposition true is not

different from simply thinking the proposition itself, so to command or permit an action as right ("To drive carefully is right") is not different from simply commanding or permitting the action itself ("Drive carefully") But if it be true on the practical level also that all actions are right, then just as all facts which are truly called false are not facts at all, so those actions which are truly called not right would not be actions at all. To say this raises the question whether just as a fact is constituted as a fact precisely by its being true, so a human act is constituted as a human act precisely by its being right

I say human actions are so constituted They are means to ends, for we do what we do, or say what we say, either for its own sake or for the sake of something else. In either case, however, it is in the light of the good, as we consider it, that we act and speak. If, then, there be a good for the human being transcending, containing, and ordering all particular goods, then those actions which are either means to such an end or are themselves the acts of attaining such an end, will deserve properly and especially the name both of human actions and of right actions They will deserve to be called human actions because they are ultimately ordered to a human good, that is, a rational supreme good. They will deserve to be called right actions because we say that one who is learning a trade does the right thing when he so handles the intermediate steps in his art as most effectively to reach the end, and because those things which promote the good are said to be right Hence for actions to be truly human actions, for them to be meaningful actions, and for them to be right actions, will be one and the same thing All human actions will be right, and the so-called wrong act, insofar as it is wrong, not being a means to that ultimate end and good, will in all literalness, meaning nothing, be meaningless To say this is to say that a fully human being cannot fail to do the right It is to say that right and might, necessity and freedom, far from being in combat, merge in the depths of the mind and heart of the truly human person

But—and this is a most important but—just as in the case of false statements it is possible for ignorant, bigoted, and deceiving men to trespass on the goodwill, credulity, and compassion of others by making them think their statements are more than puffs of air, so here we must admit that it is possible, all too possible, for members of a divided and discordant humanity not only to mutilate being

but also to lead others to think that such subrational agitations are instrumental in the attaining of the proper end of the human person. As judges, however, knowing ourselves, we must weep rather than rage at the spectacle of what this dreadful possibility has engendered and continues to engender.

There is one absolutely crucial difference between meaningless speech and meaningless action. The remedy for wrong speech is dialectic, for by revealing to us the ultimate absurdity of our wrong opinions, it can restore meaning to speech. Dialectic cannot, however, reveal to us the ultimate absurdity of our false action. It cannot therefore make us at one with ourselves, lead us out of the cave, and restore meaning to our actions and lives. Our cure lies in another dimension altogether.

St John's College

Appendix 1

The Modal Square of Opposition Understood As a Square of Action

COMMANDS

What **MUST** be done
I have a **DUTY** to do it
I have a **RIGHT** to do it
It is **RIGHT** to do it

FORBIDS

What **MUST NOT** be done
I have **NO DUTY** to do it
I have **NO RIGHT** to do it
It is **NOT RIGHT** to do it

LAW

PERMITS

What **MAY** be done
I have **NO DUTY** not to do it
I have a **RIGHT** to do it
It is **ALL RIGHT** to do it

CONDONES

What **MAY NOT** be done
I have **NO DUTY** to do it
I have a **RIGHT** not to do it
It is **ALL RIGHT** not to do it

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY TODAY

NICHOLAS RESCHER

PERHAPS THE MOST STRIKING FEATURE of professional philosophy in North America at this historic juncture (1992) is its scope and scale.¹ The historian Bruce Kuklick entitled his informative study of academic philosophy in the United States, *The Rise of American Philosophy 1860–1930*,² even though his book dealt only with the Department of Philosophy of Harvard University. This institution's prominence on the American philosophical scene in the early years of the century was such that this parochial-seeming narrowing of focus to one single department—with its half-dozen or so philosophers—was not totally absurd for the period at issue. But today it would certainly be so. The American Philosophical Association, to which most United States academic practitioners of the discipline belong, presently has more than eight thousand members (see Appendix 1), and the comprehensive *Directory of American Philosophers* for 1992–1993 lists well over ten thousand philosophers affiliated to colleges and universities in the United States and Canada.³

¹ This essay is an expanded revision of a lecture on “The State of North American Philosophy Today” delivered at the Pontifical University of Salamanca in April of 1992. This presentation was followed by a lively discussion that stretched my knowledge of Spanish to—nay even beyond—its limits. I want to emphasize here that I do not necessarily welcome the various facts which this essay tries to describe more or less objectively. However, I found it an instructive exercise to try to see American philosophy from the vantage point of an external perspective.

² Bruce Kuklick, *The Rise of American Philosophy 1860–1930* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).

³ For reasons less of cultural imperialism than of substantive similitude and scholarly kinship, United States and Canadian philosophizing has been aggregated into one overarching “North American” whole for the purposes of the present discussion. Perhaps this overlooks some subtle differences in approach—even as United States and Canadian spoken English exhibit subtle differences. But from a Hispanic—let alone an Iberian—vantage point these differences are insignificant.

Admittedly, this profession is small potatoes compared with other academic enterprises; the Scientific Research Society *Sigma Xi* currently has a membership of more than one hundred thousand scientists, and the Modern Language Association has more than thirty-two thousand members. All the same, a small town of not inconsiderable size could be populated exclusively with contemporary North American academic philosophers. To be sure, its demographics would be rather unusual. Only just under twenty percent would be women; and blacks, Hispanics, and Asian-Americans would (each) constitute just over one percent of the population. (However much it may annoy the liberals among us, the fact is that the condition of the American philosophy professoriate is still very much a matter of live white males teaching about dead ones.)⁴ The social classes above and below the middle are underrepresented in this community, and a disproportionate fraction of its members comes from families of professional status. Moreover, for reasons that require a deeper sociological analysis than can be attempted here, the profession attracts a disproportionately larger fraction of Catholics (generally practicing ones), Jews (generally nonpracticing ones), and immigrants.

In an academic discipline of American philosophy's present size, two different—and sometimes opposed—tendencies are at work to create a balance of countervailing forces. The one is an impetus to separateness and differentiation—the desire of individual philosophers to “do their own thing,” to have projects of their own and not be engaged in working on just the same issues as everyone else. The other is an impetus to togetherness: the desire of philosophers to find companions, to be able to interact with others who share their interest to the extent of providing them with conversation partners and with a readership of intellectual cogeners. The first, centrifugal tendency means that philosophers will fan out across the entire reach of the field—that most or all of the “ecological niches” within the problem-domain will be occupied.⁵ The second,

⁴ Of the three top Ivy League institutions (Yale, Harvard, and Princeton), none presently has more than one woman full professor in its philosophy department. This state of affairs is in general rather the rule than the exception.

⁵ There is a considerable variety of explanations of the nature of philosophizing that would account for the diversified proliferation of projects and positions that actually exists. Cf. Nicholas Rescher, *The Strife of Systems* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985).

centripetal tendency means that most or all of these problem-subdomains will be multiply populated that groups or networks of kindred spirits will form so that the community as a whole will be made up of subcommunities united by common interests (more than by common opinions), with each group divided from the rest by different priorities as to what "the really interesting and important issues" are. Accordingly, the most striking aspect of contemporary American philosophy is its fragmentation. The scale and complexity of the enterprise is such that if one seeks in contemporary American philosophy for a consensus on the problem agenda, let alone for agreement on the substantive issues, then one is predestined to look in vain. Here theory diversity and doctrinal dissonance are the order of the day, and the only interconnection is that of geographic proximity.⁶ Such unity as American philosophy affords is that of an academic industry, not that of a single doctrinal orientation or school. Every doctrine, every theory, every approach finds its devotees somewhere within the overall community.⁷ On most of the larger issues there are no significant majorities. To be sure, some uniformities are apparent at the localized level. (In the San Francisco Bay area one's philosophical discussions might well draw on model theory; in Princeton possible worlds would be brought in, in Pittsburgh pragmatic themes would be prominent, and so on.) But in matters of method and doctrine there is a proliferation of schools and tendencies, and there are few if any pervasively dominant trends. Balkanization reigns supreme.

The centrifugal tendencies are, however, in a way counterbalanced by centripetal ones. North American philosophers appear to be exceedingly gregarious by standards prevailing anywhere else. Apart from the massive American Philosophical Association, there presently exist some one hundred twenty different philosophical

⁶ See Bruce Kuklick, "Does American Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?" in *American Philosophy*, ed. Marcus G. Singer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 177-89.

⁷ The scattershot nature of recent American philosophy is illustrated—among innumerable examples—by *The Future of Metaphysics*, ed. Robert E. Wood (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970). Not only do the seventeen contributors disagree as to the future of metaphysics, they also are in dissensus about its past as well: what the definitive tasks of the field are, which practitioners are the best role-models, and which approaches have proved to be the most promising.

societies in the United States and Canada,⁸ twenty-three of which claim over five hundred members. In the main, these societies are of three types: subdisciplinary (for example, Metaphysical Society of America, Philosophy of Science Association), geographic (for example, Minnesota Philosophical Society, Virginia Philosophical Association), and person oriented (for example, Leibniz Society of North America, C S Peirce Society). These societies provide the lifeblood of personal interaction among American philosophers. Their aggregate effect is a vast network of meetings and conferences that keep colleagues with common interests in ongoing interaction with one another. Even the most energetic and leisured of persons would find it next to impossible to attend all the professional conferences and symposia that would be of interest to an even modestly versatile philosopher.⁹ Some of the bigger of these societies adhere to large international bodies such as the International Federation of Philosophical Societies or the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science. The activities of these UNESCO sponsored umbrella organizations, however, have little impact on American philosophers and none on American philosophy.

Outside the instructional context, philosophy also plays some role in various research centers that are affiliated with major universities, such as the National Humanities Center in the Research Triangle of North Carolina, the Center for Values and Social Policy at the University of Colorado, and the Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh. Apart from colleges and

⁸ See the *Directory of American Philosophers 1992-93* (Bowling Green Philosophical Documentation Center, 1992), 176-91.

⁹ For one perfectly average month, October 1991, the "Philosophical Calendar" of the American Philosophical Association listed the following events: (1) Conference on System and Teleology in Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, Memphis State University, (2) Mountain-Plains Philosophy Conference, Colorado State University, (3) American Maritain Association colloquium, Washington, D C, (4) Society for Health and Human Values meeting, St Louis, Missouri, (5) Virginia Philosophical Association meeting, Norfolk, Virginia, (6) Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy meeting, Memphis, Tennessee, (7) Conference on Social Theory, Politics and the Arts, Jacksonville, Florida, (8) International John Macmurray Society meeting, Marquette University, (9) Midwest Radical Scholars Conference, Loyola University, Chicago, (10) Wheaton College Philosophy Conference, Wheaton, Illinois, (11) Tenth Annual Joint Meeting of the Society for American Greek Philosophy and the Society for the Study of Islamic Philosophy and Science, Baruch College, New York.

universities, American philosophy gets a (very modest) slice of the academic research support pie through such federal programs as the National Endowment for the Humanities and the National Science Foundation. Moreover, such privately funded providers of research support as the Guggenheim Fellowship Program or the MacArthur Foundation's "Creative Genius" Program also on occasion support the work of philosophers. In North America, philosophy is securely entrenched in the academic scheme of things. Nevertheless, the share of philosophy-and-religion is less than two percent of the college book market in the United States, less than one quarter of that of psychology.¹⁰ (In America, Freud and company have clearly won a signal cultural victory.)

One feature that distinguishes present activity in American academic philosophy from the situation at any earlier stage is the rise of historical studies; for in North America, research in the history of philosophy is currently in a remarkably active and flourishing state. Several hundred specialized books are published in this area each year, many of them of a level of technical expertise rarely attained in American contributions of an earlier era. There exist some dozen specialist journals in the field (including *Ancient Philosophy*, *Medieval Studies*, *Hume Studies*, *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, and the *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, among others). There are also some dozen specialist societies, most of them dedicated to the work and thought of a single great thinker of former times, including Leibniz, Hume, Hegel, Kant, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Whitehead, and Santayana. One third of American philosophy Ph D theses produced in America these days relate primarily to historical issues.¹¹

It is, of course, possible and indeed necessary to distinguish between philosophers and philosophy professors—between those who are active contributors to the intellectual resources of the discipline and those who provide academic instruction in the field. But the fact is that in recent years the latter group has largely become incorporated into the former group—a growing professionalism based on more rigorous formal training and a "publish or perish"

¹⁰ Data from Fritz Machlup et al., *Information Through the Printed Word*, vol. 1 (New York: Praeger, 1978), 238.

¹¹ Data derived from annual surveys of doctoral dissertations for the 1989–1991 period in the *Review of Metaphysics* 44, no. 1, 45, no. 1, 46, no. 1.

ethic in the academy has meant that the teaching staffs in American colleges are increasingly populated by people who are productive philosophers. The fact is that American philosophers are quite productive. They publish well over two hundred books per annum nowadays. Issue by issue they fill up the pages of over one hundred seventy-five journals.¹² Given that almost four thousand philosophical publications (books or articles) appear annually in North America, and a roughly similar number of symposium papers, conference presentations, and the like, the line between teaching and substantive contribution is anything but hard and fast. To be sure, the aggregate published output of philosophers—some one hundred twenty thousand pages per annum—does not match that of other branches of the academic profession. (In 1987 alone, American scholars in English literature published five hundred forty-four articles on William Shakespeare, two hundred fifteen on John Milton, and one hundred thirty-two on Henry James.)¹³ But even without such scholarly overkill, the productivity of American philosophy is an impressive phenomenon.

Despite what Marshall McLuhan says, the book is still the key artifact of philosophizing. It continues to make a major impact, with works like W. V. Quine's *Word and Object*, Thomas Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, John Rawls' *A Theory of Justice*, and Richard Rorty's *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* casting large ripples across the pond. Nevertheless, even monographic books are declining in import, with collections of a particular author's essays or lectures often exerting an influence no less substantial. Donald Davidson's *Essays on Actions and Events* (1980) or Saul Kripke's *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Languages* (1982) are illustrations of this phenomenon. In the background looms the fact that the vast and diffuse journal literature is a formative force in present-day American philosophizing, just as potent as the domain of books.

What is distinctive in American philosophy today is less a matter of product than one of process. It seems appropriate to characterize contemporary American philosophy as a substantial in-

¹² See the *Directory of American Philosophers 1992-93*, 192-216.

¹³ Edward B. Fiske, "Lessons," *The New York Times*, 2 Aug. 1989, sec. B, p. 8. At this rate, the annual output of Shakespearean scholarships is over six times as large as the collected works of the Bard himself.

dustry with thousands of operatives, many hundreds of worksites (college departments), scores of training institutes (universities), and a prolific and diversified range of products, including not only classes but books, journals, congresses, conferences. Throughout, a high degree of scholarly competency and professionalism pervades the enterprise. Considering the quantity of philosophical writing that sees the light of print, its overall quality is respectably high—that is if one's standard gives weight to the technical dimension. (Depth of insight is another matter.) At any rate, the day of the philosopher as isolated thinker—the talented amateur with an idiosyncratic message—is effectively gone. For better or for worse, an outsider along the lines of a Spinoza or a Nietzsche would find it near to impossible to get a hearing in the North American philosophical world of today.

The recent statistics of philosophy doctorates bring some interesting facts to light (see Appendix 2). The total number of doctorates awarded by institutions of higher learning in the United States has been relatively stable at around one hundred thousand in recent years (101,000 for 1970 to 1975 and 98,700 for 1980 to 1985). But the production of philosophy doctorates has declined substantially (along with that of humanities Ph.D.'s in general), seeing a forty percent reduction from 1,178 for 1970 to 1975, to 746 for 1980 to 1985. The proportionally increasing prominence of women among the new philosophy Ph.D.'s (growing from 158, or thirteen percent of the total, for 1970 to 1975, to 161 or twenty-two percent of the total for 1980 to 1985) is a noteworthy phenomenon. Whatever victory this percentage gain represents for women seems a Pyrrhic one, however, for they are in the process of securing a somewhat larger share of a profession that is declining probably in status and certainly in economic terms. (In the American context those factors are seldom far apart.)

Employment opportunities within the philosophy industry are reasonably good for those who meet its elaborate entrance qualifications. In the later 1980s some five hundred fifty to six hundred philosophy teaching posts were advertised annually in the United States, with some eight hundred fifty job seekers in pursuit of them. Given that job seekers include people who already hold jobs but wish to change them, this would indicate that the profession is currently able to provide the great majority of its qualified practitioners with teaching jobs. As regards remuneration, the position of

philosophers is typical of that of humanists in higher education. In the early 1990s beginning assistant professors of philosophy averaged some \$28,000 per annum. Full professors of philosophy in United States colleges and universities currently have average annual salaries of some \$58,000, which compares with \$70,000 for professors of engineering, and \$84,000 for law professors¹⁴. Professors of medicine, of course, are in quite another league. Moreover, professors in general find themselves in an economically declining situation, with average salaries diminishing in real terms by over twenty percent from 1970 to 1990. It is ironic that in a period when the real cost of higher education has risen dramatically, the average real pay of those who staff the activity has declined dramatically. The reason lies in the fact that the size of the professoriate has expanded much faster than the size of its undergraduate clientele, with a negative impact both on its pay and on its status (see Appendix 1).

The growth of the profession, the growth of the system of higher education, and the eroding economic status of the professoriate all combine to make philosophy less of an elite endeavor than it used to be. This decline in elitism in American philosophy is illustrated in a graphic way by the production of Ph.D.'s in the departments of high prestige universities (see Appendix 3). Of the five traditional Ivy League institutions (Yale, Harvard, Princeton, Columbia, and the University of Pennsylvania) only one, Columbia, currently figures on the roster of North American philosophy departments most productive of Ph.D.'s. From the standpoint of Ph.D. training, the most prominent contribution is made by the big state universities (Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Texas, and Wisconsin) and by the large Catholic institutions. The biggest single producer of philosophy Ph.D.'s in North America, however, is the University of Toronto.

The very size of such an industry is intimidating and engenders humility. The individual professional confronts the sobering reflection. Consider a thought experiment. Excise from American philosophy everything that is near and dear to you—every author and book and journal you actually read, every lecture you go to hear, every colleague you interact with. The result is still a large and thriving enterprise that has a healthy and active life of its own, irrespective of such an excision. The amputation would make a

¹⁴ Salary data for 1990 to 1991 from *Academe* 77, no. 2 (1991) 9–17.

difference, but nowise a fatal one. The process as a whole would proceed much as before.

The size and scope of the academic establishment exerts a crucial formative influence on the nature of contemporary American philosophy. In the philosophical environment of the past, the role of the great figures was more prominent, and the writings of philosophers established a balance of influence for "big names" vis-à-vis "modest contributors" that was much more favorable to the former category than is the case today, when philosophical writers who make use of "the literature" are destined to take far more notice of the smaller philosopher simply because there are so many more of them.¹⁵ In the past, the philosophical situation of academically developed countries could be described by indicating a few giants whose work towered over the philosophical landscape like a great mountain range, and whose issues and discussions defined the agenda of the philosophizing of their place and time. Once upon a time, the philosophical stage was dominated by a small handful of greats. Consider German philosophy in the nineteenth century, for example. Here the philosophical scene, like the country itself, was an aggregate of principalities, presided over by such ruling figures as Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Schelling, Schopenhauer, and a score of other philosophical princelings. In North America, however, this "heroic age" of philosophy is now a thing of the past. The extent to which professionally solid and significant work is currently produced in American philosophy by academics outside the high-visibility limelight is perhaps insufficiently recognized. The fact that in philosophical teaching, the topical anthology has in recent years gained a position of equality with, if not dominance over, the monographic philosophical text or treatise is just one illustration of this phenomenon.

Until around 1914, it was religion that exerted the dominant influence on philosophers writing in America. During the era from 1914 to 1960 natural science served as the prime source of inspiration. But over the past generation the sources of inspiration have been

¹⁵ This phenomenon is reflected in the principle known in the social sciences as Rousseau's Law, which maintains that in a population of size n the number of high-visibility members stands as $\sqrt{n}$. Cf. Nicholas Rescher, *Scientific Progress* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 96-8. By Rousseau's Law, in a profession of ten thousand we would expect to find some one hundred widely recognized contributors.

greatly diversified. The stimulating essay by Richard Rorty on "Philosophy in America Today"¹⁶ both describes and celebrates the post-war era's shift from a scientific model of philosophizing to a political model wherein "literary culture" is what matters most, and wherein people proceed with "the sense that nature and scientific truth are largely beside the point and that history is up for grabs."¹⁷ But this tendentious account envisions an unrealistic uniformity. The fact is that at present philosophy is a garden where one hundred flowers bloom. In recent years the sources of influence have fragmented across the whole academic board. For inspiration some look to psychology (especially to Freud), others to economics (from Marx to von Neumann), still others to literature, or to law, and so forth. The list goes on and on. Contemporary American philosophy does not have the form of a histogram with a few major trends; it is a complex mosaic of many different and competing approaches.

Prominent examples of currently fashionable approaches are found in certain programmatic tendencies: to explicate the meaning of certain philosophical concepts by means of "truth" conditions (for example, free agency, or linguistic understanding), to explain human capacities (for example, for knowledge or for understanding) in terms of models or analogies from computing machines and "artificial intelligence" considerations; to explain human rule-following practice in terms of social policies and norms, to explain human capacities (for example, for knowledge or for understanding) on the basis of evolutionary theories and Darwinian natural selection. Each such program sets the stage for a diversified, multi-participant effect—a little "cottage industry," as it were. Often as not, these programs result from the provocation of some individual's or school's exaggerated claim along some line such as that "all evaluations simply express people's attitudes," or "all communicatively significant features of human linguistic performances are rooted in social norms."

For better or for worse, we have entered into a new philosophical era wherein what counts is not just a dominant elite but a vast host of lesser mortals. Principalities are thus notable by their absence, and the scene is more like that of medieval Europe—a collection of

¹⁶ Richard Rorty, "Philosophy in America Today," in Richard Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 211–30.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 228–9.

baronies. Scattered here and there in separated castles, prominent individuals gain a local following of loyal friends or enemies. But no one among the academic philosophers of today manages to impose his agenda on more than a minimal fraction of the larger, internally diversified community. Even the most influential of contemporary American philosophers is simply yet another—somewhat larger—fish in a very populous sea.

Appendix 4 gives some statistics regarding citations of the more influential members of the American philosophy professoriate of the present day. It is interesting to note, as this appendix indicates, that even on their home ground only a few of these American academics exert as much influence within the profession as do some of their European contemporaries. Derrida, Foucault, Habermas, and Ricoeur all easily outplay all of the home team when it comes to the statistics for citation indices (though, to be sure, those figures in Appendix 4 reflect the situation not in philosophy alone, but also in the allied humanities). However different the situation prevailing in other areas such as science or mathematics or economics, in philosophy many American professors continue to look to Europe for role models and for inspiration to a degree that would doubtlessly annoy Ralph Waldo Emerson, who looked for a declaration of intellectual independence to succeed the political one. (This is not to say that a marked provincialism is not at work in other regards. In America, as elsewhere, domestic stars of the third magnitude are far more likely to have their work noted by fellow countrymen than are foreign stars of the second magnitude.)

If one looks to such currently widespread ideological tendencies of American philosophy as analytic philosophy, neopositivism, Wittgensteinianism, hermeneutics, Heideggerianism, and the like, then one notes that virtually all of them—neopragmatism apart—have roots in European thinkers. (Europe, after all, is the home of ideologies.) But much of American philosophy—like much of American politics—is refreshingly free of ideological involvements. It addresses palpable problems by whatever means lie to hand, relying on the power of *intellectual* technology to carry the day. It looks to help whenever it can be found—and not necessarily only in the works of the big names.

The fact is that those bigger fish do not typify what the sea as a whole has to offer. Matters of philosophical history aside, some

of the salient themes and issues with which American philosophers are grappling at the present time are the following

applied ethics: ethical issues in the professions (medicine, business, law, and so forth);
 computer issues. artificial intelligence, "can machines think?"
 the epistemology of information processing,
 rationality and its ramifications;
 social implications of medical technology (abortion, euthanasia, right to life, medical research issues, informed consent),
 feminist issues;
 social and economic justice, distributive policies, equality of opportunity, human rights,
 truth and meaning in mathematics and formalized languages,
 the merits and demerits of skepticism and relativism regarding knowledge and morality,
 the nature of personhood and the rights and obligations of persons

None of these issues was put on the problem-agenda of present concern by any one particular philosopher. None arose out of a preoccupation with fundamental aspects of some already well-established issue. None arose out of one particular philosophical text or discussion. They blossomed forth like the leaves of a tree in springtime, appearing in various places at once under the formative impetus of the *Zeitgeist* of societal concern. The nature of American philosophy today is such that for the most part new ideas and tendencies have come to prominence not because of the influential impact of some specific worker's contribution but because of the disaggregated effects of a host of writers working across a wide frontier of individual efforts. Philosophical innovation today is generally not the response to the preponderant effort of pace-setting individuals, but a genuinely collective effort that is best characterized in statistical terms.

"But I really want to know what those bigger fish are thinking and teaching." Good for you! This interest of yours is perfectly appropriate—and laudable. In pursuing it, however, you must not fool yourself into thinking that the information you obtain is providing you with a satisfactory picture of American philosophy. What you will be getting is no more than a pastiche of some philosophizing done by some Americans. To see this as somehow representative and possessed of some broader cultural significance—

as usefully informative about the philosophical lay of the land in America at large—would be profoundly erroneous. Even a full account of the philosophical work of the two or three dozen most influential American philosophers would not yield a faithful portrait of the present state of American philosophy at large as reflected in the thematic structure of the present literature, the makeup of instructional curricula, or the constitution of conference programs.

Agenda enlargement is yet another of the most striking features of contemporary American philosophy. The pages of its journals and the programs of its meetings bristle with discussions of issues that would seem bizarre to their predecessors and to present-day philosophers of other places. For example, the overall program of the annual meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in December 1991 included papers such as, "Is it Dangerous to Demystify Human Rights?" "Difference and the Differend in Derrida and Lyotard," "Animal Rights Theory and the Diminishment of Infants," "On the Ecological Consequences of Alphabetical Literacy," "Is Polygamy Good Feminism?" "The Ethics of the Free Market," "Planetary Projection of the Multiple Self on Films," "The Moral Collapse of the University," and "The Construction of Female Political Identity."¹⁸ Entire societies are dedicated to the pursuit of issues, now deemed philosophical, that no one would have dreamt of considering so a generation ago. Some examples are the Society for Machines and Mentality, for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking, for the Study of Ethics and Animals, for Philosophy and Literature, for Analytical Feminism, and for the Philosophy of Sex and Love. The fact that those many hundreds of philosophers are looking for something to do that is not simply a matter of reexploring familiar ground has created a substantial population pressure for more philosophical *Lebensraum*.

The result of this agenda enlargement has been a revolutionization of the structure of philosophy itself by way of taxonomic complexification. The current (1990s) picture of the taxonomic lay of the land in North American philosophy is thus vastly more complex and ramified than anything that has preceded it. The tabulation of Appendix 5 gives an overview of the situation, which reflects the burgeoning of philosophical study and writing after World War

¹⁸ See *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* 65 (October 1991), 13–41.

II The taxonomy of the subject has burst for good all the bounds of the ancient tripartite scheme of logic, metaphysics, and ethics. Specialization and division of labor run rampant, and cottage industries are the order of the day. The situation has grown so complex and diversified that the most comprehensive recent English-language encyclopedia of philosophy¹⁹ cautiously abstains from providing any taxonomy of philosophy whatsoever. This phenomenon also goes a long way toward explaining why no one has written a comprehensive history of philosophy that carries through to the present-day scene.²⁰ Philosophy—which ought by mission to be and is by tradition an integration of knowledge—has itself become increasingly disintegrated. The growth of the discipline has forced it beyond the limits of feasible surveillance by a single mind. After World War II it became impossible for American philosophers to keep up with what their colleagues were writing.

The rapid growth of “applied philosophy”—that is, philosophical reflection about detailed issues in science, law, business, social affairs, computer use, and the like—is a striking structural feature of contemporary North American philosophy. In particular, the past three decades have seen a great proliferation of narrowly focused philosophical investigations of particular issues in areas such as economic justice, social welfare, ecology, abortion, population policy, military defense, and so on. This situation illustrates the most characteristic feature of contemporary English-language philosophizing: the emphasis on detailed investigation of special issues and themes. For better or for worse, anglophone philosophers have in recent years tended to stay away from abstract matters of wide and comprehensive scope characteristic of the earlier era of Whitehead.

¹⁹ *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan, 1967).

²⁰ John Passmore's *Recent Philosophers* (La Salle: Open Court, 1985) is as close as anything we have, but—as the very title indicates—this excellent survey makes no pretensions to comprehensiveness. In this direction an earlier multi-person survey went somewhat further, exemplifying what is the best and most that one can hope to obtain, see *Philosophy: Princeton Studies of Humanistic Scholarship in America*, ed. Roderick M. Chisholm et al. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1964). Yet not only does this book attest to the fragmentation of the field, but it conveys (from its Foreword onward) the defeatist suggestion that whatever larger lessons can be extracted from a historically minded scrutiny of the substantive diversity of the contemporary situation are destined to lie substantially in the eyes of the beholder.

or Dewey; nowadays they tend to focus their investigations on issues of small-scale detail that relate to and grow out of those larger issues of traditional concern. The turning of philosophy from globally general, large-scale issues to more narrowly focused investigations of matters of microscopically fine-grained detail is a characteristic feature of American philosophy after World War II. Its widespread use of the case-study method in philosophy is a striking phenomenon for which no one philosopher can claim credit—to a contemporary observer it seems like the pervasively spontaneous expression of “the spirit of the times.”

In line with the increasing specialization and division of labor, American philosophy has become increasingly technical in character. Philosophy historians are increasingly preoccupied with matters of small-scale philosophical and conceptual detail. Philosophical investigations make increasingly extensive use of the formal machinery of semantics, modal logic, compilation theory, learning theory, and so forth. Ever heavier theoretical armaments are brought to bear on ever smaller problem-targets in ways that occasionally make journal readers wonder whether the important principle that technicalities should never be multiplied beyond necessity has been lost sight of. There is certainly no doubt that the increasing technicalization of philosophy has been achieved at the expense of philosophy's wider accessibility—and indeed even of its accessibility to members of the profession. No single thinker commands the whole range of knowledge and interests that characterizes present-day American philosophy, indeed, no single university department is so large as to have on its faculty specialists in every branch of the subject. The field has outgrown the capacity not only of its practitioners but even of its institutions.

Do American philosophers exert influence? Here, of course, the critical question is, Upon whom? Let us first consider their influence upon other philosophers. We have already remarked that the extent to which even the “leading philosophers” manage to influence others is highly fragmentary: in each case only a small sector of the entire group is involved. Turning now to society at large, it must be said emphatically that they do not exert influence. American philosophers are not opinion-shapers: they do not have access to the media, to the political establishment, to the “think tanks” that seek to mold public opinion. Insofar as they exert an external influence at all, it is confined to academics of other fields. Professors

of government may read John Rawls, professors of literature Richard Rorty, professors of linguistics W. V. Quine. Outside the academy, however, the writings of such important contemporary American philosophers exert no influence. It was otherwise earlier in the century—in the era of such philosophers as William James, John Dewey, and George Santayana—when the writings of individual philosophers set the stage for at least some discussions and debates in a wider public. But it is certainly not so in the America of today. Philosophers (and academics in general) play very little role in the molding of an informed public opinion in the United States, such work is largely done by publicists, filmmakers, and talk show hosts. American society today does not reflect the concerns of philosophers, but the very reverse is the case: where “relevant” at all, the writings of philosophers reflect the concerns of the society.

Many philosophers are not enthusiastic about this, for American philosophers by and large see themselves, accurately enough, as cultivating one academic specialty in contrast to others—as technicians working in the realm of ideas. This means that they generally write for an audience of their fellow academics and have little interest in (or prospect of) addressing a wider public of intelligent readers. (This is another significant difference between the philosophical situation in North America and in continental Europe. American philosophy is oriented to academia and academics. By contrast, European—and especially French—philosophy is oriented to the wider culture-complex of an intelligent readership through its concern with currently controverted issues.) Moreover, “political correctness,” which has become a point of controversy on various American campuses, has made comparatively little impact among philosophers—in contrast to practitioners of such fields as legal or literary theory. Outside of rather limited circles, philosophers in America are still expected to give reasons for their contentions, rather than to paint those who dissent with the brush of fashionably attuned disapproval—let alone to resort to name calling. The high degree of its technical professionalism has tended to countervail the politicization of the field.

The prominence of specialization gives a more professional and technical cast to contemporary American philosophizing in comparison to that of other times and places. It endows the enterprise with something of that can-do spirit that one encounters in other aspects of American life. There is something of a confidence in the

power of technique to resolve the problems of the field. In this respect American philosophizing has little use for a pessimism that contents itself with a melancholic resignation to human inadequacies. Confined to the precincts of higher education, contemporary American philosophy cannot easily afford sending messages that the young are not prepared to hear.

All the same, its increasing specialization has impelled philosophy toward the ivory tower. The most recent years have accordingly seen something of a fall from grace of philosophy in American culture—not that there was ever all that much grace to fall from. For many years, the *Encyclopedia Britannica* published an annual supplement entitled the *Book of the Year*, dealing with the events of the year under such rubrics as world politics, health, music, and so forth. Until the 1977 volume's coverage of the preceding year's developments, a section of philosophy was always included in this annual series. Thereafter, however, philosophy vanished—without so much as a word of explanation. The year of America's bicentennial seemingly saw the disappearance of philosophy from the domain of things that interest Americans. At approximately the same time, *Who's Who in America* drastically curtailed its coverage of philosophers and academics generally. During this same time period, various vehicles of public opinion—ranging from *Time* to *The New York Times*—voiced laments over the irrelevance of contemporary philosophy to the problems of the human condition, and the narcissistic absorption of philosophers in logical and linguistic technicalities that render the discipline irrelevant to the problems and interests of nonspecialists.²¹ It is remarkable that this outburst indicating popular alienation from philosophy's ivory tower came at just the time when philosophers in the United States were beginning to turn with relish to the problems on the agenda of public policy and personal concern. The flowering of applied ethics (medical ethics, business ethics, environmental ethics, and the like), of virtue ethics (trust, hope, neighborliness, and so forth), of social ethics (distributive justice, privacy, individual rights, and so forth), and of such philosophical hyphenations as philosophy-and-society—and even philosophy-and-agriculture—can also be dated from just this period. By one of those ironies not uncommon in the pages of

²¹ See "What (If Anything) to Expect from Today's Philosophers," *Time*, 7 July 1966, 24–5.

history, philosophy returned to the issues of the day at almost the very moment when the wider public gave up thinking of the discipline as relevant to its concerns

The fact is that philosophy has little or no place in American popular (as opposed to academic) culture, since at this level people's impetus to global understanding is accommodated—in America, at least—by religion rather than philosophy. Philosophical issues are by nature complicated, and Americans do not relish complications, and they have a marked preference for answers over questions. The nature of the case is such that philosophers must resort to careful distinctions and saving qualifications. In this regard Americans do not want to know where the complexities lurk; they yearn for the proverbial one-armed experts who do not constantly say “on the other hand.” We are a practical people who want efficient solutions (witness the vast market for self-help books with their dogmatic nostrums)

While philosophy nowadays makes virtually no impact on the wider culture of North America, however, its place in higher education is secure. To be sure, of all undergraduates in American colleges and universities, only about half of one percent major in Philosophy (compared with nearly three percent for English, and over fifteen percent for business and management).²² But owing to philosophy's role in meeting distribution requirements it has secured a prominent place in the curricula of post-secondary education. Unlike the United Kingdom, where post-World War II philosophers held a very technical and narrowly conceived idea of what the job of philosophy is—with the result that they effectively assured the discipline's declining role in the educational system—America has seen philosophy not only survive but even thrive in higher education. It has done so in large measure by taking a practical and accommodationist turn. American philosophers have been very flexible in bending with the wind. When society demands relevancy to social concerns, a new specialty of “applied philosophers” springs forth to provide it. When problems of medical ethics or of feminist perspectivism occupy the society, a bevy of concerned young philosophers stands ready to leap into the breach.

²² Data from Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, *Carnegie Survey of Undergraduates, 1986*, as reported in *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, Feb. 5, 1986, pp. 27–30

Thus there is no question that philosophy is alive and well in America today. As long as philosophy maintains its place in collegiate education with at least two to three competent representatives at each of those several thousand institutions that grant baccalaureate degrees, it will continue as an active and productive venture

It should occasion no surprise that philosophical activity flourishes on the American academic scene in a way that reflects wider social concerns. Of the forty-five thematic sessions on the program of the American Philosophical Association's Eastern Division in 1991, six were devoted to feminist themes and two to issues relating to blacks.²³ This dedication of some fifteen percent of the program space to these issues prominent on the agenda of present-day United States politics is clearly not accidental. It does not, however, reflect a comparable prominence of these topics in the current journal literature on the subjects, where, as the *Philosopher's Index* entries indicate, the aggregate space occupied by these themes is diminutive. To a cynic, it might seem that American philosophers are seeking to offset the underrepresentation of women and blacks in their ranks by throwing words at the issues involved. (In this regard philosophers are akin to politicians, a consideration that invites second thoughts about Plato's philosopher-kings.)

Sometimes, however, what at first sight looks like a large-scale phenomenon is only the large shadow cast by a smallish object. This seems to be the case with feminist philosophy in North America. At present there are only two journals in the field (*Feminist Studies*, *Hypatia*) and only two societies (Society for Analytical Feminism, Society for Women in Philosophy). As far as philosophy goes, academic feminism, however prominent elsewhere, is at present still no more than a statistically minor blip.²⁴ (To be sure, the shift from nothing to something is always a big one.)

Insofar as American philosophers collect themselves into ideological groupings of (comparatively) substantial size, this conformation is based not on factors of substance (of doctrinal agreement) but on factors of style (of methodological commonality). One major

²³ *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, 65 (October 1991) 11-24

²⁴ See Appendixes 4 and 5

grouping—the analysts, as they have come to be called—adopts a scientific model of philosophizing and looks to the sort of detailed investigation by logico-linguistic methods of analysis that was introduced into Anglo-American philosophy in the era of G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell. The other major affinity grouping—the pluralists—looks to Continental models of philosophizing through reappraisals of the grand tradition of Western philosophy in the manner prominent in German philosophy in the time from Dilthey to Heidegger. Different culture-heroes are at issue, and different modes of procedure. The one “school” seeks to use the machinery of logic and formal semantics to extract philosophical juice from science and common sense; the other employs the methodology of historical and humanistic studies to extract lessons from the materials of cultural and intellectual history. The upshot is a difference in the substance of philosophizing that roots in a difference in the style of philosophical practice engendered by looking to rather different models of philosophizing. (The recent trend toward specialization and the division of labor, however, is just as prominent among the pluralists as among the analysts.) Analysts often as not focus upon doctrines rather than writers. They generally discuss intellectual artifacts in the manner of the introduction, “I take a realist to be someone who endorses the following three theses . . . ,” where no actual person has ever propounded those theses together in exactly that form. By contrast, the Continental style of philosophizing addresses the real (or supposedly real) views of identified philosophers, with different writers having somewhat different ideas about membership in the list of canonical authorities, each having a personal register of the good and the wicked.

An interesting—and unexpected—aspect of contemporary American philosophy relates to the fate of pragmatism. The high priests of this quintessentially American tendency of thought—C. S. Pierce, William James, John Dewey, and C. I. Lewis—while entertaining rather different conceptions of the doctrine at issue, were all agreed on the central point that the standard of merit for cognitive products (ideas, theories, methods) lay outside the realm of pure theory in the area of practical application and implementation. For them the test of our intellectual artifacts lay in their being seen as instrumentalities of effective praxis, as able to serve the communal purposes for the sake of which available resources

are instituted. But in recent years many philosophers who have laid claim to the label of "pragmatism" have subjected the traditional doctrine to a drastic sea-change. Where the classical pragmatists sought in applicative efficacy a test of objective adequacy—an individual-transcending reality principle to offset the vagaries of personal reactions—the pseudo-pragmatists turn their backs on the pursuit of objectivity and impersonality. For traditional pragmatism's communal concern with "what works out for us" they have perversely substituted an egocentrism concerned with "what works out for me (or for you)." The defining project of the pragmatic tradition—the search for objective and impersonal standards—is shattered into a fragmentation of individual impressions. We have a total dissolution—that is, destruction—of the classical pragmatic approach that saw the rational validity of intellectual artifacts to reside in their capacity to provide effective guidance toward the successful conduct of our extratheoretical affairs—in matters of prediction, planning, successful intervention in the course of nature, and like aspects of the conduct of our practical activities.

The large ongoing response to writers such as Heidegger, Derrida, and their epigones clearly shows that there is more academic hay to be made nowadays by debunking metaphysics and epistemology as traditionally conceived than by practicing them. In this light, one of the striking and paradoxical features of American philosophy today is the widespread assault by a disaffected avant-garde against the discipline as normally practiced. On many fronts a *fin de siècle* disillusionment with the enterprise is coming to expression. Some argue—be it on the basis of skepticism or relativism or scientism—that we have entered a post-philosophical era, where philosophy as traditionally conceived is no longer viable. Others argue on neo-Marxist grounds that interest (not necessarily economic but also cultural or social) is what determines all and that old-style, would-be rational philosophy is simply a covering for sexist, racist, or culturalist prejudices. Traditional philosophizing is viewed as mere ideology that should be dismissed as the prejudicial vaporings of dead white males, and the politically correct thing to do is to abandon philosophy as a venture in inappropriate elitism.²⁵ Other critiques of philosophizing issue from a basis

²⁵ Cornel West, for one, regards the reluctance of American philosophers to abandon classical issues and methods as betokening the fuddy-duddy

external to philosophy. Followers of the "critical studies" trend of literary analysis propose to deconstruct philosophical discourse to a point of a variety that renders rational deliberation unrealizable.²⁶ From the vantage point of such a postmodernist disdain for reason, traditional philosophy's commitment to the methodology of reflective analysis and impartial reasonableness continues to earn for it the sort of opposition encountered by Socrates at the very outset of the enterprise. Yet the fact that any critical examination of the scope and merits of philosophy will itself form part of the philosophical venture at large—that metaphilosophy is a part of philosophy—continues to assure the discipline a lively future despite all such critical opposition.²⁷

Insofar as this descriptive survey offers an overall interpretation, it is somewhat as follows. A century ago, the historian Henry Adams deplored the end of the predominance of the great and the good in American politics and the emergence of a new order based on the dominance of masses and their often self-appointed representatives. Control of the political affairs of the nation was flowing from the hands of a cultural elite into those of the unimposing, albeit vociferous, spokesmen for the faceless masses. In short, democracy was setting in. Exactly this same transformation from the preeminence of great figures to the predominance of mass movements is now, one hundred years on, the established situation in even so intellectual an enterprise as philosophy. In its present configuration, American philosophy indicates that the "revolt of the masses," which Ortega y Gasset thought characteristic of our era, manifests itself not only in politics and social affairs but in intel-

adherence of "an American male WASP cultural elite loyal to an older and eroding European model of culture," and as a resistance to taking the plunge into the invigorating atmosphere of a "prophetic . . . form of American left thought and action in our post-modernist moment"; Cornel West, *The American Evasion of Philosophy* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), 238–9.

²⁶ To be sure, that does not trouble them, since they see rationality itself as a form of political oppression, given the hyperdemocratic consideration that while everyone feels, only some of us trouble to think.

²⁷ The enthusiasm with which philosophers co-opt the issue of the infeasibility of philosophizing is illustrated in the recent anthology, *The Institution of Philosophy: A Discipline in Crisis*, ed. Avner Cohen and Marcello Descal (La Salle: Open Court, 1989).

lectual culture also and even in philosophy²⁸ A cynic might characterize the current situation as a victory of the troglodytes over the giants²⁹ The condition of American philosophy today is a matter of trends and fashions that go their own way without the guidance of agenda-controlling individuals This results in a state of affairs that calls for description on a statistical rather than biographical basis It is ironic to see the partisans of political correctness in academia condemning philosophy as an elitist discipline at the very moment when philosophy itself has abandoned elitism and succeeded in making itself over in a populist reconstruction. American philosophy has now well and truly left the "genteel tradition" behind.

If such a perspective is indeed valid, certain far-reaching implications follow for the eventual historiography of present-day American philosophy, for it indicates a situation with which no historian of philosophy has as yet come to terms In the heroic era of the past, the historian of the philosophy of a place and time could safely concentrate upon the dominant figures and expect thereby to achieve a certain completeness with respect to "what really mattered" Such an approach is grossly unsuited to the conditions of the present era, however Those dominant figures have lost control of the agenda To accommodate the prevailing realities, the story of present-day American philosophy must be presented in a much more aggregated and statistically articulated format Insofar as single individuals are dealt with as such, it must be done against such an enlarged background: they must now be seen as representative rather than as determinative figures, with the status of the individual philosopher selected for historical consideration generally downgraded into a merely exemplary, illustrative instance of a larger

²⁸ Ortega himself did not expect it "Philosophy needs no protection, no attention, no sympathy, no interest in the part of the masses Its perfect uselessness protects it", Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*, trans. Anthony Kerrigan (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989), 73 Ortega did not reckon with "applied philosophy"

²⁹ Richard Schlatter, the general editor of a first-rate survey of American humanistic scholarship, writes in the Foreword to the volume on philosophy "Not many of the names mentioned in these pages are recognizable as those of great intellectual leaders, and many are unknown even to an old academic hand like myself who has a fair speaking acquaintance with the various humanistic disciplines in America", *Philosophy: Princeton Studies of Humanistic Scholarship in America*, p. x

trend. The historian of American philosophy in its present-day configuration accordingly faces a task of selection entirely different in nature and scope from that which prevailed heretofore. If the development of American philosophy continues along its present path, the role of the individual, as seen in the historiography of the future, will be as the subject of a footnote illustrative of the diversified general trends and tendencies of thought to which the main body of the text will have to be dedicated.

American philosophy, then, is very much alive. But is it also well and healthy? Should one welcome or deplore the confused and dissonant scene we find about us? Should the fact that present-day American philosophers almost invariably write for other philosophers rather than address a wider public of intelligent lay readers not be seen as a substantial demerit of the enterprise?

The fact is that there is little point in lamenting what cannot be helped: one must accept the inevitable. In the present case the structure of the situation allows no alternatives. Ten able thinkers of varying background, experience, instruction, and prejudices are surely not going to reach consensus on major ideological issues—let alone ten thousand thinkers. In a society that prioritizes the pursuit of happiness and divides its ideological inclinations between life's practicalities on the one hand and pie-in-the-sky idealism on the other, philosophy's halfway house will never ever be genuinely popular. American philosophers must take their readership where they find it, and that readership will not be among the wider public but rather among their colleagues—and also, of course, among that captive audience, their students. Accordingly, American philosophy today is characterized not by uniformity and cohesion but by a luxuriant diversity that offers something to suit most every taste. This pluralistic character of American philosophy represents a realistic and effective accommodation to its envioning circumstances and conditions, and that, after all, is what health is all about.³⁰

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³⁰ I am grateful to Jon Mandle and Annamarie Morrow for their help in gathering information for the appendixes. I am indebted to Richard Gale and Laura Ruetsche for constructively critical comments.

Appendix 1

Membership in the American Philosophical Association

1965	2,624
1970	2,725
1975	2,888
1980	5,194
1985	6,874
1990	8,792

Source American Philosophical Association Secretariat

Note 1 A disproportionately large part of this membership expansion has occurred in the Pacific Division

Note 2 This increase of 235% in APA membership contrasts with an increase of 130% in undergraduate enrollments and an increase of 30% in the general population (data from U S Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1992*, 163-5) Like Americans in general, American philosophers have proven themselves to be markedly entrepreneurial.

Appendix 2

Philosophy's Part in Doctorates in the United States

	All Doctorates	Doctorates in Letters Fields	Philosophy Doctorates			Philosophy as percent of Ph D 's	Philosophy as percent of Letters Ph D 's
			Total	Men	Women		
1970-1971	32,107	2,416	394	358	36	2%	16 3%
1972-1973	34,777	2,754	409	344	65	1 2%	14 9%
1974-1975	34,083	2,495	375	318	57	1 1%	15 0%
1976-1977	33,232	2,191	330	264	66	1 0%	15 0%
1978-1979	32,730	1,919	258	204	54	0 8%	13 4%
1980-1981	32,958	1,790	280	224	56	0 8%	15 6%
1982-1983	32,775	1,580	232	170	62	0 7%	14 7%
1984-1985	32,943	1,707	234	191	43	0 7%	13 7%
1987-1988	34,839	1,180	222	172	50	0 6%	18 8%

Sources United States Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, *Digest of Education Statistics, 1985-86* (U S Government Printing Office, 1986), table 122, 124, and United States Department of Education, *Trends in Bachelor's and Higher Degrees*

Note The statistics for philosophy include philosophy and religion. The contrasting categories are the life sciences, physical sciences, and social sciences.

Appendix 3

Major Departments Producing Ph.D.'s
in the United States and Canada: 1986-1991

<u>Most Productive Institutions</u>	<u>Number of Philosophy Doctorates, 1986-1991</u>
Boston College	24
Brown University	29
Columbia University	28
Georgetown University	28
Guelph/McMaster University Joint Program	24
University of Massachusetts	28
University of Minnesota	24
SUNY Stony Brook	29
Notre Dame University	25
University of Pittsburgh	26
University of Texas	30
University of Toronto	36
Vanderbilt University	28
University of Wisconsin	32

Comparison with Ivy League Schools

Harvard	20
Yale	19
Princeton	21
Columbia	28
University of Pennsylvania	18

Note The "Catholic Big Five" (Boston College, The Catholic University of America, Fordham University, Georgetown University, and University of Notre Dame) outproduced the five Ivy League schools by 114 to 106 during this period

Source September issues of *The Review of Metaphysics*

Appendix 4

American Philosophers Cited Most Frequently, 1990–1991

Adams, Robert M	116	Kuhn, Thomas	520
Alston, William P	103	Laudan, Larry	177
Bennett, Jonathan	126	Lewis, David	429
Cavell, Stanley	201	MacIntyre, Alasdair	405
Chisholm, Roderick	177	Nagel, Thomas	255
Danto, Arthur	193	Nozick, Robert	192
Davidson, Donald	456	Nussbaum, Martha	168
Dennett, Daniel	191	Plantinga, Alvin	132
Dreyfus, Hubert	148	Putnam, Hilary	461
Elster, Jon	201	Quine, W V	502
Feyerabend, Paul	196	Rawls, John	474
Goodman, Nelson	315	Rescher, Nicholas	129
Hacking, Ian	155	Rorty, Richard	684
Harman, Gilbert	137	Searle, John	204
Hatshorne, Charles	138	Smith, John	139
Hempel, Carl G.	155	Taylor, Charles	228
Hintikka, Jaakko	136	Toulmin, Stephen	142
Kripke, Saul	237	Williams, Bernard	308

European Philosophers Cited Most Frequently, 1990–1991

Derrida, Jacques	1,982	Hare, Richard M	191
Dummett, Michael	178	Popper, Karl R	507
Gadamer, Hans-Georg	521	Ricoeur, Paul	703
Habermas, Jurgen	1,124	Strawson, Peter F	145

Source Institute for Scientific Information, *Art and Humanities Citation Index*

Note 1 It has to be remembered that these citation statistics represent not just the quality of contributions but the fashions of the community. Moreover, the difference between the Anglo-American and the Continental thinkers reflects to some extent the greater relevance of the latter's writings to the work of their fellow humanists at large.

Note 2: It is worth noting that almost a quarter of the Americans are immigrants to North America. This indicates, among other things, both the openness of American universities and their dependence on imported talent.

Appendix 5

The Subdivisions of Philosophy

<u>Object of Consideration</u>	<u>Branch of Philosophy</u>
<i>God</i>	philosophy of religion, philosophical theology
<i>Nature</i> ("the physical world" and "the biological world")	metaphysics, philosophy of nature
<i>Mankind</i> "the human condition" in general	philosophical anthropology
the human mind and its operations	philosophy of mind, philosophical psychology
<i>Society</i> (community)	social philosophy, political philosophy
social policy	philosophy of public policy
cultural perspectives	Feminist philosophy Black studies concerning philosophy, etc
<i>Individuals</i> action and interaction in their ethical dimension	
at large	ethics (personal), moral philosophy
in special contexts	applied ethics medical ethics business ethics bioethics others
thought	see <i>Artifacts</i> below
<i>Artifacts Processes</i> (Mechanisms, Methods, Methodology)	
cognitive	theory of knowledge, epistemology, methodology of inquiry theory of everyday knowledge, general epistemology theory of experience (phenomenology) theory of evaluation (value theory, axiology) theory of demonstrative inference (deductive logic) theory of inductive inference (inductive logic) theory of scientific method

	theory of rational discourse (dialectics)
	theory of probabilistic and plausible reasoning
	theory of interpretation (hermeneutics)
	theory of learning (philosophy of education)
	others
behavioral	
linguistic	philosophy of language philosophy of communication processes
non-linguistic	theory of action (praxiology, action theory, decision theory, theory of rational choice and preference, and so forth)
<i>Artifacts Products</i>	philosophy of sport philosophy of natural science (with subdivisions by special sciences) philosophy of social sciences philosophy of economics philosophy of history, philosophy of historiography philosophy of law (jurisprudence) philosophy of the formal sciences philosophy of logic philosophy of mathematics philosophy of culture and humanistic learning (of the "arts") philosophy of art (aesthetics) philosophy of literature philosophy of philosophy (metaphilosophy) philosophy of physical production (of the crafts) philosophy of work philosophy of technology

ON PLATO'S *SOPHIST*

SETH BENARDETE

I

ONCE THE STRANGER TAKES OVER THE DISCUSSION at the beginning of the *Sophist*,¹ and agrees to discuss the sophist, the statesman, and the philosopher, it is hard to remember that Socrates had arranged to meet with Theodorus, Theaetetus, and young Socrates once more, even after he had left Theaetetus completely barren, at least temporarily, and had encountered a resistance on Theodorus's part to his further participation in any argument which the interval of a single day could not, it seems, have overcome (*Theaetetus* 169c6–7; 183c5–d5). The Stranger's intrusion thus makes us fail to notice that the only possible interest Socrates could have had in the same group would have been in young Socrates, about whom he knows only that he developed with Theaetetus a way of classifying two kinds of number: those with integral square or cube roots and those without. If Socrates had engaged young Socrates in a discussion, and informed Euclides about it in the same way as he had reported his discussion with Theodorus and Theaetetus, we know that Euclides could not have transposed Socrates' report into direct discourse and omitted Socrates' "I said" and "He said." A transposition of the kind Euclides practiced in the *Theaetetus* would have led to the indiscernability of the two Socrateses, since each would have addressed the other as Socrates, and there is no reason to believe that the wiser answers would have consistently belonged to only one of them.

The dialogue between the two Socrateses, which does not occur at dawn on the day after Socrates' appearance before the king-archon, would not perhaps be of any interest if it did not call

¹ All references are to John Burnet, *Platonis Opera*, vols 1, 2, 4 (Oxford Oxford University Press, 1900–1902), the translations are my own

attention to the characterization of thinking on which Socrates and the Stranger both agree: thinking is the silent conversation of the soul with itself (*Theaetetus* 189e4–190a7, *Sophist* 263e3–264a3). A double negation is assigned to thinking: Thinking is dependent in its presentation on the denial of two things that are indispensable for conversation: it must be before another, and it must be spoken. On the one hand, to strip speaking of its vocalic character is to assign it consonants by themselves and thus to deny it the possibility of any combination of elements, even though the combination of consonants with vowels is that which alone makes it possible to overcome the problem of nonbeing and falsehood (253a4–6). On the other hand, to strip speaking of a second participant in the conversation is to transform the single speaker into a double thinker, who retains in his doubleness the singular identity of the speaker, and who in going by the same name cannot control the split he needs in himself. Whatever thought one self gives birth to, the other self cannot test it “objectively” and must succumb, as fathers do, to favoring his own thoughts because they are his own.

The Stranger’s intrusion thus looks like a godsend for both Socrates and Plato. It is a godsend for Plato, since a philosopher of the same caliber as Socrates can continue the discussion in a form that Plato has no trouble transcribing. It is a godsend for Socrates, since he is not forced to face the true difficulty his own revision of Protagoras raises, namely, How is thinking possible if the thinker in becoming a double agent becomes thereby a double patient, and if whatever he thinks experiences a multiplicative effect that is in no time completely out of his control? Socrates proposes at the beginning of the *Statesman* to examine young Socrates as a means for his own self-knowledge (257d1–258a6). Whether or not he could have succeeded in such a task, we know that Plato could not have shown him in either his success or his failure had Plato continued to preserve the nonnarrated form of the *Sophist* and the *Statesman*. The missing dialogue *Philosopher*, which would have been the truth of which the *Sophist* and *Statesman* are two phantom images, could never have been written without Plato’s reversion to Socrates’ or Theodorus’s narration of it. If it is hard to conceive of Theodorus as narrator, we are back with a Socratically narrated dialogue, in which the representation of young Socrates through and by Socrates would have effectively concealed the true difficulty. This difficulty has two aspects: the impossibility of Plato’s presenting non-

imagistically the reality of the philosopher, and the paradox for Socrates that his own thinking necessarily takes an imagistic form as soon as he begins to think about it. Socrates can think in a genuine way as long as he does not think about thinking. Socrates, then, cannot have self-knowledge. Socrates, therefore, cannot be a philosopher, and the missing *Philosopher* represents not an impossibility for Plato the poet but an impossibility simply. The death of Socrates thus looks like the suicide of philosophy itself.

Plato has so arranged his story that through two divergent paths it ends in silence. One path of silence is that not taken: the conversation between Socrates and young Socrates immediately after Theodorus's return with the two mathematicians. The other path of silence is taken, but only partway. The Stranger proposes three discourses, but he delivers only two of them. The third would have been either a speech by himself, in which he would have presented the Eleatic version of the philosopher and concealed his own view, or it would have been a speech about the philosopher without being the direct presentation of the philosopher, since his discourse would be before others and as audible as any other speech. As an image of thinking (cf. *Theaetetus* 206d1-6), it would have been incapable of getting around itself. It seems, then, that something happens during the *Sophist* that makes the Stranger abandon his original plan and that allows Socrates to take over from him and complete his intention of the day before to talk with young Socrates. The Stranger succeeds in clearing the way for the silent return of Socrates by getting rid of the two phantom images of Socrates, the logic-chopper and the moralist, to which he assigns the names "sophist" and "statesman." The *Sophist* and the *Statesman* are two portraits of the Socrates we know, a Socrates who harnesses the quibble in the service of morality. That we do not at once recognize Socrates in his split form testifies to the persuasiveness of Plato, who does not let the seams show. Once, however, Socrates is split, it seems impossible to put him together again, for there is nothing real beyond his double image. As Socrates himself inadvertently reveals in his portrait of himself as midwife, he has the art to assist the young in aborting or giving birth to their thoughts, and he has the art to test the truth of their progeny; but these two arts cannot be one, since no woman gives birth to phantom offspring. The singular Socrates is refuted by his own image. It is only natural, therefore, for Socrates to suggest at

the beginning of the *Sophist* that the Stranger has come as a god to punish him. He is finished

This gloomy reading of the setting of the *Sophist* matches the mood of Theaetetus, who is only saved from despair by looking into the Stranger's face and seeing, according to the Stranger, his own destiny (265d1-e2). Theaetetus reads his own nature in the Stranger's face, and thus accepts without argument what he will come to maintain. His reading thus reproduces the problem of thinking, for in his unthinking acceptance of the Stranger as another while the Stranger is in fact nothing but his future self, Theaetetus reproduces in time the problem of thinking. As the Stranger presents it, the problem is particularly acute, since it is immediately after he opposes irrational nature to rational creation that the Stranger asserts that Theaetetus's nature will on its own accept the creativity of mind. This irrational path to reason seems to be the climax of the unreasonable procedure of the Stranger, who is going to lead Theaetetus without experience to a rational account of nonbeing (234e5-6). Theaetetus is supposed to come to an understanding of the sophist without ever having seen a sophist (239e1). The sophist is going to be deduced by reason. The sophist, we can only guess, is going to be deduced out of reason, and the nonbeing he represents is to be reason's own.

In the first half of the *Sophist*, the Stranger presents himself as a hunter of the hunter sophist; and if the Stranger has an art of hunting, it too must belong to the class of acquisitive arts. Once, however, the sophist is reassigned to the art of making, which the Stranger had originally opposed to that of acquisition, it would seem that the Stranger is the original of which the sophist is the copy (265a4-10). The sophist duplicates in the mode of nonbeing the real acquirer, the Stranger. Far from being a copycat of the acquisitive ways of the sophist, the Stranger is himself the model for the sophist. This turnaround, however, is not exact. The Stranger's way seems to diverge from the sophist's at the division between the hunting of lifeless things and the hunting of animals (219e4-7). Hunting in itself is the hidden hunting of the hidden or elusive beings, and applies across the board to what the philosopher as ontologist does; but the hunting by the sophist of rich young men has nothing to do with what the Stranger does and everything to do with what Socrates does. The divergence of the Stranger and the sophist at this point conceals the divergence of the Stranger and Socrates. Socrates is

the hidden quarry of the Stranger's pursuit. If, however, Socrates is a philosopher, the Stranger is in pursuit of one of his own kind, who not only does not imitate the Stranger's way but practices the Stranger's hunting of the beings in the hunting of men. Socrates seems to have a double name for this twofold pursuit. The first he calls dialectic, the second erotic. Socrates often leads us to believe that they are mysteriously the same, but if they are the same for Socrates, they are not the same for the Stranger. Socrates flits from genus to genus in the four or five varieties of acquisition, but the Stranger does not accompany him. He is not seeking himself in his double search for Socrates and the sophist. There would thus be a split in philosophy itself—a split represented by the Stranger and Socrates. The Parmenidean Stranger catches Socrates and sets him before the royal speech (235b10–c2). Socrates is to be disposed of by a more comprehensive and less idiosyncratic art.

The way of the Stranger seems to lead to two conclusions. On the one hand, it is not a way so certain as not to mistake the apparitional manifold of the sophist's art for the sophist's art, and as not to get the sophist's art right only on the second try, and even then at the high price of bewilderment before the problem of nonbeing, which the Stranger had not recognized when he noticed the resemblance of the sophist to the angler. On the other hand, the Stranger's way leaves Socrates behind in fragments, since if he cannot be unified through the notion of production, the philosopher shows up in a genuine manifold within the art of acquisition. This unsatisfactory conclusion would seem to require a critique of the Stranger's way which the Stranger cannot give. His initial success at catching Socrates is worse than his initial failure to catch the sophist. The nonbeing that lurked in his failure coincides with the being that showed up in his success. The Stranger is not prepared for either.


The fifth or sixth division, which sits uneasily between the Stranger's original insight into the sophist as acquisitor and his second view of the sophist as maker, has no standing in his almost (*σχεδόν*) perfect division of the arts in two (219a8). In the sixth division he finds Socrates in the last cut, but he puts himself in the first cut. The sixth division thus has at the top the Stranger as the separator *κατ' ἐξοχήν*, and at the bottom Socrates as the purifier. The divider of the beings discovers at the end the cleanser of souls. A diacritical ontology subsumes under itself a psychology. This

distinction cannot but remind us of the *Sophist* and *Statesman* respectively: the Stranger is the philosopher and Socrates the statesman. There is, then, no need for the third dialogue, since as the Stranger remarks to Theaetetus, he and Theaetetus have already fallen into philosophy in the course of their examination of the sophist (253a6–9). Such an interpretation would entail the demotion of Socrates and the elevation of the Stranger: the Stranger adopts Aristotle's view of Socrates (*Metaphysics* 987b1–4) before the fact.

The Stranger's subordination of Socrates to himself, along with the implicit claim that his diacritical ontology is the unity of acquisition and production, makes one wonder whether the alternative does not lie in the thwarted conversation between Socrates and young Socrates. In that conversation Socrates could have found in his namesake his true successor, who despite his reality would have eluded any representation. The triumph of the Stranger would not be a true triumph, but only the triumph which is compatible with writing and institutions. Socrates would live over against the Academy. This possibility suggests that the Stranger has not got Socrates dead to rights, but that Socrates slipped away from the final trap. The Stranger admits to Theaetetus that insofar as Theaetetus cannot tell Socrates apart from a sophist, the Stranger's sixth division vindicates Socrates' view (231a4–b2) that the sophist; is a phantom image of the true philosopher, and that Theaetetus's mistake is necessary. Indeed, if at any point the Stranger can isolate the sophist from the philosopher for the nonphilosopher Theaetetus, then and only then is Socrates refuted. It looks, then, as if the confinement of the sophist to the mode of production must give way to the establishment of the being of nonbeing, that is, to the necessity of the intertwining of being with nonbeing.

Since Theaetetus has never seen a sophist and nevertheless believes that the description of soul-cathartics resembles the sophistic art, Theaetetus must take Socrates for a sophist, for not only does Socrates' maieutics correspond fairly closely to soul-cathartics, but Theaetetus's own experience of his ignorance through Socrates agrees with the Stranger's account, particularly since Theaetetus's attribution of the highest state of moderation (σωφρονεστάτη τῶν ἐξέων αὐτῇ) to one so purified echoes Socrates' claim about Theaetetus's moderate condition at the end of the *Theaetetus* (*Sophist* 230d5; *Theaetetus* 210c3). The *Theaetetus*, then, parallels to some extent the *Sophist*, and if the philosopher would have been discussed

by Socrates and young Socrates, then the Stranger's third discourse in its absence is the same as Socrates' second conversation in its absence. The situation, then, is this



If this scheme is right, the Stranger must have split, through his diacritical ontology, the (maieutic-erotic) unity of the Socratic dialectic of the *Theaetetus*. The *Sophist* and *Statesman* are the two *phantasmata* of the *Theaetetus*. What, then, is the *Theaetetus*? Why isn't it the missing *Philosopher* all by itself? If it is not the *Philosopher*, but as much an image of it as Theaetetus is of Socrates, how does it differ as an image from its twofold image, the *Sophist* and *Statesman*? If Socrates is sitting for his portrait in the *Sophist* and *Statesman*, what is missing from the portrait in the *Theaetetus*? If Euclides had preserved Socrates' original narrative, the *Theaetetus* would have been something like a self-portrait. Do the *Sophist* and *Statesman* make up for Euclides' decision to get rid of Socrates' perspective? If they do, why do "I said" and "he said" undergo the transformation into different dialogues with two different interlocutors? If the *Sophist* is to the *Statesman* as rationalism is to empiricism—in the sense that the sophist is to be deduced in the former without the intervention of experiences, particularly experiences of sight—and the statesman is to be induced in the latter from young Socrates' endurance of political practice, there is obviously a way in which Theaetetus's experience of false births in the context of the discovery of logos as that which sets apart knowledge from true opinion reproduces the duality of the *Statesman* and the *Sophist*.

If the philosopher cannot thematize himself but must be thematized by another, the Stranger seems initially to disagree with Socrates as to how this can be done. Socrates says that his own thematization must show up in two separated apparitions; the Stranger says that the school of Parmenides holds that a separate

account of the philosopher is possible. The evidence Plato left us tells us that the Stranger is mistaken. If he realized his mistake, he must have done so during the discussion of either the sophist or the statesman. On the basis of his admission that he is about to commit philosophical patricide (241d3-8), he realizes his mistake at the point where Theaetetus cannot tell Socrates apart from the sophist, and therefore nonbeing must be if Theaetetus's error is to be grounded in something more than an accidental inadvertence. It is hard to believe, however, that the Stranger has not foreseen this crisis from the start, since he declares that he had long broken with the Parmenidean doctrine of his youth (239b1-3; 242a7-8). The Stranger, then, deliberately sets out on a path of illusion, he knows that his *diarresis* will not give a *logos* of the sophist. The Stranger proceeds deliberately into error. He makes error an indispensable part of the way of truth. This way of truth consists in the apparent borrowing of the thematized term "hunting," so that it necessarily appears as parasitic while it is in fact the original host. As apparently parasitic it cannot be thematized, as apparently nonparasitic it can. Is this, however, a special case of the inversion of priority, or do such inversions hold everywhere? If they do, then the Stranger's schematism—simple paradigm and complex copy—must be the paradigm for any philosophical procedure: the paradigm must break down, and only after it has broken down does "true" philosophy begin. "True" must be bracketed because if such a procedure is necessary, the "false" paradigmatic beginning is part of philosophy. The *Sophist*, then, if it approaches as closely as possible to the thematization of philosophy, must do so very late in its examination. The true beginning of philosophy is precisely at that point where the Stranger ends his discussion of Presocratic philosophers and begins again with the problem of *logos* (251e7). It is at that point where the Stranger and Socrates merge and proceed forward thence in step until the end of the *Statesman*.

The actual conditions for the conversation between the two Socrateses precludes its being written up, but the alternative—that Theodorus did not bring the Stranger with him—seems to allow for a Socratically narrated dialogue in which philosophy would be the subject. If we should then ask what occasion would have led to such a topic, it would seem at first that we cannot dictate whatever Plato would have found most appropriate. On reflection, however, the germ from which Socrates could most plainly start would be a

discussion of Theaetetus's errors in the *Theaetetus*, of which the two most conspicuous were his failure to see how to generalize his first answer—that knowledge is knowledge of whatever is measurable and numerable—and his failure to see that “through speeches” is the answer to the question Socrates raised, Through what does the soul handle being and nonbeing? (185c9–e2). Theaetetus's first failure blinded him to the issue that lay behind Socrates' description of soul-maieutics. How can knowledge of number and measure be put together with knowledge of soul? His second failure blinded him to the manner in which the discussion of speech omitted the kind of speech Socrates and Theaetetus were employing in the discussion. A conversation, then, between Socrates and young Socrates, if it began with the failure of the *Theaetetus*, would thematize philosophy. This thematization had in fact already occurred, since Socrates, in narrating the dialogue he had with Theodorus and Theaetetus, would have thematized philosophy, inasmuch as his representation of Theaetetus through Socrates himself had put Theaetetus in the proper perspective. Euclides had wiped out that perspective as soon as he wiped away all traces of perspective. Euclides cut himself out of the picture and thus claimed for himself a position outside of space and time from which he could survey everyone else and cast no shadow on his own. If this argument is found plausible, then the missing dialogue *Philosopher* is as latent in the *Theaetetus* as it is in all other dialogues. This latency cannot be developed in the light directly; it must undergo a split along the lines of the *Sophist* and *Statesman*, which are in turn present at least in every other dialogue. Whether they are present in each other is another question.

Perhaps the most perplexing omission in the *Sophist* occurs at the point where the Stranger, after giving an account of the painter's art—by means of which all things are imitated, and in being exhibited to the foolish young at a distance deceive them into the belief that the paintings are the beings and the painter competent to make the beings themselves—gets Theaetetus to agree that there could be a parallel art in speech, so that the sophist in showing spoken phantoms (εἰδωλα λεγόμενα) to the young, who are still at a distance from the truth of things (τὰ πράγματα), would be believed to be speaking the truth and be the wisest in everything (234c2–e4). Even apart from the puzzle of the inversion in the parallel—such that the distance of the young from the paintings becomes the distance of the young from the truth of things and Theaetetus has to agree

to his being the believer in the sophist's phantom speeches before he has been disillusioned by direct contact with the beings—the Stranger gets Theaetetus to agree on a possible art of imitation through speeches without ever giving a single example of a spoken phantom. When, moreover, the Stranger proceeds to divide the art of image-making into eikastics and phantastics, he does so again on the basis of painting and does not stop, before he plunges into the problem of being and nonbeing, to illustrate the difference between an eikastic and phantastic speech. We seem to be left on our own to devise a sense for *εἰδῶλα λεγόμενα* that would ground the Stranger's argument. Our task is in a sense made easy by the existence of the *Sophist*. The *Sophist* is obviously a case of phantom speech, but we have no way of knowing whether it was produced by eikastics or phantastics unless we can determine what we mean by calling it an imitation. If, however, Plato emerges as the master sophist, and if the philosopher Plato shows up apparitionally as the nonphilosopher and the philosopher Stranger as his finest product, how is the whole argument of the sophist not undermined? In looking outside the dialogue we detect the *φανταστικός* Plato, in looking into the dialogue, we find the philosopher pure and simple. Once, however, we incorporate the perspective we gained from the outside into the inside, the Stranger is a phantom philosopher or sophist, who catches the pseudo-sophist, that is, the sophist who is not an apparition of the philosopher. Theaetetus at any rate declares the sophist to be the impersonator of the wise (268b10), and whoever the wise is, whether god the maker or the wise simply, he is not the philosopher.

The difficult position in which Plato put the Stranger seems to be a proof that philosophy cannot be thematized without undergoing a transformation into an apparition of itself. Plato thereby vindicates Socrates' view of the relation between the philosopher and the sophist and denies any validity to the Parmenidean view which the Stranger was asked to expound. Before, however, we claim to find the truth about the sophist solely in the form of the *Sophist*, Plato has not left the Stranger without his own way of exemplifying the problem of spoken phantoms, even if Theaetetus is put in the funny position of following an argument he cannot follow except in the image of spoken phantoms—images in deed. Up to the point where the Stranger turns to the analysis of image-making, hunting and pursuit dominate his language and align what he is doing with what the sophist does. Words with *-θηρ-* are found forty-seven times

in the *Sophist* before 235a11 and twice afterward. Of the latter two instances, the first occurs when the Stranger recalls his remark that the sophist was hard to catch (*δυσθῆρευτον*), and the second when he summarizes the kinds of acquisitive arts he and Theaetetus first assigned to the sophist (261a5; 265a7). What happens then in the course of the *Sophist* is a reflection on its starting point in the doubling of the image of hunting in the action of the sophist and the Stranger. The Stranger's controlling paradigm is thus subject to a double critique. What grounds his discovery of the kinship between angler and sophist, and what grounds his understanding of what he is doing in the same terms? Theaetetus is at first reluctant to admit that there is a hunting of men (222b6), but he does not notice that while the sophist hunts men, he and the Stranger hunt the beast sophist. The image of hunting is more literal on the level of the Stranger's method than on the sophist's. The Stranger thus denies what Theaetetus had accepted—that men are tame and there is a hunting of them—by making the sophist a wild animal which they are to turn over to the royal speech.

If, then, an example of a spoken phantom is that of the sophist and the Stranger as hunters, the Stranger is asking, in generalizing the issue of his own language, whether images in speech necessarily involve deception, or the nonbeing of spoken images entails falsehood, and whether it is not possible to proceed in one's understanding without having any recourse to images. When the Stranger began by saying that the sophist was not the easiest to grasp (*συλλαβεῖν*), that he believed the genus of the sophist was hard to hunt down (*δυσθῆρευτον*), and that he knew of no easier way (*ὁδός*) than to practice the sophist's pursuit (*μέθοδος*) on an easier subject (218c6, 218d3; 218d6–7), there was no reason for Theaetetus to galvanize his language back into life and anticipate the Stranger's exploitation of expressions that he could have as easily let fade away in the course of the discussion. Phantom images in speech thus seem to be a difficulty of the Stranger's own creation, so that whereas he has to face the problem of image-making in speech, the sophist does not, since the sophist after all does not have to accept the Stranger's picture of himself. The sophist can go about his business without ever entangling himself in an image. He would thus argue that his own spuriousness arises from the invention of the Stranger, and the Stranger has to account for himself without a shred of evidence that the sophist ever resorts to images in speech. How easy

it would have been to dispense with the Stranger's language can be seen if one reflects on the structure of his first example, the art of angling. The division falls into three sections, with three items in each. The first section establishes the manner of the art: it is a kind of hunting. The second establishes the object of the art—fish—and the third establishes the means employed to catch the fish—hook and line. The Stranger's example, then, could have been generalized at once, and the sophist's art determined by its manner, object, and means, and there would have been no need to bring hunting to bear on either the sophist's or the Stranger's activity. The paradigm of the angler allowed for the scaffolding on which the Stranger's image-making is based to be dismantled without either any loss to the inquiry or any distraction from it.

If, then, the sophist had been confronted straight-on with this threefold question—how, what, and by what means—the sophist could have been said to lure young men by means of speeches. The sophist, to be sure, could not have been distinguished thereby from Socrates, but that, according to Socrates, is as it should be. Why, then, does the Stranger get himself involved in a series of definitions which, he claims, cannot be unified except through the notion of phantom speeches? A possible explanation can be found in the observation that Theaetetus has never seen a sophist and has no experience of the disillusionment that comes from experience after living in the world of phantom speeches. Through the Stranger's literalization of language, he represents to Theaetetus a world of phantom speeches, which Theaetetus recognizes as such when he realizes the impossibility of discovering the sophist's unity in the manifold of his different arts. Within the dialogue and through experience in speech alone, the Stranger gives Theaetetus an image in speech of what is entailed in the experience of things. The disillusionment reality occasions is presented in an image. The Stranger thus implies that the fundamental experience of the beings, which most men undergo after their initial distance from them, is the discovery of this principle. Everything is just what it is and nothing else. This principle is enshrined in the formula: a being is that which does not stand in need of another. The ones of phantom speech are shown to be phantoms as soon as they submit to analysis. This atomism, whether material or ideal, has as its corollary that to be is to be countable. It thus links up, at least in part, with the implicit definition of knowledge which Theaetetus first offered Soc-

rates. The starting point of the Stranger thus reaches back to the beginning of the *Theaetetus* and goes forward to his examination of the philosophers who count the beings. The problem of nonbeing, which comes to light through a manifold that can be shown to be one only if nonbeing is, leads to the problem of being, in which it turns out that there can be no stable counting of the beings, regardless of whether there is to be only one or more. Initially, every manifold that was designated by a single name betrayed the presence of appearance and the failure to get at what something is; and the impossibility of keeping to the original count in the case of the beings entailed that it was not appearance that multiplied unity, but being itself was infected with the same multiplicative virus. The Stranger's solution to this ontological crisis is to incorporate nonbeing into being as the other. The other is designed to cure three things simultaneously: being is no longer countable, or nothing is just what it is and nothing else; appearances are a reflection of nonunitary being; and false speech still consists in saying what is not, even though it is always speaking of that which is. Whether in fact the other does solve all three problems, it puts the Stranger's artificial phantom image of the sophist in speech in a new light. The discovery of the manifold beneath the illusory one of the sophistic art, where each art is just what it is, is the inverse of the truth. The sophist, in his being always the other, is the mark of what is. The Stranger had prepared us for this inversion by speaking of the truth of things (*τὰ πράγματα*) and not the truth of the beings (*τὰ ὄντα*) as that from which the young stand far removed (234c4). To grasp the beings in all their vividness through experiences is not necessarily to grasp the truth of the beings.

If the sophist is the sign of being as the other, and if therefore it is not inappropriate for the Stranger to be the philosopher in being his hunter, he still is not the only other in the *Sophist*. The threefold question Socrates raises happens to coincide not only with three discourses the Stranger can recite off the top of his head, but also with the question Theodorus, Theaetetus, and young Socrates asked the Stranger sometime between the end of the *Theaetetus* and their meeting with Socrates (217b4-8). Whatever we may think of this coincidence—Theodorus's distress at the going over he received from Socrates (*Theaetetus* 169a6-c6), reinforced as it was by Theaetetus's futile answers, might well have prompted him to question an authority about Socrates—we know that neither the Stranger

nor Theodorus came to the question in the same way as Socrates did. Socrates' way into the question begins with his tweaking Theodorus for his possible failure to recognize the Stranger as a god in disguise. In reply, Theodorus distinguishes between "godlike" (*θεῖος*) and "god," or between philosopher and god (216b9–c1). Philosopher and god are not two of a kind. Socrates replies that the philosopher too has his apparitions, or that "philosopher-like" applies no less to sophist than to statesman. Since, however, Socrates continues to employ his Homeric citations even after Theodorus's denial, he implies that "philosopher" and "god" are the same, or, to follow Socrates more exactly, that the philosopher belongs to the genus to which god belongs.² Socrates was led to this possibility by Theodorus's introduction of a philosopher as a nameless stranger. He turns a typical piece of indifference to the human-all-too-human on Theodorus's part into a general question—Who could possibly be of necessity forever nameless and a stranger?—and gives the answer, "a god." Gods can never become our acquaintances (*γνώριμοι*); they must always remain outside whatever group, large or small, we belong to. "God," then, is the other as such. As the other, he is not merely something else (*ἄλλος τις*), but he is attached to that of which he is the other because he is the other. As the other, god is not subject to a wholly negative theology; man too is the other, for he is the other of that other. The indeterminate pair which god and man constitute makes one wonder whether the *Sophist* and the *Statesman* are not the same pair in its apparitional form. The *Statesman* cannot determine the politician without separating him from god the ruler and from man the political animal, and the *Sophist* puts the sophist in his place only through the notion of god the rational maker. Mind as efficient cause thus emerges as the apparition of god as the other. God sets the structure of making but is divorced from the structure of acquisition, at the head of which would be the knowing ignorance of the philosopher. God, then, is as apparitional as the sophist, and he is other than the philosopher when he appears as maker. Socrates had opposed the Stranger as a punishing god to himself. The Stranger asserts in the myth of the *Statesman* that there cannot be a punishing god; indeed, he denies

² τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ (*Sophist* 216c4–5) is an odd expression unless Socrates implies that beings other than god belong to the same genus, Cobet's correction τῶν θεῶν is certainly what one would have expected.

that Zeus is a name for god, since the age of Zeus stands for the time when the god has let go of the universe and it is on its own. Zeus is a concealed negation, it means not-god or without god. God with a name designates not-god. He is the other of the other.

The Stranger and the sophist compete for the title of the other, one as god, one as beast. Both are outside the circle of man, and yet they are not apart from man. Indeed, if man as such is not a third between beast and god, then the Stranger and the sophist cover all that man is. Man, then, would emerge as the other *κατ' ἐξοχήν*, and the primary piece of evidence for the denial that there is anything which is just what it is. Man becomes exemplary of being once the highest being is a defective being, and, as the Stranger later says, there is no part of nonbeing that is any less than any being (258a7-b3). That man is an issue, and perhaps even the issue, behind Socrates' question is already foreshadowed in the *Theaetetus*. Socrates there tried to get at the question of philosophy through the question, What is knowledge? The necessity for philosophy emerges if it can be shown that knowledge or wisdom is impossible (*Theaetetus* 145e5), and it can be shown to be impossible if there is an obstacle to wisdom for man as man. This obstacle must take the following form. knowledge consists of two or more kinds which cannot be understood as an apparitional manifold. Each is just what it is even though each is knowledge. Protagoras's "Man the measure" is not an answer to the question of knowledge but its enigmatic representation. Socrates with his knowledge and Theaetetus with his are together the same enigma; but they cannot be together because there is no "vocalic" bond between them. When Socrates first formulates a version of the Protagorean thesis, he asks two questions about its meaning: "Does it state that whatever sort things severally appear to me, that's the sort they are for me, and whatever sort to you, they're of that sort to you, and you and I [are] man?" Theaetetus answers the first question and does not notice the second (152a6-9). In particular, Theaetetus does not notice that in Socrates' second question, a plural subject has a singular predicate, and there is no copula. Socrates and Theaetetus are severally man, but they are not anything together. The determination of man as the vocalic bond between beast and god can be said to be the theme of the *Sophist* and the *Statesman*.

In the course of his setting out his model for definition, the Stranger consistently presents the undivided class as suffixed with

-ικόν but never with -ική, with which τέχνη is either expressed or implied. The -ική suffix occurs only after a class has been divided. The Stranger's language thus duplicates the historical development of the suffix from being an ethnic to a skill, which we know occurred very rapidly toward the end of the fifth century³. The Stranger indicates thereby that there is no art for the undivided species but only for the atomic class. There is no art of hooking (ἄγκιστρευτικόν), but only of its two species, τριοδοντία and ἄσπαλιευτική. Art implies specialization, and until one gets to the smallest division of labor there is an element of inexpertness that lurks in any general action. The Stranger's starting-point, "art," is misleading, for if one looks to the man who could possibly do all the things the manifold of arts do, one would not find the artisan but the jack-of-all-trades. "Sophist," or "Mr Know-it-all" necessarily looks spurious once the arts have developed in the way that Socrates assumes they have in the *Republic*, where the original housebuilder soon gives way to the lumberman, the carpenter, the blacksmith, and so forth. The Stranger, in implying, for example, that there is an art of striking (πληκτική), from which the arts of spearing and angling split off, is going against the truth of the arts and laying himself open to the charge of making phantoms of the real. Long before the Stranger sets the sophist in the class of image-making, then, he has been employing the art of image-making in order to establish the kinship among the various arts to which we give the same label, sophistic. The way of discovery is productive in the class of acquisition, and the Stranger in being the hunter of the hunter-sophist uses as his nets those made up by the poetic art. The Stranger, then, practises versions of the sophist's two ways, but in neither version does he duplicate exactly the sophist. For the Stranger, hunting is a way of understanding; it assumes that the beings are not out in the open, and the way to bring them out is to illuminate them in a series of images. The Stranger's art of the image seems to be eikastics, for he is not setting things out to show them as beautiful. lice-hunting, he says, serves as well as generalship for hunting (227a9-b6). The Stranger's art of hunting, however, does seem to be due to phantastics, for it seems to be adjusted to Theaetetus, who is to pass for manly and brave in following the

³ Cf Pierre Chantraine, *La formation des noms en grec ancien* (Paris: Librairie Champion, 1933), 385-93.

track of the sophist Eikastics, then, is to phantastics as ontology is to psychology. If philosophy in general takes after the Stranger's double way, philosophy in its ontological aspect is not guided by anything. Its images are of its own devising and not grounded in the nature of things. In its psychology, however, there is the nature of Theaetetus, which in its moderation calls on its own for its proper corrective, just as young Socrates' boldness demands domestication through the womanly art of weaving.

Between his catching Socrates and the sophist together and his isolating the sophist in the class of making, the Stranger inserts a classification of arts that puts him and Socrates together and excludes the sophist. He begins this classification with a set of verbs which belong to the actions of several arts (226b5–c9). In labeling their common action dividing, he shows us what he himself has been doing all along, collecting and dividing, but it is typical of the *Sophist* that the diacritical function is stressed, and it is not until the *Statesman* that its syncritical counterpart is mentioned (282b7). However that may be, the Stranger applies the single name of the diacritical art to what is done in sifting flour or carding wool. No specialist art, however, practices diacritics in itself, only the Stranger does so whenever he proceeds to cut any class in two. The Stranger comes partly into the light in these first two steps. Συγκρίνειν and διακρίνειν are the first verbs which in being comprehensive refer at the same time to particular actions. The undivided species is no longer an image of the arts in its subsets but an art in its own right. The collapse of the ethnic suffix -ικόν into the art suffix -ική is comparable, and perhaps ultimately identical, with Socrates' persistence in refusing to separate διαλέγεσθαι from διαλεκτική. It is therefore surprising that the Stranger can discover a version of Socratic dialectics in a genealogical descent from διακριτική with which it does not link up in any obvious way.

At the conclusion of his dividings the Stranger opposes soul-cathartics to the art of admonition that fathers practice on their sons. Since, however, those who discovered soul-cathartics started from a premise that the admonitory art rejected—that every kind of folly was involuntary—and the admonitory art had long been in place before the discovery of soul-cathartics, education (παιδεία) cannot be split between an artless and an artful form. If, however, soul-cathartics moves up a level and becomes identical with

education, Theaetetus must be mistaken in labeling a Socratic insight an Athenian practice (229d2). Theaetetus calls education that art which gets rid of the belief on the part of one who does not know that he knows; but the fact that *δοξοσοφία* is the peculiar obstacle to learning belongs to soul-cathartics and has nothing but language in common with a father's rebuke to his son, "You think you're so smart." If now, however, Socrates' way takes over as the true form of education, it is not obvious that the art of instruction (*διδασκαλική*) treats two different kinds of ignorance (*ἄγνοια*), since the premise of the psychic counterpart to gymnastics is that every soul is involuntarily ignorant of everything (228c7-9). Theaetetus's distinction between education and demiurgic instruction cannot be maintained if the basis of the latter is mathematics, for the distinction seems to be equally at home with education in either the ordinary or Socratic sense. If, then, soul-cathartics now treats the ugliness of soul *per se*, it cannot be kept out of the treatment of the illness of soul, since the Stranger ascribes to the conflict of opinions in the soul a source of its illness and assigns to soul-cathartics the task of bringing to light the conflict of opinions in the soul (228b1-4, 230b5-8). Soul-cathartics, then, takes over as the entire treatment of soul, for the Stranger's divisions have been in accordance with opinion and therefore incoherent. Soul-cathartics, however, cannot be pegged at this point either, for in order to get to the soul the Stranger has to separate the soul from the body, regardless of whether or not the body is ensouled, but such a separation of the soul from the body is nothing other than the practice of dying and being dead, which is another name for philosophy. Even if we grant the Stranger's cut between soul and body as nothing more than a "theoretical" division, he cannot go on to split the vices of soul on the basis of a split in the vices of body without granting the body, in its apartness from soul, a theoretical determination of this structure of soul. The Stranger, moreover, identifies the soul in its separation from body as thought (*διάνοια*, 227c4); and thought cannot be subject to a distinction between moral and intellectual virtue, upon which the Stranger's counterparts to medicine and gymnastics depend.⁴ There is the further difficulty that though the soul is sup-

⁴ Note that *ἡσθημεθα* (222b4) is used of the Stranger's and Theaetetus's "knowledge" of the conflicts in moral vice, and *ἴσμεν* (228c7) of their knowledge of the soul's involuntary ignorance.

posed to have an impulse toward truth, there is no argument that the soul has either a natural strength to attain truth or the capacity to accept the steroids of art. Indeed, soul-cathartics is described wholly in terms of medicine and not as capable of instilling beauty and strength of soul. Theaetetus indeed said that it produced the most moderate of states, but according to Theaetetus moderation should be the contrary of intemperance (*ἀκολασία*) and therefore subject to the punishing art of *Δίκη* (228e1–229a7). If, then, the Stranger's separation of soul and body cannot stand as he phrased it, soul-cathartics is now threatening the division in the arts of purification, for soul-cathartics must now have a diacritical function if it is to understand soul by itself before it treats it. The Stranger's first division in the diacritical art had been between an unnamed art of separating like from like and the purificatory art of separating better from worse (226d1–5). This unnamed art is nothing but the Stranger's own procedure and identical with what soul-cathartics must also practice. It thus turns out that Socrates, rather than being a subordinate of the Stranger, usurps the Stranger's role and corrects the Stranger's divisions in light of his own resolution of the contradictory opinions at the heart of the Stranger's diacritical ontology. It now turns out that the example of spoken phantoms is that division of the Stranger's where he and Socrates both are. Its plausibility to Theaetetus is a sign of its phantom character. It is Theaetetus, after all, who insists that the Stranger's fear of confusing the sophist and the philosopher be set aside and that Socrates be condemned for sophistry through a semblance (*ἀλλὰ μὴν προσέοικέ γε τοιούτῳ τινὶ τὰ νῦν εἰρημέναι*; 231a4–5).

Perhaps the most curious consequence of the Stranger's analysis is that Socrates' way is correctly characterized but falsely categorized. The truth is hit upon in and through a false structure. This structure is the Stranger's way, which produced the philosopher in a setting that gave him the appearance of the sophist. It is, then, the Stranger's way which fully exemplifies *φανταστική*. Previously we had thought that the Stranger's way was eikastic, since the classes he had found were the products of his own image-making, but now, in involving himself in his own classification of an art—*διακριτική*—he adopts simultaneously the perspective of Theaetetus and betrays Socrates. The Stranger's *φανταστική* corresponds rather exactly to the one he ascribes to painting, for in that case the painter makes the image ugly in order for it to appear

beautiful, and here Socrates appears as completely successful, with everyone angry only at themselves and tame toward everyone else (230b8–9). The Stranger's beautification of Socrates seems to be self-defeating, it does not keep Socrates from being identified as a sophist but rather convinces Theaetetus that Socrates is a sophist. Theaetetus cannot tell the elusive sophist from the beautiful Socrates. The eikastics of the Stranger's first divisions are in agreement with the phantastics of his last—the Socrates who lurks in the rejected species of acquisition—he shows up finally as the money-losing chatterbox (225d7–10)—comes into the light of opinion as the same as his own apparition. As long as Socrates is hidden in the rejected species of the Stranger's way, he is safe from being misidentified; but as soon as the Stranger sets out to stalk him alone—Socrates is like the retailer who stays at home and sells what he himself contrives (224d4–e4)—he cannot show him as he really is. It is through a set of un-Socratic distinctions that Socrates becomes as pretty as a picture.

II

At the very moment that the Stranger will abandon the image of hunting—he has just established the sophist as imitator—he becomes particularly exuberant in the exploitation of the image of hunting. "It is our job from this point forward no longer to let up on the beast (*θῆρα*), for we have pretty nearly encompassed (*περιελλήφμεν*) him in a certain kind of net (*ἀμφιβληστροικῶ τινι*) that is instrumental in speeches for things of this kind" (235a10–b2). It seems, then, that we are being given a spoken phantom just before the Stranger confronts the problem of image, but it cannot be overstressed that we and not Theaetetus are given it. Theaetetus plunges into a discussion of *εἰδωλα λεγόμενα* without having any clue as to what they are. They are there in the Stranger's language, no less than they are in Theaetetus's, but they are never brought up to the level of the argument. The one exception to this blanket concealment proves that it is not an exception. The Stranger remarks that the sophist is really (*ὄντως*) amazing and very difficult to be caught sight of, and Theaetetus replies, "It seems" (*ἔοικεν*; 236d4). The Stranger pounces on this *ἔοικεν* without ever saying that that is what makes him suspect that Theaetetus is just going along with him and does not really recognize the problem. The Stranger is

saying that unless words are taken literally their use betrays a failure to understand. Are we then to understand the Stranger's "encompassed" (*περιειλήφμεν*) literally? If we do, the Stranger agrees with the body-people who deny that anything is which they cannot get both their hands on (*ταῖς χερσὶν ἀτεχνῶς πέτρας καὶ δρύς περιλαμβάνοντες*; 246a8; cf 265a10). When the Stranger remarks that it was truly said that the sophist-beast was complex and not, as the saying goes, to be seized with one hand, Theaetetus's reply, "Then we have to with both" (226a8), must again be literal, and their hunting down of Socrates is not just a manner of speaking but truly means his arrest and execution. It is possible, then, to read the *Sophist* as the execution in deed of Socrates' premonition that the Stranger has come to punish him for the poorness of his speeches, and it is no less possible to read the problem of spoken phantoms as implicitly claiming a privileged position to the identity of being with body, which is preserved as a relic in any language but which is still capable of being recovered through the pruning away of all the idealistic excrescences that a language assumes over time. Socrates, therefore, would be the appropriate target, since his "philosophy" stands or falls by the priority or nonpriority of soul to body.

An immediate advantage to reading the *Sophist* in this way would be the explanation it would offer for the Stranger's silence about the meaning of *εἰδῶλα λεγόμενα*. *Εἰδῶλα λεγόμενα* would be language itself, which would be constantly expanding away from its literal roots and adding thereby images of bodies to the language of bodies. The sophist, then, would be each and every nonmaterialist philosopher, from Parmenides to the friends of the ideas—anyone, in short who claims either that virtue is something other than ingrained habits of the body or that numbers exist. To give to the Stranger's use of hunting a significant role would be pointless: almost any speech would betray its own corporeal basis. The Stranger's elaboration of image-making in the painting done by eikastics and phantastics would thus represent the real part of imitation; all the rest would be derivative from it and as such a sign of its spuriousness. Indeed, the Stranger could not get at soul-cathartics without returning to the difference between the health and beauty of the body, and he only confused the issue by interpolating the *στάσις* of the city as a way of accounting for what he meant by illness (228a4–9).

The reductionist program that this reading of the *Sophist* suggests cannot, I think, stand up to scrutiny; but it does reinforce the

peculiarity of the dialogue, where the Stranger's failure to explicate the difference between eikastic and phantastic speech entices us to a reading of everything he says in light of the body. The body is the background against which we understand what he is saying. It is therefore of the highest importance that the Stranger at the end confines the sophist to being an impersonator in his body of what he seems to know. The sophist is the sophist precisely because the noncorporeal is made corporeal and passed off as noncorporeal. The sophist embodies what in its truth cannot be embodied. He is merely a higher version of vulgar or political virtue, which mistakes images of the body for traits of the soul (cf. *Republic* 518d9–e2). The Stranger, then, must ultimately give an argument for turning language upside down, so that the nonliteral language of soul can stand independently of its literal meaning. The argument must ground the phantastics of speech in something other than the being of body. If the argument can do so, we can then say that the Stranger fails to exemplify his meaning, not because it is plain in everything he says but because it is truly hidden in everything he says. The *Sophist* is a vindication of this remark in the *Statesman*. "The bodiless things, being most beautiful and greatest, are shown plainly only in speeches and in nothing else" (286a5–7).

In order to solve the specific problem—the distinction between eikastic and phantastic speech—the Stranger has recourse to well-known philosophic issues: appearance, false opinion, and nonbeing (236e1–237a1). The specific problem seems to get lost in the Stranger's review of various answers to the philosophic issues. His experience of the perplexity of being and nonbeing takes over from Theaetetus's innocence, and from his unawareness that it was his failure to detect the difference between Socrates and the sophist that confirmed the existence of *φανταστική* in speech and supplied the evidence of its power. A series of divisions in speech was made by way of images that led to the impossibility of telling apart beast from nonbeast (nonbeast covers both god and man), but their indiscernability is nothing but an exemplification of the sophist's art of *φανταστική*. The Stranger claims he knows that the being his argument detected was the philosopher, but he cannot convince Theaetetus that he is any different from the previous series of atomic species. The very parallel between painting in deed and painting in speech seems to imply that experience, which diminishes the distance the young stand from the beings, cannot be duplicated in

speech. If speech could in fact overcome the distance of innocence, one could speak of speeches in deed. "the hard facts of life" would have their equivalent in speech. We know that tragedy does have this effect with regard to the passions; we do not know, however, whether there is a rational counterpart. If the Platonic dialogues were such a counterpart, it would be necessary that through their speeches one would experience a turnaround of their several arguments. The Platonic dialogues would be governed by a *φανταστική* by means of which we would get nearer to the beings without ever abandoning the level of speech. For the Stranger, the Parmenidean speech, and ultimately all the speeches of philosophers up to now, are *φαντάσματα* in speech at a distance from the beings in speech. He proposes to narrow the distance. Theaetetus stands from the beings by leading him from on high to where the Stranger himself is, but all within the element of speech. This movement is the Stranger's version of Socrates' second sailing, which consists in the realization that the beings are plainer to us in speeches than in deeds. The autobiography of the Stranger records for being what Socrates' does for becoming or causality, despite this difference, however, they are the same experientially.

In order to get at the problem of nonbeing, the Stranger establishes the arithmetical character of being and of any speech about being. The characteristic prefix of his argument is *πρός*-, "in addition." Being is countable, nonbeing is not. It turns out, however, that the arithmetical structure of *λόγος* forbids the use of *λόγος* to show the nonsense of nonbeing, since *λόγος* cannot treat nonbeing if it does not give nonbeing an arithmetical structure which it then shows being cannot have. The sophist, then, if he is who he is through nonbeing, is always immune from attack. Why, however, must the sophist be assumed to have recourse to nonbeing? The sophist's claim is that he has a single science of everything. Theaetetus believes that the issue is the sophist's claim to know everything (233a3-4), his denial of that claim is not backed up by any argument. If there were an argument, it would have to take the form of a proof that the parts of knowledge of which we are aware are two or more, with two or more essentially different sets of principles, and that the sophist is involved in nonbeing and image-making by his assimilation of every other part of knowledge to one part with its unique set of principles, or by the comprehension of all the parts of knowledge to some unknown knowledge with an unknown set of principles.

The ways of assimilation and comprehension both involve image-making. Theaetetus is asked what an image is; he speaks of images in mirrors, paintings, and statues. The Stranger asks him to imagine that the sophist is blind and that he wants a characteristic of image that does not appeal to sight. Theaetetus has no trouble in satisfying the blind sophist: whatever is another such (*ἕτερον τοιοῦτον*) likened to the true is an image (240a7–8). Theaetetus makes up a spoken phantom. His criterion for an image in sight is an image in speech. *Ἐτερον τοιοῦτον* entails, as he says, a weaving together of being and nonbeing (240c1). Through this “weaving together” (*συμπλοκή*) he anticipates the rest of the *Sophist* and the finale of the *Statesman*. Not only does *συμπλοκή* itself crop up in the Stranger’s two characterizations of *λόγος*, but the prefix *σύν-* is destined to take over from the Stranger’s *πρός-*. *Σύν-* is not subject to an arithmetical account.⁵

If *ἕτερον τοιοῦτον* is the characteristic of any eikastic speech, and Theaetetus has no trouble in supplying it, it might seem odd that the Stranger does not follow it up with a comparable demand for the characteristic of a phantastic speech. Instead, he turns to false opinion, whose characteristic, Theaetetus agrees, involves the impossible conjunction of being and nonbeing (241a3–b3). This replacement, however, of phantastic speech by false speech and opinion does not occur; rather, false opinion is nothing but phantastic speech, for false opinion is an experience of the soul that is due to an eikastic speech.⁶ There are not two kinds of speech, but there is only one speech and how that one speech appears, or there is the experience of falsity, which seems to make for two speeches. The experience of falsity is thus to be explained by the being of nonbeing in the image. False opinion consists in the belief that the images of beings are the beings, and that—this is something new—the beings are the images of nonbeings. Nonbeings are, however, images of beings. False opinion holds that the images of the images of the beings are the beings, but *φανταστική* was precisely that art that produced images of images of the beings so adjusted to the perspective of the

⁵ *Προστίθεναι* occurs at 238c1 and 239b9, *συντίθεσθαι* at 252b1, 252b3, 262e12, and 268d3, and *συμμίγνυσθαι* comes in at 252b6 and occurs four more times (cf. 264b2).

⁶ The Stranger’s phrasing of the problem of false opinion points to this: *ὅταν περὶ τὸ φαντασία αὐτὸν ἀπατᾶν φῶμεν*, τότε πότερον ψευδὴ δοξάζειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ μὴν φήσομεν (240d1–3).

observer that he would take them for the beings. Accordingly, the Stranger has merely enlarged the problem with which he started and has not altered it. The Stranger's final division, in which he caught Socrates, was in itself an eikastic speech; it became a phantastic speech at the very moment Theaetetus believed it described the sophist. It was geared for that mistake as well as for its own dismantling, which we accomplished by tracing back the descent of Socrates to his origin in the Stranger. His projection of himself in another (Socrates) appeared to Theaetetus as another such of the sophist, but Socrates was the same as the Stranger and not his image.

The impasse that nonbeing makes for anyone who attempts to deny that it is suggests to the Stranger that the fault lies with an understanding of being, shared by all the philosophers, which has generated a contrary to being out of a fundamental lack of clarity about itself. The Stranger gives an arithmetical character to this misunderstanding, whereby he shows that those who say being is any number, two or more, are forced to reduce their manifold to one, and Parmenides' one in turn cannot be meaningful unless there are at least two. The precise people are opposed to the comprehensives (245e6-246a2), who do not count the beings but characterize them. The Stranger shows, however, that the comprehensives must compromise their principles in order to find room for their own understanding, and once they do compromise—either in the direction of nonbody or in the direction of soul—they must declare that being is two, and fall into the trap he had already sprung for the precise people. This argument bears directly on the sophistic claim in the following way. It supplies the proof that there is not a single science of everything, for if there were, there would have to be a coherent set of principles which would determine the number of beings. If the number of beings jumps about between one and two, there is something in being that is recalcitrant to the unity of the science of being. The simplest example, perhaps, of the impossibility of keeping the count of the beings down to the number one starts with is to be found in atomism. Its principle is, to be is to be body. Body, however, does not allow for motion unless there is space. Space is absolutely nonbeing if the atomists hold to their principle. They therefore have to weaken their principle if they are to obtain any kind of structure. This difficulty is not confined to atomism. It shows up no less in the *Republic*, where the principle one man-one

art cannot establish the class structure of the city, than in Newtonian mechanics, where the first law of motion assumes inertial frames—that is, there are bodies which are not subject to acceleration, which the principle of gravity denies⁷

If this is the general strategy of the Stranger—to strengthen the case of the sophist by ruining the case of the philosophers—it still does not tie in directly with the doublet eikastic-phantastic speech, for the explication of which the discussion of being is presumably an indispensable digression. The Stranger says that the philosophers tell stories (242c8–243b1). A typical story combines a count of the beings with an image of becoming in which the philosopher who tells the story is not part of the story. The Stranger does not criticize this type of philosopher either for talking in images or for leaving himself out, but in the case of the comprehensives he tells the story which puts them into one story and makes their being the issue. It thus looks as if the precise ontologists are to the comprehensives as countable being is to epistemology or psychology, for the formula “to be is to be body” really means “to be is to be touchable,” and “to be is to be an idea” really means “to be is to be intelligible.” The philosophers, then, are presented in such a way that eikastic speech is opposed to phantastic speech, and the Stranger’s presentation of phantastic speech is itself eikastic. We can then say that the diacritical ontology of the Stranger, which discovered Socratic psychology, reappears in the opposition between number and soul. This opposition is at first resolved through the Stranger’s proposal that rest and motion both are; but he immediately concludes that this pair both must be one and cannot be one. The Stranger ends up by counting the beings; his counting, however, does not take into account what he is counting. It assumes that the two are not parts, for if they were parts of one whole they would not necessarily be together what they are apart. The body-people

⁷ Cf. Derek J. Raine and Michael Heller, *The Science of Space-Time* (Tucson: Pachart Publishing House, 1981), 26. “The force-free motions, the existence of which is asserted by the Law of Inertia, play a fundamental role in the theory [of Newton]. It is by means of these privileged trajectories that we map out the structure of space-time. Newton certainly did not take this next step with much success. For, in constructing a space-time arena for his dynamics, he reverts to the idea of a kinematical description of inertial motions. In doing so, he arrives at a space-time structure which is not strictly consistent with his Law of Inertia.”

are body-people by themselves, when the Stranger puts them into a story they become giants. Likewise, the friends of the ideas cease to be nameless once they too are parts of the same story. they become gods. We therefore do not know what happens to motion and rest when they are together, we do know, however, that the being of the nonbeing of motion must have a cause that is not the being of rest. The absence of any causality in the Stranger's juxtaposition of rest and motion tells us that the Stranger, if he is to go on, must find a way around causality. A recourse to speeches turns out to be the Socratic way out for the Stranger.

The Stranger groups all of philosophical thought under myth, either by accusing the precise people of storytelling or by telling a story himself about gods and giants. He leaves myth behind when he turns to *lógos*, which is to be discussed in light of its apparently contradictory way of postulating a one as subject which the manifold of its predicates denies (251a5-6). It is not immediately obvious that the Stranger's example—man and his predicates—is significant; we cannot but wonder, however, whether there is not a connection between the recourse to speeches and the citation of man, especially since they appear together after his own gigantomachy. Man had first shown up in the separation the friends of the ideas had made between body as that by means of which we partake in becoming through perception, and soul as that by means of which we are in some partnership with being through calculation (248a10-13). Man had then shown up as a possible rival to god when the Stranger elicited Theaetetus's assent to the proposition that the being which perfectly and completely is must have mind and life in soul (248e6-249b1); but the Stranger had not gone on to ask whether soul entailed body. Man, then, is at least in the background of the discussion of *lógos*. The *lógos* is man's *lógos*. His speech is prior to the letters which make up his speech. The consonants of his speech are not in his speech what they are in the alphabet. "body" is the consonant of the alphabet, "ensouled body" is the consonant prior to the alphabet of the friends of the ideas. The Stranger's own alphabet accordingly is very misleading if it is not accompanied by a procedure which informs us how to translate its letters into sounds. its *ἄφωνα* into *σύμφωνα*. The key to this procedure is provided by the observation that only one of the letters of his alphabet is explained. Being, motion, rest, and the same are manipulated, but nothing is further revealed about them through their manipulations. Only

the other emerges with a trait it did not have as an element of the alphabet. The other thus turns out to be not a letter at all but the operator which is designed to transform all the other letters into sounds. Nonbeing as the other makes for the possibility of λόγος

In his autobiography in the *Phaedo*, Socrates compared the looking at the sun during an eclipse with the looking of his predecessors at the beings directly, and the looking at the image of the eclipsed sun in water with his looking at the beings in speeches (99d5–100a3). If the Stranger, in his turn from myth to λόγος, is going over the Socratic revolution, the region he is now looking at must be the region of nonbeing, for nonbeing belongs of necessity to λόγος. Any something looks as if it is taken up into speech without alteration: ὄν has a referent that seems to be outside discourse, but μὴ ὄν has already submitted to an operation of λόγος before it enters any λόγος. When Odysseus tells Polyphemus—he of many names—that his name is Οὐτίς, he has prepared the way for its being understood in the Cyclops' speech οὐτίς με κτείνει, as "None kills me."⁸ The syntax of λόγος strips οὐτίς of a referent. Speech makes the neighbors of Polyphemus as blind as Odysseus made him.⁹ Negation, then, bears the mark of man's presence in discourse. The Stranger, however, extends this to all speech regardless of whether it has a negative or not. He does this by denying that any letter of his original alphabet is what it is by itself. Motion is not the same as itself on account of its own nature but on account of its participation in the same (256b1). The participation of any element in anything denies the identity of the element with whatever it partakes in. But the principle of participation or of partial sharing is the other, for nothing is other than any other on account of its own nature but on account of its partaking in the *idea* of the other (255e3–6). The other, however, or the principle of participation, makes it possible for something to be said of something, for otherwise, as the eristical say, man would be only man and good only good. The other therefore de-idealizes every being and makes it not just itself but puts it in relation with other things. The other is that which adds the vocalic element to the silent consonants of being. The *Sophist*

⁸ Homer, *Odyssey* 9 408

⁹ It is striking that the absence of a referent for οὐτίς makes the neighbors speak at once of Zeus, whose afflictions it is impossible to avoid, *Odyssey* 9 409

began with Socrates' suggestion that god was the philosopher. The philosopher, he implied in the argument of the Stranger, was the consonantal being with its vocalic glide already attached. The true philosopher is the only being that enters speech as just what he is. He therefore cannot but not appear as he is, for he cannot avoid being taken to be like every other being, a being in itself. The philosopher thus bears an uncanny resemblance to the lover, who despite his being equally defective comes to light as perfect and complete.¹⁰ It is not surprising, therefore, that Theaetetus ends up by saying that the sophist impersonates the wise (268c1).

It is now possible to link the other with two prior stages of the argument. One stage is due to Theaetetus, the other to the Stranger. The image as *ἕτερον τοιούτου*—or, as Theaetetus said, the weaving together of being and nonbeing—is no longer a marginal class among the things which are, rather, the image is that class of things acknowledged by everyone—the ease with which Theaetetus discovered the proper formula testifies to it—as not being just what it is. They are the counterparts outside of speech of what “philosopher” is within speech. Within speech, the image is necessarily double. “that is so-and-so” and “that is not so-and-so.” The image creates non-contradictory doubletalk. It is thus the way into the other itself. The second step on that way is the Stranger's contribution, it comes from his attempt, easier in speech than in deed, to tame the giants. “To be is to be an agent or a patient power” was not acceptable to the friends of the ideas, who tried to restrict it to becoming. The paradox that knowing could not be either an agent or patient power was not resolved, however, and seemed to leave the friends of the ideas without ideas, or at least without ideas that can be known (248d4–e5). It is true that the definition of being as power, once it is split between agency and patiency, suffers from the same defect as any counting of the beings; but the definition does state that being is relational, since a power cannot be an agent unless something else is a patient. The definition thus sets the stage for the final emergence of the other. The other is the logical equivalent to the dynamical pair of being. It too makes every being relational insofar as it is in speech; but it overcomes the difficulty of power by getting rid of the contrary and including within itself a two. The

¹⁰ This is the gist of the argument between Agathon and Socrates in the *Symposium*.

not big is the equal and the small, the not beautiful the ugly and the just, the not Greek barbarian and barbaric. In the last case, the other, in cutting barbarian away from barbaric, brings "Greek" over to "not Greek" and does not exempt it from savagery. The designation "stranger" likewise bears on this designation ("barbarian"), not only because the Spartans call barbarians strangers,¹¹ but because "not stranger" includes the acquaintance and the savage. The Stranger says, at any rate, that not to comply with the company's request appears to him ἄξερον (217e6). The Stranger will not be a stranger while remaining the Stranger. The Stranger's double status prepares the way for what shocks even young Socrates. "To be lawless [ἄνομον]" is to be outside the law and above the law. It is to be either tyrant or philosopher (*Statesman* 301b10-c4).

The Stranger distinguishes between two kinds of weaving together. One is the weaving together of species, the other of nouns and verbs (259e5-6; 262c5-7). It is on account of the first kind of weaving that we have λόγος, but it is the second kind that constitutes the structure of λόγος. The first establishes the possibility of λόγος; it allows for things to enter λόγος. The second, however, distinguishes between the agent and the action of a λόγος. This distinction makes us realize that the Stranger's own divisions were primarily sets of discriminations among verbs of action, and the agent, whether angler, Socrates, or sophist, was defined by a predicate or predicates to which he could be attached. The verbs were so determinative of the agents that whoever could be plausibly said to do some action was ipso facto that agent. Accordingly, Socrates took on the guise of the sophist, for there was nothing in the verb that could declare whether the agent was spurious or not. Indeed, from this perspective, the Stranger's initial assertion that he and Theaetetus had only a name in common meant that they had an agent-noun which had to be hooked up to an action (218c1-5). The deed (ἔργον) he there spoke of was of an action (πράξις). To move from word to deed was simply to discover the verb. In dissolving the subject into the verb, the verb was put in the third person, in which form was concealed a he or she that suited anyone who performed the action. Whatever this action was, knowledge had

¹¹ Herodotus, *Histories* 9.11.2

nothing to do with its character. Although the split between an artless and artful form of contradiction was strictly impossible (225b12–c9), there was nothing in “to haggle” that denied it was not fully informed by art, any more than there was in its counterpart any trace of knowledge except the label. The emergence of the agent is something we are not prepared for, since if truth or falsity is now to be found in the compound of agent and action, the Stranger is admitting that Socrates and the sophist do not do different things, and no division by itself can mark off their difference. Socrates might be as much a maker as the sophist.

After his characterization of *λόγος* and his illustration of a false speech, the Stranger quickly dispatches thought, opinion, and *phantasia* (263d6–264b8). He asserts that thought and *λόγος* are the same, except that thought is the *διάλογος* within the soul before itself without sound. If, then, thought and speech are the same, speech is dialogue. Speech, however, had not been dialogue but what the Stranger now calls opinion, the assertion or denial of a thought. The Stranger had indeed anticipated this revision, for he had interpolated in his example of a false speech a dialogic remark, “Theaetetus, with whom I am now conversing, flies” (263a8). What he had called speech involved two agents, the first and second persons of dialogue, if Theaetetus is being addressed by the Stranger, however, the *λόγος* is not “Theaetetus flies” but “you fly,” which in Greek has the agent built into the verb, *πέτεσαι*, or if contracted, *πέτη*. Once speech becomes dialogue, the minimal speech is the verb with its proper ending. If, however, the Stranger is addressing Theaetetus, he is asking a question and expects that Theaetetus will answer it. Theaetetus is called upon to decide about his own state. Whether he is right or not depends on whether the Stranger speaks an image or not for, according to Socrates, if it is an image it is an image of those whom Theodorus calls philosophers, and we would not expect that if Theaetetus were one of them his answer to the question would be true (*Theaetetus* 173e5; 175e2). However this may be, speech as dialogue alters the issue of predication. “I” and “you” seem to be resistant to their elimination through verbal action, for at first glance there seems to be no verb which specifies what we do in the way that “hunts” or “sifts” does, let alone an art or science that rationalizes the human. On reflection, however, the verb which is predicated of man as such is *διαλέγεσθαι* and its scientific form is

διαλεκτική.¹² The Stranger's characterization of λόγος, then, points to a structure of λόγος in which the explicit agent—his two examples are “man” and “Theaetetus”—contains another, “you” if the explicit agent is “I,” or “I” if the explicit agent is “you.” These agents are present in any dialogue regardless of whether they are part of any λόγος. They are the object of Socrates' soul-cathartics in the double form of self-knowledge.

The Stranger concludes his account with φαντασία. It is a mixture of opinion and perception. Φαντασία, however, if it is to stay within the dialogic structure of speech and thought, has to be understood as the formulation of an opinion in answer to a question in light of the interlocutor's perception of the questioner. Such an answer is soon to be given by Theaetetus. The Stranger will ask him whether everything is the handicraft of a god or of thoughtless nature, and Theaetetus will say: “I, perhaps on account of my age, often have opinions on both sides, now, however, in looking at you and supposing you believe things are made in conformity with a god, I too hold in this way” (265d1–4). The most revealing thing in Theaetetus's remark is the absence of the word φαίνεται, for its absence is what makes his remark the example of a φάντασμα. Before our eyes Theaetetus banishes doubt and replaces it with a conviction which he builds out of a reading of the Stranger's face. This reading is a spoken phantom. Regardless of whether this is a correct reading of the Stranger's face, Theaetetus is now something else than a verbal action. His conclusion has no weight unless Socratic cathartics is possible and can test whether this time Theaetetus is not pregnant with a wind-egg. The soul, after all, is something

We do not know whether we are to ascribe Theaetetus's apparition that the things are of divine making to the Stranger's exercise of φανταστική; but we do know that Theaetetus's apparition precedes the Stranger's reattachment of eikastics and phantastics to image-making. As the Stranger sets up the distinction between divine and human making, there is no artful kind of divine image-making,

¹² Perhaps it is just an accident, but the Stranger's examples of verbs that do not in succession constitute a λόγος are all in the active voice (βαδίζει, τρέχει, καθεύδει), and the two that illustrate true and false speech are both in the middle (κάθηται and πέτεται). The middle voice is strictly used for those actions which occur within the sphere of the subject, cf. Pierre Chantraine, *Grammaire homérique*, vol. 2 (Paris: Librairie Klincksieck, 1953), 174–6.

for though he alludes to dreams, his examples of the god's *φαντάσματα* are either shadows or mirror-images (266b9-c4). There is no suggestion that they are anything but automatic consequences of the bodies the god makes directly. Indeed, the bodies that the Stranger allows to be the god's work are all on or in the earth (265c1-5), there is neither heaven nor stars, let alone an ordered cosmos (cf. 233e5-234a4). There are animals and soulless things, but there is no mention of soul, neither *ψυχή* nor *ἔμψυχον* reappears once the Stranger returns to *ποιητική* (*ψυχή* appears last at 264a9). We are left in the dark, then, as to whether the god practices phantastics either in deed or in speech; and if Socrates was right that the Stranger is a god, we are in the dark as to whether Theaetetus's *φάντασμα* was due to the Stranger's art. If, as it seems, the *φάντασμα* was Theaetetus's own offspring, there would be no divine phantastics in deed; but if it was after all a product of the Stranger's skill, as if it were the product of a god, there would still be no divine phantastics in speech. The Stranger's impersonation of a divine craftsman would not require more than a question to come across as an answer; it would not entail an elaborate account of divine revelation, either in the form of laws or of Socrates' *δαιμόνιον*. The function of divine making, then, is to put the stress on the body. That the body is paramount is shown by the double use of *μιμητική*, first as the comprehensive art of *εἶδωλα*, and then as the art of using one's own body or voice to represent someone else's (265a10; 267a7). At this point the Stranger's divisions break down, for he separates impersonators into knowers and nonknowers, even though he was dealing with kinds of productive art (267b7-8). Though nothing is said explicitly to this effect, it does seem that knowledgeable impersonators (Theaetetus, for example) are those who imitate those they know and ignorant impersonators those who imitate justice and the rest of virtue. The impersonators of virtue try to make appear in themselves the opinion they and almost everyone else have about virtue. They embody virtue. This kind of embodiment occurred long before men became aware of the difference between opinion and knowledge (267d4-8). What the Stranger now calls *δοξομιμητική* is known to its sincere practitioners as *ἀρετή*. It is based on the belief that virtue can appear. Theaetetus represents that belief when he reads the Stranger's face as betraying his conviction about divine production. Does the Stranger then look up?

It seems at first as if the Stranger's analysis of *λόγος* into agent

and action is designed solely for finding truth or falsity in the correct or incorrect attachment of an action to a known agent; by his restriction of imitation to impersonation, however, the agent becomes significant in himself and independent of what he does¹³ The sophist embodies virtue as it is understood in opinion, despite his suspicion that he does not know what his *σχῆμα* declares he knows. Gorgias exemplifies this perfectly, but what he does is to contradict and refute the opinions about virtue the interlocutor himself maintains and believes he sees represented in the sophist The sophist impersonates the opinions he refutes What, then, of Socrates? He is not an impersonator Theodorus at any rate found him poker-faced, and could not figure out what Socrates believed from his totally convincing presentation of a Protagorean position (*Theaetetus* 161a6). Socrates, however, is ironical Does his claim to ignorance come across as knowledge in light of his capacity to show up the ignorance of others? More particularly, does the incoherence in opinion about a virtue, once Socrates has exposed it, induce the impression that Socrates himself possesses that virtue? It would seem impossible that Socrates could display popular virtue without its inconsistencies while bringing to light its inconsistencies, but Socrates the logic-chopping moralist seems to be doing exactly that. *Λόγος* as dialogue thus comes to light as the problem of Socrates the agent in his action. We can say that the *Sophist* ends at that point where the problem has been uncovered, and the *Statesman* is designed to treat Socratic agency Socrates the agent, however, cannot show up in himself, instead, he shows up in the patient, young Socrates

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¹³ In the summary the Stranger gives of the sophist's genealogy (268c8-d4), all but one of his lines of descent can be rephrased as a verb the difference between divine and human imitation resists such a rephrasing

ARISTOTELIAN FRIENDSHIP SELF-LOVE AND MORAL RIVALRY*

ANNE MARIE DZIOB

IN THE FIRST SEVERAL PARAGRAPHS of *Nicomachean Ethics* 98, Aristotle asks “whether a man should love himself most” (*NE* 1168a28),¹ and asserts that “men say that one ought to love best one’s best friend” (1168b1). Yet earlier (1159a27) Aristotle describes loving as more essential to friendship than being loved; furthermore, he emphasizes that a man wishes well to his friend for his friend’s sake, not as a means to his own happiness (1155b31). Note also Aristotle’s continued emphasis upon man as a political animal. In the *Politics* as well as the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle describes the biological, even instinctive tendency of humans to seek each other’s company. He considers it absurd for a man even to imagine living alone, since “without friends no one would choose to live, though he had all other goods” (1155a5–6). It is only the human animal, however, who is even capable of that genuine friendship which, although rare (1156b25), Aristotle considers “not only necessary but also noble, for . . . we think it is the same people that are good men and are friends” (1155a28–31), these friends are “alike in their excellence” (1156b7), one loving another “as being the man he is” (1156a11).

We would argue that this implies that in loving a friend men thereby choose what is good for themselves: “for the good man in becoming a friend becomes a good to his friend” (1157b28–31), and,

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¹ The following abbreviations will appear in the text: *NE* for *Nicomachean Ethics*, *EE* for *Eudemian Ethics*, *MM* for *Magna Moralia*.

simultaneously, his friend a good to him. Aristotle states that it is the recognition of my friend's good character (known by his actions) that incites me, so to speak, to wish for him whatever is good. The same is true in the other direction. Aristotle adds "it is mutually known to them that well-wishing of this kind is [also] reciprocated" (1156a3-5).

Just what are we wishing for our friend? If one values the person and his welfare, should one not take great care to discern how best to serve him? It seems evident that the well-wisher (and well-doer) in a genuine friendship by definition cannot make serious blunders or be greatly unskilled. A developed sensitivity to needs seems assured. After all, one must know what the friend wants. genuine friendship requires time and familiarity to become established (1156b26). Friends trust not only one another, but also (and especially) each other's ability to recognize and even anticipate what each does in fact need.² What each wants—being good, hence consistent (and not weak-willed)—is that which is good for the other. That which is good for him is precisely what is good for the well-wisher, for he is another self. Since one's friend is similarly a good man, one chooses for him what one would wish for oneself.

The Self in Friendship. What kind of "another self" is the good man's friend? It is noteworthy that Aristotle employs the noun "self" (*autos*) very seldom, and only in his ethical treatises. Moreover, it is only in the chapters on friendship that Aristotle refers to another self (*allos autos*) or considers self-love (*philautra*). "Self" for Aristotle uniformly describes the human agent responsible for his choices, the originating source of his own conduct. The term is central to Aristotle's analysis of friendship. "Self," we conclude, underlies the notion of what one is when being a friend of the genuine sort, and what goes on in this friendship, namely, self-loving.

Whenever one friend acts (and desires to act) for his friend's sake, this is definitive of genuine friendship (*Rhetoric* 1361b35-40). For Aristotle, to be aware of one's friend is in effect to be that friend, by means of one's own activity of knowing him, one thereby knows one's self. In order to be able to know myself as friend, however, I

² Friends are in fact so solicitous on each other's behalf that they display "foresight in a special degree respecting one another" by vividly dreaming about each other (which some interpret as having predictive value), see Aristotle, *On Divination in Sleep* 464a27-29.

must recognize my self in my friend, becoming identical, so to speak, with him. I thereby become aware that he is another self while recognizing that I am one just like him, another self.

Aristotle's notion of self is not that of an impersonal, objective or transcendent mind; rather, the self is simply the individual who thinks, acts, has affections, wishes, and chooses. We emphasize that it is the whole human individual who is this self, one who knows another and thereby recognizes himself *as* an individual self. We note furthermore that for Aristotle, a person is related to his friend as he is to himself because the friend is another self (*NE* 1166a3, 1166a15–17, 1166a30–32). That is, the friend is mirrored by another as friend; he recognizes himself *as* the friend he is to himself. Therefore a person is related to his friend as he is to himself—as a second self.

An often overlooked but relevant point is that Aristotle only strictly applies the notion of self to humans. Unlike a god the human self needs—cannot do without—another self in order to be able to know himself. For Aristotle it is specifically in genuine friendship that two friends mutually serve as knower and known, as each other's another self, whereas for the divine the two are one: God is immediately both selves at once. Note, however, that Aristotle calls attention to something within the individual that is divine. "It may be even held that this is the true self of each, inasmuch as it is the dominant and better part" (*NE* 1178a2), "the intellect more than anything else is man" (*NE* 1178a7). The "true" human self is somehow divine. Moreover, Aristotle urges men to attend to this true self's divine feature, presenting this as the supreme goal of human life.

We ought as far as possible to do all that man may to live in accordance with the highest thing in him. It would be a strange thing if a man should choose to live not his own life [that is, be most truly his own self] but the life of some other than himself. (1177b31–1178a4)

Aristotle advocates that all human activity should be oriented as much as possible toward this life, but the express condition for possessing it is that the individual remain somehow his own self.³ That is, if one is to be successful when aiming toward this supreme goal,

³ See *NE* 1159a8–12, 1178a2–3

the individual must be most truly his own self. This in turn requires that self-awareness which can only be had by means of identification with another self that is most truly himself, that is, a genuine friend for whom one also serves as his other self. We know that it is this mutual recognition which Aristotle calls genuine friendship, friendship without qualification (see *NE* 1156a11, 1156b10, 1157b3).

In all such genuine friendship, this mutual recognition of friends as second selves must obtain. What this implies is that whatever appears good for a man as belonging to himself will also appear good for him, again, when it is possessed by his friend. This includes that self-awareness, or consciousness of being alive, which is desirable to the individual selves (*NE* 1170b1–5).

Again, human awareness of self⁴ can only be satisfactorily obtained for Aristotle through the awareness of a friend and his activities. Aristotle advises us that “we can contemplate our neighbors better than ourselves and their actions better than our own” (*NE* 1169b34–35); hence friends do help one to know one’s self. Thus it is friends who are essential to self-awareness.

Knowing that one’s acts are virtuous is not identical with knowing that one is a virtuous man. Specifically, it is only by means of a friend that men know themselves as good men. Examine Aristotle’s description of “the unduly humble man” who seems not to know himself, “else he would have desired the things he was worthy of, since these were good” (*NE* 1125a19–23). By contrast, Aristotle’s proud, independent man does in fact desire the goods of which he knows himself to be worthy. This magnanimous man “cares about few things only, and those great” (*EE* 1232b5; see *MM* 1192a26–29). Significantly, this great-souled man “must be unable to make his life revolve round another, unless it be a friend” (*NE* 1125a1); for genuine friendship is the greatest human good.

Further explicit proof that for Aristotle self-recognition does indeed depend upon one’s friend is found in the *Magna Moralia*:

The friend—if we figure a friend of the most intimate sort—will seem to be a kind of second self. Now we are not able to see what we

⁴ Where the *Nicomachean Ethics* mentions self-awareness, the *Magna Moralia* emphasizes self-knowledge. “It is only or best in character-friendship that one can come to know oneself—to know the objective quality of one’s own actions, character, and life”, John M. Cooper, “Aristotle on Friendship,” in *Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics*, ed. Amelie O. Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 324.

are from ourselves As then when we wish to see our own face, we do so by looking into the mirror, in the same way when we wish to know ourselves we can obtain that knowledge by looking at our friend. For the friend is, as we assert, a second self. If, then, it is not possible to know this without having someone else for a friend, the self-sufficing man will require friendship in order to know himself (*MM* 1213a10–26)

Hence Aristotle does hold self-knowledge to be necessary to the person who is a friend. Aristotle first establishes that all men naturally desire to know; now he adds that all (good) men naturally desire to know themselves. We conclude that it is genuine friendship which is essential to their obtaining this self-knowledge. In short, Aristotelian genuine friendship mandates that one's self be recognized as another self.

It is only by means of his friend, we conclude, that the individual can thus recognize himself, seeing himself reflected as in a mirror—as he is, in his motives, actions, and life. For Aristotle, the very observing of one's friend, his actions, and his life, defines a loving act. We would add that to recognize a friend's motives for actions is to ascribe these same motives to one's own actions. Recognition of an other self thus produces a kind of self-affirmation,⁵ what might be termed self-love.

Self-Love and Friendship Which self is it that one loves in that self-love exhibited by genuine friends? The self is one who is responsible for his own choices, is the source of his conduct, and is one who recognizes himself as responsible, as source. The self is the unique, irreplaceable individual who thinks, acts, has affections, wishes, and chooses. The self is what is befriended and befriends, what is appreciated and appreciates, it is what one is when acting as genuine friend. The self is what is stimulated to win, what is

⁵ The good man, choosing to live a good life, the best possible life, knows that he does so. We note that he must affirm his living thus in order consciously to live an ever more virtuous life, that is, he must always be aware of what actually motivates his virtuous actions. The friend, in recognizing another as oneself, thereby affirms himself, as he likewise serves as source of affirmation for his friend. In the summary of his defense of altruism Cooper decides that for Aristotle egoism is overcome in the activity that defines genuine friendship. "Aristotle's argument, in short, is that in loving and valuing [affirming] the other person for his own sake one becomes able to love and value [affirm] oneself. There is no reduction here of friendship to narrow self-love", Cooper, "Aristotle on Friendship," 333

happy, what values and loves. In sum, for Aristotle the self is the completely human person, not a god ⁶

Virtuous actions constitute the best life for man as man. For Aristotle the virtuous life is the best human life, the fullest expression of human nature; even "the irrational passions are thought not less human than reason is" (*NE* 1111b1–2). Virtuous activity reveals the best state of man's reason-self as dominating the activity, along with the best states of man's feelings and desires as always in harmony with this dominant reason (*NE* 1178a9–22). Thus whatever a man does that is conducive to this harmony of *all* best states—feelings and desires included—is an example of self-love. When answering the question whether or not there is friendship toward oneself, Aristotle refers to the whole individual, stating.

Then only will the soul be one, when the reason and the passions are in accord with one another so that when it has become one there will be friendship towards oneself. And this friendship towards oneself will exist in the good man, for in him alone the parts of the soul are in proper relation to one another owing to their not being at variance. (*MM* 1211a33–38)

We would argue that in fact the friend's feelings—his nonrational desires—play an essential role for Aristotle, even and especially in genuine friendship.

Aristotle does emphasize that it is the men themselves who are dear to one another: "Friendship, we maintain, exists only where there can be a return of affection" (*MM* 1208b28). To explain how and why this is so, we now examine the impact of man's feelings upon his engendering and maintaining genuine friendship. By doing so we uncover an important piece of evidence seldom discussed by Aristotelian critics.

The Role of Thumos For Aristotle, the whole gamut of human feelings is involved in virtuous activity. Virtue demands emotional habituation; one's nonrational desires must be properly guided by

⁶ Here we differ from critics such as Julia Annas, who maintain that for Aristotle, "when we are considering self-love and treating a friend as another self, the self at issue is really the person's reasoning part", Julia Annas, "Self-Love in Aristotle," *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 27 (suppl.) (1988): 3. Annas also claims that the self one loves "is his developed capacity for practical reasoning" (p. 13).

reason⁷ The good man will give full, measured, and appropriate expression to his feelings, and moreover will enjoy doing so One caveat is needed. the good man feels like doing what his reasoned deliberations choose for him to do He will take pleasure in this harmonious and organized functioning, recognizing why he acts the way he acts (*NE* 1105a31–32) When nonrational desires are thus trained⁸ (never eliminated), the good man will be able to count upon their support and relax his guard, so to speak; he will expect himself to act in his characteristic manner That is, strictly emotional desires need no longer refer to reasoned thoughts about what is to be done, since a situation has been encountered and dealt with in the past The controlled desires (*orexis*, movements of the soul toward or away from action) are divided by Aristotle into three kinds. the reason-based desire (*boulesis*), appetite (*epithumia*), and a spirited, competitive impulse (*thumos*)⁹

We would like to highlight the *thumos* of the good man, wherein disciplined emotions do effect what is in fact good for man without always “checking” with reasons for the action desired Reason has long ago persuaded (not coerced) these nonrational desires to obey (*NE* 1120b31–33) But how does reason thus persuade? Explaining that “there are both conceptual thoughts and (if you like) ‘urges’ on both sides of Aristotle’s distinction between *logos* and the *alogon*—reason and the nonrational,”¹⁰ Cooper argues that for reason to persuade nonrational desires, it

is for it to get its own view of what is good to prevail, in the sense that this conception comes to be adopted by the non-rational part itself as well Reason is not just exercising brute force [but proceeds] by getting it [any nonrational desire] to respond to a

⁷ “Nor indeed is the irrational part praised, except in so far as it is capable of subserving or actually subserves the rational part”, *MM* 1185b11–12

⁸ “‘Character’ derives from ‘custom’ because it is the result of accustoming. Whereby it is evident that no one of the excellences of the irrational part springs up in us by nature”; *MM* 1186a1–3

⁹ See *EE* 1223a26–27, 1225b24–26, *MM* 1187b37

¹⁰ John M. Cooper, “Some Remarks on Aristotle’s Moral Psychology,” *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 27 (suppl.) (1988) 32 He adds the following “Aristotle’s distinction, then, between rational and non-rational parts of the soul has nothing to do with the modern distinction between reason (regarded as the faculty of concept-formation and the manipulation of concepts), on the one hand, and desire (regarded on its own as a concept-free faculty of urges), on the other hand” (p. 32)

wider and more comprehensive view of the facts Being persuaded thus to feel about the situation as reason, on its own grounds, thinks best, that will mean that your rational thought about the goods and bads in that situation comes to be accepted by the non-rational part

The way you then feel about what has happened and about what should be done about it, is exactly also the way you think, for reasons, about it¹¹

This explains how, for Aristotle, “we are brought to perfection by habits of feeling” (*NE* 1103a26) Expressing these trained nonrational desires is part of what it means to be a fully functioning human Unlike the Stoic ideal, Aristotle’s psychology calls for a man’s feeling the full range of emotions, such as grief, joy, and a competitive spiritedness.

Thumos, for Aristotle, has a natural affinity to reason: it “obeys the argument in a sense” (*NE* 1149b1).¹² Like reason, *thumos* “is open” to what are the facts and is not given to “guile-weaving” (*NE* 1149b15–16) With choice and motive, it is an essential component of courage: one must be spirited to become (through habit) brave (*NE* 1116b30, 1117a3–4)

Noting that “in the works of Aristotle left to us there does not seem to be any full and thematic analysis of spiritedness, [even though] the word [*thumos*] is very common in Greek literature,”¹³ Laurence Berns nevertheless defines and fully describes Aristotle’s use of the term spiritedness:

It is that power of the soul that is activated whenever something threatens or opposes what the soul seeks or cherishes as desirable and good, spirit rises to overcome the difficulty [in] hope In social and political life it is the indispensable temperamental basis for the fight against injustice It is indispensable as well for the individual’s fight against the vices within himself The classical equivalent of conscience would seem to be a certain compound of spiritedness and shame [Spiritedness] implies some kind of rational estimation, or comparison of the behavior with the standard [Hence it is] the soul’s fighting element¹⁴

When left unguided by reason (or law), *thumos* “perverts the minds of rulers, even when they are the best of men” (*Politics* 1287a30–32) For the good man, however, that friend to himself whose reason

¹¹ Cooper, “Some Remarks on Aristotle’s Moral Psychology,” 33–4

¹² See also *De Anima* 432b5–7, *Metaphysics* 1072a26–28

¹³ Laurence Berns, “Spiritedness in Ethics and Politics A Study in Aristotelian Psychology,” *Interpretation* 12 (1984) 345

¹⁴ Berns, “Spiritedness in Ethics and Politics,” 345–6.

can be counted upon to dominate, spiritedness "is the quality of the soul which begets friendship and enables us to love" (*Politics* 1328a1-2)

We are now ready to establish what occurs in self-love. The good man's nonrational desires that are *thumos* have, as explained earlier, been trained by habituation and persuasion to respond to certain events. The desires of *thumos* converge with those of reason. When one loves oneself or a friend, therefore, one is moved eagerly, spiritedly, to demonstrate this love. Finally, Aristotle intends the broader sense of self when he describes self-love. Just how does the good man, genuine friend of self and other demonstrate this love? One manifestation is accomplished by the response of *thumos*, which loves another self as fellow competitor. It is as competitor that man can best promote the welfare both of his friend and of himself.

In order precisely to specify this role of *thumos*, we piece together from various sources what for Aristotle actually is done in the activity which is friendship, and what in particular is effected by a man's spirited desire, or *thumos*. Two good (and fortunate) men, alike and with similar taste, befriend one another, what transpires in the befriending process? Because "goodwill seems to be a beginning of friendship" (*NE* 1167a4), these feelings of well-wishing arise—perhaps suddenly (*NE* 1166b35)—separately in each man "on account of some excellence and worth, when one man seems to another beautiful or brave or something of the sort, as we pointed out in the case of competitors in a contest" (*NE* 1167a18-20). Spurred by the recognition that the other is, say, brave, each shares in the other's wish to excel in bravery. But goodwill only becomes friendly feeling when it "involves intensity or desire [and] implies intimacy" (*NE* 1166b33). There now obtains a mutual feeling of appreciation such that each wishes the other to continue doing brave deeds. Thus far, these sudden feelings—the spurring on to excel, the intense desire, and intimate feelings of appreciation—all involve a response which is inspired by *thumos*.

Why this wish for continuation? It is enjoyable for the good man to witness brave deeds being done, whether his own or another's. "Most pleasant is that which depends on activity, and this is most lovable" (*NE* 1168a14-15), and again, "To each his own activities and others like them are pleasurable, and the actions of the good are the same or like" (*NE* 1156b15-17). It is precisely this delight

that is a prelude to friendship: "Men do not become friends with those in whom they do not delight" (*NE* 1158a5-6). The wish next becomes desire. One is moved to do whatever it takes to continue witnessing these brave deeds man's spirited element, *thumos*, craves this ongoing delight¹⁵ *Thumos*, moreover, that element which also desires to win (*philonikon*), is incited to do for another, for his sake, whatever will further his brave deeds, for such deeds are good and the trained *thumos* recognizes them as to-be-pursued

Over time, after repeated brave and virtuous deeds, intimacy becomes friendship "Good men . . . [gradually come to] trust each other . . . on the basis of their characters" (*EE* 1243a11-13); "Each has allowed the other to test him, . . . for a friend is not to be had without trial" (*EE* 1237b25, 1238a1) Again, a friend is "a man who has long been tested by oneself" (*NE* 1157a21). But of what does this testing consist? Precisely here is the effect of *thumos*'s major role. Testing takes the form of competition each friend is a moral contestant.

Moral Rivalry. Aristotle's agonist differs from the modern antagonist.¹⁶ Today, sports and other contests often resemble battles wherein competitors may act as adversaries, even enemies, an antagonism may develop, and contentious, seemingly hostile foes compete as if in active opposition. (The victor may say, referring to his victim, "I killed him" or "I wiped him out") In ancient Greece, the agon was likewise a contest of strength or endurance, for a prize,

¹⁵ Remember that the genuine friend must be a good man, his emotional attitude therefore is constituted by appropriate feelings. For example, he is not self-indulgent, he loves himself enough not to be distracted from enhancing his own rational activity. Thus the good man's behavior will be determined by his desires, and his desires by his character

¹⁶ See Michael B. Poliakoff, *Combat Sports in the Ancient World: Competition, Violence, and Culture* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987). Contrasting the Greek with the modern notion of athletic contest, Poliakoff defends the notion that "the agon played a more significant role in Hellenic culture than in the cultures of other ancient peoples. Sports were serious activities that brought honor and status, athletic victory and defeat were momentarily important, Greek sports were almost always individual rather than team competitions" (p. 107). He later provides many examples to document his belief that the "distinctive features of sport in historical Greek times" soon deteriorated to approximate today's contests. "Looking over the athletic scene in later antiquity, one encounters many signs of a full-blown professional world of sport: subsidies for athletes, slaves competing, massive numbers of festivals" (p. 132). Poliakoff concludes that the world of sport after the Greeks was far less "ennobling."

and was a public game. Even though contestants were indeed rivals, however, they could also be friends.¹⁷ And while it is true that similarities between modern and ancient contests may be observed, the Greek emphasis was on the act of competing itself, an act experienced as pleasant by contestant and audience alike.¹⁸ In this context Aristotle notes the following "Victory also is pleasant, and not merely to the competitive but to everyone. . . . The pleasantness of victory implies of course that combative sports and intellectual contests are [in themselves] pleasant" (Rhetoric 1370b32-1371a1). The testing of friends likewise takes the form of a contest: fellow agonists strive to win what is noble by outdoing each other in virtuous activity.¹⁹ Aristotle says that "as in the Olympic Games it is not the most beautiful and the strongest that are crowned but

¹⁷ See Donald G. Kyle, *Athletics in Ancient Athens* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1987). Kyle's focus on the cultural significance of athletics challenges the conventional wisdom that Greek sport was primarily guided by military needs. He highlights the major political importance of the Greek agon, arguing that "athletics were a public, integral, and potentially unifying element in the civic experience of the Athenians" (p. 177). Noteworthy is Kyle's description, in Appendix 2, of Lysis—known from Plato's dialogue on friendship—who was in fact an Athenian athlete.

¹⁸ See also David Sansone, *Greek Athletics and the Genesis of Sport* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). Sansone defines not only early Greek athletic contests but all sport as "the ritual sacrifice of physical energy" (p. 37). Arguing that all sport has a singular, fundamental nature (p. 14), he first defends the idea that it "redirects aggression and helps form human bonds" (p. 31). He then substantiates his claim that in a cultured society such as ancient Greece (as well as America), sport assumes a "pattern of behavior that has acquired a new, communicative function" (p. 43). Arguing that "the Greeks were capable of experiencing what is at the root of human feeling and consciousness, and [that] they communicated it to us in terms that are familiar to us" (p. 76), Sansone presents the Olympic athlete as "both the dedicator and the dedication" (p. 115), as sacrificer as well as sacrificial victim. Sansone illustrates clearly how races began as races to an altar, and how competition often obtained among willing victims in order only to select the best offering for sacrifice (always an Athenian citizen). Relevant to our thesis are Sansone's arguments that, first, these athletes compete primarily to select the best victims (p. 64). Second, contests need not be participatory: both activities of performing and of watching athletes share in the fundamental nature of sport (p. 70). Third, the prize-sacrifice is held in universal regard: whether the Stanley Cup, or, in ancient Greece, the best athlete-sacrifice himself, the goal was always considered noble.

¹⁹ Elijah Millgram employs a fanciful metaphor: "One's friends are the teammates one needs to play the game of a virtuous life", Elijah Millgram, "Aristotle on Making Other Selves," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 17 (1987): 369.

those who compete, so those who act rightly win the noble and good things in life" (*NE* 1099a3–5). In another place he proclaims that "that which is the prize and end of virtue seems to be the best thing and something godlike and blessed" (*NE* 1099b16–17). He is referring to human happiness, which is likewise activity.

Friends, then, spiritedly compete as moral rivals. When asking toward whom it is that we feel friendship, shame, envy, and emulation, Aristotle answers in part for each category, "our rivals." These rivals he describes as "those before whom we should be ashamed to do anything really wrong" (*Rhetoric* 1381b20), and "those who take us as their models or other people, it may be, like ourselves, whose rivals we are. For there are many things that shame before such people makes us do or leave undone" (1385a6–8). He also says that we feel envy toward our equals and

also our fellow-competitors —we do not compete with those whom we take to be far below us or far above us. So too we compete with those who follow the same ends as ourselves: we compete with our rivals in sport or in love, and generally with those who are after the same things. (*Rhetoric* 1388a9–14)

Moral rivals, in sum, by their very existence serve both to prevent one another from "doing anything really wrong" and to cause one another to "make do or leave undone." The friends are thus goaded, Aristotle tells us, because they "follow the same ends," "are after the same things." Each "desires the same things with all his soul" (*NE* 1166a14).

These trials and tests completed, genuine friendship is produced. Genuine friendship is sustained, moreover, by more of the same, each friend now expects the other to serve as spur. "It is characteristic of good men neither to go wrong themselves nor to let their friends do so" (*NE* 1159b6). The friend can be counted upon to help his friend hold fast and avoid base services. This is precisely the comparison Aristotle makes between the behavior of the self-lover, that good man who is said to be his own best friend (because guarantor of his good actions), and the behavior of genuine friends. Each is reliable, constant, and can count upon the other to sustain the relationship.

We need to clarify and further explore the connection between genuine friends' moral competition—which is engendered, maintained, and spurred on by each good man's *thumos* or spiritedness—

and these ongoing trials and tests. It is important to highlight why for friends who are good men the trials and tests cannot be understood merely as part of ordinary living. Each friend aims, in co-operative rivalry, for the other as well as himself not just to live ordinarily but to live well. To live well, as we emphasized earlier, a man must give full, measured, and appropriate expression to such human feelings as spiritedness, and enjoy doing so.

The claim that the spirited moral rivalry which involves these trials and tests does facilitate genuine friends' living well demands further evidence. The basis for this evidence appears in part in Aristotle's account of the character of citizens in the best *polis*. Preceding his appraisal of this state as "not a community of living beings only, but a community of equals, aiming at the best possible life" (*Politics* 1328a37–38), and arguably therefore as a community of genuine friends (as we shall later affirm), Aristotle stresses the importance of spiritedness.²⁰

Here the corroborating evidence for the importance of genuine friends' moral competition becomes clear: What happens when an alleged friend decides no longer to engage in the trial-and-testing rivalry? What if he somehow becomes satisfied with a certain level of virtuous activity and hence no longer strains every nerve to excel and outdo his friend by performing ever more noble deeds? Aristotle would have to answer that his friend's well-trained *thumcs*, which recognizes without recourse to reason that the good is to be pursued, reacts by fighting, as if invincible, to maintain this good which is genuine friendship and which aims at the best life possible for each good man. In fact, Aristotle does give such a reply:

A lofty spirit is not fierce by nature, but only when excited against evildoers. And this, as I was saying before, is a feeling which men

²⁰ Aristotle notes that "the natives of Asia are intelligent and inventive, but they are wanting in spirit, and therefore they are always in a state of subjection and slavery", *Politics* 1327b27–28. Not exhibiting this "one-sided nature," however, is the Hellenic race "Being high-spirited and also intelligent . . . it continues free, and is the best governed of any nation and, if it could be formed into one state, would be able to rule the world", *Politics* 1327b30–33. His fellow spirited and intelligent Greeks are "those whom the legislator will most easily lead to virtue", *Politics* 1327b37. Aristotle depicts the ideal state as similarly comprised of those citizens who, because spirited, exhibit "the power of command and the love of freedom [which] are in all men based upon this quality" which is "commanding and invincible"; *Politics* 1328a6–7.

show most strongly towards their friends if they think they have received a wrong at their hands as indeed is reasonable, for, besides the actual injury, they seem to be deprived of a benefit by those who owe them one (*Politics* 1328a9-15)

As earlier explained, it is incumbent upon the good man and friend to be counted upon to continue to act as competitive spur. The friendship requires it, it is owed. This owed benefit, of which the errant friend deprives another, is the ability to live well by means of the moral rivalry. Hence the *thumos* of the wronged friend, described here as exhibiting "the power of command," is fiercely motivated to reestablish the friendship. "The soul's fighting element," as we depicted spiritedness earlier, that which "enables us to love," is incited because threatened. This spirited reaction, what Aristotle calls loving, "seems to be the characteristic virtue of friends, so that it is only those in whom this is found in due measure that are lasting friends, and [it is] only their friendship that endures" (*NE* 1159a34-38). The intensity of the friend's spirited reaction, like that of Archilochus (*Politics* 1328a3-4), is not only justified but is even virtuous. For Aristotle this is what it means to be a good-tempered man: he is angry at the right person, when he ought and as he ought (*NE* 1125b32-33), and for the sake of their noble friendship.²¹ Without this spirited drive which makes it possible both to care to compete and to challenge one's moral rival to continue to act virtuously through mutually imposed tests and trials, there could then never obtain the abiding friendship of good men.

Additional evidence of the connection between genuine friends' moral competitiveness and their acting for the sake of the other's well-being appears again in Aristotle's description of a citizen's character. Because "every member [of the *polis*] ought to grow in proportion, that symmetry may be preserved" (*Politics* 1302b36-37), since it is important to maintain the *polis*'s security. Aristotle notes that "the argument in favor of ostracism is based upon a kind of political justice" (*Politics* 1284b16-17). Noteworthy here is Aristotle's limited list of those whom it is just to banish: those who seem "to predominate too much through their wealth, or the number

²¹ Perhaps this is in part why Aristotle claims that, possibly as much for *philia* as for *eros*, "not without reason, it seems, did the first mythologer yoke Ares together with Aphrodite", *Politics* 1269b27-28

of their friends, or through any other political influence" (*Politics* 1284a21–24). Excluded from banishment is

some one person whose virtue is so preeminent that the virtues
or political capacity of all the rest admit of no comparison with his
. Such a one may truly be deemed a god among men For men
of preeminent virtue there is no law—they are themselves a law
(*Politics* 1284a3–14)

Aristotle continues to extol this preeminently virtuous citizen, adding that "mankind will not say that such a one is to be expelled and exiled . . . [Rather,] all should joyfully obey such a ruler, according to what seems to be the order of nature" (*Politics* 1284b8–34).

Ostracism therefore is justifiable "when the mass of the people are of the high-spirited kind" (*Politics* 1306b29), and when they decide to banish for a time only "him who greatly excels in beauty, strength, birth, wealth" (*Politics* 1295b6–7) or political power. This is because a city should be composed "of equals and similars", otherwise, those who greatly excel naturally engender envy, and "nothing can be more fatal to friendship and good fellowship in states than this" (*Politics* 1295b22, 26).

The case of genuine friendship is analogous to this state composed of equal and similar—and high-spirited—citizens. We know that "equality and likeness are friendship, and especially the likeness of those who are like in virtue" (*NE* 1159b2–3). One friend cannot endure the other's consistently far outstripping him in virtue. Aristotle asks, "Should the latter treat the former as a friend?" and answers unequivocally, "Surely he cannot" (*NE* 1165b23–25). Realizing that a "great interval in respect of virtue" is unbearable because it means that "then they are no longer friends" (*NE* 1158b33–34), each friend will be goaded by this very fact to keep pace with his friend in their moral rivalry. The recognition of the possibility of being surpassed is part of what characterizes the self-awareness of a genuine friend.

The analogy with ostracism is now evident. We have noted that friendship for utility's sake exists between contraries, but in genuine friendship "like is dear to like" (*NE* 1165b17). In the former case, "what a man actually lacks he aims at" (*NE* 1159b14), but in the latter case, he aims for more of what he already has. That is, the genuine friend may lack wealth or beauty or strength, but since these are not his aims *as* genuine friend, their excessive presence in

another can never incite envy. Whom, then, will he ostracize? To preserve the friendship—to keep it, like the *polis*, secure—he cannot entertain the possibility of his friend's future preeminence in virtue, since this will effect that outstripping and great interval, and nothing can be more fatal to friendship. Like can be dear only to what remains like. Hence Aristotle's argument that it is unjust to banish the preeminently virtuous citizen—that god among men—is not consistent with his allegation that it is quite reasonable not to expect “friends really [to] wish for their friends the greatest goods, for example, that of being gods, since in that case their friends will no longer be friends to them” (*NE* 1159a6–8).

Is it really inconsistent though? Perhaps the answer, and our evidence, lies in the connection between the friend's spirited urge to keep the contest running and his reasoned desire to aspire always to the noble. That is, the *thumos* of the good man, recognizing what is good as to-be-pursued, cannot help but be driven by the fact that “friends are good things” (*NE* 1159a8); hence it “wishes” or desires for the good man “most of all . . . what is good” (*NE* 1159a13). Says *thumos*, “His friend must remain the sort of being he is” (*NE* 1159a10). Reason counters that friends, being good, must so far as they can make themselves immortal, and strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best thing in them (*NE* 1177b34–1178a1), that is, they must become godlike. For Aristotle there obtains no inconsistency here. Reason, the authoritative element, continues to act to secure for one's friend the greatest good, for the sake of the friend's well-being, even if this means he will have godlike preeminence in virtue, or become a god among men. As demonstrated earlier, the views of the friend's reason prevail: *thumos* responds appropriately. It can only have been this spirited competitiveness that urged the ostracizing of a preeminently virtuous friend, one who would “admit of no comparison” and who could hence no longer serve as moral rival. So long as each friend continues to inspire and stimulate the other to strive toward excellence, his spirited urge to ostracize a possibly far better friend will prove unrealistic. Not only will their friendship continue to be “augmented by their companionship,” but each will persist in spurring the other to become better by his activities and by improving the other (*NE* 1172a12–14).

The Effects of Competition upon Friends We find that problems do arise in the practical sphere of cooperative competition. *Thu-*

mos's effects again are central to their resolution. First, although virtue is synonymous with excellence, Aristotle admits that there are degrees: the mean for each virtue is itself an extreme (*NE* 1107a23). That is, one can strive to act ever more perfectly. Friends, being rivals, guarantee that competitive "cooperation in well-doing means practice and perfection of the well-doing of each."²² Second, pleasures wane, even those derived from virtuous activity. Aristotle speaks of pleasure heightening the activity (*NE* 1175a3–10). After a time, however, as the freshness wears off, we do experience less satisfaction. For the requisite pleasure to be sustained, then, novelty must be provided. But genuine friends are enterprising, noble actions, as ever new objects of competition, are intensely desired, are *thumos* inspired. Hence the friends not only "strain every nerve to avoid wickedness" (*NE* 1166b27), but also "busy themselves in an exceptional degree with noble actions . . . and strain every nerve to do the noblest deeds" (*NE* 1169a6–9). The friend who is a moral rival will "do what he can . . . to the utmost of his power" (1163b15–17).

Third, like the athletic contestant,²³ the good man must maintain a regimen of training; we see again that "a certain training in excellence arises also from the company of the good" (*NE* 1170a11). In order to "stay in shape," friends who are moral rivals cannot afford to lose the inspiration whose source is the other's very existence. *Thumos* stays energized by continued education, habituation, and persuasion; for Aristotle this spur often takes the form of emulation: ". . . for those who are friends on the ground of excellence are anxious to do well by each other (since that is a mark of excellence and of friendship), and between men who are emulating each other in this [virtuous activity] there cannot be complaints; . . . he takes his revenge by doing well by the other" (*NE* 1162b6–10).

Fourth, since the good man's appetite necessarily converges with the desires of reason and of *thumos*, continued virtuous acts must be experienced as naturally pleasant to perform. Because of one's friend who serves as catalyst,²⁴ pleasure does obtain: "By oneself it

²² Harold H. Joachim, *Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics: A Commentary*, ed. D. A. Rees (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 258.

²³ Aristotle himself often employs this simile, for example in *NE* 1106b5–6.

²⁴ "It will intensify the action. For the pleasure is an incentive to increased action, if it comes from the action itself", *MM* 1206a9–10.

is not easy to be continuously active, but with others and towards others it is easier. With others therefore his activity will be more continuous, being in itself pleasant" (*NE* 1170a5-7).

Finally, it is impossible to compete against oneself. Sustained motivation requires the encouragement of the friend. Now since it is natural and necessary for the human animal to group together,²⁵ in part for continued sustenance, that animal who alone can deliberate and choose needs renewed intellectual sustenance as well.²⁶ Regarding friendship Aristotle states, "Those in the prime of life it stimulates to noble actions—'two going together'—for with friends men are more able both to think and to act" (*NE* 1155a15-16). The spirited impulse which is *thumos*, we are able to conclude, helping effect this stimulation, consistently assists reason to ensure that noble actions will continue to be produced unabated by the friends to whom it responds in rivalry.

Richard Kraut corroborates our analysis when he examines the manner in which friends can be said to compete:

In moral competition, as Aristotle conceives it, each individual is striving to be best of all. Even if the specific goal of the competition cannot be achieved by all, it is nonetheless possible, as in tennis, for each to be better off than he would have been had he not competed.²⁷

We concur with Kraut's conclusion: each friend is better off for having competed, and our analysis has specifically demonstrated why and how friends are thus better off. But in our analysis, each friend has also walked off with the trophy.

Julia Annas, like Kraut, also emphasizes the benefits of moral competition: "Each gains by being more virtuous than she would have been without competition, and this matters far more than the fact of not being the *most* virtuous."²⁸ Annas infers that Aristotle "reinterprets and redefines" the notions both of competition and of self-love, and "as a result, competition among true self-lovers is also reinterpreted."²⁹ Hence,

²⁵ See *Politics* 1280b29-31, *NE* 1169b30-1170a4.

²⁶ One's friend may thus be regarded as "a renewable energy source."

²⁷ Richard Kraut, "Comments on 'Self-Love in Aristotle' by Julia Annas," *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 27 (suppl.) (1988): 20. See also Richard Kraut, "The Importance of Love in Aristotle's Ethics," *Philosophy Research Archives* 1 (1975): 47.

²⁸ Annas, "Self-Love in Aristotle," 7.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 8.

when people compete to be virtuous, what they do is not at the others' expense, since *each* person gets the greatest good, so true competition, like true self-love, does not take anything away from others, or conflict with their interests, or do them down. Aristotle is saying of virtue something like what Shelley said of love. "True love in this differs from gold and clay/That to divide is not to take away . . ." This kind of competition is like what we think of as co-operation, *true* competition is not really competition at all³⁰

It seems that problems posed by Kraut and Annas—whether moral rivals compete at each other's expense, whether their interests conflict, and whether limitations constrain the competitors' efforts and achievement—should dissolve when one considers Aristotle's distinction among goods. Claiming that "some goods are in the soul—for instance, the virtues; some in the body . . . and some outside of us" (*MM* 1184b2-3), Aristotle proceeds to explain that it is the nature of the first group to be capable of being shared without anyone's share lessening. In fact, it is for the noble—a good of the soul—that friends do compete (*NE* 1169a8) by performing virtuous acts. This is why "the winner . . . will not complain about his friend, for each is aiming at the good" (*NE* 1162b11-12). But to achieve the noble, the absolute good, which *can* be shared, friends must make use of the advantageous, of goods which restrict one and do not admit of being shared even though the good man "does many noble deeds by reason of them" (*EE* 1249a14). Hence, although psychic goods are comparable to Shelley's vision of love in which to divide is not to take away, other goods must have nobility conferred upon them, so to speak. These goods are made absolutely good, since "to the noble and good man the naturally good is noble" (*EE* 1249a6). It is only genuine friends who, being good men, can effect this.

In sum, cooperative competition, or the moral rivalry of genuine friends, yields mutual victory: winning does not suggest losing, hence neither contestant is deemed selfish or unselfish. Annas agrees with this conclusion³¹. Both friends who are good men benefit equally by each serving as a spur to the other's ever more noble, always novel, mutually training, continuous, pleasant, and stimulating activity.

³⁰ Annas, "Self-Love in Aristotle," 8. Later, Annas again quotes Shelley's *Epipsychidion*: "If you divide pleasure and love and thought/Each part exceeds the whole" (p. 17, n. 12).

³¹ *Ibid.*, 8, 11.

Based upon the foregoing demonstration of the major role played by *thumos* in genuine friends' cooperative competition, we can now defend the proposition that for Aristotle the *thumos* of the good man—calling to mind Plato's *philonikon*, that element which desires to win—can only be that spirited impulse which converges with the motive of his reason. That is, as friend, the good man must be moved energetically to spare no effort in spurring on his moral rival-friend. Their shared motive is mutual self-enhancement, and the role of *thumos* is to strain every nerve to excel in virtuous acts. The friendship is sustained precisely because each friend will incite the other to continue existing as a good man and therefore a good for the other. "The man who excels . . . gets what he aims at, for each man desires what is good" (*NE* 1162b11). It is because each friend will therefore be a good for the other—as a consequence of, but not motive for, each one's activity—that no egoism can be imputed to either. The friend's welfare is as important as one's own. The friendship is effectively a symbiotic relationship, for if they were not friends neither good man could serve as fellow competitor. Hence the converging desires of *thumos* and of reason ensure that each friend is counted upon to serve as another self, as guarantor of continued virtuous activity. We now appreciate the significance of Aristotle's description of the *thumos* of the good man as "the quality of the soul which begets friendship and enables us to love" (*Politics* 1328a1).

In summary, we have highlighted the important role of *thumos* and have analyzed why *thumos* is necessary both to produce and to sustain genuine friendship. Beginning with the reciprocity of goodwill, which leads to the mutual recognition and appreciation of this feeling, to the desire to act to maintain this pleasure, to well-doing over time, to intimacy, and thus to a loving commitment to compete in virtue, the two good men continue to act together in the enjoyment of one another's presence. These competitively spirited friends serve as mutual stimuli, as catalysts, and as guarantors of a striving to perform the noblest of deeds. Moreover, insofar as friendship "implies passion and affection" (*NE* 1126b23), as we have amply demonstrated is the case, the whole individual is being referred to when Aristotle describes self-love as paradigmatic for friendship. Hence we cannot limit Aristotle's notion of the self to reason, to that divine element which is man's true self, when defining the friend as another self. We have conclusively established that

Aristotle centers his portrayal of self-love upon the broader meaning of self, the completely human person, the unique, irreplaceable individual. Friendship implies a shared history of mutual testing over time.

The good man loves himself. His "best states" are consistently in harmony, with his reason always dominating reason and passions accord with one another, are in proper relation to one another (see *MM* 1211a33-37). As we have pointed out, actions conducive to strengthening this harmony or cooperation of states are instances of self-love. So too actions which motivate and stimulate the love between friends, who each serve as other selves, likewise enhance this competitive co-operation. Both types of self-love therefore—that toward oneself and that which obtains toward one's other self—have as their aim the same prize. And each friend effects each aspect of self-love "with all his soul" (*NE* 1166a14). We have thus shown that the friend best loves himself at the same time as and in the same manner as he best loves his friend.

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ARISTOTLE ON PROPERTY

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I

JONATHAN BARNES HAS WRITTEN RECENTLY that "Aristotle's remarks [on property] in the *Politica* are too nebulous to sustain any serious critical discussion."¹ Some scholars are (a bit) more confident about successfully getting to the bottom of Aristotle's opinions concerning property, but few have dealt with the topic in any detail.² In this essay I shall investigate the relevant texts on property from the Aristotelian corpus, beginning with an especially careful look at Aristotle's criticism of Plato's communism of property. I shall also consider the historical and cultural context in which Aristotle was writing. The result will be, I hope, a full account of, and hence a better understanding of, Aristotle's views on property.³

II

It hardly needs to be said that Aristotle is not an ascetic of any kind: he believes that human happiness requires all kinds of external

¹ Jonathan Barnes, "Aristotle and Political Liberty," in *Aristoteles' "Politik" Akten des XI Symposium Aristotelicum Friedrichshafen/Bodensee 25.8-3.9.1987*, ed. Gunther Patzig (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1990), 252. Barnes actually says this about Aristotle's view that property should be private generally, but common in use. As we shall see, this view is central to Aristotle's conception of property, and thus Barnes's remark in the end applies to Aristotle's account of property in general.

² Perhaps the most extensive treatment of Aristotle's views on property to appear recently is Fred Miller, "Aristotle on Property Rights," in *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy IV: Aristotle's Ethics*, ed. John P. Anton and Anthony Preus (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 227-47.

³ In the end, my view of Aristotle is somewhat like that found in Miller, "Aristotle on Property Rights," and I owe a great deal to his superb article. Still, there are differences. For example, I engage in a more extended discussion of Aristotle's critique of Plato, and I do not speak in terms of a theory of rights.

goods, including wealth or property⁴ The important question for us is, In what form (politically, socially) should property be held?

Aristotle considers three possible arrangements concerning property⁵ and its use: (1) property is private, use is common; (2) property is common, use is private; (3) property is common, use is common. Why does Aristotle not consider a fourth option: property is private, use is private? Miller claims he omits this option because "he is not defending a system of unqualified privatization"⁶ But this is not the reason. As we shall come to find out (in section IV below) one friend giving something to another, or in fact any act of generosity, falls under private property, common use (view [1]) For instance, this horse is mine, but I share it with (that is, make it common to) my friend. Thus, this fourth option—private property, private use—is no option at all, for it would be a property arrangement that systematically rules out any kind of giving or sharing of one's private property⁷

Aristotle gives examples of each of these arrangements.

For example, [1] the plots of land are separate [that is, private], while the crops are brought into the common [store] [τὸ κοινὸν] and consumed [in common], just as some of the nations do. Or [2] the opposite: the land is common and farmed in common, while the crops are divided with a view to private use (some of the barbarians are said to share

⁴ On the different types of goods, see *Rhetoric* 1.5, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.8, and *Politics* 7.1. In Miller, "Aristotle on Property Rights," the section entitled "The Eudaimonistic Justification of Property" (pp. 230–2) is an excellent discussion of why humans need property. I believe, however, that this section does not show that Aristotle defended private property rights.

⁵ According to *A Greek-English Lexicon* ("LSJ" hereafter), ed. Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, revised by Henry Stuart Jones, 9th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), *κτήσις* can mean "acquisition," or "possession," in the plural it can also mean "property." In Aristotle, however, it is sometimes best to translate even the singular as "property." *Οὐσία* is also used as "property." On the ambiguity in property terminology at this time, see A. R. W. Harrison, *The Law of Athens*, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968 and 1971), vol. 1, pp. 200–1.

⁶ Miller, "Aristotle on Property Rights," 237.

⁷ This is not to say that Aristotle *does* defend a system of unqualified privatization, but only that such a system would fall under option (1). As we shall see shortly, there are many particular property arrangements that fall under each of these three broad arrangements.

in common in this way, too) Or [3] the plots of land and the crops are common (*Politics* 1263a3–8)⁸

It is extremely important to keep in mind that the three examples he mentions are just examples. So although Aristotle's position will fall under one of the three possibilities—we later find he accepts view (1)—that position may be quite different from the example he gives here.⁹

The question for Aristotle now becomes, Which is better, a private property arrangement (view [1]) or a system where property is common (view [2] or [3])? Aristotle presents several arguments against the latter and for a private property system.

III

Aristotle begins his criticism of the communism of property with what has been (correctly) called a “standing difficulty of communist schemes”.¹⁰

Now if the farmers were different [from the citizens], the manner [in which property would be managed (cf 1262b37–38)] would be different and easier, but if they [that is, citizens who are farmers] do the hard work [διαπονούτων] by themselves, the arrangements concerning possessions will lead to greater discontent [δυσκολίας]. For in fact, when in enjoyment and in work they are not equal, but unequal, accusations [ἐγκλήματα] will necessarily be raised against those enjoying or taking many things while laboring [πονοῦντας] little, by those taking less while laboring more. (*Politics* 1263a8–15)¹¹

Is Aristotle criticizing the communism of property here simply because he thinks it is impractical (that is, it leads to greater

⁸ Unless otherwise indicated, translations from the Greek are my own. For the *Politics*, I have used *Aristoteles' Politica*, ed Alois Dreizehnter (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1970).

⁹ In addition, the examples are narrow, dealing with crops and land alone. Other kinds of arrangements might be broader, or narrow in a different way.

¹⁰ *The Politics of Aristotle, Books I–V*, ed Franz Sussemlahl and R. D. Hicks (London: Macmillan and Co., 1884), 233.

¹¹ Aristotle says “farmers,” but he probably means “farmers, and any others who do hard work.” On the dispute over whom is meant by the “they” that I say refers to citizens who are farmers, see *The Politics of Aristotle, Books I–IV*, 233, and *The Politics of Aristotle*, ed W. L. Newman, 4 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1887–1902), vol 2, pp 246–7.

discontent, which is inimical to the city's unity), or, beyond this, does he hold that such a system is unjust as well?¹²

This question can be answered by considering some key texts outside of *Politics* 2.5. The first is from *Nicomachean Ethics* 5.3:

For if [the people involved] are not equal, they will not [justly] possess equal things, but from this comes fights and accusations [ἐγκλήματα], whenever things are distributed and equals possess unequal [shares] or unequals equal [shares]. Further, this is clear from what is according to worth [κατ' ἀξίαν]. For everyone agrees that the just in distributions must be according to some worth, the worth, however, everyone does not call the same thing (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1131a22–27, cf. *Politics* 1280a16–22)

In *Politics* 5.3 he writes

It is also clear what honor is capable of and how it is the cause of factional conflict [στάσεως]. For being dishonored and seeing others honored, [people] engage in factional conflict. These [that is, the honoring and dishonoring] happen unjustly whenever certain persons are honored or dishonored contrary to their worth [παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν], and justly whenever according to their worth (*Politics* 1302b10–14)

Justice, of course, involves equals getting equal shares (of whatever is being distributed), and unequals unequal shares. This idea runs throughout *Nicomachean Ethics* 5. Whether one deserves equal or unequal shares depends on each person's worth (and on what is held to be worthy). A lack of justice or an apparent lack of justice leads to quarrels and accusations, the latter being mentioned in the passage from *Politics* 2.5 now under consideration. One is honored or dishonored justly depending on whether he gets what he deserves (that is, what he is worth), and unjust (that is, contrary to worth) dishonor can lead to factional conflict.¹³

So it seems Aristotle is making the following two points. First, having some people work more and yet receive the same as others

¹² There is an important interpretive question as well. By whom, exactly, and toward whom, is this discontent felt? I argue elsewhere (in my "Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's *Republic*: A Philosophical Commentary on *Politics* II 1–5" [Ph.D. diss., Georgetown University, 1991], 230–1) that the discontent is not felt by the iron and bronze citizens of the *Republic* and toward the gold and silver ones (as many seem to think), but that Aristotle has in mind the iron and bronze class alone. That is, he thinks those workers who do the hard work will resent those who do not.

¹³ See *Politics* 1266b28–31, 1267a37–b9.

(who work less) leads to discontent (and possibly to conflicts) This occurs under communism of property. Second, this situation is unjust, for unequals are clearly receiving equal rewards True, equality and inequality depend on what is thought worthy and unworthy, but in this context, the standard must be the ability to work well or hard¹⁴ This second point implies that Aristotle's criticism of the *Republic* is less consequentialist than some have thought. Aristotle's position is not simply that the *Republic's* position is unworkable, but that it is also in some ways unjust.¹⁵

Aristotle concludes that "in general, living together and sharing in common in all human matters is difficult, and most of all in these sorts of things," that is, concerning property (*Politics* 1263a15–16). This conclusion is justified from the earlier criticisms of the communism of women and children (some of which apply to property as well),¹⁶ from the criticism just discussed, and from some easily observable facts, of which he gives two examples¹⁷ First, "the communities of fellow travelers reveal this, for most of them are at odds from clashes [*προσκρούοντες*] with one another over pedestrian and small things" (*Politics* 1263a17–19, cf 1303b17–18). It is unclear

¹⁴ Although Aristotle says the one who works hard deserves more rewards—and here he must mean material rewards—he does not make the Lockean connection between labor and the right to property—the right to that with which I have mixed my labor

The connection between honor and material reward is central in Homer's *Iliad*. Achilles says to Agamemnon, "Always the greater part of the painful fighting is the work [*διέπονσ'*] of my hands, but when the time comes to distribute the booty yours is far the greater reward, and I with some small thing yet dear to me go back to my ships when I am weary with fighting Now I am returning to Phthia, since it is much better to go home again with my curved ships, and I am minded no longer to stay here dishonored and pile up your wealth and luxury", *The Iliad of Homer*, trans Richard Lattimore (Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1951), 1165–171 See also the context of this passage, 1118–1187, as well as 9.104–9113 Cf *Nicomachean Ethics* 1163b5–14

¹⁵ Cf David Charles, "Perfection in Aristotle's Political Theory Reply to Martha Nussbaum," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, suppl (1988) 200

¹⁶ See *Politics* 1261b23–1262a1

¹⁷ Although Aristotle does not mention jointly owned property, it may have been on his hearer's mind, for disputes were known to arise over such arrangements See *Athenian Constitution* 52.2, 56.6, P. J. Rhodes, *A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenian Politeia* (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1981), 631, and, Harrison, *The Law of Athens*, vol 1, pp 239–43

whether this is an example of a "human matter" generally, or of the sharing of property in particular. But in any case, fellow travelers have some kind of community, and thus to that extent they share something in common (see *Nicomachean Ethics* 1159b26-32). For example, they may buy some wine, bread, and onions to share during their trip, and they might even have common funds. But they could very well come to blows over who drank more wine, had more bread, and so on. "And further, we clash most of all with those of the servants we use most for ordinary tasks" (*Politics* 1263a19-21). Humans are such that they do not even need to share property for disputes to arise. Simply occupying the same space, working together on the same job, and the like, will do it. Where there is human association, the potential for conflict exists. An increase in association (as in communism) will produce an increase in the potential for conflict.

We have seen problems not only with the full-fledged communism of property, but with a very limited sharing of life and property as well. Aristotle believes these problems are enough to rule out the communism of property. But one could argue that although communism might lead to some problems, it would avoid others. This in fact is the reputation communism has come to have. Aristotle writes that

this sort of lawmaking [communism] is fair of face [*εὐπρόσωπος*] and might be thought humane [*φιλόανθρωπος*], for he who hears it receives it gladly, thinking that some marvelous affection will come to be in all for all, especially when someone charges that the evils now belonging to regimes come about through property not being common. I mean lawsuits against one another concerning contracts, trials for perjury, and flattery of the rich. (*Politics* 1263b15-22)¹⁸

Aristotle has in mind the view that perjury, contractual disputes, flattery of the rich, theft, and the like can exist only when property

¹⁸ For *εὐπρόσωπος*, *LSJ* gives as a general meaning "fair of face," and I have translated it accordingly. But *LSJ* also lists "fair in outward show," "specious." Newman says it means "wears a plausible look" (*The Politics of Aristotle*, vol. 2, p. 253), but T. A. Sinclair, in his translation of the *Politics*, is probably right in claiming that Aristotle here means that the communism of property sounds attractive when first hearing about it (*Politics*, trans. T. A. Sinclair [Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1962], 64).

The list at the end of the passage is not necessarily exhaustive. Although Aristotle does not mention theft here, it makes sense to think he had it in mind (see note 19 below).

is held privately and unequally, and thus the communism of property should be instituted, since it will eliminate such injustices.¹⁹ He replies, "None of these things come about through lack of community, but through wickedness [*μοχθηρίαν*], since we see those who possess in common and have much in common at odds more than those holding property separately" (*Politics* 1263b22-25). Communism is not the answer, Aristotle says, because the cause of these injustices is not private property, but wickedness. The evidence for this is that although we might see people who hold property privately committing these acts, we see these same actions, or some of them, committed by those sharing property in common—in fact, even more of these actions.²⁰

But if the communism of property is not the answer to these problems, what is? We cannot simply say the answer is private property, since these acts can also be committed when property is private. To find Aristotle's answer we must go to *Politics* 2.7, where he criticizes the view held by Phaleas and others that property should be leveled.²¹

It is claimed that the communism of property—or leveling property generally—could cure the injustices associated with property, since all (or nearly all) crimes are committed in order to acquire the necessities of life. After ensuring that everyone has the necessities of life, and equal amounts of these, there would be no reason to commit unjust and shameful actions—neither to get what one wants, nor because of envy. Aristotle rejects this claim, for he challenges the idea that crimes are committed only in order to acquire necessities.²² There are in fact, he says, three reasons why crimes are committed (*Politics* 1267a2-9): to acquire the necessities of life (for example, food, clothing), to satisfy desires for things that are beyond what is necessary (for example, a drunk who wants more wine than is good for him, or a man who kills from a desire for revenge); to experience painless pleasures (for example, through

¹⁹ See *Republic* 425c-e, 464d-465c, and Aristophanes, *Ecclesiazusae* 560-7, 605-7, 655-73. Both mention the elimination of theft.

²⁰ See also *Politics* 1263a15-21, 1263b25-27.

²¹ Communism is a form of property leveling, and some claim that it cures crime. Thus Aristotle's discussion in *Politics* 2.7 seems applicable.

²² Not all factional conflict is due to unequal property. See *Politics* 1266b38-1267a2.

tyranny or philosophy)²³ There are three remedies corresponding to the three causes of crime (*Politics* 1267a9–12) a minimum amount of property and work, for whoever has these would not need to commit crimes in order to possess the necessities of life; moderation, for a moderate man does not desire more than is proper,²⁴ the philosophical disposition or life, for this is the greatest of the painless pleasures, and the man with a truly philosophical disposition will not commit crimes²⁵

Aristotle claims that in fact the greater crimes are not committed to acquire necessities, but for one of the other two reasons:

They commit the greatest injustices because of excesses, but not because of necessary things, for example [people] are not tyrants in order not to be cold. So it is with a view to minor injustices alone that Phaleas's type of regime is of assistance (*Politics* 1267a12–17)

The solution to the problem of what to do about crime is not the leveling of property, but the improvement of character through education (*Politics* 1266b28–31). It is better if desirable ends are achieved by the improvement of a citizen's character through education than by an attempt to compel citizens to act in certain ways through the control or abolition of their property. As we shall see, this is a central part of Aristotle's view of property

Aristotle also claims the communism of property will reduce productivity. He writes that "dividing the care [of possessions], they will not make accusations against each other, but rather they will improve, as each attends to his own" (*Politics* 1263a27–29). Now what does Aristotle have in mind? He probably wants us to think back to *Politics* 2.3, where he was criticizing the communism of women and children at *Politics* 1261b32–40 he says that people who

²³ On painless pleasures, see *Nicomachean Ethics* 1152b36–1153a2, 1173b15–19, 1177a25–26, and *Parts of Animals* 645a7–19. It is unclear whether Aristotle has in mind the committing of crimes in order to study (which seems rather strange), or some other kind of crime, for example, tyranny. He may be thinking of the view some had that a tyrant could experience any pleasure with ease or without pain. See Xenophon, *Hiero*.

²⁴ The first remedy is ensured by common messes and every citizen's owning land and other property. The second is ensured by laws and moral education. More on these later.

²⁵ See *Politics* 1323a24–34.

share things in common neglect those things because they think others are taking care of them. This applies to property as well.²⁶ If I own one acre of land I shall most likely see to it that that one acre is cared for and is productive. But if I am one of one thousand citizens who share one thousand acres in common, each acre is likely to be much less cared for and much less productive. That is Aristotle's point. Not only does private property avoid the accusations and conflicts discussed so far, it also improves the citizens' well-being by making them more productive.

In addition to the above problems, Aristotle argues, the communism of property would diminish or destroy certain kinds of pleasure:

Further, with regard to pleasure, too, it makes an immense difference to consider something one's own. For it is not without reason that each person has affection for himself, this is natural. (*Politics* 1263a40–b1)²⁷

Aristotle is claiming that because we naturally feel affection for ourselves, what is our own is therefore pleasant to us. But it is surely unclear how or even if this inference is justified. A passage from *Rhetoric* 1.11, however, sheds some light on the point he is trying to make.

Since that which is according to nature is pleasant, and things related to each other are according to nature, all related and similar things are pleasant [to each other], for the most part, for example, man [is pleasant] to man, a horse to a horse, a young person to a young person.

And since everything that is similar and related to oneself is pleasant, and each man himself is this way most of all in relation to himself, everyone necessarily is a lover of self, more or less. For all

²⁶ See *Politics* 1261b23.

²⁷ This passage continues as follows: "Being a lover of self [*φίλαυτον*] is justly blamed. But this is not having affection for oneself [*τὸ φιλεῖν ἑαυτόν*], but having more affection than one ought, just as in the case of the money-lover, since almost everyone has affection for each of these things" (*Politics* 1263b2–5). Here Aristotle distinguishes a lover of self from a person who loves or has affection for himself. In the *Rhetoric*, however, he treats the two interchangeably (as we shall see). This is not terribly important. We need only keep in mind his claim in *Nicomachean Ethics* 9.4 and 9.9 that the good person is truly a lover of self—despite what most people think—while the bad person is not really a lover of self—again, contrary to common opinion.

such things belong most of all [to one's relationship] to oneself And since everyone is a lover of self, one's things [$\tau\alpha\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\omega}\nu$] are necessarily pleasant to everyone [individually], for example, deeds and words [$\epsilon\rho\gamma\alpha\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$] (*Rhetoric* 1371b12-23)

It does not seem at first that we have made progress, for Aristotle at the end of this passage claims that a man finds his things pleasant because every man is a lover of self But this is precisely what we are attempting to explain We have to see if there is in Aristotle some way of justifying this inference. A way has been suggested by Miller

True self-love is embodied in persons who act according to their own rational judgment (cf *Eth Nic* 9 8 1168b34-1169a3) True self-love thus requires that persons be able to act according to their own judgment, and the existence of private property provides them the sphere in which they can do so²⁸

So the important part of Aristotle's argument for our purposes, given Miller's suggestion and the above passages from the *Politics* and the *Rhetoric*, may very well be something like the following: (1) Every man (or good man) has affection for himself (2) The natural, including what is naturally beloved, is pleasant. (3) Therefore, every man finds himself pleasant (4) For a man to find himself pleasant is for him to find all those things that essentially make up his *self* pleasant (his character, his own rational judgment, his actions that follow his judgment, his deeds and words). (5) By extension, a man will find pleasant whatever makes his self possible—for instance, whatever makes possible voluntary action according to his own rational judgment (6) Having his own things, including private property, makes possible such judgment and action (7) Therefore, a man finds having his *own* property pleasant

The important premises are (4) through (6) Although Aristotle does not state them explicitly, they are necessary if the argument is to be complete Aristotle could have argued that because a person's own things are related to him (naturally or properly), he therefore derives pleasure from them But he says more than this a man gets pleasure from things that are his own because he has affection for himself This requires that Aristotle hold something like premises (4) through (6)

²⁸ Miller, "Aristotle on Property Rights," 239

The important move—from the point of view of the critique of Plato's *Republic*—is Aristotle's argument that because there are pleasures in things being one's own, and since nothing is one's own in a communistic system, where property is common the pleasures connected with things being one's own are destroyed or diminished. Aristotle's point may be deeper, however, if it is true, it reveals a greater problem with Plato's best city (or communism generally). For if it is true that having things that are our own is a condition of acting according to our own judgment, then communism not only destroys the pleasures associated with things being our own and the affection we feel for ourselves, but also seems to undercut our autonomy, that is, our ability to act according to our own judgment.

Still on the subject of pleasures, Aristotle writes that "doing favors for and helping friends, guests, or mates is most pleasant, and this happens [only] when property is private. These things do not occur for those who make the city too much of a unity" (*Politics* 1263b5–8). This argument is similar to the last one: (1) Generosity, like all virtues, is pleasant.²⁹ (2) Generosity requires private property.³⁰ (3) Private property does not exist where property is common. (4) Therefore, generosity cannot exist where property is common. (5) Therefore, where property is common, men will be deprived of the pleasures connected with generosity.

As is clear from this argument (it is actually stated in premise [4]), not only is the pleasure connected with generosity destroyed, so must the virtue itself be destroyed.³¹ The communism of property will destroy the work or function of "generosity concerning possessions, for no one will be known to be generous or do generous actions, since the work of generosity is in the use of possessions" (*Politics* 1263b11–14). Again, Aristotle's argument has something like the following form: (1) Generosity or the activity of generosity requires

²⁹ See *Nicomachean Ethics* 1120a25–31.

³⁰ See *Nicomachean Ethics* 4.1, 1178a28–29, and *Politics* 1265a34–38. This point will be discussed more fully later.

³¹ At this point, Aristotle actually discusses the destruction of two virtues: generosity and moderation (*Politics* 1263b8–11). But we shall be interested in the former alone. Aristotle's discussion of moderation is better suited to his treatment of the communism of women and children, not that of property, because the moderation he claims is destroyed under communism is moderation concerning women.

private possessions (2) Where property is common there are no private possessions (3) Therefore, where property is common there is no generosity, or no generous activity involving possessions. If generosity is destroyed, then the function or work of generosity, that is, the result of people acting generously, is destroyed.

The soundness of this argument, however, depends on the truth of premise (1) (as the soundness of the previous argument depends on the truth of premise [2]). But can this premise be defended? Terence Irwin claims that it cannot:

My own generosity may be properly expressed through my role in collective actions, it does not seem to need resources under my exclusive control. Even if we think the practice of generosity requires me to be free to dispose of some resources on my own initiative, it does not follow that the resources must be under my exclusive control. The state might loan them to me, and allow me to dispose of them as I please within certain limits and in certain circumstances, such an arrangement would leave ample room for the exercise of generosity.

We might argue that this is not real generosity, if the virtuous person's action does not cost *him* anything, and that it does not cost him anything unless he gives from his exclusive possessions. But this objection seems to overlook the virtuous person's attachment to the common good. He will regard the distribution of his friend's resources as a cost to himself, because he regards his friend's resources as his own, and he will take the same view of the community's resources. We might object that such identification of one's own interest with the interests of others is impossible or undesirable, but Aristotle should not be easily persuaded by any such objection, since it would undermine his whole account of friendship. Perfectly genuine generosity seems to be quite possible without private property, and to this extent private property seems unnecessary for anything of distinctive value.³²

There are two major problems with Irwin's argument. First, as we have seen, according to Aristotle we will not and indeed cannot attend to common things very well—in fact we tend to neglect them. For this and other reasons, I cannot feel for the community's resources what I feel for myself and my own things, I cannot really regard the former as my own.³³ Second, I *might* regard the distribution of a close friend's (or family member's) resources as a cost

³² Terence Irwin, "Generosity and Property in Aristotle's *Politics*," in *Beneficence, Philanthropy and the Public Good*, ed. Ellen Frankel Paul et al. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 51–2.

³³ See *Politics* 1261b23, 1261b32–40, 1263a27–29, 1263a40–b1.

to me, since, in a sense, the goods of such friends are common. But I do not have the same relationship with the community, and thus neither do I view the community's resources in this way.³⁴ Therefore, I shall indeed need my own resources if I am to act generously.³⁵

It is true, Aristotle would say, that the communism of property could eliminate some problems, for example, if all property were common, it would be impossible to be brought to court because of debts owed. This would amount to a handful of small advantages, however, compared to a host of problems—all the problems we have seen so far. “But it is just to speak not only of how many evils they will be deprived of when they have [property] in common, but also how many goods. This life appears to be wholly impossible” (*Politics* 1263b27–29). The communism of property makes life impossible, whatever problems it might eliminate. But a system of private property, however, if arranged correctly, is wholly desirable, whatever problems might remain.

IV

What is a properly arranged system of private property? What system of property does Aristotle advocate?

But the way that exists now [concerning property], if adorned with character [*ἡθες*] and an order of correct laws, would differ not a little [from the communism of property]. For it would have what is good from both. By “from both” I mean from possessions being common in some way, but private generally. (*Politics* 1263a22–27)

³⁴ This is in part the point of Aristotle's criticism of the communism of women and children in *Politics* 2.3–2.4. For an account of the civic friendship implicit in this objection to Irwin, see Mayhew, “Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's *Republic*,” chap. 4, and John Cooper, “Political Animals and Civic Friendship,” in *Aristoteles' "Politik"*, 220–41.

³⁵ Aristotle is using “generosity” narrowly here to mean the giving of possessions (see *Politics* 1263b11). In *Nicomachean Ethics* 4.1, generosity is described as the virtue concerning the giving and taking of wealth, where wealth is anything whose value or worth is measured in money (1119b22–27). This could arguably include generosity with one's time and labor, for instance. Such generosity, broadly understood, will not fall to Aristotle's criticism, although the narrow sense will. Of course, Plato could argue (in fact, he probably would argue) that the narrow sense of generosity is not a virtue in his best city, and thus the argument that generosity will not exist there proves nothing of importance.

Property is to remain private, but with some adornments that give it the advantages of common, as well as of private, property. What these adornments are will be seen later

Although private property is clearly better than the communism of property, property should still be common in some sense: its use should be common. "It will be through virtue that, with regard to use, 'the things of friends are common' (as the proverb says)" (*Politics* 1263a29–30). It turns out that this is not necessarily a radical suggestion. "Even now this is the way it is in some cities in outline, so it is not impossible, and in finely managed [cities] most of all some of these things exist, while some of them could come to be" (*Politics* 1263a30–33).

Property will be common in use through virtue (whatever that means), but Aristotle also says, "It is . . . evident that it is better for possessions to be private, but to make them common in use. That they [the citizens] become such [as to use possessions in common], this is a special function of the legislator" (*Politics* 1263a37–40).

There are several questions that must be answered if we are fully to understand Aristotle's views on property. First, what exactly does he mean when he says property should be used in common? Next, how private is private property? That is to say, surely there will be some common or public property—but how much? To what extent, if any, will private property be limited and regulated? Finally, how does the legislator make citizens become such as to use their property in common and properly? Does he simply pass laws to that effect? We shall proceed to answer these questions, beginning with *Politics* 2.5, but going beyond it

Let us start by looking at the common use of private property. The first thing to be said is that there seem to be degrees of common use. "For each owning possessions privately, some things are made useful to his friends, while some are used in common" (*Politics* 1263a33–35). Aristotle is talking here about two different kinds of sharing, both of which constitute making what I own common in use: some things I share in common with certain people (for instance, close friends), but not with others, and some things I make available to everybody, or all citizens. Each citizen will share some (but not all?) of his possessions with his close friends, but not with everyone, whereas some other possessions he will make available to all his

fellow citizens. The level of friendship will determine just how common one makes his possessions. Aristotle gives an example: "In Lakedaimon, they use each other's slaves as their own, so to speak, as well as horses and dogs, and provisions for travel, if they need any, from the farms throughout the territory" (*Politics* 1263a35–37).³⁶ This passage becomes a bit clearer if read in conjunction with Xenophon's discussion of these arrangements in the *Lakedaimonian Constitution*:

And [Lycurgus] made it such that, if someone needed to, he could also use someone else's servants. And he joined together a community of hunting dogs, so that those needing them invite [the owner] to go to the hunt, but if he does not himself have the time to go, he sends [the dogs] with pleasure. And they use horses in the same manner. For one who is sick or is in need of a carriage or wishes to go somewhere quickly, if he sees there is a horse somewhere, after taking it and using it properly, he restores it. Wherever people coming late from the hunt are in need of provisions, if they did not happen to have packed anything, he also set it down that in that case those who possess something should leave behind the [leftover] prepared food, while those in need break the seals, take however much they need, return [what is left over], sealing [the container]. Accordingly, in this way, giving shares to each other, those who have little partake in all of the things in the region, whenever they need something.³⁷

In Xenophon's account, property is private, and there is a concern (and respect) for private property. If someone owns something, however, and is not using it—or will not be using it, in the case of leftovers—he should make these things available to his fellow citizens. As a consequence, those who otherwise would not be able to have the advantages of a horse, or take part in a hunt, or the like, are able to. Aristotle would seem to agree with this much, given that he chose these practices to illustrate a system he praises.

So far we know that common use involves sharing servants, horses, hunting dogs, and food for the hunt. What else is shared? In his summary of the practices of the Lakedaimonians, Aristotle mentions provisions for travel from the farms throughout the territory. Although this may simply be a generalization from the principle whereby leftovers should be placed in containers, Aristotle

³⁶ One must keep in mind that Aristotle's view of Sparta is in general quite negative, see especially *Politics* 2.9.

³⁷ *Lakedaimonian Constitution* 6.3–6.5.

most likely found this general principle an important part of what it is to share one's property in common. For example, writing in the *Athenian Constitution*, he³⁸ says that Cimon "maintained many of his fellow-demesmen, for any man of Laciadae who wished could go to him each day and obtain his basic needs, and all his land was unfenced, so that anyone that wished could enjoy the fruit."³⁹ One way a citizen, especially a wealthy citizen, can make the use of his private property common is to give needy citizens access to his lands. This is one important reason (others being the financing of the military and the arts) that Aristotle regards wealthy citizens as a crucial part of the city.⁴⁰

³⁸ Aristotle or an anonymous student of Aristotle is writing. P. J. Rhodes supports the latter, see P. J. Rhodes, *Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia*, 9. John J. Keaney supports the former, see John J. Keaney, *The Composition of Aristotle's Athenaion Politeia: Observation and Explanation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 5–14.

³⁹ Aristotle *The Athenian Constitution*, trans. P. J. Rhodes (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984), 27.3. All translations of the *Athenian Constitution* are taken from here. Compare the above passage to *Athenian Constitution* 16.2–4. See also Rhodes, *Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia*, 214–15.

Aristotle is very likely contrasting this private generosity with the public generosity (that is, the "generosity" with public funds, see *Athenian Constitution* 27.4) of Pericles, see Rhodes, *Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia*, 339, cf. *Nicomachean Ethics* 1120a34–b1. Aristotle would not have found Cimon's providing the poor with sustenance ideal, preferring instead a system of common messes. More will be said on this later.

The generosity of Cimon might bring to mind public service or liturgies (λειτουργία, see Rhodes, *Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia*, 340–1). But did Aristotle approve of them or include them in his conception of common use? L. B. Carter writes that in Athens during the classical period, "the performance of civic duties had grown from something more casual, even amateur, to something highly professional and full-time", L. B. Carter, *The Quiet Athenian* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 41. This may very well have been true of liturgies too, for they had become obligatory (though many were done voluntarily). Although Aristotle may not have minded voluntary liturgies, he did object to compulsory ones, see *Nicomachean Ethics* 4.2, *Politics* 1309a14. Cf. Cicero, *De officiis* 2.16.56–57. For some interesting remarks on the ways in which a person can and cannot help himself to the fruit of another, see Plato, *Laws* 844d–845d.

⁴⁰ See *Politics* 1283a16–19, 1328b10, 1328b22–23, 1329a19, 1341a28. In the example from Lakedaimon at *Politics* 1263a35–37, Aristotle mentions provisions for travel from the farms. This may suggest that putting one's land to common use was something he regarded as *ad hoc* rather than something relied upon for the general maintenance of the needy.

Not only does generosity give the needy access to things from which they would otherwise be excluded, it also helps hold the city together. In *Politics* 6.5, Aristotle says, "It is also fine to imitate the practices of the Tarentines. For these people, making their possessions common in use for the poor, maintain the goodwill [*εὐνοίαν*] of the multitude" (*Politics* 1320b9–11).⁴¹ As was mentioned before, Aristotle thinks there should be different degrees of what one is willing to make useful to others. Perhaps he believes the common use of servants and hunting dogs will be more limited—that is, I might share them, but not with just anyone—whereas the practices, mentioned earlier, with horses or with food in the fields will be more communal.

One important question concerning common use remains. Is such use voluntary, or is it to be enforced by law?⁴² Martha Nussbaum claims the latter is the case. She says, "Aristotle's insistence on common use—that it ought to be possible for a needy person to help herself to your crops, without penalty and with good will—shows that in any case he did not defend private ownership in the form in which most contemporary thought defends it."⁴³ In a note to this passage, she continues: "One might fruitfully compare to this housing policies that have been adopted in some socialist and social-democratic countries, giving the homeless certain rights toward unoccupied or luxury housing."⁴⁴ I believe Nussbaum has failed to grasp the essential nature of Aristotle's view that property should be private generally, but common in use. First, according to Aristotle, when I make *my* property (which *is* private) common in use, I do so from virtue and in the manner of friends. This certainly

⁴¹ Tarentum was a colony of Sparta and thus it is very likely that it had many of the institutions Aristotle gives as examples at *Politics* 1263a35–37. See Newman, *Politics of Aristotle*, vol. 4, pp. 536–7.

⁴² These are not mutually exclusive categories. There could be laws against theft—laws compelling me not to steal—and yet I choose not to steal voluntarily. What I am asking here is this: Is my giving of property to others simply voluntary, or *must* I give certain things to others according to the law? and is this what Aristotle means by common use?

⁴³ Martha Nussbaum, "Aristotelian Social Democracy," in *Liberalism and the Good*, ed. Bruce Douglass, Gerald Mara, and Henry Richardson (New York: Routledge, 1990), 232. See also p. 205, where she claims Aristotle's notion of common use puts limitations on private property.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 249, n. 86.

sounds voluntary.⁴⁵ Second, Nussbaum's conception of common use seems to conflict with Aristotle's conception of what it is for property to be private. In the *Rhetoric*, he writes that something is one's own (*οἰκέϊα*)

whenever the [ability] to dispose [*ἀπαλλοτριῶσαι*] is with oneself. And I mean by "dispose" "giving" and "selling." Generally, being wealthy is in the using more than in the possessing (*Rhetoric* 1361a21–24)⁴⁶

If property is really to be private (which I take to be close to the above sense of "one's own"), then the power to dispose of property—even to allow others to use it in common—must reside with the owner. If I possess something but do not control its use, then it is not really mine. So Aristotle is not advocating (at least not for the best city) the transferring of certain of my property "rights" to those of my more needy fellow citizens.

Then what exactly will "private property, common use" be like in practice? To give an example, a needy person will be able to help himself to my lands if *I*—not because compelled to do so by law, but voluntarily—unfence my lands (*à la* Cimon) so that needy people can enjoy the fruit. In addition, however, the lawmakers may (or must) do something to encourage owners to make their property common in use in certain ways. For instance, perhaps they could see to it that containers are set up to hold leftovers in the field, and they could establish laws that make it impossible for the owner of a horse, say, to bring to court someone who uses his horse in the way described by Xenophon. As we shall see later, there is much more that the legislator must do to make citizens have generous characters.

I have argued that Aristotle's conception of making one's property common in use is not meant as a legal restriction or limitation on the use of one's property. Such use is voluntary. Still, does Aristotle allow for no limitations on private property? How much of the property in a city should be privately owned? Let us look at the latter question first.

⁴⁵ See *Politics* 1263a22–40, 1329b41–1330a2. Virtuous actions are voluntary, not forced; *Nicomachean Ethics* 1109b30–1110a1.

⁴⁶ Cf. Miller, "Aristotle on Property Rights," 229–30.

While describing the best city⁴⁷ in *Politics* 7 10, Aristotle says it is necessary to discuss the distribution of land. As a prelude to such a discussion, he mentions the following four points: (1) Possessions should not be common, but should "become common in use, in a friendly way [*φιλικῶς*]" (*Politics* 1329b41–1330a2).⁴⁸ (2) No citizen should lack sustenance (*Politics* 1330a2). (3) "Concerning common messes [*περὶ συσσιτίων*]" all agree it is useful for them to belong to well-equipped cities. (The reason for which we agree will be stated later.) All citizens should share in these, but it is not easy for the poor to contribute the set [or required] amount from their private funds and manage the rest of their household" (*Politics* 1330a3–8).⁴⁹ (4) Expenses relating to the gods are, or should be, common to the whole city (*Politics* 1330a8–9). Given these four points, how should property be arranged for those who wish to live in the best regime?⁵⁰

⁴⁷ The citizens of the best city will be good men, or at least good citizens, and none of them will do manual labor. I argue in my "Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's *Republic*" that Aristotle does value a relatively high degree of freedom and independence for these citizens. But we need to keep in mind that such freedom, on his view, depends on slave and barbarian labor that provides these best of men with the leisure in which to use this freedom properly.

⁴⁸ I see no reason for accepting Nussbaum's translation "common by way of a use that is agreed upon in mutuality", Nussbaum "Aristotelian Social Democracy," 203. *LSJ* gives "friendly" for *φιλικῶς* and says *φιλικῶς* is the opposite of *πολεμικῶς*.

⁴⁹ In the *Politics* that has come down to us, Aristotle does not fulfill his promise to explain his agreement with others concerning common messes.

⁵⁰ Aristotle is asking, If we could set up a city in the best way possible, how should we do it? All he is talking about is the original distribution of land in the city. (He may have in mind the rather common phenomenon of colonization. Cf. *Laws*, 737b–c, and see Richard E. Wycherley, *How the Greeks Built Their Cities*, 2d ed. [New York: Norton, 1976], 4–5, 210–11, n. 3.) We must be very cautious about trying to derive strong principles of redistribution from what Aristotle says here, as Nussbaum does. See Martha Nussbaum, "Nature, Function, and Capability: Aristotle on Political Distribution," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, suppl. (1988), 147–84, esp. 172 (with "Reply to David Charles," 207–14), and Nussbaum, "Aristotelian Social Democracy," esp. 210. But this having been said, I think Charles, in his "Perfectionism in Aristotle's Political Theory: Reply to Nussbaum," in the same volume, goes a bit too far in stating that "we have no idea as to what specific policies of distribution Aristotle would favour. That is, for all he says, he might have preferred either a minimal or

Aristotle believes that in order for a city to count as the best one could hope for, it would have to have, among other things, the division of territory described in *Politics* 1330a9–15. Taking it for granted that the city will also have territory on which government buildings (for example, the Assembly) will stand, and putting that land aside, the following describes how the rest of the land would be distributed: part of the land should be common, and part should be private. These two parts should further be divided such that part of the public land houses common messes and produces crops (and funds?) that enable all to participate in them, while another part supports public service to the gods; the private land will be divided such that every citizen will possess land near the city as well as land near the frontier.⁵¹ There is, however, no indication of how *exactly* the city's land is to be divided. So we cannot assume, as Nussbaum does, that "fully half the city's land will be held in common."⁵²

maximal state, Rawlsian or Nozickian or Marxist principles of distribution" (pp. 203–4). I believe that in the end, as unclear as Aristotle's own position is, we can rule out its being either Nozickian or Marxist. That is, Aristotle defends neither the absolutism of property rights, which entails no or almost no limitations on the ownership of property, nor the extremely limited ownership of property, which includes a great deal of redistribution.

⁵¹ Cf. *Politics* 1265b24–27, and see *Laws* 745e. I shall not be concerned with the city-frontier distinction. It is this private land, of course, along with the citizens' private possessions, that will, one would hope, be used in common in the way Aristotle describes. How the public lands are used, however, falls outside of Aristotle's conception of private property, common use.

⁵² Nussbaum, "Aristotelian Social Democracy," 204. The relevant Greek lines, describing the two divisions of the territory, are (1330a9–11) ἀναγκαῖον εἰς δύο μέρη διηρῆσθαι τὴν χώραν and καὶ τούτων ἑκατέραν διηρῆσθαι δίχα πάλιν. Nussbaum translates them as follows. "We must divide the land into two portions" and "We must divide each of these two portions in half [δίχα] again." I would translate them as follows. "It is necessary to divide the territory into two parts" and "[It is necessary] to divide each of these [two parts] in two [δίχα] again." There is no mention of equal parts. Δίχα does not necessarily mean "two equal parts" (see *LSJ*, *Topics* 142b12–19, *History of Animals* 503a28, *Parts of Animals* 644a11), though it sometimes can (see *Politics* 1318a40). Concerning *Nicomachean Ethics* 1132a28, Hermann Bonitz (*Index Aristotelicus* [Berlin: de Gruyter, 1870]) writes, "*in duas partes pares*," but that is by no means necessary. Cf. *Physics* 239b19. So we have no way of telling what Aristotle intended, or even whether his intentions were ever so specific. We know the territory in a city that aims at being best must be divided into four parts, but we

Let us focus now on public or common land. There should be land to house government buildings, temples, and common mess halls, as well as land that produces enough income to support their maintenance (or part of that maintenance), including perhaps pay for those involved in their upkeep.⁵³ City-owned land would produce crops and livestock (and perhaps precious metals)⁵⁴ to support these institutions. The city might also rely on other surplus revenues (Although they are sometimes warranted, Aristotle does not emphasize taxes, especially not in his discussion of the best city. We shall speak more of this later.)

In *Politics* 2.9, Aristotle criticizes the Spartan system of common messes, and praises the Cretan system

The law concerning common messes has not been framed finely by the one first establishing it. For the gathering should rather exist from common funds, as in Crete. But among the Spartans everyone must pay, even some who are exceedingly poor and not able to afford this expense. It is not easy for the very poor to participate in [the common mess], but this is the definition of the regime among them, passed down from their fathers: the one who is not able to pay this fee is not to participate in it [that is, in the regime] (*Politics* 1271a26–37)

In *Politics* 2.10, he again comments on the superiority of the Cretan system of common messes

In Crete [the common mess is set up] in a more common manner, for from all the crops and livestock that come from the public lands and from tribute [*phoroi*] (which the subjects pay), one part is set aside for the gods and for common liturgies, and another for the common messes, so that everyone (women, children, and men) is maintained from the common funds (*Politics* 1272a16–21)⁵⁵

cannot know—at least not from this passage—the relative size of these parts. Actually, it is very unlikely the parts are equal. Will one fourth of all the land be for service to the gods?

⁵³ See Harrison, *The Law of Athens*, vol. 1, pp. 234–5, and *Politics* 7.12.

⁵⁴ On funds from mines, see *Athenian Constitution* 22.7; Rhodes, *Aristotelean Athenaeon Politeia*, 277–9, and Harrison, *The Law of Athens*, vol. 1, p. 234.

⁵⁵ Newman writes, “The term *phoroi* applied to the contributions of the serfs indicates subjection, and probably conquest”, Newman, *The Politics of Aristotle*, vol. 2, p. 354. We need not assume that Aristotle is advocating or counting on the collection of tribute from such subjects, although we cannot rule it out. Athens had as many as three hundred fifty or so tribute-paying allies (not necessarily subjects), including most member states of

The land on which the common messes stand is common land, and the common crops and funds, which come from the common lands, should ideally pay for the common meals of everyone.⁵⁶ But how extensive are common meals? It seems quite clear, unless Aristotle was intending something entirely radical, that they took place every day and once a day. It was the main meal of the day (*τό δείπνον*), which took place at sunset.⁵⁷ But who was allowed to attend? Despite what Aristotle says, it seems the Cretan common messes were attended by adult male citizens (including the poor), and boys. Women, Dosiadas tells us, were in charge of the meals, but they did not seem to partake of them.⁵⁸ There is no mention of daughters anywhere.⁵⁹ It is of course possible that Aristotle read into, or embellished, earlier accounts of the Cretan common messes a bit (much like Plato in the *Laws* may have), so that men, women, and children all receive meals there. In any case, it is fairly clear that Aristotle himself supports the inclusion of women in common meals. So, Aristotle wants the city to see to it that each citizen

the Delian League, see *Athensian Constitution* 24.3, and Rhodes, *Aristotelian Athenian Politeia*, 300–2. This may have been another legitimate means of income for the city, in Aristotle's view, but once again we cannot say for sure.

⁵⁶ Clearly, Aristotle wants the common funds to ensure the participation of poor citizens in the common meals, see Nussbaum, "Aristotelian Social Democracy," 204, 228, and Irwin, "Generosity and Property," 46. Here Aristotle's ideal parts company with common practice. Ephoros (quoted in Strabo 10.4.16) states that in Crete the common funds paid for boys and the poor. Pyrgion, also discussing Crete, says orphans are taken care of by the common funds (Atheneus 143e). It is never claimed that the common funds support all citizens, unless the contributions of those who can afford it are considered part of the common funds. According to Dosiadas, every citizen contributes one tenth of his income to help support the common messes (Atheneus 143a–d). Aristotle, however, is hoping the common lands will produce enough so that no one will have to contribute anything for the maintenance of the common meals.

⁵⁷ See Atheneus 143a, Plutarch, *Lycurgus* 12.7, and Xenophon, *Lakedaimonian Constitution* 5.7.

⁵⁸ See Atheneus 143a–d, and *Republic* 458c–d. Although there are common meals for women in neither Sparta nor Crete, it seems Plato and Aristotle think there should be separate ones for them. See *Laws* 780d–781d, 806d–807b, and *Politics* 1265a8–9.

⁵⁹ For the presence of boys at common meals, see Strabo 10.4.20, Atheneus 143a–e, Plutarch, *Lycurgus* 12.4, and Xenophon, *Lakedaimonian Constitution* 5.5–6. (On some possible doubts about common meals for the young, see *Laws* 636b–e, 666b.)

(and his family) receives at least the main meal of the day. In this way the basic sustenance of every citizen is guaranteed⁶⁰

Generally, the possessions of citizens are private, and citizens possess land privately, though they can (and should) make some of their land and possessions common in use in the ways indicated. But what limitations with respect to amount or use should there be on private property? Aristotle obviously advocates limits on the criminal use of property.⁶¹ But what else? A good place to begin is with the first two "necessary" offices⁶² Aristotle says, "First . . . is the superintendence concerning the market [ἐπιμέλεια . . . ἡ περὶ τὴν ἀγοράν], for which there should be some office overseeing agreements and orderliness" (*Politics* 1321b12-14).⁶³ It is clear that

⁶⁰ One last point. Is attendance at the common meals voluntary or compulsory? In Sparta it was, with minor exceptions, compulsory (see Plutarch, *Lycurgus* 12.2-3. Cf. Plato, *Laws* 762b-c). Aristotle's view is unclear, however, for his position is never fully stated. If the meals' sole purpose is to ensure that the poor have enough to eat, then all that is necessary is that they be available, not mandatory. If they have some other purpose(s), then he may have thought they should be compulsory. It is unlikely that the sole purpose of the common messes was the care of the poor. There was probably something about participation in the common meals—besides getting a decent meal—that Aristotle found important for all citizens. One possibility is education: the common messes may have had some role in the formation of the character of citizens, for instance, letting the young observe the proper way of conducting oneself in a social context. (As we have seen, Aristotle never fulfilled his promise to say more about common messes. *Politics* 8, which is about education, is generally considered incomplete. Perhaps the rest of Aristotle's discussion of common messes was [or was intended to be] in this book on education. If this is the case, then common messes obviously have an educational function.) If this were the case, then they may have been compulsory. A related purpose is the nurturing of civic friendship. The unity of the city depends on civic friendship, which in turn requires that citizens spend time together and gain knowledge of each other. Common messes would provide an excellent opportunity for this. (See, for instance, *Politics* 1313a41-b6, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1155a23-26, 1167a22-28. The *Laws* mentions education in courage and moderation, *Laws* 625c-626a, 635e-636a.) In the end, however, it is quite unclear whether common meals in Aristotle's view were meant to be compulsory, though most likely he would have hoped that people in the best city would be of such a character as to voluntarily participate in them.

⁶¹ For example, if I claimed to be selling pure wine, it would be illegal for me to water it down.

⁶² Those offices without which the city cannot exist, *Politics* 1321b6-7.

⁶³ Compare this to Theophrastus's *Nomoi*, which states that "the market-inspectors (ἀγορανόμους) must look after two things: good order in

their main functions are to see that everyone involved is honest and holds to their agreements and contracts, and that orderliness (*εὐκοσμία*) is maintained.⁶⁴ But Harrison writes that in Athens market supervisors also fixed certain prices⁶⁵ In *Athenian Constitution* 51, which describes this office, although the emphasis is on preventing fraud and dishonesty, there is some mention of price fixing, especially regarding the price of wheat Rhodes, commenting on this section, writes that

Athens had relied on imported corn [that is, wheat] to supplement the local crop, and to ensure that the citizens should be fed the state was led to take a special interest in the corn trade [T]he importers were not free to sell their corn wherever they could get the highest price for it⁶⁶

It is unclear whether Aristotle advocates any of this, but he may. In general, though, the "limits" on private property implied by this necessary office are not that intrusive⁶⁷ In fact, one main concern is the *protection* of private property against fraudulent activity in the marketplace.⁶⁸

The second necessary office is town management (*ἀστυνομία*) This office seems to have three functions (*Politics* 1321b18-27): (i) superintendence of private and public property in town, with a view to ensuring orderliness, (ii) superintendence of the preservation and repair of decaying buildings and roads; (iii) the prevention of boundary disputes⁶⁹ Barnes complains.

What exactly is the function of these officials with regard to private houses? May they do no more than (1) order the repair of dilapidated

the market place, and honest dealing not only by the sellers but also by the buyers", Theophrastus frag 20 Szegedy-Maszak For an earlier and not dissimilar view of *ἀγορανόμοι*, see *Laws* 759a, 764b, 849a-e, 881b-c, 913d, 917b-e, 920c, 936c, 953b

⁶⁴ See *Politics* 1321b34-40, and Theophrastus frag 21 S-M For what is probably a very accurate description of the functions of the market supervisors, see Newman, *The Politics of Aristotle*, vol 4, p 549 For *εὐκόσμία*, *LSJ* gives "orderly behaviour," "good conduct," and "decency"

⁶⁵ Harrison, *The Law of Athens*, vol 2, p 25

⁶⁶ Rhodes, *Aristotelian Athenarion Politeia*, 575-9

⁶⁷ That is, putting aside fraud and such, a citizen is left at liberty to use his property as he will

⁶⁸ Cf Barnes, "Aristotle and Political Liberty," 258

⁶⁹ On the functions of this office, cf *Laws* 759a, 763c, 779c, 844b-c, 845e, 847a-b, 849a-b, 849e, 879d-e, 881c, 913d-914c, 936c, 954b-c

property when it endangers neighbors or passers-by? (E.g. may they instruct me to mend my tottering chimneys?) Or may they also (2) regulate any alterations or repairs I make to my house which could in any way affect third parties? (E.g. may they require me to paint the external woodwork in a seemly colour?) Or may they further (3) determine how I deal with the internal affairs of my house, affairs which affect only its occupants? (E.g. may they prohibit me from installing an electric socket in my bathroom?) These three possibilities mark out, for the modern thinker, three different attitudes to political liberty. Possibility (1) illustrates an old fashioned liberalism. Possibility (3) illustrates a new fashioned paternalism. Any theorist who interests himself in political liberty must take a stand on these questions. Aristotle takes no stand.⁷⁰

Is this fair? True, there is much that is unclear. But can we say nothing? Must we conclude that Aristotle takes no stand? I am not so sure. Function (iii) above clearly applies only to what is happening outside of the house. As for functions (i) and (ii), the *Athenian Constitution* might shed some light. "They prevent buildings which encroach on the streets, balconies which extend over the streets, overhead drainpipes which discharge into the street, and window-shutters which open into the street."⁷¹ Much of this no doubt describes function (ii). As for function (i), Aristotle may have seen it implied in the other two functions: seeing to it that my drainpipes do not throw water on to passers-by, and preventing boundary disputes, *do* promote public orderliness.⁷²

In any event, of the three possibilities mentioned by Barnes above, although it is unclear whether Aristotle would have embraced (1) or (2), we have no reason to believe he would have accepted (3). Given the nature of the first necessary office, the description of the second necessary office in the *Athenian Constitution*, and even the discussions of this second office in Plato's *Laws*,⁷³ there is no indication of any of the sort of paternalism described by Barnes. Again, the limits on property are not so intrusive.⁷⁴ So, to this extent at least, Aristotle does take a stand.

Thus, the superintendence of market and property does not imply any great restrictions or limitations on private property. We

⁷⁰ Barnes, "Aristotle and Political Liberty," 258-9

⁷¹ *Athenian Constitution* 50.2

⁷² See Harrison, *The Law of Athens*, vol. 2, p. 25

⁷³ See note 69 above

⁷⁴ See Newman, *The Politics of Aristotle*, vol. 4, pp. 550-1

cannot conclude, however, that Aristotle had anything like a *laissez faire* view, for he seems to have advocated a ceiling on how much one may own, primarily in order to avoid what he thought were harmful disparities of wealth and poverty—especially, it should be added, in nonideal situations.⁷⁵ In fact, given his distinction between natural and unnatural acquisition of wealth (*Politics* 1 8–1.11), even in the best city he would have put a limit on the acquisition of wealth.⁷⁶ It is unclear, however, what kind of restriction this implies: would wealthy citizens be taxed? Would any money they made (over the ceiling) be handed over to the city?⁷⁷ In the best city, some citizens would be wealthy, but they would most likely not be able to acquire an “unnatural” amount of wealth because citizens are forbidden the merchant’s or businessman’s life. Of course, this is itself a restriction on property.⁷⁸

Although there may be limits to wealth, Aristotle is obviously not eliminating the wealthy altogether. In fact they are a crucial part of the city.⁷⁹ Moreover, he opposes and deems unjust the confiscation of the property of the wealthy—at least the confiscation of anything below the limit on the acquisition of wealth.⁸⁰ Sustenance for the needy, as we have seen, should ideally come from generosity and the common lands, not, in the best circumstances at least, from the redistribution of wealth.⁸¹

Is this to say Aristotle is against taxes? Some passages certainly imply that the wealthy will be taxed, for political, and especially military, functions.⁸² But at other places he writes as if

⁷⁵ *Politics* 1266b8–16, 1270a15–22, 1295b1–1296a18, 1309a14–26, 1319a8–10, *Athenian Constitution* 11 2–12 3. He also believes some restrictions on the alienation of property are justified, *Politics* 1270a18–21.

⁷⁶ See Miller, “Aristotle on Property Rights,” 235–7.

⁷⁷ In Plato’s *Laws*, any surplus above the limit goes to “the city and the gods who possess the city,” 744e–745a.

⁷⁸ See *Politics* 1258b35–39, 1328b39–41, 1337b8–15. Aristotle may have, in some circumstances, condoned the ostracizing of the wealthy. See *Politics* 1284a17–22, 1284b15–34, 1308b19, but cf. 1302b15–20. On the Peripatetic view of ostracism, see Andrew Szegedy-Maszk, *The Nomos of Theophrastus* (Salem, N.H.: Ayer, 1987), 52–4.

⁷⁹ See note 40 above.

⁸⁰ See *Politics* 1281a15–21, 1309a14–19, 1318a25–26, 1320a5–10.

⁸¹ See, however, *Ibid.*, 1320b2–4.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 1283a16–19, 1328b10–23. Cf. *Athenian Constitution* 24 3, and Rhodes, *Aristotelean Athenian Politeia*, 301–2.

taxes are certainly not ideal⁸³ This apparent discrepancy can be resolved in the following way Aristotle believes that in the very best situation, funds from common lands, the generosity of citizens, and so forth will cover all the city's expenses But this is not very usual or likely Normally, even in the best of cities, funds from common lands will cover much of the city's expenses, but some wealth from the richest citizens will be needed to cover what is left (especially if a lot of money is required for the military) To acquire such funds, taxes would be employed.

It seems that in most cases Aristotle believes that a citizen's property (any that does not go above a certain ceiling on wealth) is that citizen's to use, so long as he does not use it fraudulently, and as long as there are enough funds for the city to function properly. If there are not, the wealthy citizens would have to give some of their wealth to the state to meet these needs⁸⁴

V

What, then, did Aristotle mean when he said, "That they [the citizens] become such [as to use possessions in common], this is a special function of the legislator"? (*Politics* 1263a39-40) The only cogent answer is public education The legislator must make laws controlling the upbringing of children,⁸⁵ both by making laws that will properly influence them, and through the establishment of a system of public education. As a result, when they become adult citizens, they will (generally) be of such character that they will freely share their property with friends and fellow citizens in the ways described in section IV⁸⁶

As we have seen, at least with respect to property, Aristotle is critical of any substantial deprivation of freedom Because of the

⁸³ See *Politics* 1309a14-26 and 6 5, and Newman, *The Politics of Aristotle*, vol 4, pp 399-400, 532

⁸⁴ See Miller, "Aristotle on Property Rights," 240-5

⁸⁵ He must also, to some degree, make laws controlling the habits of adults—for example, laws making them act moderately, see *Nicomachean Ethics* 1180a1-18

⁸⁶ For texts showing that education is the responsibility of the legislator, see *Politics* 8 1, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1102a7-10, 1130b25-29, and 10 9.

fundamental importance of education in the life of the city, however, he advocates a coercive education of the young. In the *Politics* he claims that the legislator must make the education of the young his object above all (*Politics* 1337a11–14). He goes on to say that

since there is one end [τέλος] for the whole city [or the city as a whole], it is clear that education must necessarily be one and the same for all, and that the superintendence of it should be common and not private (this latter being the manner in which each individual at present superintends his own offspring privately and teaches them whatever private learning he thinks best). For common things the training too should be made common. At the same time, one ought not even consider [νομίζειν] that some citizen is of himself [or belongs to himself, αὐτοῦ], but that all [citizens] are of the city [or belong to the city, τῆς πόλεως], for each is a part of the city. (*Politics* 1337a21–32)⁸⁷

It is better to have a lack of freedom in one important area—in the education of one's children—than in the whole of one's life. This education may be coercive, Aristotle would argue, but it makes possible independent and responsible citizens who do not have to be coerced in every aspect of their lives. Moreover, it is better to have a city made up of good citizens, each of whom is free to use *his* property as he sees fit, but who will most likely use it properly (because of his character, feelings of friendship, and so on), than laws strictly regulating the use of private property, or abolishing it altogether.⁸⁸ This is what Aristotle has in mind when he says, contra Plato, "It is strange for one who intends to introduce education and who thinks that through this the

⁸⁷ Cf., however, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1180a32–b31. This passage seems to conflict with what I have said in this essay and in "Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's *Republic*" about Aristotle's views on individual independence. I believe there are three ways of interpreting the passage in light of this apparent contradiction. First, Aristotle is contradicting himself. In some places he says a free man is of himself and not of another (see *Politics* 1254a10–15; *Metaphysics* 982b25–26), whereas here he is saying a free man is not of himself but of another (of the city), which counts as despotic rule (see Irwin, "Property and Generosity," 44, n. 2). Second, however contradictory Aristotle may appear, this passage is strong evidence for the view that he really saw humans as mere parts of the city. This is the view of Barnes, who uses this passage as part of an argument for the view that Aristotle is an implicit totalitarian. Barnes, "Aristotle and Political Liberty," 262–3. Third, Aristotle is here presenting the relationship between the individual and the city in one special context: the education of the young. In this context alone one should consider (νομίζειν) himself a mere part of the city. Although I cannot argue for it here, this is the view I accept.

⁸⁸ See *Politics* 1266b24–31. Cf. *Laws* 740a.

city will be excellent, to suppose that it can be set right by these sorts of things, but not by habits[or character, *ἥθες*], philosophy, and laws" (*Politics* 1263b36–40). Platonic civic unity is achieved through "these sorts of things," namely, laws forcing humans to share property in common, to treat each other as "brothers," and the like. Aristotelian unity, however, is achieved through character, philosophy, and laws—that is, through laws and public education that properly shape the character of the citizens, but then allow these citizens to act independently, control their own property, and so on.

VI

While much remains unclear, we can understand a lot more about Aristotle's remarks on property than Barnes thinks possible. We know that Aristotle believes private property must exist and it must be respected. Although Aristotle does not defend absolute property rights, the limits to the use of property are few, especially when considered in their historical context. So Aristotle is no classical liberal—he is no Lockean—but he is much closer to this than many believe.

This having been said, it is nevertheless difficult to paint Aristotle with any kind of modern brush. First, Aristotle wants to accept some key aims of modern liberalism (for example, seeing to it that every citizen receives at least basic sustenance), but he would like to avoid what are usually regarded as necessary means to such aims: strong limitations on property, and the redistribution of wealth. In addition, the way he defends private property seems different from modern liberalism and socialism, and yet his defense of a citizen's freedom to use his property as he wants depends on a rather nonclassical-liberal institution: a coercive system of public education. Thus, we cannot subsume Aristotle's conception of property under any one modern theory. In the end, perhaps the best label for his theory of property is "Aristotelian."⁸⁹

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⁸⁹ I would like to thank Alfonso Gomez-Lobo, Henry Richardson, Gerald Mara, Nicholas Smith, John Christman, and Allan Gotthelf for their many helpful comments and criticisms. Any remaining errors are my own.

BOOKS RECEIVED

SUMMARIES AND COMMENTS*

MATTHEW CUDDEBACK AND STAFF

BOTWINICK, Aryeh *Postmodernism and Democratic Theory* Philadelphia Temple University Press, 1993 288pp n p—In his newest book, Botwinick continues a project begun in earlier works presenting a “generalized agnosticism” that can provide support for participatory democracy in a postmodern culture To be sure, this project’s premises are still far from certain There is no reason to assume that our entire society is moving into a culture being shaped by postmodern philosophers, though Botwinick is correct that the acids of skepticism have eaten deeply into most traditional systems of belief Unlike dogmatic skeptics, moreover, Botwinick does make clear that his own method can never escape entirely the taint of circularity Like dialectic historicists and others who seek to relativize once settled opinions, skeptics, we are told, often hide the foundations of their own critical thinking They therefore elevate to a privileged status their methods and views without acknowledging their epistemic limits

Botwinick owns up to the circularity of his own skepticism, which, as he assures us, is always to be viewed as tentative Like Thomas Nagel, he speaks of “reasoning” bodies of knowledge and forms of inquiry, making them serve limited purposes without considering them as definitive The difficulty, in my opinion, comes at the point when Botwinick goes from his exploration of postmodernism into explaining how generalized agnosticism can contribute to participatory social democracy Botwinick is justly critical of the claims to value-neutrality made by some liberal constitutionalists, and he notes that in a liberal regime decisions by the state to intervene or not to intervene have come less from dispassionate normative judgments than from social and material interests He rejects these interests as somehow unjust Nonetheless, it is never shown how agnosticism can settle conflicts between divergent values and interests Though Botwinick favors social experiments, I am not convinced that his agnostic approach can be made to sanction such charges Will those who use their property rights agree to be dispossessed on the basis of a tentative and circular skeptical method, albeit one elevated to a communal

* Books received are acknowledged in this section by a brief resume, report, or criticism Such acknowledgement does not preclude a more detailed examination in a subsequent Critical Study From time to time, technical books dealing with such fields as mathematics, physics, anthropology, and the social sciences will be reviewed in this section, if it is thought that they might be of special interest to philosophers

doctrine? Also, what happens if an individual or a minority decides to secede from the participatory democracy once established? Can the majority assert its authority, if necessary by force, against the wills of other investigating skeptics?

Having raised these critical questions, I should stress nevertheless that Botwinick's work is both deeply erudite and elegantly written. If his conclusions disappoint—which is also often the case with Alasdair MacIntyre—his treatment of the ideas of others, like MacIntyre's treatments, reveals remarkable learning put into forceful prose. The best part of this book is its discussion of the bridge between Leo Strauss and postmodern democratic political theory. Contrary to the impressions left by some of his disciples, Strauss, Botwinick says, believed that liberal democracy is linked directly to philosophical skepticism. To whatever extent liberal democrats wish to make truth claims, they do so, according to Strauss, by reaching beyond a liberal democratic regime, in search of nonliberal truths. Even more importantly, Botwinick explains, looking especially at Strauss's commentary on Maimonides, Strauss assumed not only a disjunction between reason and revelation, but also a difficulty inherent in all philosophy in going from problems and themes toward cogent universal answers. Botwinick observes that in *Natural Right and History* Strauss does not criticize historicists for denying that truths exist independently of historical contingencies. Rather, Strauss accuses historicists of missing the historical lesson "that all human thought, and certainly all philosophical thought, is concerned with the same fundamental themes and the same fundamental problems." Thus the "unchanging framework" that Strauss believed was present in the human condition is not a set of transcultural or metahistorical verities but the permanence of an intellectual quest. Botwinick interprets Strauss's multi-layered skepticism accurately and arrives at conclusions that overlap the treatment of Strauss's skepticism done by his candid student Stanley Rosen. What Botwinick sees as Strauss's postmodernist tendencies, however, may also be interpreted differently. The view of a self-limiting rationalism, and a general uneasiness with liberal legality divorced from older authority structures, were features of the German intellectual world from which Strauss came. Despite Strauss's efforts, particularly in his postwar lecture and writings, to mask this German heritage, it comes through unmistakably in his early work and, as Rosen suggests, even later. Unlike Botwinick but like Rosen, I would argue that Strauss's critique of liberal modernity is a more dominant theme in his corpus than his defense of liberal democratic skepticism. —Paul Gottfried, *Elizabeth-town College*

BOWEN, Alan C., ed. *Science and Philosophy in Classical Greece*. Institute for Research in Classical Philosophy and Science. Sources and Studies in the History and Philosophy of Classical Science, vol. 2. New York

Garland Publishing Inc., 1991 xvi + 329 pp \$58.00—This very interesting collection, long awaited, represents the proceedings of a 1986 conference sponsored by the Institute for Research in Classical Philosophy and Science. The conference grew out of the Institute's concern that scholars of the histories of philosophy, the exact sciences, biology, and medicine have been insufficiently familiar with each other's work. "So," writes Alan C. Bowen, director of the Institute, in his Preface,

what we proposed was to encourage collaboration. And to do this we assembled leading historians of ancient Greek philosophy, the various exact sciences, the life sciences, and medicine to focus on three topics: (a) how Greek philosophers and scientists defined science and demarcated the particular sciences during the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., (b) the role played by observation in theory as well as by theory in observation, and (c) whether philosophical debates about the ontology and character of scientific explanation occasioned any changes in what the Greeks later regarded as science, and were in fact instrumental in the emergence of the new sciences (pp. ix-x).

The twelve authors do indeed constitute a distinguished cast, and although inevitably individual papers stray from these topics, cumulatively they do shed significant light on all three across a wide range of sciences. The collection begins, appropriately, with a trenchant reaffirmation by Charles Kahn ("Some Remarks on the Origins of Greek Science and Philosophy") of the traditional view that Greek science and philosophy came into the world "*together*, one and indivisible, first in Ionia and then in Southern Italy and Sicily, in the sixth and early fifth centuries B.C." (p. 1), and that Presocratic natural philosophy and early Greek astronomy and mathematics, with their radically innovative concern for explanation and proof, constituted "a revolutionary break" with their predecessors. Kahn's piece is complemented by G. E. R. Lloyd's study, later in the volume, of the early medical writings ("The Definition, Status, and Methods of the Medical *Technē* in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries"). Lloyd finds spread through a number of Hippocratic treatises a characteristically Greek "heightening of self-consciousness and the construction of not one but several overlapping and competing models of what medicine is or should be" (pp. 258-9). Elsewhere Lloyd has commented on the relationship between Presocratic theorizing and these aspects of the medical corpus, here he considers how these aspects were affected by factors internal to the medical profession itself.

Kahn's introductory manifesto is followed by three papers concerned with aspects of the overall *conceptions* of science in the preeminent philosophers of the period under consideration, supplied by Alexander Mourelatos ("Plato's Science—His View and Ours of His"), Joseph Owens ("The Aristotelian Conception of the Pure and Applied Sciences"), and Robert Turnbull ("Platonic and Aristotelian Science"). Of the next six papers, three delve into early Greek mathematics and three into the mathematical sciences of harmonics and astronomy, and the volume closes with Lloyd's paper on Hippocratic medicine and

with one on Aristotelian biology by James G. Lennox ("Between Data and Demonstration the *Analytics* and the *Historia Animalium*"). The editor's grouping by subject matter is complemented by various thematic groupings the reader should be encouraged to pursue, for it is one of the merits of the volume that study of it provides the reader just the opportunity for cross-fertilization among subject matters that the 1986 conference aimed to foster.

For instance, several contributors are concerned (among other things) with the *aims* of certain ancient treatises: for example, Mourelatos with Plato's *Tymaeus*, Wilbur Knorr with Euclid's *Elements* ("What Euclid Meant: On the Use of Evidence in Studying Ancient Mathematics"), and Lennox with Aristotle's *Historia Animalium* (hereafter "*HA*") In the first and third of these, this concern with aims shades into a concern for the relation between the scientific (or "scientific") content of the treatise and its ancient author's philosophical conception of that activity.

Thus, Mourelatos argues that the *Tymaeus* is not "an encyclopedia of the sciences," nor "a prefiguring of the standard hypothetico-deductive method of scientific explanation" (p. 12), but an edifying, inspirational illustration of metaphysical truths that were established a priori. "What matters is that we grasp the principle truths that the universe is good and beautiful, that it shares the workings of intelligence at all levels of its organization, and that it is articulated in harmonious structures" (p. 29). Mourelatos makes a very plausible case, although it would have been good to see that case tested by comparison and contrast of the last part of the *Tymaeus* with relevant parts of Aristotle's *Parts of Animals*. That would have been instructive, since the latter is probably an early Aristotelian work, stimulated by a reading of the *Tymaeus* (cf. *Philosophical Issues in Aristotle's Biology* (hereafter "*PIAB*"), ed. Allan Gotthelf and James G. Lennox [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987], 17). The contrasts are indeed many, and reflect, among other things, the philosophical differences between Aristotle and Plato, which Mourelatos well spells out the Platonic side. But there is one important similarity, since it is at least plausible to think that *Parts of Animals* has the aim, not only of contributing to an *epistēmē* of animal nature (Cf. *PIAB*, chap. 7), but also of exhibiting, to borrow Mourelatos's words, "the principle truths that the universe is good and beautiful, that it shows the workings of [teleological natures] at all levels of [living] organization," and that it exhibits the unity of form and matter throughout the living world. In fact, Aristotle says as much in his famous exhortation to biological study in *Parts of Animals* 1.5 (Cf. *PIAB* pp. 1-2). Aristotle's work need be no less scientific for having wider philosophical aims. If Plato's work falls short of Aristotle's by reasonable standards of science (as it surely does), it is because of such other features as Mourelatos attributes to Plato's work—his lesser concern for "hard data," his rationalism, and ultimately a metaphysics which excludes natural science from the realm of *epistēmē*—and not because it seeks (among other things) to illustrate or defend metaphysical (or other philosophical) truths.

If such reflections should stimulate interest in the connection between Aristotelian theory of science, as presented in the *Analytics* and Aristotelian scientific practice, the contributions by Lennox (mentioned above) and Andrew Barker ("Aristoxenus' Harmonics and Aristotle's Theory of Science") will do much to satisfy that interest. Lennox carries forward in dramatic ways his ongoing project (begun in *PIAB*, chap. 5) of showing the fit between the practice in *HA* (as he and I have interpreted it) and certain prescriptions for proper science in the *Analytics*. He shows that indeed *HA* is an investigation into the "facts" preliminary to establishing their causes, but that such an inquiry is much richer and more methodologically structured than has previously been assumed. Lennox provides an illuminating analysis of the method of "selecting premises" described in *Prior Analytics* 1 27ff, and shows its relevance to the search in *HA* with respect to each animal differentia for the widest subject that possesses it—a search we have argued is a central concern of *HA*. To illustrate his claims Lennox offers a detailed study of *HA* 4 1–4 7, which, like all of his work on Aristotle's biology, advances in important ways our understanding both of Aristotle's detailed practice and of his wider concerns. (For a caveat regarding the evidence Lennox and I have offered for our interpretation of *HA*, see Allan Gotthelf, "*Historiae I Plantarum et Animalium*," in *Theophrastean Studies*, ed. W. W. Fortenbaugh and R. W. Sharples [New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988], 113.)

Barker's discussion of the theory-practice relationship is fascinating. Here we have Aristoxenus, one of Aristotle's prize students, explicitly applying Aristotelian theory to an ongoing science, clearly adopting that theory in developing and organizing his results (not just in teaching them), refining it in places, even rejecting certain Aristotelian claims (for example, about the relationship of "superordinate" mathematics to "subordinate" harmonics), and raising questions on ontological fundamentals (for example, on the relationship between form and matter). In addition, one's picture of how philosophical theory might shape (and be shaped by) a study of harmonic theory will be enhanced by comparing Barker's analysis of Aristoxenus with Bowen's own illuminating analysis of Euclid's very different harmonic theory ("Euclid's *Sectio canonis* and the History of Pythagoreanism").

The other harmony that so interested the Greeks was the harmony of the spheres. The way the mathematical study of arcs and angles formed by circles on a sphere enabled the ancients to get enormous mileage out of very limited quality empirical data is the concern of J. L. Berggren's historically wide-ranging contribution ("The Relation of Greek Spherics to Early Greek Astronomy").

The study of Greek mathematics has been enlivened in recent years by the work of Ian Mueller, Wilbur Knorr, and D. H. Fowler, all of whom were present at the 1986 conference. Mueller's contribution ("On the Notion of a Mathematical Starting Point in Plato, Aristotle, and Euclid") insightfully analyzes Platonic and Aristotelian texts not only for the philosophers' own views on the nature, justification, and different types of starting points but also as evidence for the views

held by the mathematicians of their respective times. With regard to *types* of starting-points, Plato's contemporaries apparently recognized only definitions, by Aristotle's time at least three of Euclid's "common notions" were included. Euclid adds the postulates himself. On one longstanding matter Mueller is (perhaps too hastily) deflationary. "I see nothing in Euclid's starting points which would suggest to an unbiased reader influence from the work of Plato or Aristotle" (p. 91).

Fowler's contribution ("Ratio and Proportion in Early Greek Mathematics") seeks to establish that "early Greek mathematics and astronomy show no trace of influence of arithmetisation" (p. 113), what might look to us like common fractions are better understood in terms of the notion of ratios as defined by "reciprocal subtraction" (*anthrophairesis*). Knorr, in the contribution mentioned above, contests this, working back carefully from later texts, which show clear signs of common fractions, to the earlier conception, in the context of a more general discussion of proper methodology in the study of ancient mathematics. Limited to fragmentary texts, or a fragmentary knowledge of context, how do we decide such issues as whether Greek conceptions of ratio and proportion are arithmetized, or what Euclid's aim(s) was in writing the *Elements*? Knorr claims that contemporary literary theory, judiciously read (he dismisses "literary skepticism" as less "fruitful"), can assist historical scholars, he cites E. D. Hirsch, Jr.'s study of genre in his discussion of Euclid's aims in the *Elements*. But Knorr's valuable studies of ratio and proportion, fraction, and the aims of Euclid's *Elements* do not seem actually to depend on any interpretative distinctions or techniques not already firmly entrenched, at least as explicit ideals (and often as realities), in the best scholarship on ancient Greek philosophical, scientific, and mathematical texts (in which Knorr's own work is to be included). On the contrary, I think that serious students of textual interpretation, and of questions of historical objectivity, have much more to learn from a close study of that scholarship than from much of what passes for literary criticism, and literary theory, today.

One reason for the scholarship's quality may be the self-consciousness about methodology that is often a part of that scholarship, and the desire for continued improvement it embodies. We see such self-consciousness in the reflections, noted above, which gave rise to the conference whose proceedings are now before us. They are wise reflections, for the scholarship's quality is certain to improve yet further, if scholars adopt this volume's message, and look more systematically to work in related areas for lessons they might apply to their own. This volume provides a fine prod in that direction.—Allan Gotthelf, *Trenton State College*

BROD, Harry. *Hegel's Philosophy of Politics: Idealism, Identity, and Modernity*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1992. x + 216 pp. Cloth,

\$45 00, paper, \$15 95—Hegel's philosophy of politics, according to Brod, is to be found primarily in the third part of the *Philosophy of Right*, supplemented by Hegel's historical writings and his philosophy of history. All of these need to be read in the context of some knowledge of contemporary political events. This approach to the *Philosophy of Right* sets aside the question of how Hegel construed the unity of his own text and project, in order to use a portion of the text as a means of answering a set of questions which the author has framed as a relevant context for focusing on just that portion (p. 21). The context tacitly invoked by Brod would appear to be something like standard Western political theory of the modern period, perhaps as represented by Sabine's classic commentary (mentioned more than once by the author). The project of the book might be characterized (somewhat crudely) as making Hegel's political philosophy intelligible to someone raised on Sabine's categories. At one point the author refers to Sabine's opinion that in the *Philosophy of Right*, "the arrangement [of topics] hopelessly dislocated the subject matter" (p. 91). Brod clearly anticipates that his more informed reading of Hegel will render it more intelligible to an audience reared in the Sabine tradition. Such a project is not unworthy of attention, but it seems to me that the author's efforts achieve only mixed success.

The work, which began ten years earlier as a doctoral dissertation, contains an Introduction and eight chapters. The Introduction articulates the author's view that Hegel's understanding of contemporary history shaped "the basic structure and intent of his philosophic system" (p. 6). He characterizes Hegel's political philosophy as "idealist" in that "its primary concern is with the consciousness of the citizens in the Hegelian state" (p. 3). The first chapter elaborates on the theme of the historical basis of Hegel's political philosophy, while the second and third dwell on Hegel's conception of contemporary events, especially the French Revolution. Chapters 4 through 7 offer a commentary on political aspects of *Sittlichkeit*, that is, on the family and property rights, the dialectic of civil society, Hegel's treatment of representative political institutions, and the rational state. A final chapter attempts to draw some conclusions concerning contemporary notions of society, law, and gender.

In the course of the work Brod refers to a considerable range of secondary literature. He arrives at defensible, if familiar, conclusions on a number of issues, he produces some questionable interpretations on other points, but arrives at no significant readings which struck this reviewer as both distinctive and sound. As an example of the sort of reading which I found troubling, Brod declares that "Marx rejects in Hegel the idea that the economic realm of civil society remains in the sphere of nature. This explains why Marx ultimately calls for the overcoming of the civil society-state dualism and why Hegel ultimately rejects the standpoint of civil society in favor of the state" (pp. 75-6, cf. p. 90). If one has in mind Hegel's fundamental contrast between nature and spirit, then referring to civil society as "nature" can only lead to confusion. Similarly, one finds the author using "culture" on occasion as a synonym for Hegel's "spirit." The

difficulty (and ambiguity) arises out of the original decision to translate Hegel's terminology into some of the more familiar categories of standard political theory without first attempting to orient the reader properly within *Hegel's* project (for example, skipping "Abstract Right" and "Morality" as not germane to the book's interpretive project) The book could perhaps be recommended as a relatively gentle and readable introduction to the topic for a reader not previously acquainted with Hegel, but should be viewed only as a starting point — Philip Grier, *Dickinson College*

CASEY, John *Pagan Virtue An Essay in Ethics* Oxford Clarendon Press, 1990 xii + 242 pp \$22 95—This book presents the author's reflections on the "pagan" cardinal virtues of courage, temperance, justice, and practical wisdom (*phronēsis*) as depicted by Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics* Casey sees these virtues as pagan because they "are undeniably worldly", include an element of self-regard, and rely on material conditions for their fulfillment" (p viii) Christian virtue, by contrast, centers on the next world, emphasizes humility, and is independent of the vagaries of fortune because it depends (as Kant articulates in the *Grundlegung*) wholly on having good will Casey makes no attempt to synthesize the pagan and Christian-Kantian traditions, like Nietzsche, he stresses their "irreconcilable conflict" (p 212) Casey wants simply to elicit sympathy "for ways of thinking about the virtues that owe very little to the Christian tradition" and to show that, despite our putative Christian-Kantian ethical stance, "we do in practice think about human excellences much of the time in ways which could be described (or censured) as 'pagan'" (p 211) Casey concludes that "when we think most rigorously and realistically we are 'pagans' in ethics, but our Christian inheritance allows only a fitful sincerity about this" (p 226)

The book is divided into seven chapters The initial chapter argues that the human person must be thought of as embodied, not as a Kantian abstract rational entity essentially unconnected to the realm of the bodily and empirical "All human nature, from the body to the emotions expresses our nature as rational beings" (p 8). Drawing heavily on Sartre, Casey presents phenomenological sketches of various emotions and shows how these emotions imply embodiment and relatedness to other persons The human good, and consequently human virtue, must be defined partly in terms of contingencies such as intellectual ability, material goods, and luck We must therefore give up our cherished Christian-Kantian belief that the highest moral life can be achieved by anyone having good will

Chapters 2-5 present, respectively, Casey's reflections on courage, temperance, practical wisdom, and justice After explaining Aristotle's views on the cardinal virtue in question (with frequent reliance on Aquinas's analyses in the *Summa Theologiae*), Casey examines

various topics related (sometimes rather obliquely) to that virtue. The chapter on temperance, for example, includes discussions of sloth, gracefulness, childhood belief in magic, imagination, self-love, cruelty, and power. These essays are richly illustrated by quotations from a wide variety of authors, including Homer, Shakespeare, Milton, Jane Austen, Nietzsche, and Sartre. As Casey acknowledges in his preface, his wide-ranging reflections on the cardinal virtues "sit very loosely with Aristotle" (p. ix). A unifying theme, however, is the partial dependence of human moral goodness on the vicissitudes of fortune.

Chapter 6 explores the contrast between the Aristotelian virtue of magnanimity (*megalopsychia*) and the Christian-Kantian virtue of humility. The final chapter, intended as "a footnote to Nietzsche" (p. 212), contrasts the Homeric and Shakespearian ways of understanding tragedy.

This book offers interesting (though often loosely connected) phenomenological analyses of various moral topics, illumined by well-chosen literary examples. But Casey's attempt to contrast pagan and Christian doctrines of virtue is seriously undermined by his oversimplification of both the pagan and Christian ethical traditions. He identifies pagan ethics with Greek ethics, and Greek ethics with the doctrines of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, making no reference, for example, to Plato's seminal discussions of the cardinal virtues in the *Republic*. Christianity is seen exclusively through Kantian (and Nietzschean) eyes. Ironically—and without explaining the irony—the author whom Casey quotes most extensively to explain the "pagan" virtues of Aristotle is Aquinas. A closer attention to the similarities between certain versions of Greek and Christian ethics would have enabled the author to avoid the philosophically disappointing conclusion that we are the heirs to two traditions that are simply and fundamentally irreconcilable.—Donald C. Abel, *St. Norbert College, Wis.*

DIAMOND, Cora. *The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the Mind*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991. xv + 396 pp. \$32.50.—This rewarding collection consists of a preface, two introductory pieces, fifteen essays (twelve previously published), a bibliography, and an index. The essays, of consistently high quality, move by easy transitions from Frege to the early Wittgenstein to the later Wittgenstein to ethical issues (with a paper on "Anselm's riddle" fitted in along the way).

The topics treated suggest how broadly an initial claim must be understood: "There is a sense in which the entirety of this book lies within philosophy of mind" (p. 1). The one hundred pages on Frege discuss the nature of nonsense (two essays), what a concept-script is meant to accomplish, and Frege's demand for full determinacy in concepts and relations. After one essay shared with Frege, Wittgenstein has the next few to himself, on his conception, early and late, of philosophy, on his conception of secondary sense and its relation to ethical

and religious discourse, and on his understanding of necessity. The final section treats the broad scope and varied methods of ethics, and the issue of animal rights.

Diamond's papers connect more closely, she suggests, than a listing of their contents indicates. "I found, in trying to make clear their relations to each other, that I was trying to show how the unity of Wittgenstein's thought had been refracted through my own discussions now of this, now of that" (p. ix). Her double introduction and her opening essay, which she terms "the central paper in this collection as a whole" (p. 5), stress Wittgenstein's "realistic spirit," and subsequent discussions exemplify it.

This spirit, she explains, does not lay down metaphysical requirements concerning what there is or must be (p. 20). It does not "take the details of what we say, what we do, to be irrelevant to the understanding we seek" (p. 13). Instead, it carefully scrutinizes the misconceptions that accompany the beginnings of our philosophizing, for instance in the *Tractatus* (p. 37). Indeed, it seems the very antithesis of the spirit of the *Tractatus*.

Yet Diamond views Wittgenstein's early thought as metaphysical "only in an extremely exiguous sense" (p. 20). This she considers important. "If we read the *Tractatus* as containing metaphysical claims about reality, if we take the metaphysics that we think we find in it to be joined with the idea that metaphysical claims cannot be put into genuine propositions, we shall miss entirely the character of Wittgenstein's later philosophy" (p. 20). These claims—about the *Tractatus* and about the dire consequences of reading it differently—look more problematic than most of those advanced, and the latter, in particular, would require more demonstration than Diamond attempts. For the most part, however, her positions are fully argued, with competence and care. Familiarity with Frege's and Wittgenstein's thought is presupposed.—Garth Hallett, *St. Louis University*

EVANS, J. Claude. *Strategies of Deconstruction: Derrida and the Myth of the Voice*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991. xxiii + 205 pp. Cloth, \$39.95, paper, \$14.95—Evans challenges a widely held, but far from unanimous, view that Derrida's early studies of Husserl and Saussure are carefully argued, scholarly critiques of those thinkers' positions. Evans is careful to point out that in criticizing Derrida's readings and interpretations he is not importing a standard to which Derrida owes no allegiance. Rather, he is applying Derrida's own standard, namely, that a reading must "recognize and respect" all the "instruments of traditional criticism," including the canons of faithful textual interpretation and logical argumentation, not in order to "protect" a text but to "open" a reading (p. xv, quoting Derrida). Evans proceeds by following Derrida's analyses of Husserl and Saussure with great care and in great detail. The first and larger part of his book is devoted to Derrida's reading in *Speech and Phe-*

nomena of the opening sections of the first of Husserl's *Logical Investigations*. The second part of the book is devoted to Derrida's critique of Saussure in the opening chapters of *Of Grammatology*. While Evans does not systematically devote space to Derrida's other early critical work on Husserl (*Edmund Husserl's "The Origin of Geometry" An Introduction*), themes touched upon therein are discussed by Evans in the course of his treatment of *Speech and Phenomena*. This is unsurprising because (1) Derrida's case against Husserl revolves around Husserl's purported logocentrism and phonocentrism, and this case rests upon the reading of the *Logical Investigations*, and (2) Derrida assumes that Husserl's earlier and later views are continuous (although, according to Evans, this view must be qualified in important ways), and Derrida consequently reads Husserl's early work from the perspective of later works such as "The Origin of Geometry." Indeed, many of the themes deconstructive of the *Investigations* are found explicitly, according to Derrida, in "The Origin of Geometry."

There is not sufficient room in a short review to recount Evans's detailed analyses of Derrida's misreading of important Husserlian distinctions and texts, and of Saussure's discussions of linguistic science. Let it suffice to say that Evans's task is a very difficult one. Not only must he recount the interpretations Derrida gives, but he must show where they have gone wrong and why. It is difficult to keep this tangled web of exposition, quotation, double quotation, and analysis from overwhelming a reader, but Evans does a very good job of maintaining the clarity and organization of his exposition throughout. Evans concludes on the basis of these detailed analyses and carefully framed arguments that "the texts we have examined fail to live up to their own [critical] standards" (p. 167).

Indeed, they fail so completely that Evans must consider the possibility—argued by some—that Derrida's "critique" is a parody or a satire and that his invocation of logical standards is ironic, a device by which to set up the parody which follows. While Evans recognizes that he cannot thoroughly disprove this suggestion, he nevertheless rejects it. Any attempt, he argues, to read Derrida's critical works as parody robs them of their deconstructive force. If they are parodies, they do not genuinely undercut the metaphysical tradition with its commitments to presence, logocentrism, and phonocentrism at all; consequently they fail to support the deconstructive position said to arise from these critiques. Moreover, if they are read as parodies, they are poor examples of the genre.

Finally, it is possible to argue that we should not be overly concerned about the accuracy of Derrida's readings, it is his own position, independent of the accuracy of his readings of Husserl and Saussure, that ultimately is of interest. Evans closes this door too. Since Derrida's philosophical positions are developed exclusively through the critique of others—that is, since Derrida provides no arguments for his positions independent of the deconstruction of the authors he reads—the strength of his own position varies proportionately to the strength of the reading he gives those authors. At the very least, Evans argues, even if Derrida is not required to be faithful to the

Husserlian texts themselves, his position can be only so strong as the position he deconstructs is plausible. According to Evans, however, a figure who argues in the manner of "Derrida's Husserl" is thoroughly implausible (p. 174). Hence, Derrida's position cannot hold. "Setting up straw men and blowing them down—even in the name of parody and fiction—simply will not do the job" (p. 177). Derrida must—and in this I think Evans's arguments are successful—be held with all seriousness to the argumentative standards he sets for himself, as Evans has shown, Derrida cannot meet those standards—John J. Drummond, *Mount Saint Mary's College, Md.*

FRIEDMAN, Michael. *Kant and the Exact Sciences*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992. xvii + 357 pp. \$45.00.—The author of this impressively learned and innovative addition to Kantian scholarship is concerned primarily with Kant's lifelong attempt to furnish philosophical grounds for the exact sciences of his time. The reference to "exact sciences of his time" is of central importance. A part of Friedman's thesis is that Kant scholars, in their eagerness apparently to defend the contemporary relevance of Kant, tend to be embarrassed, in view of twentieth-century developments in science, by the quaintness of Kant's total immersion in eighteenth-century Euclidean (physical) geometry and Newtonian mechanics. This tendency, Friedman claims, is highly unfortunate: it obscures the magnificent service performed by Kant in showing the extent to which philosophical foundations can be furnished for whatever science is contemporary. Kant, Friedman adds, probably makes a contribution in this regard that has been unmatched to the present.

The book is divided into the usual pre-Critical, Critical, and post-Critical periods of Kant's work. The pre-Critical grappling with the Leibniz-Wolff versus Newton compromise is relegated to the Introduction. But a substantial Introduction it is. One is left wondering, in view of Friedman's scholarly treatment, whether the task undertaken by Kant, compared to the efforts of modern day philosophers of science, was as simple as some of the commentators would have us believe. Admitting the explosion in scientific knowledge since Kant, one might still regret, Friedman appears to be saying, that the Russells, Carnaps, Reichenbachs, and so on have not come closer to capturing a philosophical foundation for science that might compare to Kant's.

The Critical period receives very little more attention in this book than does the post-Critical period, essentially an examination of the *Opus Postumum*. This no doubt it due to the intensive research that has already gone into the *Critiques*, the *Metaphysical Foundations*, and so on. But the post-Critical works show the utter tenacity with which Kant pursued his goal of philosophically grounding the exact sciences—even chemistry, a suspect science he had previously maligned. And maybe tenaciousness, along with a little help from the

central nervous system, is what truly marks a great philosopher —
Edward Schuh, *University of Miami*

GALGAN, Gerald. *God and Subjectivity* American University Studies, series 5, vol 99 New York Peter Lang, 1990 xxii + 290 pp \$47.95—Galgan wants to write a biography of being, and the character witnesses are Aristotle, Anselm, Descartes, and Feuerbach. The main points are that Anselm is a pivot between a classical and modern view of God in first philosophy, and that modern philosophers gave up the search for God by claiming to have found God to be man. Thus God was replaced by subjectivity—our subjectivity. The book is not a textual study, but does give a fairly close commentary on texts of Anselm, Descartes, and Feuerbach.

Chapter 1 considers Aristotle's notion of the subject of first philosophy and the sense in which it is theology. Chapter 2 analyzes Anselm's meditation on first philosophy in the *Monologion*. Chapter 3 analyzes Anselm's dialogue with God in the *Proslogion*. Chapter 4 studies Descartes' new foundation for knowledge as witnessed in the *Meditations*. Chapter 5 considers Feuerbach's reduction of first philosophy to anthropology in *Lectures on the Essence of Religion* and *The Essence of Christianity*. Chapter 6 sums everything up with a note on how the problem of evil haunts the modern scene.

Aristotle sets the course for first philosophy. Two views of what substance means to Aristotle are cited and seen as not necessarily contradictory. The first is Joseph Owens' view that substance in the first place means divine substance, the second is Werner Marx's view that with Aristotle for the first time the individual is that which is actual (p. 16).

Anselm's ontological argument includes the transformation of the first philosophy of Aristotle and the grounds for the Cartesian re-founding of first philosophy. Anselm represents that fundamentally different Christian perspective on God and the world. For Aristotle, God is a part of the universe, for Anselm, God is outside this universe and thus able to create the universe. The subjective character of the ontological argument prepares for the subjective character of Descartes' first philosophy. It does not seem to be Galgan's intention to discuss Anselm's ontological argument *qua* argument for the existence of God, though some indication of his thoughts does come in the last chapter when he explains that the moderns have misunderstood Anselm's argument by treating Anselm's "negative idea as if it were positive or descriptive of what God is for God" (p. 219).

Descartes is a reversal of Anselm, such that now one understands in order to believe (p. 103). Anselm's God which cannot be thought not to exist is a precondition for Descartes' "human subject that cannot think beyond the impossibility of its own existence." In contrast to Anselm's dialogue, Descartes' philosophy is a solitary meditation.

Feuerbach is indebted to Descartes for the subjective turn in philosophy, for he reduces first philosophy to a study of the human subject.

He is also indebted to Anselm's finding of the image of the Trinity in man's remembering, understanding, and loving. Feuerbach reverses Anselm by seeing the triune God as the projection of the human mind.

The final chapter treats of the following: the misunderstanding of Anselm by the moderns, the fact that Anselm's thought still stands as an unconscious precondition for their subjectivity, the modern effort to do away with mystery, and the problem of evil. The problem of evil is an ancient one that moderns such as Feuerbach have not been able to dismiss. Galgan suggests that the problem of evil is the "inverse reflection of a Being that has brought beings 'out of' nothingness" (p. 253). —David Ruel Foster, *Seton Hall University*

HENDLEY, Steve. *Reason and Relativism: A Sartrean Investigation*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991. ix + 253 pp. \$10.95.—Whereas French philosophy sought to surpass Sartre by rapidly moving from structuralism to post-structuralism to postmodernism, Hendley's insightful and interesting study of Sartre's theory of dialectical reason and associated epistemic issues suggests that this movement may have been somewhat *précipiteux*. With unusual patience he sifts through the first volume of Sartre's *Critique de la Raison dialectique* in order to display his various and numerous attempts to formulate his conception of dialectical reason. The tension between the knowledge of being and the being of knowledge is taken as the central paradox that Sartre's thought tries to resolve.

A novel aspect of this study is that it approaches Sartre in the *Critique* in terms of the question of cognitive or epistemic relativism as it emerges in the context of a project to disclose the conditions for the possibility of historical knowledge. Framing his critical work in this way leads Hendley into the theoretical domain of Rorty, Foucault, Lyotard, Feyerabend, Habermas, and Kuhn. By doing so he presents Sartre's later thought in a new light, one that is (though it is not called such) clearly post-Marxian.

The problem of the historicity of knowledge is shown to be one that Sartre struggles with in his attempt to develop his socio-historical theory. It is shown that Sartre does, at times, commit himself to the uniqueness of claims to truth, to the historicity of various theoretical methods or structures. Despite this, Hendley does a heroic job of attempting to save Sartre's conception of dialectical reason from the swirl of relativism. For Sartre, all knowledge is practical knowledge, knowledge made manifest in the "totalizing" activity of praxis. Tolerant of Sartre's frequent and often obscure reformulations of his own theoretical notions, the author argues that he puts forward a nontheoretical, nonfoundational basis for a lived, practical comprehension of action, social existence, and social dynamics in his concept of dialectical reason. That there is dialectical reason and that it informs all other modes of reasoning is the most vulnerable notion in the *Critique*. The author's defense of the "being" and operation

of this ostensibly unique mode of reasoning leads not only to an admitted epistemological circularity, but to assertions that are paradoxical and sometimes more than paradoxical (cf pp 121, 197-8). By granting that totalization in praxis is interpretation (which invariably entails both theory and what Gadamer long ago called "prejudgments"), the author undermines this emphasis elsewhere on totalization's "nontheoretical," "nonfoundational" nature. The putative "transhistoricity" of dialectical reason (p 202) is by no means securely defended.

By seeking to present the most difficult to defend of all of Sartre's notions in the *Critique*, the author takes on a demanding (if not impossible) task. Nonetheless, his study cuts across a number of recent and contemporary issues that are alive and volatile. Whereas others have examined the dialectical *interpretation* of social action and social dynamics and defended its value, Hendley grapples with the enigma of a "dialectical Reason" while relating Sartre to thinkers that have transformed contemporary thought. This last point alone would make this work valuable and useful.—George J. Stack, *State University of New York at Brockport*

HEYD, David. *Genethics: Moral Issues in the Creation of People*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992. xiii + 276 pp. \$45.00.—This is intended to be a foundational study in what the author claims is a new branch of ethics, "genethics," which has as its distinctive subject matter three sorts of questions: Should some human being or group of human beings come into existence? If so, how many? Of these, what should they be like? Heyd maintains that these questions are posed for the first time, or in a distinctive way, because of developments in biotechnology, and that they cannot be resolved within any of the major types of ethical theory. Contractarian theory is useless, for either we include future generations as parties to the contract or not. If we do, we suppose their existence and beg the question, if we do not, then we are bound to appeal to noncontractarian considerations. Kantian theory obliges us to treat persons as ends, but genethics is concerned with the prior question of whether there should be persons to treat thus. Moreover, principles of respect and autonomy, as well as the categorical imperative, seem to have no natural application to genethic cases. Utilitarianism both in its total- and average-welfare maximizing forms is beset with familiar difficulties. Heyd mentions Aristotelian virtue ethics only to dismiss it as a viewpoint "which cannot be of much help in the direct analysis of procreation" (p 41). This is odd, however, since Aristotle gives ample attention to issues of justice and friendship across generations.

According to Heyd, genethical questions are theoretically as well as practically important, since they can play a crucial role in resolving two fundamental disputes in moral philosophy: whether value is discovered or created, and whether all value is relative to persons (which

he calls "volitionism") or not ("impersonalism") It is not that genethics dictates answers to these questions, rather, genethical cases such as "wrongful life" suits elicit conflicting ethical intuitions from us, and in sorting through these we are forced to take a clear and consistent stand on the deeper issues The ideal is eventually to reach a "wide reflective equilibrium" which can encompass problematic genethic cases

Heyd argues for "generocentric" volitionism Generocentrism is the view that "genesis choices can and should be guided exclusively by reference to the interests, welfare, rights, and duties of those making the choice, the 'generators' " (p 96) A second and not obviously equivalent characterization of the view is this potential persons have no moral standing, "the only ethical considerations relevant to decisions regarding their creation are those that refer to actual people, either present or future" (p 106). The qualification "either present or future" is added because Heyd regards human reproduction as only incompletely within human control at present those whose generation will take place regardless of any decisions we might make he countenances as "actual"

It might be thought that generocentrism, if acted upon, would amount to a kind of egoism of the present generation Heyd denies this, and much of his book is an effort of reconstruction, aiming to show that the sort of behavior we might take to be responsible vis-à-vis the next and future generations can be well enough justified by generocentric reasoning, without appeal to the rights or welfare of future "potential persons" Heyd admits that a generocentrist must accept certain paradoxical conclusions (for example, a woman with rubella does nothing wrong by conceiving a child rather than waiting three months until she is well again), but he thinks his view preferable under a sort of theoretical cost-benefit analysis (p 90) —Michael Pakaluk, *Clark University*

HUSSERL, Edmund *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893–1917)* Translated by John Barnett Brough Collected Works, vol 4 Dordrecht Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991. lvi + 408 pp Cloth, \$149 00, paper, \$39 00—Brough's translation of Husserl's writings on time-consciousness found in volume 10 of the critical edition of Husserl's works (*Husserliana*) is a welcome addition to the growing catalogue of translations of Husserl The texts collected in *Husserliana* 10 are of central importance to understanding Husserl's phenomenology They are indispensable first to understanding the "wonder" (p 260) of time-consciousness, whose analysis is "an ancient burden" (p 3), and the "most difficult" (p 286) and "perhaps the most important" (p 346) problem in phenomenology But they are also indispensable to understanding the most fundamental structures of *all* experience and of the ego The irreducible and unitary form of time grounds the possibility of experiencing the duration, concreteness,

and individuality of *all* objects, whether immanent or transcendent, whether processional or enduring, indeed, even ideal objects are experienced as timeless only against the backdrop of the temporal. The analysis of time-consciousness therefore discloses intentionalities essential to the experience of every possible object.

This translation surpasses that previously available (by James S. Churchill [Indiana University Press, 1964]) in several respects. First, Brough's translation, unlike Churchill's, is based on the critical edition of 1966 rather than the Heidegger edition of 1928. Consequently, Brough's translation also includes the important supplementary texts gathered by Rudolf Boehm for the critical edition.

Second, the research of Rudolf Boehm and Rudolf Bernet regarding the status and dates of the texts comprised by *Husserliana* 10 was available to Brough. The 1928 edition brought together texts in such a way as to obscure the significant changes within Husserl's thought. While both the critical edition and Brough's translation follow the plan of the 1928 edition, the availability of the material regarding the dating of the various parts of that text and of the supplementary texts enables one better to understand both Husserl's development and his mature position.

Third, Brough's translation establishes a better balance than Churchill's among (1) scholarly demands for as literal a translation of the German as possible, (2) interpretative clarity in translational choices—and given Brough's long-standing scholarly devotion to the analysis of these texts, I can think of no one more suited to achieve this interpretative clarity, and (3) the demands of English syntax and the English ear. Brough's translation is more faithful to the original, his translational choices are better, even when Churchill's different ones are not incorrect.

Fourth, this volume is graced by Brough's lucid introduction. Brough first discusses the history of the texts, and he recounts how they came to have the form they do. Since the texts span the years 1893 to 1917, it is clear to anyone familiar with Husserl's philosophy that there must have been fundamental changes in Husserl's views of time-consciousness owing to the gradual development of his theory of the phenomenological method and, especially, of the phenomenological reduction, which was first explicitly presented in *The Idea of Phenomenology* (*Husserliana* 2) in 1907. Consequently, Brough takes up the issue of the relation between Husserl's developing sense of the phenomenological reduction and these writings on time-consciousness. Insofar as the reduction is a methodological device disclosing the intentional correlation between consciousness and its objects as intended, Brough then turns his attention to this correlation.

The largest part of Brough's introduction, following a brief discussion of the temporal object as experienced, is devoted to the discussion of Husserl's evolving views of the consciousness of time. Brough establishes the problematic and context for Husserl's account of time-consciousness by briefly reviewing Husserl's understanding of and objections to the theories of Meinong and Brentano. Even if Meinong is successful in explaining the succession of consciousness, he cannot

explain the consciousness of succession. Brentano cannot adequately explain the awareness in the present of the past (and future), that is, he cannot adequately account for the momentary awareness of the temporal extent of the intended object. Husserl's distinction between primary memory (later called "retention") and secondary memory (memory in the full and ordinary sense) are the key to his resolution of these problems. But his understanding of primary memory or retention changes significantly around 1909, for his earlier theory suffered from defects similar to those infecting Brentano's. Brough provides concise explanations of Husserl's earlier and later views and the reasons for Husserl's change of view, and he prepares the reader very well for both the richness and complexity of Husserl's own texts.

Brough's admirably clear translation is of great value not only to Husserl scholars already acquainted with these texts but to all philosophers interested in time and our awareness of it. The clothbound volume is a handsome, but expensive, book. The paperback will be equally handsome, differing only in its binding. This text is very attractive for those teaching Husserl at the graduate level, unfortunately even the paperback is expensive, at least for typically impoverished graduate students. But at least the paperback makes Husserl's careful and insightful reflections on time-consciousness available to a wider English-speaking audience, and those who can afford it should buy it, it is a volume which repays careful rereadings.—John J. Drummond, *Mount Saint Mary's College, Md.*

KANT, Immanuel. *The Metaphysics of Morals*. Introduction, translation, and notes by Mary Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. xii + 307 pages. Cloth, \$49.50, paper, \$16.95.—The thesis that every translation is an interpretation, fraught with an unavoidable indeterminacy, is never more obvious than when a translator is faced with some sinuous, systematically rich term in the original language that, from context to context, cannot, *salva significatione*, be translated with the same word in the destination language. Such is the case in Kant's use of the key term *Recht* in his *Die Metaphysik der Sitten*. Like the Latin *ius*, *Recht* may stand for a law or a right. In addition, Kant employs the word *Gesetz* in the sense of a law or principle and there is also a significant use of the term *Rechtsgesetz*. The matter is further complicated by the fact that while Kant clearly distinguishes between natural and positive "law" and corresponding "rights" (pp. 62–3), it is not always clear from the context which sense of *Recht* he has in mind.

Gregor masterfully meets these challenges by consistently translating *Recht* as "Right" where she understands it to stand for a law or system of laws and principles. For example, in the opening paragraph of the introduction to the Doctrine of Right, every instance of *Gesetz* is translated as "law," while the *Lehre des positiven Rechts* and the *natürliche Rechtslehre* are translated respectively as "the doctrine

of *positive* Right” and “the doctrine of natural Right” By contrast, Gregor quite appropriately translates *das angeborene Recht* as “the innate right”, so too God is said to have no duties but only “rights” (*Rechte*) There are passages, to be sure, where a decision to translate *Recht* as “Right” instead of a “right” or vice versa can be questioned. Precisely by informing readers of this strategy, however, Gregor facilitates a more critical reading of Kant’s text and more fruitful discussion about its significance

A new, complete translation of Kant’s *The Metaphysics of Morals* has been sorely needed for years (the Hastie translation of the first part, reprinted in 1952 and 1974, dates from 1887, the Ladd edition is almost thirty years old) More than meeting this need, Gregor’s conscientious translation deserves superlatives for its accuracy, clarity, and consistency, and for being such a good read while still capturing the inimitable style of Kant’s German The translation also lists the corresponding pages of the standard Academy edition by Natorp (volume 6) in the margins The translation would have been enhanced by a glossary, in both the introduction and the helpful notes Gregor might have given her readers more indication of the major influences on Kant’s doctrines of right and virtue Yet these are quibbles Legal scholars on both sides of the Atlantic as well as students of Kant’s ethical and political thought will be helped immeasurably by Gregor’s achievement.

Gregor’s Introduction should not be overlooked Focusing on a central difficulty in Kant’s moral theory, namely, the meaning of autonomy or “the relation of the will to itself,” Gregor provides readers with an admirably succinct account of the moral doctrine articulated in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785) and the *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788) in order to clarify what was left to be accomplished in *The Metaphysics of Morals* (1797) She also suggests that the precise makeup of the *Metaphysics of Morals*, though envisioned by Kant, was far from evident to him when he composed the *Groundwork*

Gregor argues quite plausibly that for Kant the notion of obligation inherent in the concept of moral law involves a distinction between a moral agent’s will and his capacity for free choice Much more clearly than in his earlier moral writings, *The Metaphysics of Morals* develops the latter notion, indeed, “the act of free choice in general” is deemed the highest concept in the metaphysics of morals (p 46n) Whereas the *Groundwork* aims to show that the moral law cannot be derived from ends based upon inclination, it also clearly indicates that this law is to be applied to such ends or, more exactly, “maxims of choice.” The articulation of this application of the moral law or the idea of a pure will (*Wille* as pure practical reason) to the capacity of choice (*Willkür*) generates the metaphysics of morals “Applied to the capacity for choice with respect to its objects,” Gregor writes, “the will gives rise to laws enabling us to put different kinds of objects to use—that is, determining what rights we have or can acquire—and laws prescribing what ends we ought to set for ourselves—that is, what virtues or moral dispositions we ought to acquire” (p 7) Both parts

of *The Metaphysics of Morals* are thus devoted to articulating the way in which the application of the moral law to the capacity of choice secures the freedom to exercise that capacity: the "outer" freedom from compulsions by others (rights) and the "inner" freedom from one's inclinations (virtues).

As Gregor rightly emphasizes in her Introduction, an adequate interpretation of Kant's moral philosophy can ill afford to neglect *The Metaphysics of Morals*, his final, most mature reflection on ethics and the systematic outcome of his critique of practical reason. Kant, who was no newcomer to legal theory (see the work of Busch cited in Gregor's bibliography), develops a distinctive system of rights on the foundations of his moral philosophy. He grounds positive law in Natural Right, limiting the former to actions capable of affecting others, and he explains both the moral authority to use of coercion and the necessity of a civil condition. His account of Private Right justifies the use of the concept of possession as a prelude to the elaboration of property rights, contract rights, and domestic rights.

This effort to articulate the moral foundation of law is also evident throughout Kant's account of Public Right. Establishing universal and lasting peace constitutes "the entire final end of the doctrine of Right within the limits of reason alone," Kant claims, since peace is "the only condition in which what is mine and what is yours are secured under laws for a multitude of men living in proximity to one another, and therefore under a constitution." Yet this condition cannot be derived from experience, "but must, rather, be derived a priori by reason from the ideal of a rightful association of men under public laws as such" (p. 161). Jaspers may have exaggerated when he claimed that Kant's philosophy is essentially political, but the first part of *The Metaphysics of Morals* indicates just how intimate Kant conceived the relation between the moral and the political order to be.

In the second part of *The Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant turns from the political implications of his moral philosophy to its implications for questions of character. The Doctrine of Virtue is concerned not with single actions capable of being mandated by external law, but with dispositions to live up to obligations "even without regard for possible external lawgiving" (p. 211). Virtue is defined as "the moral strength of a man's will in fulfilling his duty, a moral constraint through his own lawgiving reason, insofar as this constitutes itself an authority *executing* the law" (p. 206). The specifics of the doctrine turn once again on the categorical imperative: "Kant's procedure is to begin with ends that we would adopt merely on the basis of inclination and submit our maxims of pursuing such ends to the test of whether they could qualify for a giving of universal law" (p. 23).

Kant's metaphysics of morals is beset with formidable difficulties, some noted by Gregor in her introduction. As in the case of the other half of the Kantian system (the metaphysics of nature), the transition from the transcendental philosophy to its corresponding metaphysics, given the empirical assumption essential to the latter, is highly problematic. For example, one need not have socialist proclivities to wonder about the justification of property in terms of the categorical im-

perative Questions also remain about the connection between rights and virtues Yet these difficulties, while couched in Kant's own ethical deliberations, are not peculiar to them Thanks to Gregor's excellent translation of *The Metaphysics of Morals*, it is now possible for English readers to appreciate just how Kant wrestled with these issues — Daniel Dahlstrom, *The Catholic University of America*.

KEMAL, Salim *Kant's Aesthetic Theory An Introduction*. New York St Martin's Press, 1992 vi + 197 pp \$45 00—Kemal's useful introduction is largely devoted to the first half of Kant's *Critique of Judgment* It guides the reader through many of the topics which make up that philosopher's aesthetic theory Among the matters not dealt with, or dealt with only in passing, are Kant's theory of the sublime, his conception of adherent beauty (importantly different from free beauty and excluded from the domain of pure judgments of taste), and the question whether Kant does or can allow for ugliness, the opposite of beauty

The first five chapters of Kemal's work are directed first to the historical background of Kant's aesthetic theory, and then to Kant's conception of the logical features of pure judgments of taste as well as to his proof of the intersubjective validity of such judgments Chapter 1 provides the background, including an account of Kant's views on cognitive judgment and its conditions Chapter 2 introduces aesthetic judgments together with the four "moments" of Kant's *Analytic of the Beautiful* It also contains an examination of the first of these moments The second moment is the topic of chapter 3, and the third and fourth are dealt with in chapter 4 Chapter 5 contains an extended account of the deduction of the validity of pure judgments of taste

Chapters 6 and 7 expand the discussion to such matters as community, culture, and freedom of agency Chapter 6, in many ways the most interesting part of the book, takes up some consequences of Kant's characterization of judgments of taste as necessary or as demanding a liking shared by others Finally, in chapter 7 the author treats the problem of compatibilism between freedom and nature, a problem incurred by Kant's theory of aesthetic judgment and already hinted at by Kemal in earlier portions of the book

In his historical sketch, Kemal discusses Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten, as well as the empiricist school of aesthetics He argues that Kant first needed to develop a new conception of reasoning (both antirationalist and anti-empiricist) in order then to criticize the underpinnings of the aesthetics of his predecessors To make the point concrete, the author takes the reader on a quick trip through the *Transcendental Deduction* of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, with its conception of rational consciousness Kant's basic objection to all of the earlier aesthetics, Kemal holds, is that rationalists and empiricists alike (albeit in different ways) failed to distinguish properly between

sense and intellect True enough, but Kemal in this connection underestimates the significance of Baumgarten's break with the Leibnizian-Wolffians Baumgarten's account of a special logic, and of a perfection of the senses, despite its internal difficulties, created the possibility of a new aesthetics in Germany, even though Kant was to reject that philosopher's perfection view of free beauty, his claim that aesthetics was a science, and his account of the nature of aesthetic affects

Leading up to the four moments, Kemal argues that as part of a complete theory of our knowledge of nature, Kant examines the talent of judgment itself This examination leads to a conception of reflective, nondeterminate judgment, of which proper aesthetic judgments are a species In the course of analyzing Kant's deduction and the four moments—aesthetic liking as disinterested, as universal without the benefit of a determinate concept, beauty as purposiveness without purpose, and aesthetic liking as carrying a necessity—Kemal works hard at distinguishing between universality and necessity What he has to say in these chapters about *sensus communis* and about aesthetic necessity as exemplary is interesting and helpful

An insightful argument is made in chapter 6 we can demand assent to our proper aesthetic judgment from others since others can make such judgments and are obligated to do so, for experience of beauty promotes culture, culture is the striving for morality, and we are obligated to move towards the moral stance Kemal here makes good sense of Kant's attaching a type of interest to beauty without making such interest a criterion for beauty and without disavowing the disinterestedness of aesthetic liking

The discussion of freedom in the final chapter is disappointing Kemal is tempted by incompatibilism between free agency and natural necessitation, and it never becomes clear what Kant is supposed to take the effectiveness of final causation to reside in The author engenders expectation of a translation between the language of free agency and that of causal determinism, something which then would "generate a contradiction" A remark, in the context of a discussion of natural, radical evil, that we need to "harmonize [freedom and our natural being] as best as possible" embodies no resolution —Ralf Meerbote, *University of Rochester*

LANG, Helen S *Aristotle's Physics and Its Medieval Varieties* SUNY Series in Ancient Greek Philosophy Albany State University of New York Press, 1992 ix + 322 pp Cloth, \$44.50, paper \$14.95—
 "Although the end be last in the order of execution, yet it is first in the order of intention" This dictum arises in Aquinas's discussion of human acts, it nonetheless comes readily to the mind of readers of Helen Lang's book Lang's thesis is that in the *Physics* Aristotle wrote *logoi*, arguments structured around an initial thesis This structure is seen across the books of the *Physics* and provides a frame-

work in which to understand the various parts of Aristotle's science of nature. Lang maintains that Aristotle's *Physics* establishes his science of nature, and that all *logoi* of the work address difficulties surrounding the scope of the subject of this science. One ought not understand the arguments in terms of the *Physics* as a whole, rather, each argument is to be seen in relation to the *logos* of which it is a part. Lang provides careful study of the arguments comprising books 2, 7, and 8, and concludes that each *logos* falls under an initially stated thesis.

The overriding concern in book 2 for Aristotle is to distinguish nature and "by nature" from art, in this way Aristotle distinguishes his science of nature from Plato's view that all the material world is an artifact of the Demiurge. As one moves through the *logoi* of the *Physics*, one observes a narrowing scope of Aristotle's arguments. In book 7, says Lang, Aristotle addresses two difficulties: the world is not a self-mover, hence not moved by soul, as Plato maintains, the sequence of moved movers cannot proceed to infinity, as the atomists maintain. By viewing book 7 in this light, one sees Aristotle as solving certain difficulties surrounding the science of nature, not as providing a link in an ever tightening argument culminating in a proof of the existence of a first mover.

Lang carefully examines Aristotle's explanation of elemental motion (fire goes up), then proceeds to book 8, wherein Aristotle focuses on the first motion, the first mover, and the first mobile. She argues that Aristotle intends to prove the eternity of motion, not the existence of a first mover, he is solving a difficulty about nature and is thus operating within the domain of physics. Lang concludes that Aristotle's first mover is not god, as seen in *Metaphysics* 12, rather, his arguments in *Physics* 8 "resolve a problem concerning the location of the first moved (and hence also the first motion) by indicating that it must be on the outermost circumference of the cosmos" (p. 94).

Lang discusses five medieval commentators on the *Physics*: John Philoponus, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, John Buridan, and Duns Scotus. While each of these men reads the *Physics* in his own light, Lang claims they all miss the overriding structure of Aristotle's argument. Philoponus's commentary is inescapably Platonic in its presentation of the concept of nature. Rather than being an intrinsic ability to be moved, nature as understood by Philoponus is "an intrinsic mover, soul or inclination, that molds and governs" (p. 121).

Albert's reading of the *Physics* is that of a theologian as well as that of a physicist. He divides his commentary into tractates, a division not supported by the Aristotelian text. In addition, Lang maintains, Albert views the arguments about elemental motion and the first mover in a theological light: the generator moves the elements, not their natural place, the *Physics* builds toward and culminates in a proof of the existence of a first mover, who is God.

The exposition of Thomas Aquinas on the *Physics* is reputed to be a literal commentary. Lang challenges this reputation and focuses sharply on the structure of Aristotle's *logoi* as compared with Thomas's analysis of the *Physics*. Aristotle situates each argument under

an overriding thesis, which thesis he states clearly at the outset of the *logos*, his arguments narrow in scope as the *Physics* develops because he is resolving more and more objections concerning the scope and understanding of the subject of his science of nature. This reading of Aristotle, constitutive of Lang's thesis, contrasts markedly with the reading one finds in Thomas's exposition. He identifies the subject of physics with mobile being and sees the development and narrowing of Aristotle's arguments within a whole, which whole reaches fruition in the proof of the existence of an unmoved mover. Rather than setting out the scope of the subject of the science of nature at first, and then resolving objections and making clarifications, Aristotle, as understood by Thomas, sees the end of the science of nature as the end in execution: proof of the existence of the first mover. Thomas understands this first mover as God and as one with the first cause of *Metaphysics* 12.

Lang presents Buridan's analysis of the *Physics* in terms of *quaestiones* and contrasts each one's understanding of physics with the *Physics*. The commentary of Scotus is inexorably bound by its historical concerns (post 1277) with the power of God, the question of how to put angels, finite beings, in their place is important, Lang thinks, in Scotus's reading of the *Physics*.

Lang's thesis is refreshing and challenging. It, and this book, deserve careful attention.—Laura Landen, *Providence College*

LOUDEN, Robert B. *Morality and Moral Theory: A Reappraisal and Reaffirmation*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. xiii + 230 pp. Cloth, \$35.00, paper, \$15.95.—The book is divided into two parts. Each part is about eighty pages, followed by nearly fifty pages of notes and a comprehensive bibliography. Morality is reappraised in Part 1 and reaffirmed in Part 2. The aim of Part 1 ("Morality") is to articulate a conception of morality and moral theory that combines elements from act-based and virtue-based approaches, with the latter taking the lead. Part 2 ("Moral Theory") defends moral theory against the criticisms of "antitheorists," a diverse group that includes Annette Baier, Stanley Fish, Cheryl Noble, Bernard Williams, Martha Nussbaum, and Michael Walzer. In both parts most of the historical attention is devoted to Aristotle and Kant. Louden contends that neither Aristotle (the virtue theorist) nor Kant (the act theorist) were as exclusive in their approaches to morality as they are usually portrayed. Aristotle, it is argued, had a use for a specifically moral ought; Kant had a keen interest in the cultivation of virtue. Both are largely innocent of the crimes of which they stand accused by the antitheorists. What are those crimes? They are the errors of thinking that correct moral judgments are deducible from universal principles, that moral values are commensurable, that all moral conflicts are rationally resolvable, that the role of moral theory is to enable one to deduce the correct answer to moral questions, that moral theory

is purely normative, not descriptive or explanatory, and that moral problems are solved best by moral experts. Louden agrees with the antitheorists that all of these are false, but he maintains that few moral theories entail them. Thus, he charges that the antitheorists are attacking a straw man. It is of some interest here that Louden dismisses utilitarianism—one of the main targets of the antitheorists—in a few paragraphs (no entry under “u” in the index) for committing the sin of reductionism. There is no significant discussion of more sophisticated consequentialists such as Sedgwick, Moore, and Brandt. In many ways Aristotle is an easy case for Louden to defend, and indeed some of the authors in the antitheory group, such as Nussbaum, approve of Aristotle. The case for Kant is much harder and involves stressing Kant’s appreciation of the role of non-rule-governed judgments in making moral choices. Louden says little about the categorical imperative in his treatment of Kant, though he does argue that there are genuine moral dilemmas in which neither “Do A” nor “Do not do A” can be willed to be universal law.

Louden’s own “stronger, richer moral conception” is a virtue-based account. Morality is best understood as being, at bottom, self-regarding rather than other-regarding. Louden espouses the Socratic view that our first and most important moral duty is self-perfection. By putting agents rather than acts at the center (being over doing) we widen the scope of moral assessment to include just about every aspect of a person’s life, behavior, and character. Louden insists that this maximizing tendency is a good thing (unlike the bad maximizing principles of the utilitarians). There cannot be too much morality, he argues, stressing that this is not the same as endorsing moral fanaticism. More generally, Louden defends the construction of moral theories as being a valuable human activity that should embrace, as John Dewey advocated, historical, psychological, and cultural factors. The result of this activity, he thinks, will be pluralistic in two senses: a number of normative theories will compete with no clear winner, and each theory will recognize irreducible moral values. He says, “Theorists in all domains need to get used to the ideal of unending competition, for knowledge ceases to grow when theoretical competition stops” (p. 126). But it is unclear what sort of *reflective* moral knowledge we would possess if we were genuinely unable to decide between competing theoretical alternatives.—Martin Curd, *Purdue University*

- LUKACS, Georg. *The Process of Democratization*. Translated by Susanne Bernhardt and Norman Lavine. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991. viii + 179 pp. \$14.95.—This text was Lukacs’ response to the Soviets’ crushing of the Dubcek reform movement in August 1968. As Norman Lavine notes, it was written in great haste between September and December 1968, and Lukacs was not satisfied with the result. It seemed “too much of a summary to be a true

scientific work and too scientific for a good summary" (p. 4). Lukacs intended to revise the text as part of a projected work on ethics. I would suggest that *The Process of Democratization's* literary form is "manifesto." Like its famous predecessor, the book brings a lifetime devoted to a dialectical reading of social experience to bear on a specific revolutionary situation. Unlike the text of Marx and Engels, however, the task of this dialectical inquiry is to explain the emergence of alienating repression *within* a praxis supposedly guided by Marxist-Leninist principles, and to point toward an overcoming of the alienation that remains within Marxism.

Given the developments from 1989 to 1991 in the former Soviet empire, it may seem that Lukacs' attempt to revitalize Marxism has been superseded by the flow of events. A reading of this book, on the contrary, shows its ongoing relevance to an understanding of sociopolitical life in societies that have for decades interpreted their experience in the categories of the dialectic. Part 1, "Bourgeois Democracy as a False Alternative for the Reform of Socialism," provides an interesting reflection on the attempt to establish market economies in the former Soviet bloc. Part 2, "The Pure Alternative: Stalinism or Socialist Democracy," provides an insightful critique of the Stalinist development of Marxism-Leninism as a prelude to the creation of a form of democratic politics congruent with socialism.

Lukacs' central argument is that the repression and alienation that has arisen within the Soviet bloc has its roots in the failure of Marxism to develop a conception of political democracy that could complement its critique of the economic foundations of capitalist society. In Norman Lavine's formulation, Lukacs argues that the repressive and totalitarian tendencies that have marred the history of Marxism—which can be traced back to the formulations of socialism in the Second International—are rooted in a failure to distinguish between the categories of the "state" and the "political." In classical Marxist doctrine, the bourgeois state, as an instrument of repression and control, was to "wither away" after the proletarian revolution. Such a demise of the state, however, was incorrectly equated with the absence of ongoing political life—with anarchism. Believing that Marx's understanding of the supersession of the bourgeois state form implied anarchism, the Second International failed to provide a conception of political participation that was congruent with the post-revolutionary world. The absence of a positive, enabling concept of political participation that was congruent with a socialist economic order left a theoretical vacuum which facilitated the rise of the repressive tendencies of the Stalinist bureaucracy.

Lukacs argues that neither of the two great Western models of political democracy—the Greek city-state and French republicanism—offer a conception that is plausible in the contemporary world. He attempts to demonstrate, moreover, that the liberal parliamentarism characteristic of Western "democracies" is quite compatible with social inequality and repression, while the Stalinist bureaucratization of Marxism has emptied the soviets of any effective role in "Marxist" states.

Part 2 is the most significant part of the text. Rejecting the Twentieth Party Congress's line that the Stalinist deformation of socialism can be understood as "a cult of the personality," it attempts to "understand the present and existing mode of socialism . . . from a socio-historical perspective" in order to "formulate more accurately the problem of democratization" (p. 93). Lukacs offers a sketch of the history of Russian Marxism beginning with an admission that it was not a "classical embodiment" of Marxist theory. Given the fact that Russia had not passed through the capitalist phase of the historical dialectic, Lenin saw that "the fundamental, decisive task to which all others are subordinate is the establishment of an alliance between the new (socialist) economy and . . . the economy of millions and millions of peasants" (p. 96). The primacy of the economic problem, characterized by Lukacs in Kantian terms as "the Kingdom of Necessity," overshadowed the fundamental breakthrough that socialism, "the Kingdom of Freedom," offered. Reiterating themes that trace back to *History and Class Consciousness*, Lukacs argues that, in socialism, "consciousness must become the directive telos of society," and "socialism in part means the control of human evolution by human consciousness, or social self-determination" (p. 97). Such social self-determination, which Lukacs equates with a process of democratization, was retarded by the primacy of the economic question in Russia together with historical specificities such as the rise of fascism and the illness of Lenin. The pressing need to manage the economic engine of a large nation-state in the context of a world war led to a thrusting of the "Kingdom of Necessity" into the central place in Marxist thinking, and to a neglect of the essentially political process of self-determination.

The major weakness in Lukacs' attempt to come to grips with the crisis of Marxism-Leninism is his attempt to portray Lenin as a semi-tragic figure who can be absolved of practically all blame for the failure of Marxist societies to develop viable forms of political participation — John Donovan, *Mount Saint Mary's College, Md*

MADIGAN, Patrick. *Aristotle and His Modern Critics: The Use of Tragedy in the Nontragic Vision*. Scranton: University of Scranton Press, 1992. 120 pp. \$22.50—Is there a place for the tragic vision in an orderly scheme of things? This is the question that Patrick Madigan asks in an interesting essay that explores not only the place of tragedy and comedy in human experience, but also the place of the opening that tragedy represents in the Aristotelian system. He argues that Aristotle's view of being, if rightly understood, can accept and even embrace the tragic vision, and moreover that the perspective on human experience laid open by tragedy can lead to a more complete understanding of ourselves and the world we try to come to terms with. He argues that it is only in the dreadful character of tragic experience that we can be shocked out of a complacent "doxalogical slumber."

into the genuinely self-critical examination required for the attainment of theoretical knowledge

Madigan begins with a treatment of comedy, the place of which in the progress toward understanding is more straightforward. In comedy we find the low character chafing against constraints that we all find irritating from time to time. Because of his character, the protagonist represents no threat to the morality of the audience, and his antics can provide a welcome relief for our own feelings of frustration and anxiety. When he suffers some relatively minor penalty for his transgression, we are chastened along with him for our own sympathy with his act, thereby resolving the whole business (by means of reason) into something that in the end reaffirms our commitment, both practical and theoretical, to virtue. Focusing as it does on the mundane, the constraints, irritations, and pleasures of the ordinariness of things, comedy becomes "a kind of secular sacrament, spontaneously developed and intuitively reached for, virtually a gift from the gods extended perhaps out of compassion and compensation to minister to our derivative, creaturely condition. It can set us back on our feet and give us new lease on life—on practical life, where the majority of our living must take place" (p. 71).

In tragedy on the other hand, the protagonist, and through him, we ourselves, initiate and carry through a quite different rebellion. Confronted by an injustice in the fundamental scheme of things, he refuses to submit, testing his own self-worth against the gods themselves. This draws us into the unfamiliar territory of a "blasphemous theology," forcing us to consider the possibility of a world in which nothing makes sense, where the gods themselves have lost track of the orderliness upon which our usual vision of ourselves, our projects, and our hopes depends. If we cannot count upon the justice of the gods, what hope is there for finding a stable meaning behind the shifting play of appearances? Must we surrender ourselves to the notion that there is no such meaning, that even the gods are in the end lost in a universe mindlessly shifting from one position to another, our occasional attempts at establishing order no more significant than the paths of the anthill beneath our feet?

One response to tragedy is just this, and it is this modern response that Madigan wants to call into question. The tradition that develops through Nietzsche and Schopenhauer to contemporary writers such as Walter Kaufman (and perhaps many if not all of the deconstructionist critics, though these are not the focus of Madigan's concern) takes the tragic vision as representing a fundamental truth about the human condition, a truth that earlier philosophy turned away from in weakness and horror. It is only in accepting and even embracing this vision, these new critics would have us believe, that we can become fully ourselves. We realize what freedom we have in a recognition of the hopelessness of our situation, as we rise in defiance against the irrational mechanism of a cosmos careering away from us out of control, wherein indeed the very notion of control is to be seen as nothing more than a cowardly turning away from the truth that there is no ultimate meaning to be uncovered.

Against this view, Madigan suggests that the tragic vision can actually lead us to a fuller comprehension of a nontragic worldview. We find in the tragic hero and his travails simply another logical possibility, and one that we must indeed confront if we are to become fully ourselves. But this need not drive us to an embrace of the irrational, we might instead, having had this tragic vision presented to us for our contemplation, choose to open ourselves to the continuing attempt to know what the Aristotelian project proposes as our highest and most natural goal. Far from turning his face away from the truth that tragedy represents, Aristotle, in Madigan's characterization, empirically justifies its importance as something that can (and in fact did, in the audiences he observed) contribute meaningfully to this larger project through the dialectical tension that it forces us to resolve.

The dialectical tension that Madigan points to here is of course something that Hegel is greatly interested in, and I think that my Hegelian friends might raise (with some justice) a question about why Madigan is inclined to neglect the Hegelian analysis altogether. While Madigan does not pretend to be offering a comprehensive treatment of various reactions to the tragic vision, Hegel does seem to be notably excluded from a treatment that nonetheless draws upon some of his insights (or that at least makes similar claims). But I do not want to accuse Madigan of illegitimately neglecting Hegel, since I do not think that he is offering only another version of the Hegelian analysis in his essay. In fact, I think that he might well claim that Hegel, caught in what is referred to here and there as a "Parmenidean" vision, falls prey to what Madigan sees as Plato's mistake in being too ready simply to dismiss the tragic vision as misbegotten, or to resolve it too neatly as nothing more than a dark dream from which reason rightly wakes us. The opening that Madigan hints at in the nature of God is I think reflected by his understanding of the continuing place of tragedy in human experience. Given this, he could go on to argue that the tension and dynamic of the tragic vision cannot be subsumed—as it ultimately must be by the Hegelian Absolute—into a univocal and thoroughly integrated Being. The Parmenidean "dousing" of becoming may be overcome in tragedy, and it is this in fact that represents tragedy's contribution to understanding.

I may be moving well beyond Madigan's intentions here, however. I would like to see more of the ontology that lies behind his defense of tragedy's place in the scheme of things, and rather wish that he had provided some more direct comment about this in his book. This notwithstanding, I recommend this book as an intelligent and useful counterpoint to what seems to me an increasingly prevalent and uncritical celebration of the dark side of the tragic vision. It is, after all, only by contrast with some meaningfully "nontragic" vision that a tragic vision can find any logical place or significance.—Brian John Martine, *University of Alabama in Huntsville*

MELE, Albert R. *Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. ix + 272 pp. \$39.95—This

book is a very good example of a movement in contemporary analytic philosophy propounding "the philosophy of action." This movement begins with work by Donald Davidson in the 1960s and 1970s in which he argues for the intelligibility of the belief-desire model of rational behavior implicit in common sense and in much of social science. Major contributors to the school include William Alston, Robert Audi, and Alvin Goldman. This movement has three essential characteristics: a conservative attitude toward the basic elements of commonsense or "folk" psychology, an armchair, nonexperimental methodology, and the avoidance of formal logic, and a concomitant lack of interest in the logical issues arising from the investigation of intentional notions. This book exemplifies well all three of these characteristics.

The book is divided into two parts. In Part 1 Mele examines the connection between intentional behavior and the strength of the underlying motivation. He attempts to answer the question, Do we always do what we want most to do? This part culminates in the construction of a theory of irresistible desires. In Part 2 Mele takes up a number of issues concerning the place of intentions in the commonsense model of rational behavior.

Chapter 2, "Mental Causation," is devoted to the mind-body problem, in particular to the problem of reconciling our commonsense view that intentional states *qua* intentional states cause observable behavior with the assumption that a comprehensive account of all causal connections can be rendered in the language of physics (a language lacking the idiom of intentionality). Mele argues convincingly that a physicalistic basis can be provided for certain counterfactuals relating intentionality and behavior, such as, If Jones had not decided to make his bed, he would not be making it. As Mele recognizes, however, there is a gap between the truth of such counterfactuals and the existence of genuine causal connections. Given our present lack of an adequate theory of the semantics of causation, no one knows how to fill that gap.

The bulk of Part 1 is taken up with an examination of a thesis proposed by Donald Davidson, which Mele labels *P1*. If we act intentionally at all, we do whatever we want most to do, among what we believe to be the available options. Mele accepts *P1* as approximately true, and in a method similar to Chisholm's, he modifies *P1* by adding a series of epicycles, each added in response to a putative counterexample. The result is quite complicated, and the whole exercise left me unconvinced of its value.

In Part 1, chapter 5, Mele presents his account of irresistible desires. I gained something valuable from this chapter. I became convinced of the importance of taking into account the possibility of plans and strategies for intentionally modifying one's own desires. In the preceding chapter, Mele discusses some important work on this topic by the psychologists George Ainslie and Walter Mischel. Nonetheless, I found Mele's definition of irresistible desires quite unenlightening (which is not to say false). In effect, Mele defines an irresistible desire as one for which one lacks the "physical and psychological skills

and capacities" needed to resist it. This definition comes fairly close to "dormitive virtue."

The focus of Part 2 is the claim that there are very real but defeasible connections between evaluative judgments and intention, between preponderant motivation and intention, and between intention and action. The role of intentions is to mediate between evaluative judgments and desires on the one hand and overt intentional behavior on the other. Mele argues that preponderant motivation can override present intention (as in certain cases of *akrasia*), but that future desires can be altered through the adoption of appropriate plans. Neither judgments nor desires can produce action directly; both must first effect appropriate present-directed intentions. These claims by Mele are plausible conjectures, but I am worried that thanks to the law of diminishing returns there may be little expected payoff from pushing the project of clarifying and elaborating the commonsense model of the mind so far.—Robert C. Koons, *University of Texas at Austin*.

MORRIS, Brian. *Western Conceptions of the Individual*. New York: Berg Publishers, 1991. x + 505 pp. \$74.00.—This ambitious book examines the conceptions of the human subject held by numerous Western thinkers from various disciplines. The study begins with Descartes and ends with Derrida. For the forty-six principal authors covered, Morris gives a brief biography (except in the case of living authors), an overview of the author's thought in its historical context, an analysis of the author's theory of the human individual as presented (implicitly or explicitly) in a major work (for example, Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Marcuse's *Eros and Civilization*), and a critique of that theory. Writers in addition to these forty-six are also discussed, but in less detail. As is not surprising in a work that spans the fields of philosophy, psychology, anthropology, sociology, and sociobiology, the expositions and critiques rely considerably on secondary sources (for example, on Copleston's *History of Philosophy*).

Morris divides his study into ten chapters, each presenting a distinctive approach to the topic of the human person: mechanism (the principal figures being Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Hume, Kant), voluntarism (Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Freud), empiricism (Darwin, Watson, Skinner, Wittgenstein, Edward O. Wilson), neo-Kantian anthropology-psychology (Dilthey, Wundt, Boas, Benedict, Margaret Mead), Hegelianism-Marxism (Hegel, Marx, Lukács, Lev Vygotsky), sociology (Comte, Durkheim, A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, Leslie White, Louis Dumont), pragmatism (James, Dewey, George Herbert Mead, Erving Goffman), critical theory-psychoanalysis (Horkheimer, Marcuse, Habermas), phenomenology-existentialism (Kierkegaard, Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty), and structuralism and post-structuralism (Lévi-Strauss, Piaget, Althusser, Foucault, Derrida).

In the course of each chapter, Morris explains why he considers all the authors in that chapter to share the same general approach to the human subject. He does not, however, provide a concluding chapter pointing out similarities, differences, and connections among the ten approaches described in the individual chapters. Morris's only general statements about his project occur at the end of his brief introduction, where he states that his study focuses on writers who have adopted a standpoint of empirical naturalism rather than that of religious belief (pp. 3-4), and at the end of the first chapter, where he states that Kant is the "turning point," synthesizing the rationalist and empiricist philosophies that preceded him and giving rise to the major subsequent movements in Western thought (neo-Kantianism, Hegelian-Marxism, positivism, pragmatism, and phenomenology) (p. 58).

One cannot but admire the breadth of learning and research reflected in this study (the list of primary and secondary works cited covers forty-seven pages). But while each of the ten chapters is unified by virtue of its illustrating a particular approach to the human individual, the book as a whole seems to lack any unity other than the fact that all the chapters deal with a specific way of approaching the same general topic. Consequently, the book is more useful as a reference work on particular approaches to the human subject and on individual theorists, especially the anthropologists and sociologists included, than as a volume to be read from cover to cover.—Donald C. Abel, *St. Norbert College, Wis.*

PLANINC, Zdravco. *Plato's Political Philosophy: Prudence in the Republic and the Laws*. Columbia University of Missouri Press, 1991. xi + 307 pp. \$37.50.—We know from various accounts that Plato was considered by the founding fathers as a poor guide in practical affairs. He was considered a radical, a constructor of imaginary utopias—an idealist in the most pejorative sense. It is on this very score, the charge of dangerous idealism, that the author endeavors to defend Plato in this book.

Planinc argues that for Plato neither theoretical wisdom (*sophia*) nor practical wisdom (*phronesis*) can be properly understood without reference to *nous*. Both of them are related by virtue of the *noesis* (intellection) they have in common. Without *noesis* the former is indistinguishable from sophistry, and the latter is reduced to simple cleverness. To say, therefore, that Plato was an ideologue who was willing to proceed in the political realm with blueprint in hand is, to Planinc, profoundly to misunderstand Plato, whose prudential teaching counseled that such a procedure would issue in the destruction of both politics and philosophy. Plato's modern critics, however, point to the striking absence of concern for individual choice among the citizens of his perfect political order. Plato's critics go on to say that the taking of the unchanging archetype Ideas as a point of departure

in political philosophy obscures the understanding of the natural internal liberty of contrariety that is at the heart of self-government. Platonic political philosophy thus leads, they say, to authoritarian or totalitarian social engineering, or at any rate to a closed political society that scorns consent, possibility, and the self-directed movement of each citizen

I believe Planinc is correct in implying that most modern criticisms of Plato are grounded in arguments that militate against taking nature as the standard, and that put in place of natural right an ersatz prudence that amounts to that simple cleverness that Plato warns against. To the more sophisticated critics of Plato, who take Aristotelian political philosophy as a counterpoise to what they believe is a lack of prudential moderation in Plato, Planinc says that their reading is simply mistaken. Plato is not without a teaching about prudence, in which he is more at one with Aristotle than not. Aristotle's renowned criticism of extreme unity in politics is correct, but not as directed against Plato.

Readers will be gratified by the fact that philology is not overworked in this book. We are instead treated to delightful illustrations drawn from, for example, Raphael and Homer. Planinc writes that the very study and interpretation of Plato's dialogues are formative of the *habitus* of prudence. Some of the excitement of participating in prudential training has been communicated to Planinc's own work. This book should be in the bibliography of any future scholarship touching on the subject of prudence in Plato. Some friendly criticism might include the suggestion that Planinc's argumentation would have been even more persuasive if it called greater attention, by way of comparison, to Aristotle on prudence.

One should, in fact, present the case against the facile reading of Plato according to which he lacks any identifiable prudence. The totalitarian mentality tends to rely on the desire not to be encumbered by any norms or limits not arrived at by collective or individual will. A totalitarian attempts to remove any contradictions between the region of intellect and the concrete world by any means necessary. It is hard to know where to begin with people who see Plato in this light. On the other hand, effacing the real distinctions between the teachings of Plato and Aristotle is not justifiable either. The disagreements between Aristotle and Plato may not be comparable to those between Plato and the ideologists, but the differences seem real enough in the *Politics* and *Metaphysics*. If, as Aristotle says, law as a rule and measure of human acts must be homogeneous with what it measures, the perfect political order will not take the elimination of the qualifications of indigenouness and private property to be a characteristic of the perfectly just regime. Aristotle's criticism of Plato is that the notion of partnership in everything tending to unity is the upshot of taking universals to be somehow more real than concrete beings. Setting out in politics from an understanding of real causes in the order of causation leads Aristotle to the conclusion that a regime is meant to be heterogeneous by nature. The heterogeneity of political life does not seem for Aristotle to be accepted on the basis

of a tacit compromise between wisdom and folly, but is rather accepted as the way things are. For Aristotle, an artisan or politician is in no way benefited by knowing the good itself as a logical universal predicable of many things. Does Plato's good itself contain all lesser goods actually or potentially? Can a universal of predication be said to be the real cause of the differences in things? Against Aristotle the author urges that the Stagirite's teaching absolutizes heterogeneity in a way that obscures what is right according to an unchanging order of justice. Against Plato it is said that societies everywhere will by nature be reluctant to understand a "nature" which does not take account of the way things are. Honest disputants can debate these points, and they can certainly dispute these questions without consigning Plato to the graveyard of outworn ideologues —A. L. Motzkin, *Boston University*

POPKIN, Richard H. *The Third Force in Seventeenth Century Philosophy*. Brill Studies in Intellectual History, vol. 22. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992. vi + 377 pp. \$90.00—This volume contains a collection of twenty-two essays composed by Popkin from 1979 to 1989 addressing themes in the history of philosophy. The content of the essays ranges in consideration from the kinds of skepticism found in Thomas Hobbes, David Hume, or Joseph Glanville to the "incurable skepticism" of Henry More, Blaise Pascal, and Søren Kierkegaard, to the influence of religious movements on such modern thinkers as Baruch Spinoza and Isaac Newton. The array of figures examined by Popkin and their connections with religious or epistemological skepticism are the means through which he proposes an alternative to the traditional approaches which have been taken to the interpretation of seventeenth-century thought.

According to Popkin, "the philosophical battle of the seventeenth century is usually presented as a contest between two philosophies—Cartesian rationalism and British empiricism—each of which was set forth in order to justify 'the new science'." The new philosophy arose as a way of dealing with a sceptical crisis that engulfed European thought during the Reformation" (p. 90). The author's researches during the past decade have led him to conclude that there was another tradition reacting to that same skeptical crisis, a tradition which combined theology and modern science. The seventeenth-century figures whom Charles Webster called "the spiritual brotherhood," Popkin now labels "the third force": a group of thinkers who "tend to combine elements of empirical and rationalist thought with theosophic speculations and Millenarian interpretation of the Scripture," which were used to overcome the skeptical challenge (pp. 90-1). Among those classified as members of "the third force" are William Twisse, Jan Amos Comenius, Joseph Mede, Henry More, John Dury, Samuel Hartlib, Lady Anne Conway, and Sir Isaac Newton.

For Popkin, the importance of examining the third force (as an admixture of elements from skepticism, science, and millenarianism)

is that it corrects a defect in our grasp of the intellectual influences operative in the seventeenth century

We who have been raised in the Enlightenment tradition have seen the "making of the modern mind" in terms of what led to the Age of Reason—namely scientific empiricism and rationalism turned against the Judeo-Christian tradition. A framework has been constructed in which Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, and Locke fit, and the rest of their contemporaries do not. For better or worse, we have to take the third force thinkers seriously if we wish to comprehend the transformation that led to Newton's view of the world. If we can come to appreciate this mixture of religious and scientific thought, which seems so strange today, as a vital historical force three centuries back, we can then look at its continuations in the eighteenth century and onwards in the scientific Millennialism of Whiston, Hartley, and Priestley, and in the romantic mystical Millennialism of Swedenborg, Blake, Wordsworth and Coleridge. When we can appreciate this important aspect of our intellectual heritage, we may be better able to understand where we now are and how we got here (p. 119)

Popkin notes in his Introduction that the essays concern themes in the history of philosophy. A neglected theme, he argues, is the place of those who advocated third force ideas. Most important to Popkin, however, is the historical study of philosophy by philosophers. What he contests is that kind of philosophical study which detaches thinkers and their ideas from their actual historical contexts and places them into some ahistorical, ethereal realm (p. 269). In a crucial respect, this book is as much an exploration of neglected figures and their influence as it is an exercise in defending the seriousness of studying the history of philosophy. The defense is addressed to those who dismiss such study from being part of the philosophic enterprise (pp. 325ff). But whether Popkin's present book is sufficient for that defense remains questionable for me.

Attention to the development and advocacy of third force theories during the seventeenth century is useful, and Popkin's insistence that theology or religion was a dominant issue is certain. What is less established, however, is the degree of influence exerted by third force proponents on philosophers of the first rank during the seventeenth century. Descartes, Hobbes, and Spinoza are the philosophers mentioned most frequently. But their connections with third force figures are often remote or only cursory. Moreover, investigations of the teachings of Descartes, Hobbes, and Spinoza can lead to very different conclusions than the ones reached by the author. In many cases, he relies so heavily on historical connections that he allows circumstantial evidence to replace philosophic consideration. For example, in the opening essay, "Hobbes and Scepticism I," Popkin observes that Hobbes was "a central member in the circle of Mersenne and Gassendi" during his years in Paris (pp. 10-12). Whereas those thinkers devoted much attention to skepticism, Popkin locates only two passages concerning skepticism in the writings of Hobbes. "These two references,"

Popkin avers, "hardly make it seem that Hobbes cared very much about scepticism and sceptics," even though Hobbes was accused subsequently of being a skeptic about religious convictions (p 13). The argument leaves the impression that since Hobbes knew of epistemological skepticism but did not make much fuss about it then he must not have been an epistemological skeptic, that in fact is the conclusion reached by the author (pp 25-6). What Popkin ignores are the many very decisive reasons which might have prompted Hobbes to refrain from discussing skepticism at all. Nor does the author appear to have considered that Hobbes's epistemological and religious skepticisms may have been interconnected. In defending the seriousness of the study of the history of philosophy, I believe Popkin has made his case all too historical and thus ignored the most important reason for the historical study of philosophy. When undertaken with responsibility, the study of the history of philosophy does not mire one in historicity. Instead, the historical study of philosophy liberates the student insofar as it points toward that which is always and is fundamental rather than toward that which is transitory and grounded merely in opinion or prejudice —Paul J Bagley, *Loyola College in Maryland*

RAPAPORT, Herman *Heidegger and Derrida: Reflections on Time and Language* Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1991. vii + 293 pp. \$10.95—Rapaport, a professor of literature, differs from many literary critics interested in the thought of Jacques Derrida insofar as he seeks to locate Derrida within the philosophical tradition and problematic out of which Derrida's ideas, so significant for critical theory, emerge. While Rapaport considers Derrida in relation to thinkers as diverse as Hegel, Nietzsche, Freud, Husserl, Blanchot, Joyce, and Celan, he focuses his attention on Heidegger, and Derrida's reflections on Heidegger, for there the relation between time and language central to Derrida's deconstructionism is most fruitfully to be examined.

Rapaport claims that there are two traditional interpretations of Heidegger between which Derrida moves. The first interpretation sees the turn to temporality announced for Part 2 of *Sein und Zeit*, and intimated in Part 1, as subsuming, supporting, and at the same time purifying the ontological project of Part 1 through an even more rigorous "de-struction" of the history of philosophy and critique of ontology. The second sees in Heidegger's destruction of the history of philosophy not so much a critical rejection of that history as a more original appropriation of it. Derrida's position, according to Rapaport, is "distinctive" because it sides with neither interpretation but "plays with their 'difference' of opinion and thereby takes on many directions or perspectives which would appear to be merely incompatible" (p. 7) but are not.

Rapaport, seeking to show that deconstructionism is continuous with the more radical side of Heidegger's thought, examines in detail

and against the background of Derrida's more straightforwardly philosophical works (*Le voix et le phénomène*, *L'origine de la géométrie*, and *De la grammatologie*) a broad range of Derridian texts "Ousia et grammè," "La différence," "La mythologie blanche," "Les fins de l'homme," "Pas," "Le retrait de la métaphore," *De l'esprit*, *La carte postale*, "D'un ton apocalyptique adopté naguère en philosophie," "Des tours de Babel," "Shibboleth," "Ulysse gramophone Deux mots pour Joyce," "La main de Heidegger (*Geschlecht II*)," and "The Time of the Thesis Punctuations" In these works, the "middle-of-the-road" Derrida at times suggests that Heidegger envisioned a revolutionary notion of temporality but failed to bring it to philosophical fruition, and, indeed, resisted doing so because he wanted not truly to overcome the metaphysical tradition but to maintain an existential, ontological dimension in his own thought At other times, for example, in his later treatments of Heidegger, the "conservative" Derrida himself moves toward retaining the existential, ontological dimension he had criticized in Heidegger At yet other times, the "radical" Derrida suggests that Heidegger did not genuinely conceive a revolutionary notion of temporality at all and that the development of the temporal clue announced in *Sein und Zeit* required completion through deconstructionism's assimilation of Heidegger's ontological difference to *différance* and language

Derrida's intent, according to Rapaport, is to avoid stating a simple (logocentric) thesis stipulating the historical relation between Heidegger and deconstructionism—indeed a thesis could not be stated on Derrida's own principles Derrida instead explores different and undecidable historical perspectives by considering and reconsidering Heideggerian texts at different times and in different contexts so that their affinities and antagonisms, their turnings toward and away from one another and toward and away from deconstructionism, are opened for reflection In this manner Derrida reveals the radical Heidegger's and his own conceptions of temporality conceptions which "attempt to break the spine of tradition as a teleological structure that reduces philosophy to just so many things to be serially apprehended" (p 258), conceptions which lack the "familiar notions of chronological development or historization" (p 14), and conceptions which foreclose the possibility of totalizing claims It is in language, more specifically in paronomasia, that the indeterminability of identity and difference, the flux of temporal relations, and the interplay of temporal horizons reveal themselves in a manner which "radically breaks with our everyday sense[s] of experienced time" (p 127), chronology, ends, and history

Rapaport uncritically assumes throughout his book the essential correctness of Derridian and deconstructive readings of Heidegger (and other philosophers), he asserts, but never argues, that non-Derridian approaches to Heidegger are incomplete or inadequate But it remains an outstanding issue whether what Rapaport calls "Derrida's patient and meticulous readings of philosophy" (p 22) are also careful and defensible interpretations of those other philosophers. Moreover, as Claude Evans has pointed out (in his *Strategies of*

Deconstruction [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991]), the success of Derrida's deconstructive positions depends on the plausibility of the readings he gives of other philosophers. Similarly, the correctness of the Derridian readings of Heidegger is an essential element in establishing the relation between Derrida and Heidegger for which Rapaport argues. Consequently, to those who have already boarded the deconstructive train, Rapaport's book will no doubt provide illuminating and insightful interpretations of the relation between Derrida and Heidegger—interpretations fundamentally sympathetic to deconstructive approaches to philosophy. But this book will probably not convince others to jump on that already moving train.—John J. Drummond, *Mount Saint Mary's College, Md*

RESCHER, Nicholas. *A System of Pragmatic Idealism. Volume 1. Human Knowledge in Idealistic Perspective*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992. xiv + 335 pp. \$37.50.—The author is a writer of startling productivity: his publisher reminds us that he has written fifty-nine books and two hundred thirteen journal articles. It is not surprising that, as Rescher observes, reviewers of his individual works have generally failed to understand that a systematic whole is at issue. In the projected trilogy of which the present work is the first volume, he intends to present his philosophical ideas "in a sufficiently comprehensive and coordinated form that their systematic interrelatedness becomes clearly manifest" (p. xi). This volume is devoted to epistemology, philosophy of science, and philosophy of nature. It will be followed by a volume dealing with value theory, ethics, and practical philosophy, and a volume dealing with the nature of philosophical inquiry itself. It is thus not easy to give a satisfactory account of the present book in a short space.

"Idealism," Rescher tells us at the outset, "centers on the conception that reality *as we understand it* reflects the workings of mind." Other telling phrases follow immediately: "Mind itself makes a *formative contribution* not merely to our *understanding of the nature of the real* but even to the resulting *character we attribute to it*", and, a little later on, "Both the object of inquiry and the inquiring mind make a contribution to the character of the *picture of nature* at which our inquiries arrive," and this "*picture of reality* is constituted by means of the *representations of a mind*" (p. xiii, emphasis added). The activity of the knower therefore permeates what we know, permeates it "not only in the constituting but also in the constitution of what is known" (p. 271). In due course it becomes clear that Rescher's pragmatic idealism has only a little in common with the older idealisms—those of Berkeley, Fichte, Hegel—that have given us the term 'idealism'. Those classic doctrines, however, are "ontological versions" of idealism in the useful classification Rescher gives as Figure 18.1 (p. 305), while his own "conceptual idealism" belongs with the "epistemic versions." The author is not urging a metaphysics upon

us, and the one he appears to incline toward is a guarded version of scientific realism—hardly an ontological idealism, even if some philosophers might agree with Rescher (pp 318–20) that it is compatible with his conceptual idealism

Throughout the book it is clear, in any event, that conceptual idealism is meant to be compatible with *some* version of realism, for although to Rescher the world as known is a “thing of our own contrivance, an artifact we devise on our own terms” (p 279), it is our *intent* (pp 284–5) that our (linguistic) pictures, or representations, should achieve an *adaequatio ad rem* (pp 260–4) “We recognize,” he says, “or at any rate have little alternative but to suppose, that reality exists and that there is such a thing as ‘the real truth’ about the mind-independently real things of this world” (p 298) On the other hand, we have no direct rational awareness of the real as mind-independent; realism is not a discovered fact but rather a regulative principle, or practical postulate, “initially validated by its pragmatic utility and ultimately retrovalidated by the satisfactory results of its implementation (in both practical and theoretic respects)” (p 270) The real truth just mentioned is a linguistic matter “Any correct statement in some actual language formulates a truth,” and that formulation is the representation of a fact, but a fact “is not a linguistic entity at all but an actual circumstance or state of affairs” Thus, “facts afford potential truths whose actualization as such hinges on their being given a linguistic formulation” (pp 243–4) But it appears that we can scarcely be said to *know* a fact, which of course in this setting would be to know that its linguistic formulation were true Truth itself is a concept and so has its place in the system of “mind-involving” principles that make Rescher’s doctrine ultimately a coherentist one. Any “datum-set” of propositions consists of truth *candidates*, and, even after incorporation into a coherent scheme, candidate truths can at best be “qualified truths” (157–9) We cannot hope to attain that which is true but only that which finds “acceptance-as-true” (p 57) Truth, like reality, is a regulative ideal it is not something found and acquiesced in by mind but rather a mind-formed guide to praxis

Although Rescher constantly invokes both constitutive and regulative principles supplied by mind, his understanding of the function of such principles appears to be ultimately more empiricistic than Kantian he does not seem to think that mind’s formative activity is formative of our experience Mind is part of nature, and its connection with (postulated) independent reality is but one instance of the causal concurrence of nature The epistemic outcome of this concurrence is that mind deals cognitively with empirical data expressed in propositions. (They are data only in a qualified sense, since they are linguistically formulated in propositions they are data only in the sense that they are accepted-as-true) Causality itself is intimately tied to law, on Rescher’s view—so intimately that causal laws threaten to supersede the causal relation they are intended to codify On the other hand, if not precisely Kantian, this view of causality and law is certainly idealist in Rescher’s special sense the concepts of cause and law are “conceptually mind involving” (p 317) rather than found in the real,

and the concept of law, in particular, is ideal and regulative in the sense that "*lawfulness is the product of the well-founded imputation to empirical generalizations of nomic necessity and hypothetical force*" (p. 315, emphasis present in original)

From this perspective, one sees why the scientific realism towards which Rescher tends is a qualified one—something understood to be a picture of reality, a representation of reality, all the while it is believed in. That is probably the only sense in which his scientific realism is compatible, as he supposes, with his conceptual idealism. Just here it is appropriate to observe that the notion of a perfected science—a notion implicit in scientific realism—is also a regulative ideal for Rescher—something not to be found in any actual science, now or in the future, and moreover not to be understood in terms of Peirce's convergentism (pp. 47–52).

Even readers who, like the present reviewer, find some of Rescher's more important premises unacceptable will profit from this book. The author is authoritative, clear, and thorough about the view he defends, he writes, as always, with civility and learning. The trilogy promises to be the memorable culmination of a distinguished career.—Edward Pols, *Bowdoin College*

SHARPLES, R. W., trans. *Quaestiones 1 1–2 15*. Ancient Commentators on Aristotle. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992. 183 pp. \$47.95.

DOOLEY, William E., and MADIGAN, Arthur, trans. *On Aristotle's Metaphysics 2 and 3*. Translated by William E. Dooley, S.J. and Arthur Madigan, S.J. Ancient Commentators on Aristotle. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992. 242 pp. \$47.95.—Alexander of Aphrodisias, who began his career as a professor of philosophy in Athens under the reign of the Roman emperor Septimius Severus, ranks among the most influential of the Greek Aristotle commentators. The works attributed to him, part of the vast collection of ancient commentaries on Aristotle that have come down to us from the period between 200 and 600 A.D., constitute a crucial link in the transmission of Aristotelian thought through Hellenism, late antiquity, and the Islamic world, to the Middle Ages. On a smaller scale, the Alexandrian corpus is an invaluable source for our knowledge of the vicissitudes of third-century Aristotelianism. It represents, in fact, the last and finest stage of a strictly Aristotle-oriented Peripatetic tradition, in a time immediately before the Neoplatonists were to merge Peripatetic, Platonic, and Stoic thought in an all-embracing synthesis.

The *Quaestiones* freely discuss various topics ranging from central issues in Aristotle's philosophy, such as the definition of soul and the relation between form and matter, to problems of a more scholastic kind, such as the question, How is it possible for the same person to be pleased and distressed at the same time, as happens to those who are thirsty and are drinking? (p. 55). The latter is an example of the "problems and solutions" (in Greek, *aporiai kai luseis*) in the strict

sense, while the other sections may be roughly divided into summaries of Aristotelian doctrine, and comments on particular texts or phrases from the Aristotelian corpus. Somewhat apart stands the "discussion in dialogue form" on fate and contingency (sec 1.4) in which the author, with remarkable logical dexterity, criticizes Stoic determinism in a format that reminds one of the Stoic *diatribe*. The *Quaestiones*, Sharples maintains, are likely to reflect actual debates between Alexander and his pupils, and may therefore shed light "on the functioning of a philosophical 'school' in the early years of the third century A.D." (p. 1)

By contrast, the treatise *On Aristotle's Metaphysics* belongs to the group of large-scale commentaries in which Alexander systematically elaborates on the philosophical problems raised in the Aristotelian original. In his introduction to *On Metaphysics 2*, Dooley (who already published a translation of *On Metaphysics 1* in the same series) briefly treats of Alexander's opinions on authorship and on the status of the text marked by Aristotle's ancient editors as "little *alpha*." Alexander is in no doubt about the authenticity of this Aristotelian work, yet with respect to its place within the Aristotelian corpus he prefigures modern scholarly controversy, conceiving of it either as a supplement to the first book of the *Metaphysics*, or as a separate book, or even as an independent introduction to theoretical philosophy. In his commentary on *Metaphysics 2*, Alexander focuses on the apparent contradiction between Aristotle's conception of the universe and his conception of the history of mankind as having no beginning in time on the one hand, and his rejection of an infinite chain of causes on the other. It is not, Alexander explains, an infinite regress of origins as such which Aristotle's theory of causes precludes, but rather an infinite succession of causes that are all of a different nature (p. 29).

The third book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* addresses, in a dialectical style, some fifteen basic problems concerning the division and scope of philosophy as a science of the first principles. As Madigan points out, Alexander's treatment of *Metaphysics 3* reveals a difference between the commentator and his source in the appreciation of dialectical argumentation. "Whereas Aristotle stresses the tentative and probing character of dialectic, Alexander stresses the fact that dialectical argumentation on both sides of a question involves the presence of false premises" (p. 78). One might, however, want to argue about whether the translator is justified in having Alexander refer to certain Aristotelian arguments as "verbal" (*logikos*, but cf. Madigan's note on p. 96). From a historical point of view, *On Metaphysics 3* is of particular interest to students of Neoplatonism. The work was perhaps known not only to Neoplatonists such as Syrianus (fifth century) and Asclepius (sixth century), who both wrote their own commentaries on the third book of the *Metaphysics*. "If Porphyry is right in saying that Aristotle's *Metaphysics* is concentrated in the writings of Plotinus, perhaps research may show that Alexander's commentary on *Metaphysics 3* has left its traces in Plotinus as well" (p. 80). Indeed, one need only refer to the section on "whether Being and One are substances of beings" (*Aporia 11*, pp. 174ff) to see this suggestion confirmed.

The translations will be welcomed by students of Aristotle and of later Greek philosophy who do not want to rely upon secondary literature, yet lack sufficient knowledge of Greek to read the original texts. Rather than presenting an interpretive paraphrase of Alexander's text, the translators have sought to follow the Greek as closely and accurately as possible. In notes to the translations they amply discuss textual difficulties and variant readings, and clarify allusions to Aristotle and other classical sources. The translations are followed by English-Greek and Greek-English glossaries (Greek is transliterated throughout). Moreover, in the case of *On Metaphysics 2 and 3*, where ambiguities with respect to the rendering of Greek philosophical vocabulary are particularly prone to arise, the Greek equivalents of many technical terms are given in parentheses in the translations — Henri Oosthout, *Hertogenbosch, The Netherlands*

THAGARD, Paul *Conceptual Revolutions* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992. xvi + 285 pp. \$35.00—Ever since the publication in 1962 of Thomas Kuhn's highly influential book, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, there has been considerable investigation of the nature of scientific revolutions. In this book Paul Thagard, analyzing historical examples of radical scientific transformations, presents an account of conceptual revolutions based on the Theory of Explanatory Coherence (TEC) and on the assumption that thinking is computational, such that the "cognitive architecture" underlying theory construction and change can be replicated in the computer program ECHO.

Thus there are two major theses to the book: the primary one involves a cognitive analysis of such conceptual changes as the chemical revolution in which Stahl's phlogiston theory was overturned by Lavoisier's oxygen theory, the Darwinian revolution that replaced the conception of special creation, the geological revolution whereby the theory of plate tectonics superseded that of continental drift, the revolutions initiated by Copernicus, Newton, Einstein, and Planck, and the twentieth-century revolutions in psychology involving behaviorism and the rise of cognitivism. In addition, the author compares the conceptual changes in the growth of knowledge in children and in scientists.

The second thesis (although this may be the primary one for Thagard) pertains to his attempt to elucidate conceptual changes by a computer model or program called ECHO utilizing the new insights and techniques of connectionist systems (nodes standing for concepts, rules connecting the nodes, weighted reinforcement or inhibition of the connections due to positive and negative feedbacks, and so forth). Using numerous diagrams and charts to illustrate the relations between concepts, concepts and rules, hypotheses and data, and so forth, this connectionist model is intended to simulate the cognitive connections and changes underlying conceptual revolutions.

Thagard's interpretation of cognitive revolutions focuses on the addition or deletion of concepts, their simple or revisionary reorganization, transformations in kind- or part-relations, shifts in part-whole connections, changes involving "branch jumping" or "tree branching and switching" (shifting a concept from one branch of a hierarchical tree to another), the "sublation" (where some of the previous theory is retained and some discarded) rather than the "transplanting" of theories, and the "abduction" (Peirce's term) or inference to the best hypothesis. He also distinguishes different kinds of theory change that are due to diverse influences: those that are data-driven (from observational and experimental discoveries), explanation-driven (owing to the search for abductive explanations), or coherence-driven (based on the attempt to eliminate inconsistencies and derive the simplest explanatory principles, as exemplified particularly in Einstein's work). Ultimately, Thagard believes, the search for explanatory coherence is the primary moving force behind scientific inquiry, and is the test for the truth of theories. In contrast to Kuhn and Feyerabend, he rejects the interpretation of scientific revolutions as incommensurable and irrational.

The main weakness of this analysis, in the opinion of this reviewer, is that it is rather mechanical—focusing on adding or subtracting concepts, adjusting the weights of rules connecting concepts, revising their hierarchical organization, and so forth—to allow simulation of a revolution by the computer program ECHO. As a result the author tends to minimize the dynamic, intuitive, imaginative, and inspirational conscious processes generating conceptual revolutions, especially the discovery of laws, the construction of theories, and the formulation of the arguments and revisions in the modes of reasoning leading to the rejection of previous laws, assumptions, and theories. The computational program ECHO would seem to be a better model of the neuronal processes underlying conceptual revolutions than the actual conscious cognitive processes themselves (assuming these are not identical). Nonetheless, this is a significant contribution to the attempt to understand conceptual revolutions and should be of interest to historians and philosophers of science, cognitive and developmental psychologists, as well as those investigating artificial intelligence.—Richard H. Schlagel, *George Washington University*

TILGHMAN, B. R. *Wittgenstein, Ethics and Aesthetics: The View from Eternity*. State University of New York Press, 1991. xiv + 193 pp. Cloth, \$49.50, paper, \$16.95.—The purpose of this book is to show how Wittgenstein's work, early and late, is relevant to aesthetics and to show how art provides "an experience not to be obtained by any other activity: it shows the meaning of life" (p. 178). The book is interesting because it relates the early and later Wittgenstein to a topic not typically treated by Wittgenstein scholars—art and the aesthetic—and because it tries to reinterpret some of the *Tractatus* in light of the

Philosophical Investigations without losing a kernel of truth in the early work

Tilghman notes the isolation of modern art from common life which began with the eighteenth century creation of the aesthetic as a *sui generis* dimension of human experience, and he correctly notes that this has not always been the case—for example, in the Platonic rejection of poetry. He is interested in the ethical and therefore human dimension of art and so takes with great seriousness Wittgenstein's claim that aesthetics and ethics are one. But what can that mean and what can be preserved of that if we drop the requirements of the *Tractatus*? Tilghman discusses several provocative passages from the *Notebooks*, the most interesting of which is, "The work of art is the object seen *sub specie aeternitatis*, and the good life is the world seen *sub specie aeternitatis*. This is the connection between art and ethics." To see the world *sub specie aeternitatis* is to see it as a totality—as a limited, given whole. (Notice what Tilghman does not say: that this is the way the world presents itself in the *Tractatus*.) Similarly, "art selects an object . . . and makes that object stand still to be contemplated and in doing so treats the object as if it were a world unto itself" (p. 54). Ethics in the *Tractatus* is not, then, a matter of right action but of "how to look at the world" (p. 60). The solution to "the problem of life" is "simply to accept the world as it is and to live in the knowledge that this is what it is" (p. 60).

Tilghman complains that it is difficult to know exactly what Wittgenstein means here because he gives us no examples. But this implies that it is *particular* works of art that "show" us something about the human situation, and this betrays a serious misinterpretation of Wittgenstein. What is revealing about art is that each work, by being a work of art, presents us with a model of the good life. We must see the world just as we see a work of art: as a given totality from without. Thus, nothing can be learned from an examination of particular examples. As already noted, the *Tractatus* is an example of "seeing the world under the aspect of eternity" (p. 66), and thus its point is ethical, as Wittgenstein himself claimed.

Tilghman turns to the later work by reinterpreting the passages from the *Notebooks* in light of the *Philosophical Investigations*. The stress is on examples and on the fact that giving reasons in both aesthetics and ethics is a matter of "placing things side by side." "If, however, the other person does not then see it as you see it, that is the end of the matter" (pp. 81–2). We move away from principles to cases and to the circumstances in which those cases exist. Tilghman sees all this in light of the showing-saying distinction of the *Tractatus*. Placing things side by side shows what cannot be said in both ethics and aesthetics.

Tilghman next takes up Wittgenstein's rejection of classical mind-body dualism, but that is not as clearly relevant to the overall project of the book as one would like. We are told that just as our understanding of others has been distorted by dualism, so has our understanding of art, and as Wittgenstein's later work displaces the first understanding, it also displaces the latter. Again the focus is on

practices in which we jointly participate and not on beliefs that we are supposed to acquire. There are no theoretical difficulties to discerning the humanity in another human being and there are no theoretical difficulties in discerning the art in a work of art. Both are a matter of shared practices and our participation in them, not of theories true or false.

Finally, Tilghman takes up modern art and its movement to abstraction, which is taken by many to exclude the human. He says, "The likening of abstract painting to an uninterpreted formal system that conveys no 'information', then, amounts to the contention that abstract painting has no connection with the world and *a fortiori*, with whatever of the human the world contains" (p. 147). Perhaps we should "switch the question from what it is to discern the humanity in a work of art to the question of how art can make humanity discernable," and this leads to the artistic problem of space. He says, "Doubtless some artists have explored space for its own sake, but it seems to me that the original intent of the investigation of space was to provide a place for people to interact with one another and that is what gives point to the artistic concern for space" (p. 166). Whatever the merits of this claim, how is Wittgenstein relevant to it? There are simply two activities here similar in some ways and different in others. These can be described, but how can we go on to recommend one over the other, and who would the "we" be that would do that? No doubt Tilghman's distinction in the Afterword between the aesthetic (a *suu generis* value) and art (that which selects an aspect of the human situation for contemplation) reflects his desire that art be more relevant to human life, but it surely does not record the use of the word in the language-game. Tilghman is more in tune with Dewey here than with Wittgenstein.—Michael Hodges, *Vanderbilt University*

WADELL, Paul J. *Friendship and the Moral Life*. Notre Dame University of Notre Dame Press, 1989. xviii + 189 pp. Cloth, \$23.95, paper, \$10.95.—The opening statement expresses the intention to argue "for another way to think about the moral life" (p. xiii). An understanding of friendship is at the core of this other way of moral reasoning because, the author asserts, friendship is the center of the moral life itself. In this book Wadell seeks to establish the centrality of friendship in the moral life, and to expound some implications of this centrality.

The opening chapter explains why a new model for the moral life is needed. For Wadell morality, in the sense of reasoning about the moral life, must treat the human person as a whole, and must see him for what he truly is. A moral understanding in which friendship is central provides what Wadell seeks. It considers the whole person, his needs, his aspirations, his end.

In the second and third chapters Wadell turns to the thought of Aristotle. He first observes that we live in a world in disarray, one

that has lost its center. Alasdair MacIntyre, he says, has prescribed precisely what is needed: a return to an Aristotelian ethic of virtue. The Aristotelian moral world is centered on a specific understanding of human nature. To be human is to have a goal to achieve, a good to become. The ultimate end of the human person is *eudaimonia*, the perfect and fulfilled life. As this end is constituted by virtuous living, the burden of the moral life is a striving to grow in virtue.

The third chapter, in which Wadell examines Aristotle's notion of friendship, presents a fine treatment of the three kinds of friendship and why we need them. The basic kind of friendship is that based on goodness and virtue. Friends seek the same ultimate good, and see in the other a certain embodiment of goodness, sharing the same final good, they strive to help one another in pursuing it. Friendship becomes a school of virtue. Wadell concludes that "friendship is the constitutive activity of the moral life" (p. 66), since it is the relationship in which people become good.

The goal of the fourth chapter is to demonstrate that friendship is not opposed to Christian love. Søren Kierkegaard and Anders Nygren hold that human friendship, since it is preferential, is exclusive and therefore inimical to the universal character of Christian love. Wadell gives individual treatments of these thinkers, and proceeds to form a response through expositions of the thought of St. Augustine, St. Aelred of Rievaulx, and Karl Barth. Friendship enlarges the self and fosters growth in love for God. In fact, only in friendship can a love for God take root and be fashioned. Further, the preferential love of friendship finds its truest expression in the context of Christian love for God. The friends' ultimate preference in such a context is for Christ, and thus their love becomes inclusive, not exclusive.

In my opinion the fifth chapter presents the book's most signal achievement: a strong exposition of St. Thomas Aquinas's notion of charity, or friendship with God. For Aristotle friendship with the gods is unthinkable, it requires community in nature, something shared in common. According to Aquinas supernatural grace bestows a kinship with God which makes possible the friendship called charity, which is the living expression of the union grace effects between God and man. Charity is constitutive of the end of man since the final achievement of union with God is beatitude itself. The goal of the moral life for Aquinas is to return to God through love. To expound the nature of charity itself Wadell examines the three marks of friendship—benevolence, reciprocity, and capacity to look on the friend as another self—as they obtain in friendship with God. Benevolence means that in charity a person seeks what God seeks, wills what God wills. This implies loving other persons as God loves them, or charity toward fellow humans. As regards the third mark, God becomes more and more another self as one is assimilated to Him by friendship. With incisive simplicity Wadell remarks, "God is another self to us because our self is our friendship with God" (p. 140).

The sixth and final chapter opens with a succinct expression of the major assertions of the book. Wadell says that the background chorus of the book is that we can be moral only when we can appreciate what

is not ourself. Further, the basic argument of the book is that the "moral life is what happens to us in relationship with others" (p. 142). This argument calls for what Wadell calls a "relational approach" to ethics because relations are not external to the self but constitutive of it. With these themes in mind Wadell presents in this final chapter a specific consideration of just how friendships form persons. His purpose is to suggest the practical side of his model for the moral life. The plot of the moral life, then, is cast in terms of encounter and response to others. Wadell displays great insight into the dynamics of personal development in the community of friendship.

I would like, however, to note what I perceive as a weakness in his presentation. Wadell characterizes a "moral response" as one which recognizes that in other persons, "what we are ultimately called to respect and share is their otherness" (p. 151). He also quotes Edna McDonough, who says that "one behaves morally when one responds in an other-centred way" (p. 152). In this description of moral response, and throughout the sixth chapter, Wadell highlights an essential aspect of the moral life: that to be truly human one must transcend, in love, the confines of self. Wadell does not make clear, however, what is the *ratio* behind other-centeredness. As he noted earlier, to be human is to have a good to become. Now I reason as follows. Since man's good is a good to be achieved, this good is "other" than man himself. God is man's ultimate end, and God is "other." Precisely because man's end is God, man's actions should be "other-centred," namely God-centered. Other persons, as unique reflections of God's goodness, are to be loved as such, and thus unselfishly. Wadell seems to overemphasize otherness in human friendships, at the expense of objective goodness. I say that what we are *ultimately* called to respect and share in others is not their otherness, but their goodness. In friendship we grow in goodness, supporting one another in virtuous living, achieving greater unity and likeness to one another, and primarily to God.

Wadell has made a convincing case for the necessity of rediscovering Aristotelian and Christian moral principles, particularly those concerning friendship. He demonstrates, with the seasoning of deep personal insight, that seeing friendship with God as the end of the moral life, and friendship with others as indispensable to achieving that goal, is crucial for achieving a full understanding of the moral life. A better understanding of friendship in all its complexity implies a better understanding of the moral life in all its complexity. As regards Wadell's argument for "another way" of thinking about the moral life, he does not make clear in what sense he means "another." I see Wadell's accomplishment as his providing another way of thinking about the moral life in that he unfolds something in the Christian tradition which, to the great detriment of contemporary moral discussion, is often ignored.—John A. Cuddeback, *Arlington, Va.*

Press, 1990 189 pp \$27 50—The title of Walker's book gives a felicitous summary of the content of the work as a whole The book is mainly an analysis of contemporary difficulties in constitutional theory which, the author contends, rest upon some foundation in morals, and it proposes a solution to these difficulties purported to be found in the thought of St Augustine The chapter titles are, "Normative Impasses in Contemporary Constitutional Theory," "The Moral Anatomy of Contemporary Constitutional Theory," "Augustine's Political Ethics Skepticism, Ultimacy, and the Good in Politics," "Augustinian Insight and Current Problems in Constitutional Thought," "Augustinian Tensions and the Constitution of Liberalism "

Walker begins his work by posing the following questions "Why can't writers interested in constitutional jurisprudence just keep to law and to the Constitution? Why do they have to get tangled up in esoteric and unrelated subjects?" (p 1) His answers to these questions are that while the subjects in which these writers become tangled are at times esoteric, they are not at all unrelated, and that constitutional jurisprudence cannot simply "keep to the law" because all the important arguments in this field are normative (p 2) This point made, Walker proceeds to divide his work up into two books, "or at least into two arguments" (p 5) (much in the same fashion that St Augustine divided the domain of human pursuits into two cities) First, he attempts "to assess the ways of thinking that dominate the landscape of contemporary constitutional study " Second, he gives his "proposal for clarifying the fundamental and inescapable questions confronting constitutional thought—questions that remain unanswered" (p 5) The Introduction and the first two chapters of the book assess the landscape of contemporary constitutional study as one dominated by what Walker refers to as "moral nihilism " As Walker points out, a "brief look at current thinkers is enough to establish my central point: They deny any moral reality beyond contrivances of convention " By so doing, Walker rightly asserts, such thinkers "cripple their own prescriptive arguments" (p 17) At the same time, Walker contends that constitutional thinkers who opt for moral realism (such as natural law theorists [p 6]) do not provide "satisfactory normative premises for constitutional theory" (p 23) These premises, as Graham sees it, "would avoid the tendency to collapse law and politics into morality" (p 19) To assist his reader in following his critique of the landscape of contemporary moral thinking, in chapter 2 Walker divides all such moral reasoning into four kinds teleological or deontological, based upon whether the good or the right dominates moral thinking, and conventionalist or realist, based upon whether or not one's predominant moral principle exists or does not exist independent of human artifice Then he examines the constitutional views of thinkers—such as Rawls, Dworkin, Ely, Michael Moore, Sotirios Barber, David Richards, Robert Bork, William Renquist, and John Courtney Murray—against the background of his division of moral reasoning After this, Walker engages in an analysis of St Augustine's moral theory, which he thinks generates an understanding of the rule of law that prevents law from ever mistaking

itself for morality or the rule of virtue, and that is made possible by "the ontological footing of Augustinian political theory" (p. 6)

On the whole, Walker's text is a lucid summary of the condition of contemporary constitutional theorizing, and a handy introduction to anyone interested in this problem. His treatment of St. Augustine is, by and large, masterful—at times near brilliant. At the same time, the book does have some flaws. For example, as far as I can determine, the author provides no detailed understanding of what he means by "morals," or of what he means by a moral "norm." In addition, he seems somewhat unfamiliar with forms of moral realism and natural law doctrine directly indebted to St. Augustine (such as Thomist natural law reasoning). He therefore tends to see these as opposed to the views of St. Augustine rather than as continuous with Augustine's thought. This is evidenced by Aquinas's scant treatment of natural law, his frequent references to Augustine, and his talk about the moral virtues.—Peter A. Redpath, *St. John's University*

WESTPHAL, Merald. *Hegel, Freedom, and Modernity*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992. xviii + 295 pp. \$18.95—Westphal's new book is marked by clarity and simplicity of style, a rare quality in the often turgid Hegel discussion, whose obscurity often approaches that of the master's own writing. The result is a refreshing, interesting, informed, intelligent, often critical examination of a variety of themes in Hegel's theory by one of our best Hegel scholars.

There are different ways of approaching Hegel through study of a single treatise, which in English often means the *Phenomenology*, through detailed exegesis of the texts, frequently the early manuscripts, bracketing all questions of contemporary relevance or even truth, through study of Hegel's relation to the history of philosophy, and so on. Westphal, who is aware of Hegel's debts to the philosophical tradition, as well as of the entire Hegelian corpus, studies Hegel's theory in the light of contemporary concerns. In this way, he continues the line taken by Croce, distinguishing between the viable and the no longer or never viable in Hegel's theory. Although he has respect for Hegel, Westphal properly sees Hegel's theory, as Hegel himself understood it, as necessarily limited by its own historical period, as belonging to the philosophical tradition—for this reason as sometimes outdated, and even sometimes just plain wrong. This, from someone who does not merely dismiss texts he does not know, but is concerned to work through the arguments, is refreshing and interesting.

In his great synthesis, Hegel brought together religion and philosophy as well as much of what was known in his time. It is fair to say that Westphal belongs to the Hegelian right wing in virtue of his legitimate concern with what has been called the religious dimension in Hegel's thought. As he tells us, he is personally interested in bringing together his own religious faith and his perception of current events, something that brings him very close to Hegel himself. This

religious concern provides the main thrust to his way into Hegel's thought. Indeed, Westphal says straightforwardly that Hegel's central philosophical problem from 1800 until his death in 1831 was the fate of Christianity (p. 224).

The present book consists of thirteen previously published papers, mainly reprinted in unaltered form. It is divided into three sections: "The Basic Theory of Freedom," "The Failure of Nerve," and "The Search for a Nonsectarian Spirituality of Community." Westphal begins by pointing out that Hegel is a philosopher of freedom in the modern world. He sees Hegel's theory as a political theology that inseparably conjoins religion and society, whose reunion is mediated by the supposed reconciliation of Christianity with modernity. Westphal's essays are intended to explore various aspects of Hegel's view of freedom in the modern world.

Although the Hegelian conception of freedom in modernity is the central theme, the various chapters are independent of each other. The first four chapters explore aspects of the theory developed in the *Philosophy of Right*. The next three pick up ideas earlier presented in Westphal's *History and Truth in Hegel's Phenomenology*. Here Westphal argues that Hegel's theory is a transcendental holism as distinguished from foundationalism, that although Hegel relates his theory to the historical context it is not relativist, and that his theory is spoiled by its eschatology. In a final group of six essays turning on Hegel's conception of religion, Westphal ranges widely over Hegel's views of Hinduism, the Reformation, secularism, religious knowledge, and the ideas of Pannenberg and Tillich.—Tom Rockmore, *Duquesne University*

CURRENT PERIODICAL ARTICLES

PHILOSOPHICAL ABSTRACTS*

AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Vol 66, No 3, Summer 1992

Forward to Foresight and Knowledge,
YVES SIMON

Each of these extracts from a treatise on the philosophy of science highlights an important distinction. The first distinction is between literary philosophy and the author's conception that stresses philosophy's kinship with science. The former conception seems even more prevalent today than when the distinction was made almost fifty years ago, for a whole constellation of contemporary philosophers have become indistinguishable from sophisticated literary critics. The second distinction, between science and systematic knowledge and the forms of prediction corresponding to each of them, specifically addresses the connection between foresight and knowledge.

Habermas, Adorno and the Possibility of Immanent Critique,
A. T. NUYEN

Habermas argues that Adorno's critique of reason is a "totalizing critique" and is thus internally contradictory insofar as it makes use of the very reason it criticizes. The paper defends Adorno by identifying his critique as an immanent critique and arguing that such a critique is possible. Indeed, if Kant is right, such a critique is necessary. By contrast, Habermas's conception of critique posits a "transcendental viewpoint." It is argued that such a critique is in danger of turning the authority of reason into an authoritarianism of reason insofar as it takes the "transcendental viewpoint" to be immune from critique.

* Abstracts of articles from leading philosophical journals are published as a regular feature of the *Review*. We wish to thank the editors of the journals represented for their cooperation, and the authors of the articles for their willingness to submit abstracts. Where abstracts have not been submitted, the name and author of the article are listed.

The Concept of the Heart in Strasser's Phenomenology of Feeling,
ANDREW TALLON

In 1927 Heidegger said research in the philosophy of affectivity had hardly advanced since Aristotle. Fifty years later Ricoeur praised Strasser's *Das Gemut* (1956)—a major influence on Ricoeur's own philosophy of feeling—in his foreword to the English translation (1977). *Gemut*, Greek *thumos*, heart, is affective consciousness, characterized by its own intentionality, distinct but not separate from the cognitive and volitional intentionalities of mind or "head." After presenting a historical and bibliographical context for a philosophy of affectivity, the article centers on Strasser's phenomenology and metaphysics of heart. The main thesis of the article is that the heart as affective consciousness is a mix of vital energy (*bios*) and its desire (*epithumia*) surging up from below, and the *logos* and its *eros* from above. These two vertical motions are expressed in a horizontal, developmental, and operational synthesis as affective intentionality toward the other.

Semiotics and the Deconstruction of Presence: A Ricoeurian Alternative, PATRICK L. BOURGEOIS

A critique of Derrida's "semiological reductionism" and the flux of time as discrete on which the reductionism is founded provides a context for a viable alternative which does not succumb to the facile distinction of Saussure, or to Derrida's collapse of signs to the relations of differences within the system, and the reduction of language to the play of difference. An alternative emerging from the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur adequately accounts for duration and continuity in the living present as the basis for language as discourse. Thus, Ricoeur's theory of language as essentially discourse, his distinction between words and signs, and between signs and sentences—all in the overall context of the unities of semiotics and of semantics, with the new unity of language in the semantics of the sentence—reestablish some faith in philosophical analysis as having something worthwhile to say about something, even when it deals with an interpretation of language and of texts.

Thomas Aquinas on What Philosophers Can Know About God,
JOHN F. WIPPEL

Philosophy and Experience, JOHN DEELY

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Vol. 30, No. 2, April 1993

Ethics and Rationality, PHILIP CLAYTON and STEVEN KNAPP

It is neither the case that ethical obligations can be derived directly from the notion of rational agency as such (Kant), nor that rationality

places *no* ethical constraints on human agency (Bernard Williams). Every rational agent needs to have a self-conception, that is, an image, however ill-defined, of the self he wants to be or become. Being a rational agent thus involves finding out whether my actions are appropriate to my self-conception, and I can only find this out if I solicit critical feedback from the relevant communities of experts. The authors show that certain ethical principles are entailed by the feedback process itself. Although practical reflection thus begins with internal reasons, there is no way to limit in advance the degree to which it may lead, in the Peircean "long run," to the discovery of constraints that apply to all rational agents.

On a Pragmatic Argument Against Pragmatism in Ethics,
MARK MERCER

To be pragmatic about ethical matters is to ask only what one should do, given one's beliefs, desires, and values, not what one morally ought to do. A popular argument against the proposal that those of us with doubts about the metaphysical underpinnings of normative ethical theory should become pragmatists is that pragmatism in ethics leads to nihilism and quietism. This paper argues that in fact the refusal to become pragmatic about ethics in the face of such doubts will foster nihilism and quietism.

Philosophy, Literature, and Intellectual Responsibility,
TOM ROCKMORE

This is a paper about intellectual responsibility in the wake of the increasingly visible turn toward relativism. That intellectuals have a special social obligation, a kind of conceptual *noblesse oblige* follows squarely from an absolutistic conception of knowledge supposedly available to intellectuals only. If, as the author believes, the present trend in philosophy and literature represents a widespread revolt against this view of knowledge, then the very idea of intellectual responsibility needs to be rethought. This paper considers the concept of intellectual responsibility in the views of Richard Rorty, Martin Heidegger, and Paul de Man. The thesis it develops is that in this relativistic age, it is necessary to rethink the concept of intellectual responsibility from a relativistic angle of vision.

Temptation, J. P. DAY

Temptation is important both in the supernatural sphere and in the mundane sphere. In the former, the tempter is God's adversary. In the latter, there is the great moral evil of bribery and corruption. There are two meanings of "to tempt." "To tempt₁" means to test. But "to tempt₂" means to try to induce to do something wrong by offering something truly believed to please the one tempted. Tempting₂ is one way of tempting₁, but another way of tempting₁ is provoking. Both tempting₂ and being tempted₂ are immoral. Christians, following St. Paul, hold that there are no irresistible temptations₂ and no intolerable provocations. It is argued

here that this is false, since *A* can compel *B* to do *X* by tempting₂ *B* irresistibly to do *X* or by provoking *B* intolerably to do *X*. It is argued further that when *A* thus compels *B* to do *X* it is immoral to punish or blame *B* for doing *X*. The criminal law, however, disagrees

Pure Negligence, STEVEN SVERDLIK

A number of philosophers have argued that an agent must have acted so as to produce his own ignorance, if he is to be blamed for acting in ignorance. This model for understanding blameworthy negligence is criticized, and a new proposal is made for understanding "pure negligence". The proposal is then defended against certain objections, including one based on a well-known paper of Harry Frankfurt.

The Context Principle, Universals and Primary States of Affairs,
LORENZ B. PUNTEL

This article develops a semantico-ontological approach based on a strong version of the Context Principle: "Only in the context of a sentence do words have any meaning" (Frege). This principle yields an account of sentences according to which one should distinguish between primary and secondary sentences. Primary sentences express primary states of affairs. These entities cannot be explained within the framework of the common view of predication, that is, in terms of subject-predicate duality. Rather, primary states of affairs are to be defined as realized attributes, without presupposing something like a substratum exemplifying them. The article shows the way in which one should consider primary states of affairs the only constituents of the categorial furniture of the world and how one should understand their "obtaining". In this way the concept of truth is elucidated. The article shows finally that the famous problem of universals turns out to be a problem that is easily solved.

Transcendence and Conversation: Two Conceptions of Objectivity,
FRED D'AGOSTINO

AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 71, No. 2, June 1993

Compatibilism and the Free Will Defence, JOHN BISHOP

The author argues that defenders of free will have difficulty explaining why God could not have prevented moral evil while preserving moral freedom, even if they adopt the libertarian view of human freedom. Yet the defense of free will can, he argues, be upgraded so as to justify God's rejecting all strategies available to Him for ensuring that free agents do

right. Morally significant freedom is not itself that supreme good whose value outweighs moral evil, but is just one necessary condition for the emergence of that supreme good—which, the author suggests, may be identified with the highest form of mutual loving in personal relationships. All God's strategies for ensuring that free agents do right introduce a contrivance which is incompatible with such relationships. Finally, the author considers the suggestion that this "upgrading solution" is a theist's Trojan Horse, since genuinely uncontrived personal relationships may be impossible in the shadow of the infinite God.

Why Bother? Defending Derrida and the Significance of Writing,
ROBYN FERREL

The discussion begins from John Searle's curious question in concluding a paper on the logical status of fictional discourse, Searle writes, "The preceding analysis leaves one crucial question unanswered: why bother? That is, why do we attach such importance to pretended speech acts?" The question is about desire. The present paper argues that to understand Searle's question one must approach Derrida's work.

What We Love, STEPHEN LEIGHTON

The paper considers the proper object of love in light of ancient and recent arguments. Commonplace intuitions that persons, whole persons, are love's primary and even possible objects of love run afoul of Plato's arguments about what we love. Rather than the concrete particular, the universal in its most abstract form is deemed the proper object of love. Plato's arguments in both his *Lysis* and *Symposium* are examined, as are more recent attempts to account for the object of love. The paper argues that the persuasiveness of Plato's position and its influence on more recent attempts rests on a particular understanding of characteristics and their subjects, and that an Aristotelian orientation is one way to avoid these conclusions and defend our commonplace intuitions.

Physicalism, Consciousness and the Antipathetic Fallacy,
DAVID PAPINEAU

The article argues that our ways of thinking about experiences fall into two categories: "first-person" ways, which deploy "secondary versions" of the experiences being thought about, and "third-person" ways, which do not. It is argued that the contrast between these two categories is responsible for the widespread intuition that consciousness is nonphysical for it is very natural to conclude from the fact that third-person thoughts about experience do not deploy (versions of) the experiences being referred to, that they leave out the subjective aspect of those experiences. This argument, however, which is dubbed "the antipathetic fallacy," rests on nothing more than a species of use-mention confusion. The article concludes by showing how the identification of this fallacy enables us to stop asking for certain kinds of explanation of consciousness.

Against Pluralism, A. P. HAZEN

Genuine Modal Realism Still the Only Non-Circular Game in Town, RICHARD B. MILLER

Resolving Epistemic Dilemmas,
DOUGLAS ODEGARD

Skeptical Hypotheses and "Omniscient" Interpreters,
STEVEN L. REYNOLDS

INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Vol 33, No 1, March 1993

Envy and Pity, AARON BEN-ZE'EV

At first sight pity and envy appear to be very different, pity seems to be a basically positive state, highly valued in human relations, while envy seems to be a basically negative state we try to avoid. A closer examination of pity and envy reveals that from a psychological viewpoint, the two states are similar in some important aspects. Discussing this similarity is useful for understanding the nature of envy and pity.

The Decline from Authority: Kierkegaard on Intellectual Sin,
DAVID W. AIKEN

This article has a twofold purpose: first, to examine and evaluate Kierkegaard's critique of the intellectual life; second, to show that this critique need not be construed as entailing epistemological subjectivism, particularly in light of Kierkegaard's distinctive conception of religious authority. An exposition of how Anti-Climacus indicts speculative theology forms the point of departure for a subsequent discussion of "intellectual insubordination," a central theme in Kierkegaard's neglected *Book on Adler*. The issue of religious authority having been broached, the article proceeds to explore Kierkegaard's insightful and often prophetic account of those stages through which the self-deceiving intellect passes in its flight from intellectual obedience. There follows a brief deliberation on how much *more* radical Kierkegaard's critique of the intellectual life appears when situated within the nonsubjectivistic epistemology of his later religious discourses.

Averroes, Aristotle, and the Qur'an on Immortality,
OVEY N. MOHAMMED, S.J.

Though the Averroist controversies on the immortality of the soul ended in the sixteenth century, the impression has tended to remain that

the controversies in Christian and Jewish circles rested on their correct interpretation of Averroes concerning the soul. In modern times, however, certain considerations have arisen that make it reasonable to question the correctness of this assumption, and suggest a hypothesis which the article seeks to substantiate that Averroes' treatment of soul and intellect exemplifies the harmony of faith and reason, but his treatment of the soul, including its immortality, is what the Islamic faith proposes, and what philosophical reason investigates. The article shows that the harmony is successful to the extent that it accounts for a system of reward and punishment in the afterlife that is compatible with Aristotle in his *De anima* and with the teaching of the Qur'an.

Escaping Hegel, J. M. FRITZMAN

A rhetorical reading of the Hegelian corpus shows that while Hegel assumes that the end of communication is agreement, consensus is not the goal of communication, but rather its death. Discourse remains alive because dissensus is its end. Recognizing disagreement as the *telos* of communication allows a traversing of the Hegelian dialectic that succeeds in escaping its recuperative moment.

Shinto and Christianity: Dialogue for the Twenty-First Century,
KAKICHI KADOWAKI

Issues in African Philosophy Re-examined, FIDELIS U. OKAFOR

JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 31, No. 2, April 1993

The Moral Status of "the Many" in Aristotle,
JAN EDWARD GARRETT

A scrutiny of Aristotle's remarks on the many (*hoi pollon*) in the *Nicomachean Ethics* yields a surprising result: his moral psychology includes a character type which does not neatly fall into any type commonly discussed in scholarly literature. Statistical senses of *hoi pollon* aside, the term picks out a moral category, initially (and partly) defined by views about the good life. Evidence for Aristotle's judgments concerning *hoi pollon* includes his use of the term *hoi phaulon*, which is frequently interchangeable with *hoi pollon* and not to be hastily equated with other pejoratively charged masculine plurals which he also employs. The article argues that for Aristotle, typical "mass persons" are neither incontinent nor fully vicious or wretched. Evidence from the *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Eudemian Ethics* and hints from *Rhetoric* 2 are analyzed to determine as

accurately as possible the philosopher's vision of this rather unstable character type

Buridan and Skepticism, JACK ZUPKO

John Buridan's reply to certain skeptical arguments associated with Nicholas of Autrecourt has long puzzled historians of philosophy. The problem is that although Buridan seems well aware of the arguments and their consequences for knowledge claims, he fails to engage them directly—for example, by attempting anywhere in his known corpus of writings a serious, sustained defense of the possibility of knowledge. As a result, commentators have judged Buridan's reply to be a largely ineffectual, uncritical, and primitive effort, perhaps attributable to his failure to understand Nicholas's work. But this unfortunate appearance is the product of interpreting Buridan's reply from a classical foundationalist perspective. I argue that Buridan's remarks have more in common with contemporary reliabilism. Seen from this perspective, his reply constitutes a perfectly valid antiskeptical position, which has the additional virtue of explaining why Buridan is not much gripped by skepticism.

The Rational Warrant for Hume's General Rules,
MARIE A. MARTIN

According to Hume, all judgments are formed according to natural propensities, that is, psychophysiological mechanisms. Various commentators have claimed that Hume's theory avoids irrationalism by appealing to general rules which serve to distinguish rationally warranted from unwarranted judgments. According to Hume, however, general rules are formed according to exactly the same natural propensities as the judgments they regulate. How, then, can Hume defend the normative authority of general rules? Hume's answer is that they are based on the fundamental, universal, and unavoidable principles inherent in human reasoning, and it is only by the continual adherence to general rules that we achieve a consistent system of orderly, coherent, and stable judgment. If a method of judgment formation that can provide such a belief system is rationally preferable to one that cannot, then Hume has provided a rational warrant for regulating our judgments by general rules.

Limiting Reason's Empire. The Early Reception of Hegel in France, BRUCE BAUGH

The French interpretations of Hegel of the 1930s and 1940s (Jean Wahl, Henri Lefebvre, Hyppolite, Kojève) were a reaction against an earlier interpretation of Hegel that looked to Hegel's dialectic for a solution to the perceived difficulties of empiricism and rationalism in dealing with sociology and biology. The earlier interpretation, which held sway until the 1920s, sought to restrict Hegel's dialectic to a philosophy of nature in order to avoid the taint of "Pan-Germanism" associated with his philosophy.

of history. Due to the criticisms of the Neo-Kantians, later Hegel interpreters regarded any dialectic in nature as a dangerous mystification which too readily conflated being with thought. These interpreters restricted the scope of the dialectic to history, since here thought and being, freedom and nature, are already united. The anthropological turn in Hegel interpretation in France was an attempt to avoid the perceived "totalitarian" and "pan-logicist" tendencies of Hegel's thought.

*Mathematical Demonstration and Deduction in Descartes' Early
Methodological and Scientific Writings*, DOREN A. RECKER

MIND

Vol. 102, No. 405, January 1993

Rationality in Action, MARTIN HOLLIS and ROBERT SUGDEN

This article reviews "the state of the art" in rational choice and game theory, identifying paradoxes of philosophical interest. The first part traces the history of the core concept of utility from Hobbes to Savage. The second part deploys the game-theoretic notion of strategically rational choice and dissects the problems of coordination, commitment, constrained maximization, promising, and cheap talk. The third part casts doubt on the assumption of the Common Knowledge of Rationality by examining the backward induction paradox. The fourth uncovers the philosophy of mind implicit in utility theory and reflects on alternative Humean, Kantian and Wittgensteinian accounts of motivation. In sum, rational agents are not to be confused with reasonable persons and the difference is crucial for a coherent idea of practical reason.

Dividing without Reducing: Bodily Fission and Personal Identity,
EUGENE MILLS

An antireductionist view of the person is defended against the challenge posed by imagined cases of apparent personal fission. It is argued, first, that an apparent case of personal fission is merely apparent: both of the resulting people must have existed before the fission as well as after (the cohabitation thesis). This coincides with the views of David Lewis and others. But Derek Parfit's criticism of Lewis is also accepted: if the fission survivors shared a single stream of consciousness before fission, then it cannot be that both mental continuity and connectedness ("relation *R*") and identity over time are what matter in personal survival. The proper conclusion to draw, then, is that the fission survivors had distinct streams of consciousness while cohabiting in a single body prior to fission. This thesis is defended against several objections.

Practical Unreason, PHILIP PETTIT and MICHAEL SMITH

Most approaches to practical unreason treat the phenomenon as a practical failure that is not distinctively a failure of reason, say, as a loss of autonomy or control, or as a failure of reason that is not distinctively practical, say, as a form of inattention or illogic. This paper describes an approach under which the failure can be both a practical failure and a failure of reason. The authors begin with a picture of human psychology under which action is always the product of belief and desire but is also answerable to deliberative judgment. They find room for practical unreason, properly understood, in the gap that can open between the properties that an agent finds deliberatively compelling—the properties that, were he rational and informed, he would want himself to desire—and the properties that actually arouse his desires and move him to action. The possibility of this gap opening up is documented by reference to five broadly different varieties of practical unreason.

On Natural Properties in Metaphysics, BARRY TAYLOR

Traditional metaphysics canonizes as “natural” the properties subtended by predicates which allegedly mark mind-independent cleavages in the nature of things. This article examines a modern implementation of the doctrine in David Lewis’s metaphysics of modal realism. After rejecting a subsidiary Moorean argument, the author considers Lewis’s principal ground for natural properties, that is, that no comprehensive systematic philosophy can make do without them. The author then argues that a vegetarian, theory-relative alternative yields entirely respectable answers to the problems Lewis instances, if not always the answers he favors.

Consequences of Consequentialism, DAVID SOSA

This article argues for a consequentialism with a broad conception of consequence and of intrinsic value. Such latitude may convert the consequentialism defended into a theory almost any ethicist could embrace, this may, however, be a virtue, and is hardly a refutation (any more than it is a refutation of compatibilism to say that it denies an opposition between determinism and free will). Much of the paper discusses the capacity of the proposed theory to respond to traditional objections. Two questions are important for any consequentialism: how it responds to agent-relativity, and whether it is subjective or objective. These questions are considered carefully. Other issues considered are the necessary connection between bringing about a consequence and bringing about the bringing about of that consequence, and whether or not consequentialism is too demanding, that is, does consequentialism imply that we are all moral monsters?

On an Argument on Behalf of Classical Negation,
CRISPIN WRIGHT

NOUS

Vol 27, No 1, March 1993

Lawlikeness, MARC LANGE

Lawlikeness is the property the possession of which distinguishes statements of natural law from accidental generalizations. The thesis (which has often been advanced) that only generalizations believed lawlike can be confirmed "inductively" is defended, and induction is distinguished from other ways in which evidence can confirm a generalization's truth. The relation between evidence for a generalization's truth and evidence for its lawlikeness is then considered. It is argued that a generalization that follows logically from lawlike claims need not be lawlike, examples are provided. Finally, an analysis of lawlikeness is proposed to save these phenomena. To hold that "All F 's are G " is lawlike is to hold that if "All F 's are G " were true and one believed " $\quad$ is F ," then " $\quad$ is F " would be among the optimal ways for one to justify believing " $\quad$ is G ." This view is distinguished from accounts of law statements as "inference-licenses."

On an Argument Against Omniscience, KEITH SIMMONS

The author critically examines a recent argument against God's omniscience given by Patrick Grim. The first stage of this argument purports to show that, as a consequence of Cantor's power set theorem, there is no set of all truths. The author argues that if we take truths to be linguistic entities, then the argument fails, and if we take truths to be language-independent entities, then a version of the Liar Paradox arises, to which Grim provides no principled way out. The author also rejects the premise of the second stage of Grim's argument, namely, that what an omniscient being would know would constitute a *set* of all truths. We might take all the truths to fall under an extensionless concept, alternatively, we might suppose that the truths form an open-ended hierarchy. In the absence of arguments to show that God cannot grasp the concept or survey the hierarchy, the possibility of omniscience remains.

 THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

Vol 43, No 171, April 1993

Does Orthodox Quantum Theory Undermine, or Support, Scientific Realism? NICHOLAS MAXWELL

It is usually taken for granted that orthodox quantum theory poses a serious problem for scientific realism, in that the theory is empirically

extraordinarily successful and yet has instrumentalism built into it. This paper stands this view on its head. It is shown that orthodox quantum theory suffers from a number of severe (if not always noticed) defects precisely because of its inbuilt instrumentalism. This defective character of orthodox quantum theory thus undermines instrumentalism, and supports scientific realism. The paper goes on to consider whether there is here the basis for a general argument against instrumentalism.

Time and Change, ROGER TEICHMANN

Accounts which analyze notions having to do with the passage of time in terms of the possibility of change face a trilemma as to what sort of possibility this is: physical, logical, or metaphysical. Each option is unsatisfactory. An alternative account is proposed, which lays down non-reductive *criteria* for duration expressions having to do with true clocks' readings. "Criteria" and "true clocks" are both discussed. Time without change is argued to be possible—assertions of changeless time make good sense. There would be "facts of the matter" about the duration of changeless periods, as there would be about the duration of periods of general clock-confusion. Antirealist qualms about this are answered, our concepts of duration, from which the philosophical conclusions have been drawn, are themselves defended from charges of implicit error or confusion.

Iterative Set Theory, MICHAEL D. POTTER

The article starts with some historical remarks about the emergence and present dominance of the iterative conception of set in mathematical practice. This conception can be given a strikingly simple and elegant axiomatization (due to Dana Scott and John Derrick), which is briefly summarized. Hardly anyone seriously doubts the consistency of this axiomatization. But is it sound for arithmetic? In other words, do we have any reason to believe set-theoretic proofs of number-theoretic results? The incompleteness of all our first-order specifications of number theory makes this a live question, to which, it is argued, only the set-theoretic Platonist can hope to give an affirmative answer. Moreover, reformulating the specifications in second-order terms merely transfers the difficulties from set theory to logic, it does not solve the difficulties.

The Indispensability of Translation in Quine and Davidson,
H. J. GLOCK

Why should an exotic phenomenon like radical translation provide the linchpin for two important philosophical systems? The article first shows that the centrality of this phenomenon is due to the fact that for Quine and Davidson *all* human communication is based on radical translation: we have to translate even our own straightforward utterances. Next, initial doubts are cast on this identification of understanding and translation-interpretation by contrasting the way we use these terms. Quine and Davidson ignore these differences because they believe that

translation into a "background language" is a necessary precondition of linguistic understanding. This thesis of the indispensability of translation leads to a vicious regress, and hence to the nihilistic conclusion that there is no such thing as linguistic understanding or meaning. The article criticizes the indispensability thesis in isolation, and finally argues that its consequence, semantic nihilism, constitutes a reduction of that thesis to absurdity.

PHILOSOPHY

Vol 68, No 264, April 1993

Loving Your Neighbour, Loving Yourself, OSWALD HANFLING

The biblical injunction to love your neighbour as yourself involves three difficulties. (1) Who is my neighbour? Butler's answer and a utilitarian universalist approach are discussed. (2) Can love be commanded? We can choose to behave lovingly, or to behave in ways that may be conducive to love, but love itself is not subject to choice. Kant's interpretation of the injunction is relevant but not satisfactory. (3) What is meant by loving oneself? Selfishness, self-interest, and so forth, are not kinds of love. Aristotle and Hume spoke of self-love but also expressed reservations about this notion. Was the Good Samaritan acting from love?

What's Wrong with Prostitution? IGOR PRIMORATZ

The article discusses, and tries to refute, five lines of argument meant to show that prostitution is wrong. first, the condemnation of prostitution by positive morality, second, paternalist objections to it, third, the claim that some things just are not for sale and that sex is one of them. This last argument is based either on the traditional view of sex as essentially tied to procreation and marriage, or on the conception of sex as bound up with love. Fourth is the radical feminist critique of prostitution as a practice that degrades women because it is utterly impersonal, because the prostitute is reduced to a mere means of male sexual satisfaction, because of the intimate nature of the acts she performs for money, or because what she sells is not merely a service, but rather her body or herself. The fifth is the feminist claim that prostitution is a party to the oppression of women.

Ten Questions for Psychoanalysis, D. Z. PHILLIPS

A psychoanalyst is said to provide the real understanding of a person's behavior. Ten issues are raised about what is understood, in the light of the following. (1) the difference between this and learning from a friend. (2) Deep problems are shared with few, but the psychoanalyst speaks to anyone. (3) Closeness in a relationship is essential in learning from a friend. (4) Does not psychoanalysis impose its dominant concepts on

people? (5) What of different psychoanalytic theories? (6) What about difficulties about the patient's assent? (7) Has psychoanalytic theory become more flexible, for example, with respect to religion? (8) Can we assume that the psychoanalyst is more discerning than the patient? (9) Is refusal to speak of troubles necessarily repression? (10) Has psychoanalysis discouraged the possibility of living with difficulties? Finally, will philosophical objections themselves be psychoanalysed?

Historicism and Architectural Knowledge, ANTHONY O'HEAR

James and Bradley on Understanding, ROBERT STERN

Locke on Punishment and the Death Penalty, BRIAN CALVERT

PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
Vol 53, No 1, March 1993

Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility? STEPHEN YABLO

Whether conceivability argues for possibility is one of philosophy's most disputed questions. Since part of the difficulty is just that "conceivable" can mean so many things, the article begins by developing conditions on what might be called "philosophical" conceivability. Then various standard *objections* to conceivability arguments are considered. It is found that they presuppose conceivability notions at variance with this article's conditions, these objections thus leave arguments from philosophical conceivability quite untouched. So far, though, we have only a negative understanding of philosophical conceivability: we know what it is not, but not what it is. The next step is to describe a conceivability notion that meets the article's conditions and plausibly sustains the inference to possibility. This sets up one final problem: if conceivability intuitions are as reliable as that, what are we to make of modal error and disagreement?

Heidegger and Artificial Intelligence, BETH PRESTON

A Heideggerian critique of artificial intelligence does not show that intelligent machines are impossible. Rather, it shows that the traditional cognitivist approach of explaining the production of intelligent behavior exclusively in terms of internal representation and computation is misguided. Heidegger's analysis of routine activity suggests that the explanation of behavior must advert to nonrepresented environmental structures and processes as well. This approach, which the author calls the interactionist alternative, advocates the explanation of behavior in terms of

the complex interactions of a relatively simple creature with its environment, where that environment is taken to be largely not reflected in the internal representational economy of the organism. I contrast this approach with the connectionist alternative, which proposes instead a reformulation of the notions of representation and computation. The adoption of the interactionist alternative is motivated by considerations of computational complexity, and by discussion of some successful artificial intelligence systems which employ it. Points of contact between the interactionist alternative and existing work in cognitive science are established, and the methodological implications for further research are indicated.

Rights as Normative Constraints on Others,
GEORGE W. RAINBOLT

This article sketches a new theory of what it is to have a right. Because rights are normative constraints on others, one has a right if and only if one has a Hohfeldian claim or a Hohfeldian immunity. Liberty rights and power rights are packages of Hohfeldian relations which are rights because they contain a claim. This claim protects the relation after which the right is named. There are similar packages of relations corresponding to the rest of the Hohfeldian elements, that is, there are duty rights, disability rights, liability rights, and no-claim rights.

Double-Aspect Foundherentism: A New Theory of Empirical Justification, SUSAN HAACK

Neither foundationalism nor coherentism gives a plausible account of the role of experience in empirical justification. Foundherentism is an intermediate theory which, unlike coherentism, allows the relevance of experience but, unlike foundationalism, requires neither privileged beliefs justified exclusively by experience, nor an essentially one-directional notion of evidential support. Like experientialist foundationalism, foundherentism faces the objection that since there can be only causal and not logical relations between a subject's beliefs and his experiences, experience cannot be relevant to justification. It meets that objection by means of a double-aspect, partly causal and partly evaluative, explication, articulating the distinction between the state and the content senses of "belief." Like coherentism, foundherentism faces the objection that mutual support among beliefs is viciously circular. It meets that objection by means of an explication of evidential support modeled on the analogy of a crossword puzzle.

Understanding and Blaming: Problems in the Attribution of Moral Responsibility, LAWRENCE VOGEL

In "Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility," Susan Wolf appeals to the idea of insanity to explain why she would exonerate some wrongdoers who are victims of deprived childhoods or who act in ways strongly

encouraged by their societies slaveowners in the 1850s, Nazis in Germany in the 1930s, and male chauvinists in the 1950s. This article challenges Wolf's application of the insanity defense to her examples, the examples are recast as cases of sane, responsible agents whom it may be difficult to blame on account of the causal history of their moral beliefs or motivations. I contend that Wolf's loose use of the insanity defense presents several dangers. It leads us to misunderstand the difficulties that victims of deprived childhoods may have conforming to moral norms, and it encourages a dismissive attitude towards cultures that are historically distant or alien from our own.

Aristotle on the Non-Supervenience of Local Motion,
MICHAEL J. WHITE

A common contemporary conception of local motion identifies the motion of a body with a dense and Dedekind-continuous linear array of the "instantaneous positions" of the body. This essentially topological conception of motion is referred to in this article as the *positional* or *at-at* conception of motion. Aristotle, however, accepts various nonsupervenience principles which preclude the constitution of what is continuous from parts that are individually indivisible (and hence discontinuous with one another). These principles render the positional conception of motion untenable, from Aristotle's point of view. It is argued that, as an instantiation of his nonsupervenience principles, Aristotle adopts a metrical conception of motion, according to which the motion of a body is conceived as the "measuring" of its path or trajectory of motion by the body's magnitude or some proper part of that magnitude. Such a conception, I suggest, underlies Aristotle's arguments in *Physics* 6.10 that indivisibles cannot move except *per accidens*. The article concludes with a brief consideration of the possible influence on ancient geometry of Aristotle's metrical conception of motion and the attendant strictures against the motion of indivisibles.

Act and Maxim. Value-Discrepancy and Two Theories of Power,
GRAHAM ODDIE

ANNOUNCEMENTS

The Department of Philosophy of the University of Notre Dame invites graduate students in philosophy to submit papers to be read at a conference on "The Moral Philosophy of Alan Donagan," April 14-17, 1994, at the University of Notre Dame. Papers should concern some aspect of the relevance of Donagan's theses about the common morality of mankind to moral issues of peace and war, and the justification of arguments derived from those theses. Papers should not exceed 4,500 words and should be sent by December 15, 1993, to Alasdair MacIntyre, Department of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana 46556. Those whose papers are accepted will be notified by January 31, 1994. It is also hoped that grants can be provided for two or three junior faculty members so that they may attend the conference. Details on these grants will be circulated in November 1993.

The Hume Society announces a call for papers for the Twenty-First Hume Society Conference to be held June 20-24, 1994, at the Università degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza." Papers may be on any aspect of Hume's writings, although the conference directors encourage submissions concerning any of four themes: Hume and the ancient world, Hume and common sense philosophy, Hume and the history and anatomy of the passions, and the reception and study of Hume in Italy. Papers should have a reading length of no more than thirty minutes, and should be prepared for blind reviewing, the author's name appearing only on a cover sheet. Papers may be in English or Italian, but an abstract in English is required for all papers, which must be submitted in triplicate and postmarked by October 15. Papers in English should be sent to Saul Traiger, Executive Secretary of the Hume Society, Department of Philosophy, Occidental College, Los Angeles, California 90041. Papers in Italian should be sent to Eugenio Lecaldano, Dipartimento di Studi Filosofici ed Epistemologici, Università degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza," Via Nomentana 118, 00161 Roma, Italia.

The Hegel Society of America announces a call for papers for its thirteenth biennial meeting to be held at The Catholic University of America, September 30-October 2, 1994. The conference topic is Hegel's philosophy of nature and natural sciences, its relation to the thought of his contemporaries (such as Goethe, Kant, or Schelling), and its value and importance for subsequent science and philosophy. Papers should not exceed six thousand words and should be prepared for blind reviewing. Four copies of the paper, each accompanied by an abstract of one hundred words and a short list of the principal texts used, should be submitted to Stephen G. Houlgate, Department of Philosophy, DePaul University, 2323 North Seminary Avenue, Chicago, Illinois 60614.

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The Collaborative Projects Program of the National Endowment for the Humanities welcomes applications for projects of broad scholarly and public significance in the humanities that entail the collaboration of two or more scholars for periods of one to three years. All topics in the humanities are eligible. Collaborative projects are expected to lead to major scholarly publications. Awards usually range from \$10,000 to \$150,000. The deadline for application is October 15, 1993, for projects beginning no earlier than July 1994. Application material and information may be obtained from Collaborative Projects/Interpretive Research, Division of Research Programs, Room 318, 1100 Pennsylvania Avenue, N W, Washington, D C 20506, telephone 202-606-8210.

The tenth annual issue of *New Vico Studies* (1992) has recently been published. The issue includes the following articles: "Grassi, Vico, and the Defense of the Humanist Tradition," by Domenico Pietropaolo, "Vico's Presence in the Intellectual World of Eastern Europe and Russia," by Alexander Gungov, "Imagination and Religious Pluralism: Maimonides, ibn Verga, and Vico," by Josef Faur, "The Sapirean Paradigm in Linguistics: A Vichian Commentary," by Marcel Danesi, "Eco and Vico," by John D. Schaeffer; "Bruner and Vico: Psychology and Pedagogy," by James Engell, "Should Spengler Be Reconsidered?" by Patrick H. Hutton. The issue also includes book reviews and a Vico bibliography. Subscriptions may be ordered from Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey 07716, telephone 908-872-1441, fax 908-872-0717.

The American Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies has extended the submission deadline for the Louis Gottschalk Prize to November 1, 1993. Scholarly books in any modern language with a copyright date between January 1, 1992, and November 1, 1993, including commentaries, critical studies, biographies, and critical editions, are eligible. Books which are primary translations are not eligible. The publisher must submit five copies of the book, which must be received at the Society's office no later than November 15. For further information contact the American Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies, Utah State University, Logan, Utah 84322-3730, telephone 801-750-4065.

Work has begun on the *Encyclopedia of Chinese Philosophy*, to be edited by Antonio S. Cua and published by Garland Publishing, Inc. Scheduled to appear in June 1996, the book will contain entries on all aspects of the subject, and is intended to provide an overview of current scholarship in this quickly changing field. Inquiries may be addressed to Antonio S. Cua, School of Philosophy, The Catholic University of America, Washington, D C 20064.

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